Theory and Decision最新文献_第3页

Contests with multiplicative sabotage effect 具有乘法破坏效应的竞赛

IF 0.8 4区经济学

Theory and Decision Pub Date : 2024-04-27 DOI: 10.1007/s11238-024-09983-x

Haoming Liu, Jingfeng Lu, Yohanes E. Riyanto, Zhe Wang

引用次数: 0

Combining Savage and Laplace: a new approach to ambiguity 萨维奇与拉普拉斯的结合：处理模糊性的新方法

IF 0.8 4区经济学

Theory and Decision Pub Date : 2024-04-26 DOI: 10.1007/s11238-024-09980-0

Ralf Diedrich

引用次数: 0

Au introspection and symmetry under non-trivial unawareness 非三维不可知性下的奥内省和对称性

IF 0.8 4区经济学

Theory and Decision Pub Date : 2024-03-13 DOI: 10.1007/s11238-024-09979-7

Yoshihiko Tada

{"title":"Au introspection and symmetry under non-trivial unawareness","authors":"Yoshihiko Tada","doi":"10.1007/s11238-024-09979-7","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11238-024-09979-7","url":null,"abstract":"This note discusses the relationship between AU Introspection (i.e., an agent is unaware of some event, then she is unaware of that she is unaware of the event) and Symmetry (i.e., an agent is unaware of some event if and only if she is unaware of the complement set) for non-trivial unawareness (i.e., there is an event an agent is unaware of). without Negative Introspection using a set-theoretical approach in standard state-space models. Previous studies have explored the equivalence between Negative Introspection and AU Introspection, or the equivalence between Negative Introspection and Symmetry, by assuming Necessitation of the knowledge operator. As a corollary, AU Introspection is equivalent to Symmetry. However, no studies have shown the relationship between AU Introspection and Symmetry without Necessitation. Therefore, we explore this issue. Our main result shows that if the knowledge operator satisfies Monotonicity, Truth, and Positive introspection, then Modica and Rustichini’s definition of unawareness leads to the equivalence of AU Introspection and Symmetry. In other words, we show that both AU Introspection and Symmetry hold without clashing with non-trivial unawareness.","PeriodicalId":47535,"journal":{"name":"Theory and Decision","volume":"84 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2024-03-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140147795","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Incomplete contracts with disparity, uncertainty, information and incentives 存在差异、不确定性、信息和激励措施的不完整合同

IF 0.8 4区经济学

Theory and Decision Pub Date : 2024-03-01 DOI: 10.1007/s11238-024-09976-w

Susheng Wang

引用次数: 0

Coordinated and uncoordinated punishment in a team investment game 团队投资游戏中的协调和非协调惩罚

IF 0.8 4区经济学

Theory and Decision Pub Date : 2024-02-24 DOI: 10.1007/s11238-024-09977-9

Vicente Calabuig, Natalia Jiménez-Jiménez, Gonzalo Olcina, Ismael Rodriguez-Lara

引用次数: 0

The role of noise variance on effort in group contests 噪声方差对小组竞赛努力程度的影响

IF 0.8 4区经济学

Theory and Decision Pub Date : 2024-02-17 DOI: 10.1007/s11238-023-09974-4

Merve İntişah, Mürüvvet Büyükboyacı

{"title":"The role of noise variance on effort in group contests","authors":"Merve İntişah, Mürüvvet Büyükboyacı","doi":"10.1007/s11238-023-09974-4","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11238-023-09974-4","url":null,"abstract":"We theoretically and experimentally examine the effect of noise variance and prize value on effort in individual contests and in three types of group contests: perfect-substitutes, best-shot, and weakest-link. For all contest types, we use the rank-order contest model, where effort and random noise determine performance. The theoretical model for individual contests predicts that effort will increase with prize value and decrease with noise variance. As expected, all subjects in our experiment decrease their efforts as noise variance rises, regardless of the value of the prize. Prize value, however, has no effect on effort. In group contests, each group consists of two players with different prize values. The player for whom the prize value is higher is referred to as a strong player; the other is referred to as a weak player. The theoretical model also predicts that exerted positive efforts will decrease with noise variance in all group contests. Our experimental results show that in perfect-substitutes and weakest-link contests, noise variance has no effect on either strong or weak subjects’ efforts. In best-shot contests, however, both strong and weak subjects decrease their efforts when noise variance increases. Finally, we compare the efforts of subjects in individual and group contests. We find differences only in perfect-substitutes and best-shot contests when the noise variance is high. Efforts are higher in perfect-substitutes contests and lower in best-shot contests compared to individual contests.","PeriodicalId":47535,"journal":{"name":"Theory and Decision","volume":"133 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2024-02-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139903750","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Constrained dictatorial rules are subject to variable-population paradoxes 受约束的独裁规则受制于可变人口悖论

IF 0.8 4区经济学

Theory and Decision Pub Date : 2024-02-14 DOI: 10.1007/s11238-023-09975-3

William Thomson

{"title":"Constrained dictatorial rules are subject to variable-population paradoxes","authors":"William Thomson","doi":"10.1007/s11238-023-09975-3","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11238-023-09975-3","url":null,"abstract":"In the context of classical exchange economies, we study four ways in which agents can strategically take advantage of allocation rules by affecting who participates and on what terms (Thomson in Soc Choice Welf 42:289–311, 2014). (1) An agent transfers their endowment to someone else and withdraws. The two of them may end up controlling resources that allow them to simultaneously reach higher welfare levels than they otherwise would. (2) An agent invites someone in and let their guest use some of their (the host’s) endowment. The guest transfers back to them what they are assigned over their endowment. The host may benefit. (3) An agent withdraws with their endowment. As in (1), they and someone who stays may end up controlling resources that allow the two of them to simultaneously reach higher welfare levels than they otherwise would. (4) An agent pre-delivers to someone else the net trade that the rule would assign to that agent had the agent participated. The second agent withdraws. The first agent participates with a modified endowment. The first agent may benefit. We ask whether “the constrained priority rules”, defined by maximizing the welfare of a particular agent subject to each of the others finding their assignment at least as desirable as their endowment satisfy these various requirements. The answers are all negative. Because these types of rules are often better behaved than rules that attempt some fairness in distributing gains from trade, these results strengthen the negative conclusions reached in Thomson (2014), and they may provide the key to identifying circumstances in which rules exist that satisfy the axioms, or to proving general impossibility results.","PeriodicalId":47535,"journal":{"name":"Theory and Decision","volume":"16 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2024-02-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139770836","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Is social capital bridging or bonding? Evidence from a field experiment with association members 社会资本是桥梁还是纽带？以协会成员为对象的实地实验证据

IF 0.8 4区经济学

Theory and Decision Pub Date : 2024-02-10 DOI: 10.1007/s11238-023-09971-7

Giacomo Degli Antoni, Gianluca Grimalda

{"title":"Is social capital bridging or bonding? Evidence from a field experiment with association members","authors":"Giacomo Degli Antoni, Gianluca Grimalda","doi":"10.1007/s11238-023-09971-7","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11238-023-09971-7","url":null,"abstract":"Social capital theorists posit that association members are key agents for propagating norms of trust and trustworthiness from within associations toward the society as a whole. Nevertheless, others claim that social capital is primarily bonding, that is, it helps ingroup members better achieve internal goals, but little benefits or even costs carry over to the rest of society. We deploy experimental methods to probe into whether social capital in associations has a predominantly bridging or bonding nature. We compare members’ behavior in anonymous Trust Games with behavior by a demographically comparable sample of non-members. We find that (a) Members are significantly more trusting and trustworthy than the general population both when interacting with fellow members and with people from the general population; (b) Members trust and repay trust from people from the general public nearly at the same level as they do with fellow members. Therefore, most of social capital existing within associations “bridges” over to the rest of society. We quantify 83% of additional trust, and 71% of additional trustworthiness existing in associations vis-à-vis society at large to be bridging and the remainder to be bonding. (c) Association members are no more optimistic or less accurate in predicting others’ behavior than people from the general public. (d) Increased involvement in association activities is not correlated with increased pro-sociality.","PeriodicalId":47535,"journal":{"name":"Theory and Decision","volume":"15 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2024-02-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139770674","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

False-name-proof and strategy-proof voting rules under separable preferences 可分离偏好下的防假名和防策略投票规则

IF 0.8 4区经济学

Theory and Decision Pub Date : 2024-01-25 DOI: 10.1007/s11238-023-09973-5

引用次数: 0

Decomposition of interaction indices: alternative interpretations of cardinal–probabilistic interaction indices 交互作用指数的分解：心智-概率交互作用指数的替代解释

IF 0.8 4区经济学

Theory and Decision Pub Date : 2024-01-23 DOI: 10.1007/s11238-023-09970-8

Sébastien Courtin, Rodrigue Tido Takeng , Frédéric Chantreuil

引用次数: 0