Economics of Governance最新文献_第2页

Political and non-political side activities in an agency framework 机构框架内的政治和非政治性附带活动

IF 0.9 4区经济学

Economics of Governance Pub Date : 2024-01-26 DOI: 10.1007/s10101-023-00307-3

Anthony M. Marino

引用次数: 0

Corruption risk and political dynasties: exploring the links using public procurement data in the Philippines 腐败风险与政治王朝：利用菲律宾的公共采购数据探索两者之间的联系

IF 0.9 4区经济学

Economics of Governance Pub Date : 2023-12-27 DOI: 10.1007/s10101-023-00306-4

Daniel Bruno Davis, Ronald U. Mendoza, Jurel K. Yap

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引用次数: 0

Central-local collaborative environmental governance and firm-level environmental performance: the role of firm ownership 中央-地方协同环境治理与企业层面的环境绩效:企业所有权的作用

4区经济学

Economics of Governance Pub Date : 2023-10-16 DOI: 10.1007/s10101-023-00305-5

Shanshan Wu, C. James Hueng

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引用次数: 0

Ethnically asymmetric political representation and the provision of public goods: theory and evidence from Ethiopia 种族不对称的政治代表和公共产品的提供:来自埃塞俄比亚的理论和证据

4区经济学

Economics of Governance Pub Date : 2023-10-08 DOI: 10.1007/s10101-023-00302-8

Teferi Mergo, Alain-Désiré Nimubona, Horatiu Alin Rus

引用次数: 2

Younger CEO and older managers: focusing on tournament incentives 年轻的CEO和年长的经理:专注于赛事激励

4区经济学

Economics of Governance Pub Date : 2023-10-02 DOI: 10.1007/s10101-023-00303-7

Jun Yeung Hong, Sung Min Jeon, Gun Lee

引用次数: 0

Crises and Community Resilience: Introduction to the Special Issue 危机与社区复原力:特刊导论