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Trust in municipal government and recycling behavior 信任市政府和回收行为
4区 经济学
Economics of Governance Pub Date : 2025-10-09 DOI: 10.1007/s10101-025-00341-3
Maria Carmela Aprile, Damiano Fiorillo
{"title":"Trust in municipal government and recycling behavior","authors":"Maria Carmela Aprile, Damiano Fiorillo","doi":"10.1007/s10101-025-00341-3","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s10101-025-00341-3","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":46302,"journal":{"name":"Economics of Governance","volume":"26 4","pages":"625-650"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2025-10-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"147881771","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Unveiling the myth of economies of scale in local government: empirical evidence from interpretable machine learning 揭开地方政府规模经济的神话：来自可解释机器学习的经验证据
4区 经济学
Economics of Governance Pub Date : 2025-07-16 DOI: 10.1007/s10101-025-00331-5
Kun Wang, Jujun Zhao
{"title":"Unveiling the myth of economies of scale in local government: empirical evidence from interpretable machine learning","authors":"Kun Wang, Jujun Zhao","doi":"10.1007/s10101-025-00331-5","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s10101-025-00331-5","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":46302,"journal":{"name":"Economics of Governance","volume":"26 3","pages":"313-335"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2025-07-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"147886002","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
Balance of power in a conflict model 冲突模式中的权力平衡
IF 0.9 4区 经济学
Economics of Governance Pub Date : 2024-08-30 DOI: 10.1007/s10101-024-00318-8
Ryota Tsuchiya
{"title":"Balance of power in a conflict model","authors":"Ryota Tsuchiya","doi":"10.1007/s10101-024-00318-8","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s10101-024-00318-8","url":null,"abstract":"<p>This study provides a microeconomic foundation for the bipolar stability hypothesis in international politics. It extends the well-designed conflict model of Esteban and Ray (Am Econ Rev 101(4):1345–1374, 2011) to include monetary compensation arrangements between the winning and losing groups, presenting a new conflict-related indicator called the balance of power index. The main finding of this study is that societal polarization serves to alleviate rather than exacerbate conflict intensity, which is elucidated by the balance of power index. This new characteristic of polarization is associated with the founding of the bipolar stability hypothesis by Waltz (J Int Affairs 21(2):215–231, 1967), Waltz (Theory of international politics. Addison-Wesley Publishing Company, Reading, 1979) under the economic behavioral model.</p>","PeriodicalId":46302,"journal":{"name":"Economics of Governance","volume":"62 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2024-08-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142224270","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Skimming the achieved? Quantifying the fiscal incentives of the German fiscal equalization scheme and its reforms since 1970 攫取成果？量化自 1970 年以来德国财政均衡计划及其改革的财政激励措施
IF 0.9 4区 经济学
Economics of Governance Pub Date : 2024-08-19 DOI: 10.1007/s10101-024-00316-w
Yannick Bury, Lars P. Feld, Heiko T. Burret
{"title":"Skimming the achieved? Quantifying the fiscal incentives of the German fiscal equalization scheme and its reforms since 1970","authors":"Yannick Bury, Lars P. Feld, Heiko T. Burret","doi":"10.1007/s10101-024-00316-w","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s10101-024-00316-w","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Marginal rates of contribution (MRC), i.e., the rates at which additional revenues are skimmed via larger contributions or lower transfer receipts, quantify the incentives of a fiscal equalization scheme. This paper is the first to calculate marginal rates of contribution for the Laender (states) in the German fiscal equalization scheme for each of the 51 years since its establishment in 1970 and over five major reforms, taking into account all relevant revenues. Our results show that MRC have been at a consistently high level. Until 2019 the scheme induced an almost full skimming of additional tax revenues of recipient states. With the system’s latest reform in 2020, MRC increased further. Recipient states now face an over-skimming of additional tax revenues and, thus, massive fiscal disincentives to maintain their own tax base. While these findings have been widely expected, comprehensive evidence has been missing so far.</p>","PeriodicalId":46302,"journal":{"name":"Economics of Governance","volume":"24 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2024-08-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142185294","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Predicting satisfaction with democracy in Germany using local economic conditions, social capital, and individual characteristics 利用当地经济条件、社会资本和个人特征预测德国的民主满意度
IF 0.9 4区 经济学
Economics of Governance Pub Date : 2024-08-12 DOI: 10.1007/s10101-024-00315-x
Tim Friehe, Christian Pfeifer
{"title":"Predicting satisfaction with democracy in Germany using local economic conditions, social capital, and individual characteristics","authors":"Tim Friehe, Christian Pfeifer","doi":"10.1007/s10101-024-00315-x","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s10101-024-00315-x","url":null,"abstract":"<p>This paper explores the empirical relationship between local economic conditions, social capital, and individual characteristics on the one hand and satisfaction with democracy on the other hand, using detailed information from the German Socio-Economic Panel. In contrast to previous literature, we focus on economic conditions at the <i>state</i> level instead of the <i>national</i> one. We find that local economic conditions, proxies of social capital, and individual characteristics (e.g., risk attitude, reciprocity, past unemployment experience) are important correlates of satisfaction with democracy and that some heterogeneity between genders, West and East Germany, and people with and without college degree exists in the data.</p>","PeriodicalId":46302,"journal":{"name":"Economics of Governance","volume":"180 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2024-08-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142224271","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Environmental policy implementation, gender, and corruption 环境政策的实施、性别与腐败
IF 0.9 4区 经济学
Economics of Governance Pub Date : 2024-06-04 DOI: 10.1007/s10101-024-00314-y
Nabamita Dutta, Saibal Kar, Israt Jahan
{"title":"Environmental policy implementation, gender, and corruption","authors":"Nabamita Dutta, Saibal Kar, Israt Jahan","doi":"10.1007/s10101-024-00314-y","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s10101-024-00314-y","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Beneficial influence of female representation in implementing environment-friendly policies have been documented in recent studies. However, presence of factors such as corruption and bureaucratic red tapes, known to hinder development initiatives, raises question about whether women legislators can achieve the desired level of success with environmental policies. Based on our empirical analysis using cross-sectional data for 83 countries, we find evidence that the positive impact of women in parliament on climate change policy outcomes is <i>significant and most effective</i> for countries with low levels of corruption. Depending on the model specification used, ranging from instrumental variable regressions to inclusion of controls to mitigate omitted variable bias, and matching models, we do find that the beneficial impact of women in parliament becomes insignificant and eventually might become negative with rising corruption. Thus, while women might be able to successfully propose a bill for and turn-into-law, environment-friendly policies in countries with low levels of corruption, the effort is nullified and might be reversed in case of countries with high corruption. We illustrate that the results are sensitive to model selection, and choice of controls.</p>","PeriodicalId":46302,"journal":{"name":"Economics of Governance","volume":"181 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2024-06-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141252115","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Preferences for social insurance: the role of job security and risk propensity 对社会保险的偏好：工作保障和风险倾向的作用
IF 0.9 4区 经济学
Economics of Governance Pub Date : 2024-06-03 DOI: 10.1007/s10101-024-00313-z
Mauricio Bugarin, Yasushi Hazama
{"title":"Preferences for social insurance: the role of job security and risk propensity","authors":"Mauricio Bugarin, Yasushi Hazama","doi":"10.1007/s10101-024-00313-z","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s10101-024-00313-z","url":null,"abstract":"<p>In a 2003 article, Karl Moene (University of Oslo) and Michael Wallerstein (Yale University) demonstrated that wealthier citizens tend to support higher spending in social policies directed at the unemployed, while preferring lower spending in policies aimed at the employed. This paper reveals that these findings hinge on two key assumptions: that citizens have a coefficient of relative risk aversion (CRRA) greater than one, and that all citizens face an equal probability of job loss—a presumption which is not necessarily realistic. By incorporating the observation that job security tends to correlate positively with income, we demonstrate that affluent individuals may still advocate for reduced spending in unemployment policies, even when their CRRA exceeds one. Moreover, a significant shift in the distribution of job security—such as during an abrupt economic crisis—might engender greater societal support for these policies, contrary to their previous research. Finally, empirical data from recent Brazilian history provide analytical support for the theoretical assertions presented herein.</p>","PeriodicalId":46302,"journal":{"name":"Economics of Governance","volume":"40 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2024-06-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141252277","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Can public efficiency increase tax morale? Evidence from 18 Latin American countries 公共效率能否提高纳税士气？来自 18 个拉丁美洲国家的证据
IF 0.9 4区 经济学
Economics of Governance Pub Date : 2024-05-04 DOI: 10.1007/s10101-024-00312-0
Víctor Mauricio Castañeda-Rodríguez, Gaetano Lisi
{"title":"Can public efficiency increase tax morale? Evidence from 18 Latin American countries","authors":"Víctor Mauricio Castañeda-Rodríguez, Gaetano Lisi","doi":"10.1007/s10101-024-00312-0","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s10101-024-00312-0","url":null,"abstract":"<p>By increasing trust in institutions, public efficiency could be a further key determinant of tax morale. Public efficiency is closely related to the concept of productive public spending, while total public spending also depends on government ideology. In a society where public efficiency and tax morale are high, a virtuous “tax circle” can be triggered since government can increase both tax revenues and productive public spending. Using the Latinobarometer wave (which includes 20,204 interviewees from 18 Latin American countries), the empirical analysis finds that public efficiency would have to increase significantly before its marginal effect on tax morale becomes positive. Hence, the virtuous “tax circle” can trigger in the long term. However, the cross-sectional analysis cannot highlight the potentially significant role of ideological motives, so robustness checks are performed to show that our results are neither driven by such motives nor by the multilevel structure of the dataset or by the sample distribution.</p>","PeriodicalId":46302,"journal":{"name":"Economics of Governance","volume":"31 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2024-05-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140888789","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Governance and state-owned enterprises: how costly is corruption? 治理与国有企业：腐败的代价有多高？
IF 0.9 4区 经济学
Economics of Governance Pub Date : 2024-04-20 DOI: 10.1007/s10101-024-00311-1
Anja Baum, Clay Hacknay, Paulo Medas, Mouhamadou Sy
{"title":"Governance and state-owned enterprises: how costly is corruption?","authors":"Anja Baum, Clay Hacknay, Paulo Medas, Mouhamadou Sy","doi":"10.1007/s10101-024-00311-1","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s10101-024-00311-1","url":null,"abstract":"<p>State-owned enterprises (SOEs) are present in key sectors of economies around the world. While they can provide an important public service, there is widespread concern that their activities and financial performance are hindered by corruption. In the meantime, cross-country analysis on the cost of corruption for SOEs remains scarce. We present new cross-country evidence on how corruption affects SOE performance using firm level data. We find that SOEs perform as well as private firms in core sectors when corruption is low but are significantly less efficient when corruption is high. We also show that, in turn, improvements in fiscal transparency and specific SOE governance reforms have the potential to improve SOE performance.</p>","PeriodicalId":46302,"journal":{"name":"Economics of Governance","volume":"46 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2024-04-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140624159","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Ideological ambiguity and political spectrum 意识形态的模糊性和政治光谱
IF 0.9 4区 经济学
Economics of Governance Pub Date : 2024-03-19 DOI: 10.1007/s10101-024-00310-2
Hector Galindo-Silva
{"title":"Ideological ambiguity and political spectrum","authors":"Hector Galindo-Silva","doi":"10.1007/s10101-024-00310-2","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s10101-024-00310-2","url":null,"abstract":"<p>This study examines the relationship between ambiguity and the ideological positioning of political parties across the political spectrum. We identify a strong non-monotonic (inverted U-shaped) relationship between party ideology and ambiguity within a sample of 202 European political parties. This pattern is observed across all ideological dimensions covered in the data. To explain this pattern, we argue that centrist parties are perceived as less risky by voters compared to extremist parties, giving them an advantage in employing ambiguity to attract more voters at a lower cost. We support our explanation with additional evidence from electoral outcomes and economic indicators in the respective party countries.</p>","PeriodicalId":46302,"journal":{"name":"Economics of Governance","volume":"67 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2024-03-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140204432","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
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