Economics LettersPub Date : 2026-10-01Epub Date: 2026-09-22DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2026.113246
Suli Zheng, Bo Wang
{"title":"Skepticism without scrutiny: Verification and information manipulation","authors":"Suli Zheng, Bo Wang","doi":"10.1016/j.econlet.2026.113246","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.econlet.2026.113246","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>An investment boom can coexist with investor skepticism about the claims supporting individual projects. We study investors who can identify an interested insider behind a public report before exercising a risky investment option. Verification improves the investor’s decision and deters manipulation by reducing the capital attracted by a false favorable report. Verification informs privately but disciplines publicly. Investors capture the first benefit but ignore the second, so the market verifies too little. Manipulation raises the private value of verification, making verification choices strategic substitutes and equilibrium unique. With intermediate common costs, scrutiny vanishes and manipulated reports direct capital to bad projects under Bayesian beliefs. Rational skepticism can sustain collective misinvestment when credibility is a public good.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":11468,"journal":{"name":"Economics Letters","volume":"269 ","pages":"Article 113246"},"PeriodicalIF":2.0,"publicationDate":"2026-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"149144733","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Economics LettersPub Date : 2026-10-01Epub Date: 2026-10-03DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2026.113280
André A.P. Santos, Lorenzo Pascual Caneiro
{"title":"The timing fingerprint: A rank-based test of market timing","authors":"André A.P. Santos, Lorenzo Pascual Caneiro","doi":"10.1016/j.econlet.2026.113280","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.econlet.2026.113280","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Traditional market-timing tests such as the Treynor–Mazuy and Henriksson–Merton tests are known to over-detect timing ability when fat tails and state-dependent volatility are present, and are based on rigid parametric assumptions about the timing payoff. We propose a test of market timing built on the concept of <em>timing fingerprint</em>, a rank-based test that presumes no functional form for the timing payoff and is calibrated to nominal size by a null-imposing wild bootstrap. We show that, while the same bootstrap restores the size of the classical tests, the fingerprint method identifies the direction and location of timing-like behavior across the entire benchmark distribution and is substantially more powerful against timing payoffs the classical tests do not span. We assess the finite-sample performance of the fingerprint test using Monte Carlo simulations and employ it to evaluate a large panel of U.S. equity mutual funds.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":11468,"journal":{"name":"Economics Letters","volume":"269 ","pages":"Article 113280"},"PeriodicalIF":2.0,"publicationDate":"2026-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"149144737","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Economics LettersPub Date : 2026-10-01Epub Date: 2026-10-15DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2026.113301
Haimanti Bhattacharya, Subhasish Dugar
{"title":"Whose behavior matters? Gender and responses to social information on honesty and generosity","authors":"Haimanti Bhattacharya, Subhasish Dugar","doi":"10.1016/j.econlet.2026.113301","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.econlet.2026.113301","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We experimentally examine how social information about a reference group’s honesty and generosity affects prosocial behavior, by recipients’ and reference groups’ genders. We vary reference-group gender (men, women, or unspecified) and majority behavior (80% or 20% prosocial). Women exhibit opportunistic conformity: non-prosocial majorities reduce their prosociality, whereas prosocial majorities have negligible effects, regardless of reference-group gender. Men increase prosociality for female reference groups irrespective of majority behavior, suggesting a desire to outcompete women. For male or unspecified groups, men adjust insignificantly toward the majority, though prosocial and non-prosocial treatments differ significantly. Thus, whose behavior matters depends on who receives it.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":11468,"journal":{"name":"Economics Letters","volume":"269 ","pages":"Article 113301"},"PeriodicalIF":2.0,"publicationDate":"2026-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"149202605","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Economics LettersPub Date : 2026-10-01Epub Date: 2026-10-09DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2026.113289
Karl Whelan
{"title":"The economics of free bets","authors":"Karl Whelan","doi":"10.1016/j.econlet.2026.113289","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.econlet.2026.113289","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Sportsbooks offer promotional “free bets” that return profits if the bets win, but not the stake provided. These bets can be hedged to produce guaranteed profits. This paper shows how to value the guaranteed profit from these stake-not-returned free bets under a simple constant-margin pricing rule in which sportsbooks, on average, keep a fraction <span><math><mi>m</mi></math></span> of the money staked. The guaranteed hedged value is a nonlinear function of the free bet’s probability of winning, reaching a maximum when this probability is <span><math><msqrt><mrow><mi>m</mi><mrow><mo>(</mo><mn>1</mn><mo>−</mo><mi>m</mi><mo>)</mo></mrow></mrow></msqrt></math></span>. Empirical evidence from odds on tennis bets confirms this prediction.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":11468,"journal":{"name":"Economics Letters","volume":"269 ","pages":"Article 113289"},"PeriodicalIF":2.0,"publicationDate":"2026-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"149202570","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Economics LettersPub Date : 2026-10-01Epub Date: 2026-09-26DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2026.113262
Changryong Baek, Chihoon Lee, Seungwon Lee
{"title":"Threshold HAR model for interval-valued time series","authors":"Changryong Baek, Chihoon Lee, Seungwon Lee","doi":"10.1016/j.econlet.2026.113262","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.econlet.2026.113262","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We propose a threshold heterogeneous autoregressive model for interval-valued time series (THARI). Building on the heterogeneous autoregressive (HAR) framework, THARI combines threshold interval autoregression with daily, weekly, and monthly aggregation, allowing multi-horizon interval dynamics to vary across regimes. Estimation uses minimum-<span><math><msub><mrow><mi>D</mi></mrow><mrow><mi>K</mi></mrow></msub></math></span> distance with a feasible positive-definite kernel update. For fixed and feasible kernels, the threshold estimator is <span><math><mi>T</mi></math></span>-consistent and the regression estimator is <span><math><msqrt><mrow><mi>T</mi></mrow></msqrt></math></span>-consistent. For Ethereum intervals constructed from the 50th and 95th quantiles of 5-minute intraday squared returns, THARI improves <span><math><msubsup><mrow><mi>D</mi></mrow><mrow><mi>K</mi></mrow><mrow><mn>2</mn></mrow></msubsup></math></span> forecasts over TARI(3), while comparison with a non-threshold interval HAR benchmark identifies horizon-dependent threshold gains.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":11468,"journal":{"name":"Economics Letters","volume":"269 ","pages":"Article 113262"},"PeriodicalIF":2.0,"publicationDate":"2026-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"149144743","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Economics LettersPub Date : 2026-10-01Epub Date: 2026-10-15DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2026.113290
Gian Caspari, Manshu Khanna
{"title":"Participation and revelation in the KitaMatch clearinghouse","authors":"Gian Caspari, Manshu Khanna","doi":"10.1016/j.econlet.2026.113290","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.econlet.2026.113290","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Private childcare providers in Germany generally cannot be compelled to join municipal clearinghouses, so participation is a binding design constraint. Germany’s first childcare clearinghouse, <span>KitaMatch</span>, runs provider-proposing deferred acceptance (KDA). This paper provides a rationale for that choice based on providers’ participation incentives. Providers hold incomplete priorities, which a public ranking completes subject to provider autonomy: the ranking may resolve comparisons a provider leaves open but may not reverse its strict priorities or alter its acceptable set. Under this refinement, KDA gives each provider its best stable assignment, and its transcript of proposals and rejections certifies which top-priority families are stably enrollable. Participation is robust to any aftermarket that settles on a stable outcome, and the guarantee does not rest on the public tie-breaking.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":11468,"journal":{"name":"Economics Letters","volume":"269 ","pages":"Article 113290"},"PeriodicalIF":2.0,"publicationDate":"2026-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"149202573","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Economics LettersPub Date : 2026-10-01Epub Date: 2026-10-13DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2026.113298
Yang K. Lu, Bowen Qu
{"title":"What does sovereign borrowing signal?","authors":"Yang K. Lu, Bowen Qu","doi":"10.1016/j.econlet.2026.113298","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.econlet.2026.113298","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We assess the relative importance of three common sources of government private information in asymmetric-information models of sovereign debt: time preference, default costs, and future economic fundamentals. We develop a parsimonious signaling model that nests all three information structures and show that only private information about future fundamentals can generate a state-dependent signaling effect of sovereign borrowing on default risk. More borrowing signals stronger fundamentals when public repayment conditions are favorable, but weaker fundamentals when they are unfavorable.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":11468,"journal":{"name":"Economics Letters","volume":"269 ","pages":"Article 113298"},"PeriodicalIF":2.0,"publicationDate":"2026-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"149202593","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Economics LettersPub Date : 2026-10-01Epub Date: 2026-10-09DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2026.113261
Sergio Cappellini, Sofía Ruiz-Palazuelos
{"title":"Optimal unemployment insurance under statistical profiling","authors":"Sergio Cappellini, Sofía Ruiz-Palazuelos","doi":"10.1016/j.econlet.2026.113261","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.econlet.2026.113261","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>How should unemployment insurance (UI) be designed? We characterize the optimal contract when employability is statistically assessed at the beginning of a claim and progressively revised based on elapsed job search duration. In our setting, workers can manipulate future assessments through current search behavior, generating endogenous learning rents that must be compensated to sustain search effort. We show that these rents increase with unemployment duration and UI generosity, raising the relative attractiveness of search monitoring and assistance. Ignoring learning rents may therefore lead to insufficient search incentives, lower job-finding rates, and biased estimates of the returns to search-incentivizing programs.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":11468,"journal":{"name":"Economics Letters","volume":"269 ","pages":"Article 113261"},"PeriodicalIF":2.0,"publicationDate":"2026-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"149202571","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Economics LettersPub Date : 2026-10-01Epub Date: 2026-10-06DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2026.113265
Martin Meier
{"title":"Confidence at the long end: Central-bank satisfaction and household inflation expectations","authors":"Martin Meier","doi":"10.1016/j.econlet.2026.113265","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.econlet.2026.113265","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Using 252,993 responses from the Bank of England Inflation Attitudes Survey, this paper examines the relationship between central-bank confidence, the term structure of inflation expectations, and forecast accuracy. Dissatisfied households show stronger pass-through from perceived inflation to medium- and long-term expectations. Among respondents in the same wave and current-inflation and one-year-expectation categories, their five-year expectations remain 0.37 percentage points higher. A Shapley decomposition leaves 40% of the five-year gap unexplained by those beliefs. Dissatisfied households make larger five-year forecast errors under midpoint and interval-consistent coding. The evidence is consistent with weaker long-term anchoring rather than more accurate pessimism.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":11468,"journal":{"name":"Economics Letters","volume":"269 ","pages":"Article 113265"},"PeriodicalIF":2.0,"publicationDate":"2026-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"149144739","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Economics LettersPub Date : 2026-10-01Epub Date: 2026-09-24DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2026.113243
Ryoya Nakano, Takahiro Hoshino
{"title":"Exact inference after data-driven control-unit selection in difference-in-differences","authors":"Ryoya Nakano, Takahiro Hoshino","doi":"10.1016/j.econlet.2026.113243","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.econlet.2026.113243","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>In comparative case studies that select a single control using a centered pre-treatment fit criterion, researchers report a difference-in-differences interval treating the selection as fixed. Under a Gaussian panel model with known covariance, a centered criterion yields exact naive intervals when the covariance is separable with a spherical time factor, for any cross-sectional covariance. Otherwise, given the selection and an independent residual, the estimator is truncated normal; the pivot yields exact selective coverage. In our simulations, naive coverage was often conservative and never materially below nominal; working-model plug-in inference exhibited modest undercoverage under strong serial correlation.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":11468,"journal":{"name":"Economics Letters","volume":"269 ","pages":"Article 113243"},"PeriodicalIF":2.0,"publicationDate":"2026-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"149144740","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}