Theory and Decision最新文献

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Aggregating individual credences into collective binary beliefs: an impossibility result 将个人信念汇总为集体二元信念:一个不可能的结果
IF 0.8 4区 经济学
Theory and Decision Pub Date : 2024-01-13 DOI: 10.1007/s11238-023-09968-2
Minkyung Wang
{"title":"Aggregating individual credences into collective binary beliefs: an impossibility result","authors":"Minkyung Wang","doi":"10.1007/s11238-023-09968-2","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11238-023-09968-2","url":null,"abstract":"<p>This paper addresses how multiple individual credences on logically related issues should be aggregated into collective binary beliefs. We call this binarizing belief aggregation. It is vulnerable to dilemmas such as the discursive dilemma or the lottery paradox: proposition-wise independent aggregation can generate inconsistent or not deductively closed collective judgments. Addressing this challenge using the familiar axiomatic approach, we introduce general conditions on a binarizing belief aggregation rule, including rationality conditions on individual inputs and collective outputs, and determine which rules (if any) satisfy different combinations of these conditions. Furthermore, we analyze similarities and differences between our proofs and other related proofs in the literature and conclude that the problem of binarizing belief aggregation is a free-standing aggregation problem not reducible to judgment aggregation or probabilistic opinion pooling.</p>","PeriodicalId":47535,"journal":{"name":"Theory and Decision","volume":"18 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2024-01-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139461710","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Suspicious minds and views of fairness 多疑的心态和公平观
IF 0.8 4区 经济学
Theory and Decision Pub Date : 2024-01-06 DOI: 10.1007/s11238-023-09965-5
Øivind Schøyen
{"title":"Suspicious minds and views of fairness","authors":"Øivind Schøyen","doi":"10.1007/s11238-023-09965-5","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11238-023-09965-5","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Do people with different views of what is fair attribute different intentions to actions? In a novel experimental design, participants were significantly more likely to attribute a no-redistribution vote to selfishness if they considered redistribution as being fair. I define this—attributing actions that do not adhere to one’s own fairness view to selfishness—as suspicious attribution. I develop a theory of intention attribution to show how suspicious attribution arises from two other findings from the experiment: the participants underestimate the number of people with fairness views differing from their own and overestimate the selfishness of participants with other fairness views. I discuss how the findings can help explain political polarization.</p>","PeriodicalId":47535,"journal":{"name":"Theory and Decision","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2024-01-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139372905","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Are risk attitude, impatience, and impulsivity related to the individual discount rate? Evidence from energy-efficient durable goods 风险态度、不耐烦和冲动与个人贴现率有关吗?节能耐用品提供的证据
IF 0.8 4区 经济学
Theory and Decision Pub Date : 2024-01-02 DOI: 10.1007/s11238-023-09961-9
Sébastien Foudi
{"title":"Are risk attitude, impatience, and impulsivity related to the individual discount rate? Evidence from energy-efficient durable goods","authors":"Sébastien Foudi","doi":"10.1007/s11238-023-09961-9","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11238-023-09961-9","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Discounting is a manifestation of behavioral impulsivity, which is closely related to self-regulation processes. The decision-making process for intertemporal choices is governed by the inhibition of impulses, which can influence both risk and time-related attitudes. This paper utilizes self-reported measures of risk, impatience, and impulsivity attitudes to examine their impact on the implicit discount rate used when weighing the current purchase cost against future energy savings of appliances. It analyzes and tests the interplay between these attitudes using specific functional forms and causal models. The results highlight the role of risk, impatience and impulsivity on the discount rate and the biases that arise from omitting impulsive attitudes. In addition, other factors such as environmental and social preferences, attitudes, and financial constraints contribute to the implicit discount rate.</p>","PeriodicalId":47535,"journal":{"name":"Theory and Decision","volume":"15 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2024-01-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139079766","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
A test of loyalty 忠诚的考验
IF 0.8 4区 经济学
Theory and Decision Pub Date : 2023-12-31 DOI: 10.1007/s11238-023-09966-4
Renaud Foucart, Jonathan H. W. Tan
{"title":"A test of loyalty","authors":"Renaud Foucart, Jonathan H. W. Tan","doi":"10.1007/s11238-023-09966-4","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11238-023-09966-4","url":null,"abstract":"<p>We propose and test a model of loyalty in games. Players can mutually maintain loyalty by working towards a common goal that is pareto-superior to any Nash equilibrium without it. Loyalty imposes a psychological cost on defecting in an ongoing cooperation, which is thus sustained. We distinguish loyalty from reciprocity and explain how it complements guilt aversion with two dynamic games from a field experiment conducted in a Pakistani factory. The evidence supports the validity of loyalty, which has a stronger effect within than between groups.</p>","PeriodicalId":47535,"journal":{"name":"Theory and Decision","volume":"17 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2023-12-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139065898","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Decision-making under risk: when is utility-maximization equivalent to risk-minimization? 风险下的决策:何时效用最大化等同于风险最小化?
IF 0.8 4区 经济学
Theory and Decision Pub Date : 2023-12-28 DOI: 10.1007/s11238-023-09969-1
Francesco Ruscitti, Ram Sewak Dubey, Giorgio Laguzzi
{"title":"Decision-making under risk: when is utility-maximization equivalent to risk-minimization?","authors":"Francesco Ruscitti, Ram Sewak Dubey, Giorgio Laguzzi","doi":"10.1007/s11238-023-09969-1","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11238-023-09969-1","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Motivated by the analysis of a general optimal portfolio selection problem, which encompasses as special cases an optimal consumption and an optimal debt-arrangement problem, we are concerned with the questions of how a personality trait like risk-perception can be formalized and whether the two objectives of utility-maximization and risk-minimization can be both achieved simultaneously. We address these questions by developing an axiomatic foundation of preferences for which utility-maximization is equivalent to minimizing a utility-based shortfall risk measure. Our axiomatization hinges on a novel axiom in decision theory, namely the risk-perception axiom.</p>","PeriodicalId":47535,"journal":{"name":"Theory and Decision","volume":"14 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2023-12-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139065843","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
A two-step guessing game 两步猜谜游戏
IF 0.8 4区 经济学
Theory and Decision Pub Date : 2023-12-28 DOI: 10.1007/s11238-023-09967-3
King King Li, Kang Rong
{"title":"A two-step guessing game","authors":"King King Li, Kang Rong","doi":"10.1007/s11238-023-09967-3","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11238-023-09967-3","url":null,"abstract":"<p>We propose a two-step guessing game to measure the depth of thinking. We apply this method to the P beauty contest game. Using our method, we find that 81% of subjects do not make choice following best response reasoning while the classical method would suggest only 12%. The result suggests that the classical method has the fundamental problem that it cannot distinguish if a submitted number is due to best response reasoning or not. It also suggests that traditional level <i>k</i> analysis falsely attributes some sophistication to random players, and that the degree of false attribution is large. Our procedure provides an alternative way to identify whether the individual has best response reasoning which is essential for any positive level of depth of thinking and differentiates between the depth of thinking and random choice, and hence provides a very different conclusion, which is suggestive of limitations of the classical method.</p>","PeriodicalId":47535,"journal":{"name":"Theory and Decision","volume":"258 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2023-12-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139065851","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Quasi-separable preferences 准分离偏好
IF 0.8 4区 经济学
Theory and Decision Pub Date : 2023-12-26 DOI: 10.1007/s11238-023-09962-8
Wei-zhi Qin, Hendrik Rommeswinkel
{"title":"Quasi-separable preferences","authors":"Wei-zhi Qin, Hendrik Rommeswinkel","doi":"10.1007/s11238-023-09962-8","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11238-023-09962-8","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Utility functions often lack additive separability, presenting an obstacle for decision theoretic axiomatizations. We address this challenge by providing a representation theorem for utility functions of quasi-separable preferences of the form <span>(u(x,y,z)=f(x,z) + g(y,z))</span> on subsets of topological product spaces. These functions are additively separable only when holding <i>z</i> fixed but are cardinally comparable for different values of <i>z</i>. We then generalize the result to spaces with more than three dimensions and provide applications to belief elicitation, inequity aversion, intertemporal choice, and rank-dependent utility.</p>","PeriodicalId":47535,"journal":{"name":"Theory and Decision","volume":"7 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2023-12-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139052995","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Expected utility, independence, and continuity 预期效用、独立性和连续性
IF 0.8 4区 经济学
Theory and Decision Pub Date : 2023-12-26 DOI: 10.1007/s11238-023-09964-6
Kemal Ozbek
{"title":"Expected utility, independence, and continuity","authors":"Kemal Ozbek","doi":"10.1007/s11238-023-09964-6","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11238-023-09964-6","url":null,"abstract":"<p>In this paper, we provide two novel expected utility theorems by suitably adjusting the independence and continuity axioms. Our first theorem characterizes expected utility preferences using weak versions of the independence axiom (with varying mixture weights) and a new weak continuity axiom. Our second theorem characterizes these preferences using weaker versions of the independence axiom (with mixture weights fixed at 1/2) and a strong topological continuity axiom. We provide useful examples to illustrate the tightness of these characterizations.</p>","PeriodicalId":47535,"journal":{"name":"Theory and Decision","volume":"16 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2023-12-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139052912","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Belief inducibility and informativeness 信念的诱导性和信息性
IF 0.8 4区 经济学
Theory and Decision Pub Date : 2023-12-24 DOI: 10.1007/s11238-023-09963-7
P. Jean-Jacques Herings, Dominik Karos, Toygar T. Kerman
{"title":"Belief inducibility and informativeness","authors":"P. Jean-Jacques Herings, Dominik Karos, Toygar T. Kerman","doi":"10.1007/s11238-023-09963-7","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11238-023-09963-7","url":null,"abstract":"<p>We consider a group of receivers who share a common prior on a finite state space and who observe private correlated messages that are contingent on the true state of the world. Our focus lies on the beliefs of receivers induced via the signal chosen by the sender and we provide a comprehensive analysis of the inducible distributions of posterior beliefs. Classifying signals as minimal, individually minimal, and language-independent, we show that any inducible distribution can be induced by a language-independent signal. We investigate the role of the different classes of signals for the amount of higher order information that is revealed to receivers. The least informative signals that induce a fixed distribution over posterior belief profiles lie in the relative interior of the set of all language-independent signals inducing that distribution.</p>","PeriodicalId":47535,"journal":{"name":"Theory and Decision","volume":"193 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2023-12-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139036880","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Individual selection criteria for optimal team composition 优化团队组成的个人选择标准
IF 0.8 4区 经济学
Theory and Decision Pub Date : 2023-12-23 DOI: 10.1007/s11238-023-09960-w
Lu Hong, Scott E. Page
{"title":"Individual selection criteria for optimal team composition","authors":"Lu Hong, Scott E. Page","doi":"10.1007/s11238-023-09960-w","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11238-023-09960-w","url":null,"abstract":"<p>In this paper, we derive necessary and sufficient conditions on team based tasks in order for a <i>selection criterion</i> applied to individuals to produce optimal teams. We assume only that individuals have types and that a team’s performance depends on its size and the type composition of its members. We first derive <i>the selection principle</i> which states that if a selection criterion exists, it must rank types by <i>homogeneous team performance</i>, the performance of a team consisting only of that type. We then prove that a selection criterion exists if and only if replacing the team’s lowest ranked type, as measured by homogeneous team performance, with a higher ranked type increases team performance. Finally, we show that the replace the lowest ranked property rules out most common types of team complementarities, including benefits to diverse types and types that fill structural holes.</p>","PeriodicalId":47535,"journal":{"name":"Theory and Decision","volume":"62 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2023-12-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139029859","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
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