Economics of Governance最新文献

Skimming the achieved? Quantifying the fiscal incentives of the German fiscal equalization scheme and its reforms since 1970 攫取成果？量化自 1970 年以来德国财政均衡计划及其改革的财政激励措施

IF 0.9 4区经济学

Economics of Governance Pub Date : 2024-08-19 DOI: 10.1007/s10101-024-00316-w

Yannick Bury, Lars P. Feld, Heiko T. Burret

引用次数: 0

Predicting satisfaction with democracy in Germany using local economic conditions, social capital, and individual characteristics 利用当地经济条件、社会资本和个人特征预测德国的民主满意度

IF 0.9 4区经济学

Economics of Governance Pub Date : 2024-08-12 DOI: 10.1007/s10101-024-00315-x

Tim Friehe, Christian Pfeifer

引用次数: 0

Environmental policy implementation, gender, and corruption 环境政策的实施、性别与腐败

IF 0.9 4区经济学

Economics of Governance Pub Date : 2024-06-04 DOI: 10.1007/s10101-024-00314-y

Nabamita Dutta, Saibal Kar, Israt Jahan

{"title":"Environmental policy implementation, gender, and corruption","authors":"Nabamita Dutta, Saibal Kar, Israt Jahan","doi":"10.1007/s10101-024-00314-y","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s10101-024-00314-y","url":null,"abstract":"Beneficial influence of female representation in implementing environment-friendly policies have been documented in recent studies. However, presence of factors such as corruption and bureaucratic red tapes, known to hinder development initiatives, raises question about whether women legislators can achieve the desired level of success with environmental policies. Based on our empirical analysis using cross-sectional data for 83 countries, we find evidence that the positive impact of women in parliament on climate change policy outcomes is significant and most effective for countries with low levels of corruption. Depending on the model specification used, ranging from instrumental variable regressions to inclusion of controls to mitigate omitted variable bias, and matching models, we do find that the beneficial impact of women in parliament becomes insignificant and eventually might become negative with rising corruption. Thus, while women might be able to successfully propose a bill for and turn-into-law, environment-friendly policies in countries with low levels of corruption, the effort is nullified and might be reversed in case of countries with high corruption. We illustrate that the results are sensitive to model selection, and choice of controls.","PeriodicalId":46302,"journal":{"name":"Economics of Governance","volume":"181 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2024-06-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141252115","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Preferences for social insurance: the role of job security and risk propensity 对社会保险的偏好：工作保障和风险倾向的作用

IF 0.9 4区经济学

Economics of Governance Pub Date : 2024-06-03 DOI: 10.1007/s10101-024-00313-z

Mauricio Bugarin, Yasushi Hazama

引用次数: 0

Can public efficiency increase tax morale? Evidence from 18 Latin American countries 公共效率能否提高纳税士气？来自 18 个拉丁美洲国家的证据

IF 0.9 4区经济学

Economics of Governance Pub Date : 2024-05-04 DOI: 10.1007/s10101-024-00312-0

Víctor Mauricio Castañeda-Rodríguez, Gaetano Lisi

引用次数: 0

Ideological ambiguity and political spectrum 意识形态的模糊性和政治光谱

IF 0.9 4区经济学

Economics of Governance Pub Date : 2024-03-19 DOI: 10.1007/s10101-024-00310-2

Hector Galindo-Silva

引用次数: 0

Legislative redistricting and the partisan distribution of transportation expenditure 立法机构重新划分与交通支出的党派分布

IF 0.9 4区经济学

Economics of Governance Pub Date : 2024-02-06 DOI: 10.1007/s10101-024-00308-w

Walter Melnik

{"title":"Legislative redistricting and the partisan distribution of transportation expenditure","authors":"Walter Melnik","doi":"10.1007/s10101-024-00308-w","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s10101-024-00308-w","url":null,"abstract":"I show that a state representative’s political party determines transportation expenditure in the area she represents. Previous studies of this topic consider party changes through election outcomes, which may be correlated with unobservable determinants of expenditure. To overcome this issue, I identify my estimates using Ohio’s 2012 state legislative redistricting, which moved many geographic areas into districts with opposite party incumbents. The Republican party controlled the state legislature and governorship over the period I study. I find that areas moving from governing party Republican to minority party Democratic districts received $3.4M (0.18 standard deviations) less annual highway construction funding than areas remaining in Republican districts. Areas moving from a Democratic to a Republican district, on the other hand, experienced no increase in expenditure—the negative effect of moving to a different representative’s district appears to outweigh the positive effect of a majority party representative. Descriptive evidence suggests that changing representative’s party through redistricting had a different effect on construction funding than changing through an election, underlining the importance of my identification strategy.","PeriodicalId":46302,"journal":{"name":"Economics of Governance","volume":"16 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2024-02-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139764612","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Political and non-political side activities in an agency framework 机构框架内的政治和非政治性附带活动

IF 0.9 4区经济学

Economics of Governance Pub Date : 2024-01-26 DOI: 10.1007/s10101-023-00307-3

Anthony M. Marino

引用次数: 0

Corruption risk and political dynasties: exploring the links using public procurement data in the Philippines 腐败风险与政治王朝：利用菲律宾的公共采购数据探索两者之间的联系

IF 0.9 4区经济学

Economics of Governance Pub Date : 2023-12-27 DOI: 10.1007/s10101-023-00306-4

Daniel Bruno Davis, Ronald U. Mendoza, Jurel K. Yap

{"title":"Corruption risk and political dynasties: exploring the links using public procurement data in the Philippines","authors":"Daniel Bruno Davis, Ronald U. Mendoza, Jurel K. Yap","doi":"10.1007/s10101-023-00306-4","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s10101-023-00306-4","url":null,"abstract":"Corruption plays a central role in underdevelopment in the Philippines, yet there is no reliable, non-aggregate, and periodic measurement for corruption in the country. This study demonstrates the use of statistical techniques to synthesize information from public procurement contracts into one indicator to measure corruption risk for each province in the Philippines from 2004 to 2018. The results show corruption risk decreased from the 2004 term to 2013, and increased to an all-time high in 2016. Regression analysis also shows that two measures of political power concentration among clans—a Hirschman–Herfindahl Index applied to the political sphere (Political HHI), and the Size of the Largest Dynasty per Province—is significantly and positively linked to the corruption risk indicator at least at the 5% significance level. This result coheres with emerging literature on political dynasties, suggesting that these debilitate checks and balances and increase the risk of impunity and malgovernance at the local level, particularly in the Philippines. This study highlights the importance of studying corruption vis-à-vis the evolving issue of political dynasties amassing power, and provides further evidence that reforms are required in this area to promote development in democracies.","PeriodicalId":46302,"journal":{"name":"Economics of Governance","volume":"11 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2023-12-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139080253","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Central-local collaborative environmental governance and firm-level environmental performance: the role of firm ownership 中央-地方协同环境治理与企业层面的环境绩效:企业所有权的作用

4区经济学

Economics of Governance Pub Date : 2023-10-16 DOI: 10.1007/s10101-023-00305-5

Shanshan Wu, C. James Hueng

{"title":"Central-local collaborative environmental governance and firm-level environmental performance: the role of firm ownership","authors":"Shanshan Wu, C. James Hueng","doi":"10.1007/s10101-023-00305-5","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s10101-023-00305-5","url":null,"abstract":"Using a unique dataset of publicly listed companies in China, we show that the collaborative environmental governance between the central and local governments reduces the effect of local enforcement of regulations on firms’ environmentally responsible behaviors. This is consistent with the fact that the Chinese central government uses a command-and-control type of regulations under which the local governments bear the full cost of enforcing the regulations. The local governments do not have the incentive to override the central supervision and therefore, simply lower their standard of enforcement and comply with the central supervision. However, this finding mainly reflects the results from the state-owned enterprises. For the private firms, the central supervision instead strengthens the impact of local enforcement. The heterogeneous results can be explained by the fact that the private firms are more financially constrained compared to the state-owned enterprises. They have the incentives to avoid the costs of complying with the regulations by paying a fine or colluding with the local regulators. The central supervision reduces the asymmetric information and increases the non-compliant firms’ chance to get caught for violations or collusion. This explains why once the central government intervenes, those private firms have to improve their environmentally responsible behaviors.","PeriodicalId":46302,"journal":{"name":"Economics of Governance","volume":"231 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"136078623","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0