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Skepticism without scrutiny: Verification and information manipulation 不加审查的怀疑：核实和信息操纵
IF 2 4区 经济学
Economics Letters Pub Date : 2026-10-01 Epub Date: 2026-09-22 DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2026.113246
Suli Zheng, Bo Wang
{"title":"Skepticism without scrutiny: Verification and information manipulation","authors":"Suli Zheng,&nbsp;Bo Wang","doi":"10.1016/j.econlet.2026.113246","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.econlet.2026.113246","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>An investment boom can coexist with investor skepticism about the claims supporting individual projects. We study investors who can identify an interested insider behind a public report before exercising a risky investment option. Verification improves the investor’s decision and deters manipulation by reducing the capital attracted by a false favorable report. Verification informs privately but disciplines publicly. Investors capture the first benefit but ignore the second, so the market verifies too little. Manipulation raises the private value of verification, making verification choices strategic substitutes and equilibrium unique. With intermediate common costs, scrutiny vanishes and manipulated reports direct capital to bad projects under Bayesian beliefs. Rational skepticism can sustain collective misinvestment when credibility is a public good.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":11468,"journal":{"name":"Economics Letters","volume":"269 ","pages":"Article 113246"},"PeriodicalIF":2.0,"publicationDate":"2026-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"149144733","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
The timing fingerprint: A rank-based test of market timing 时机指纹：基于等级的市场时机检验
IF 2 4区 经济学
Economics Letters Pub Date : 2026-10-01 Epub Date: 2026-10-03 DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2026.113280
André A.P. Santos, Lorenzo Pascual Caneiro
{"title":"The timing fingerprint: A rank-based test of market timing","authors":"André A.P. Santos,&nbsp;Lorenzo Pascual Caneiro","doi":"10.1016/j.econlet.2026.113280","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.econlet.2026.113280","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Traditional market-timing tests such as the Treynor–Mazuy and Henriksson–Merton tests are known to over-detect timing ability when fat tails and state-dependent volatility are present, and are based on rigid parametric assumptions about the timing payoff. We propose a test of market timing built on the concept of <em>timing fingerprint</em>, a rank-based test that presumes no functional form for the timing payoff and is calibrated to nominal size by a null-imposing wild bootstrap. We show that, while the same bootstrap restores the size of the classical tests, the fingerprint method identifies the direction and location of timing-like behavior across the entire benchmark distribution and is substantially more powerful against timing payoffs the classical tests do not span. We assess the finite-sample performance of the fingerprint test using Monte Carlo simulations and employ it to evaluate a large panel of U.S. equity mutual funds.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":11468,"journal":{"name":"Economics Letters","volume":"269 ","pages":"Article 113280"},"PeriodicalIF":2.0,"publicationDate":"2026-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"149144737","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Whose behavior matters? Gender and responses to social information on honesty and generosity 谁的行为重要？性别和对诚实和慷慨社会信息的反应
IF 2 4区 经济学
Economics Letters Pub Date : 2026-10-01 Epub Date: 2026-10-15 DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2026.113301
Haimanti Bhattacharya, Subhasish Dugar
{"title":"Whose behavior matters? Gender and responses to social information on honesty and generosity","authors":"Haimanti Bhattacharya,&nbsp;Subhasish Dugar","doi":"10.1016/j.econlet.2026.113301","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.econlet.2026.113301","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We experimentally examine how social information about a reference group’s honesty and generosity affects prosocial behavior, by recipients’ and reference groups’ genders. We vary reference-group gender (men, women, or unspecified) and majority behavior (80% or 20% prosocial). Women exhibit opportunistic conformity: non-prosocial majorities reduce their prosociality, whereas prosocial majorities have negligible effects, regardless of reference-group gender. Men increase prosociality for female reference groups irrespective of majority behavior, suggesting a desire to outcompete women. For male or unspecified groups, men adjust insignificantly toward the majority, though prosocial and non-prosocial treatments differ significantly. Thus, whose behavior matters depends on who receives it.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":11468,"journal":{"name":"Economics Letters","volume":"269 ","pages":"Article 113301"},"PeriodicalIF":2.0,"publicationDate":"2026-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"149202605","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
The economics of free bets 免费赌博的经济学
IF 2 4区 经济学
Economics Letters Pub Date : 2026-10-01 Epub Date: 2026-10-09 DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2026.113289
Karl Whelan
{"title":"The economics of free bets","authors":"Karl Whelan","doi":"10.1016/j.econlet.2026.113289","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.econlet.2026.113289","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Sportsbooks offer promotional “free bets” that return profits if the bets win, but not the stake provided. These bets can be hedged to produce guaranteed profits. This paper shows how to value the guaranteed profit from these stake-not-returned free bets under a simple constant-margin pricing rule in which sportsbooks, on average, keep a fraction <span><math><mi>m</mi></math></span> of the money staked. The guaranteed hedged value is a nonlinear function of the free bet’s probability of winning, reaching a maximum when this probability is <span><math><msqrt><mrow><mi>m</mi><mrow><mo>(</mo><mn>1</mn><mo>−</mo><mi>m</mi><mo>)</mo></mrow></mrow></msqrt></math></span>. Empirical evidence from odds on tennis bets confirms this prediction.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":11468,"journal":{"name":"Economics Letters","volume":"269 ","pages":"Article 113289"},"PeriodicalIF":2.0,"publicationDate":"2026-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"149202570","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
On the number of high-frequency surprise factors in U.S. monetary policy 关于美国货币政策高频意外因素的数量
IF 2 4区 经济学
Economics Letters Pub Date : 2026-10-01 Epub Date: 2026-10-09 DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2026.113296
Roland von Campe
{"title":"On the number of high-frequency surprise factors in U.S. monetary policy","authors":"Roland von Campe","doi":"10.1016/j.econlet.2026.113296","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.econlet.2026.113296","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>I revisit the factor decomposition methodology developed by Gürkaynak et al. (2005) and Swanson (2021) using the new U.S. Monetary Policy Event-Study Database (USMPD) provided by Acosta et al. (2025). I present evidence supporting a four-factor rather than three-factor decomposition and propose a procedure that structurally interprets the additional factor as an information factor. In particular, I demonstrate that the monetary policy surprises employed by Swanson (2021) yield three factors in pre-ZLB samples, with a fourth factor emerging following the Fed’s adoption of large-scale asset purchases. The suggested procedure has the merit that it preserves the well-established three-factor decomposition of Swanson (2021) while accommodating an additional information factor. The new evidence underlines that central bank announcements constitute high-dimensional communication events.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":11468,"journal":{"name":"Economics Letters","volume":"269 ","pages":"Article 113296"},"PeriodicalIF":2.0,"publicationDate":"2026-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"149254152","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
A Cauchy MESS 柯西的混乱
IF 2 4区 经济学
Economics Letters Pub Date : 2026-10-01 Epub Date: 2026-10-29 DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2026.113323
R. Kelley Pace
{"title":"A Cauchy MESS","authors":"R. Kelley Pace","doi":"10.1016/j.econlet.2026.113323","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.econlet.2026.113323","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>The matrix exponential spatial specification (MESS) recovers its dependence parameter when disturbances exhibit large impulses, as occur under Cauchy and log-Cauchy distributions. The zero diagonal of the weight matrix <span><math><mi>W</mi></math></span> eliminates the leading contamination term from the gradient, leaving an <span><math><mrow><mi>O</mi><mrow><mo>(</mo><mn>1</mn><mo>/</mo><mi>n</mi><mo>)</mo></mrow></mrow></math></span> bias under standard constructions. Monte Carlo experiments without regression signal show the standard deviation under Cauchy errors is 24% smaller than under <span><math><mrow><mi>t</mi><mrow><mo>(</mo><mn>200</mn><mo>)</mo></mrow></mrow></math></span> errors, with robustness across weight matrices and gradual degradation under nuisance regressors and spatial fixed effects.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":11468,"journal":{"name":"Economics Letters","volume":"269 ","pages":"Article 113323"},"PeriodicalIF":2.0,"publicationDate":"2026-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"149348792","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Threshold HAR model for interval-valued time series 区间值时间序列的阈值HAR模型
IF 2 4区 经济学
Economics Letters Pub Date : 2026-10-01 Epub Date: 2026-09-26 DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2026.113262
Changryong Baek, Chihoon Lee, Seungwon Lee
{"title":"Threshold HAR model for interval-valued time series","authors":"Changryong Baek,&nbsp;Chihoon Lee,&nbsp;Seungwon Lee","doi":"10.1016/j.econlet.2026.113262","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.econlet.2026.113262","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We propose a threshold heterogeneous autoregressive model for interval-valued time series (THARI). Building on the heterogeneous autoregressive (HAR) framework, THARI combines threshold interval autoregression with daily, weekly, and monthly aggregation, allowing multi-horizon interval dynamics to vary across regimes. Estimation uses minimum-<span><math><msub><mrow><mi>D</mi></mrow><mrow><mi>K</mi></mrow></msub></math></span> distance with a feasible positive-definite kernel update. For fixed and feasible kernels, the threshold estimator is <span><math><mi>T</mi></math></span>-consistent and the regression estimator is <span><math><msqrt><mrow><mi>T</mi></mrow></msqrt></math></span>-consistent. For Ethereum intervals constructed from the 50th and 95th quantiles of 5-minute intraday squared returns, THARI improves <span><math><msubsup><mrow><mi>D</mi></mrow><mrow><mi>K</mi></mrow><mrow><mn>2</mn></mrow></msubsup></math></span> forecasts over TARI(3), while comparison with a non-threshold interval HAR benchmark identifies horizon-dependent threshold gains.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":11468,"journal":{"name":"Economics Letters","volume":"269 ","pages":"Article 113262"},"PeriodicalIF":2.0,"publicationDate":"2026-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"149144743","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Signaling with burned money and transparent motives 用烧钱和明显动机发出信号
IF 2 4区 经济学
Economics Letters Pub Date : 2026-10-01 Epub Date: 2026-10-30 DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2026.113329
Arseniy Samsonov
{"title":"Signaling with burned money and transparent motives","authors":"Arseniy Samsonov","doi":"10.1016/j.econlet.2026.113329","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.econlet.2026.113329","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>This paper studies how an informed Sender communicates with an uninformed Receiver by visibly burning money. The Sender prefers higher Receiver actions, while the Receiver wants to match the true state. I characterize the full set of equilibrium payoff pairs and show that its Pareto frontier is generated by <em>lower-censorship equilibria</em>. In these equilibria, the Sender burns no money when the state is low and uses costly signals to disclose higher states.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":11468,"journal":{"name":"Economics Letters","volume":"269 ","pages":"Article 113329"},"PeriodicalIF":2.0,"publicationDate":"2026-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"149362956","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Optimality of full effort in dynamic monitoring 全力动态监测的最优性
IF 2 4区 经济学
Economics Letters Pub Date : 2026-10-01 Epub Date: 2026-10-31 DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2026.113331
Toshihiko Nanba
{"title":"Optimality of full effort in dynamic monitoring","authors":"Toshihiko Nanba","doi":"10.1016/j.econlet.2026.113331","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.econlet.2026.113331","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>I study costly inspections of a firm whose effort affects persistent quality and whose revenue depends on reputation. Full effort is globally optimal if and only if inspection costs do not exceed a computable cutoff. Above it, I construct a sequence of policies that strictly improve on the best full-effort policy. Their payoff gains and expected discounted effort losses vanish, but the gain-to-loss ratio diverges. No finite additional linear weight on quality restores full-effort optimality. The result allows nonlinear effort costs and asymmetric information losses.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":11468,"journal":{"name":"Economics Letters","volume":"269 ","pages":"Article 113331"},"PeriodicalIF":2.0,"publicationDate":"2026-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"149348791","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Urban bias in capital allocation: Evidence from China 资本配置中的城市偏见：来自中国的证据
IF 2 4区 经济学
Economics Letters Pub Date : 2026-10-01 Epub Date: 2026-10-23 DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2026.113299
Piyusha Mutreja, Abdulaziz B. Shifa, Wei Xiao
{"title":"Urban bias in capital allocation: Evidence from China","authors":"Piyusha Mutreja,&nbsp;Abdulaziz B. Shifa,&nbsp;Wei Xiao","doi":"10.1016/j.econlet.2026.113299","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.econlet.2026.113299","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Urban bias in resource allocation is central to development debates, yet direct evidence on differential access to capital remains limited. Using firm-level data from China, we infer the cost of capital from returns and compare urban and rural firms within the same prefecture. We find that urban firms have significantly lower returns, indicating cheaper access to capital. This gap is large for state-owned enterprises (SOEs) but negligible for nonstate firms, and is robust across specifications. The results suggest that urban bias in capital allocation is primarily driven by state-directed investment rather than private-sector constraints.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":11468,"journal":{"name":"Economics Letters","volume":"269 ","pages":"Article 113299"},"PeriodicalIF":2.0,"publicationDate":"2026-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"149348798","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
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