{"title":"Inquisitive injustice","authors":"Fintan Mallory","doi":"10.1007/s11098-025-02428-3","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-025-02428-3","url":null,"abstract":"The ability to control the direction of a conversation, which topics are raised, which questions are asked, and which lines of inquiry are followed, is a basic and powerful form of social control that has been under studied within the philosophy of language. This paper draws on work from formal pragmatics, social epistemology, and critical discourse analysis to identify the mechanisms by which social power influences who gets to set the question under discussion. In the process, it introduces the category of inquisitive injustice and identifies several underlying structural causes behind it. By making these mechanisms explicit, the paper aims to empower speakers to challenge existing but subtle forms of manipulation.","PeriodicalId":48305,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2025-11-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145478388","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Personal identity, individual autonomy and group rights","authors":"Caroline West","doi":"10.1007/s11098-025-02425-6","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-025-02425-6","url":null,"abstract":"Many liberals maintain that individuals have a right to autonomy while at the same time insisting that strong group rights are unjustified. The traditional justification for this position implicitly relies on assumptions about the nature of personal identity that are increasingly controversial—in particular, the assumption that individual persons, unlike groups, persist self-identically (or “endure”) through time. If instead we assume an increasingly popular alternative four-dimensionalist (“perdurantist”) account of the nature of personal identity, then the asymmetrical treatment of individual and strong groups rights to autonomy appears <jats:italic>prima facie</jats:italic> inconsistent. For, from the perspective of four-dimensionalism, exercises of individual autonomy are metaphysically on a par with exercises of group authority: each involves exercises of authority among numerically distinct person-stages, justified by a unity relation. This raises a challenge for liberals. If perdurantism turns out to be the correct account of personal identity over time, what—if anything—would justify attributing a right to autonomy to individuals, while denying it to groups? I consider several possible responses to this challenge, none of which succeed in vindicating the orthodox liberal position fully.","PeriodicalId":48305,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES","volume":"87 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2025-11-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145427529","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Value encroachment on scientific understanding and discovery","authors":"Emily Sullivan","doi":"10.1007/s11098-025-02383-z","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-025-02383-z","url":null,"abstract":"Most agree that science is in some way informed by values, especially when it comes to using a model. However, whether values in science impact epistemology remains controversial. <jats:italic>Prima facie</jats:italic> scientific knowledge impurism seems untenable (Gerken, 2018). Does the same hold for scientific <jats:italic>understanding</jats:italic> impurism? In this paper, I put forward the dependency-impurism view of scientific understanding where non-epistemic values encroach on the dependency models that underly scientific understanding. I argue that dependency-impurism does not face the same worries that scientific knowledge impurism may have. I discuss the larger implications dependency-impurism has for scientific understanding, discovery, and machine learning in science.","PeriodicalId":48305,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES","volume":"173 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2025-10-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145382202","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Human extinction and conditional value","authors":"James Fanciullo","doi":"10.1007/s11098-025-02429-2","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-025-02429-2","url":null,"abstract":"Why should we prevent human beings from going extinct? Recently, several theorists have argued for “additional value views,” according to which our reasons to prevent extinction derive both from the value of the welfare of future lives, and from certain additional values relating to the existence of humanity (such as humanity’s intrinsic or “final” value). Even more recently, these theories have come under attack. In this paper, I first offer a partial taxonomy of additional value views, noting the distinction between what I call “outright value views” and “conditional value views.” As I show, recent attacks against additional value views ultimately present problems for outright value views, yet may be avoided entirely by many conditional value views. I illustrate the great variety of possible conditional value views, noting advantages and costs associated with alternative versions. I conclude by sketching a challenge that conditional value views must address, despite their advantages over outright value views.","PeriodicalId":48305,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES","volume":"12 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2025-10-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145382582","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Moral encroachment and group-to-individual inferences","authors":"Martin Smith","doi":"10.1007/s11098-025-02412-x","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-025-02412-x","url":null,"abstract":"The paper is concerned with a special class of inferences, in which we draw conclusions about <jats:italic>individual people</jats:italic> based on evidence about the <jats:italic>groups</jats:italic> to which they belong. One thing that is notable about these inferences is that they are often subject to a kind of <jats:italic>moral</jats:italic> criticism. By judging people in this way, it is claimed, we demean or diminish them, and fail to properly respect them as individuals. And yet, if these inferences are epistemically sound – as they sometimes appear to be – then we face the possibility of a clash between moral and epistemic norms. One way to avoid this clash is through the thesis of <jats:italic>moral encroachment</jats:italic> – the idea that standards of epistemic justification are themselves sensitive to moral considerations and, in particular, can become more stringent when a belief has the potential to morally wrong others. In this paper I offer some reasons for doubting this thesis, and argue that group-to-individual inferences are, in the end, better understood through a more traditional framework on which epistemic justification is determined purely by the nature of one’s evidence.","PeriodicalId":48305,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES","volume":"113 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2025-10-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145397923","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The story of the tablecloth: deriving “before” from atemporal notions","authors":"Daniel Saudek","doi":"10.1007/s11098-025-02305-z","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-025-02305-z","url":null,"abstract":"<p>This article develops a new account of the relation “before” between events. It does so by taking the set of all states of an object, irrespective of any presupposed order, and then finding the order between events by exploiting a characteristic asymmetry which appears on this set, called the “record asymmetry”. It is shown that the record asymmetry 1. implies a weak temporal order (“before or simultaneous with”), and 2. is necessary for measuring a strong temporal order (“before”). I then propose a condition necessary and sufficient for a strong temporal order in terms of the set of states of a single object. The upshot is that temporal ordering is not ontologically primitive, but reducible to the record asymmetry. Also, it is a local phenomenon which requires no global temporal structure of spacetime.</p>","PeriodicalId":48305,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES","volume":"15 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2025-05-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144137059","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Opacity in the book of the world?","authors":"Nicholas K. Jones","doi":"10.1007/s11098-025-02310-2","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-025-02310-2","url":null,"abstract":"<p>This paper explores the view that the vocabulary of metaphysical fundamentality is opaque, using Sider’s theory of structure as a motivating case study throughout. Two conceptions of fundamentality are distinguished, only one of which can explain why the vocabulary of fundamentality is opaque.</p>","PeriodicalId":48305,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES","volume":"45 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2025-05-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144137058","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Credence and belief: epistemic decision theory revisited","authors":"Minkyung Wang","doi":"10.1007/s11098-025-02321-z","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-025-02321-z","url":null,"abstract":"<p>This paper employs epistemic decision theory to explore rational bridge principles between probabilistic beliefs and deductively cogent beliefs. I re-examine Hempel and Levi’s epistemic decision theories and generalize them by introducing a novel rationality norm for belief binarization. This norm posits that an agent ought to have binary beliefs that maximize expected utility in light of their credences. Our findings reveal that the proposed norm implies certain geometrical principles, namely convexity norms. Building upon this framework, I critically evaluate the Humean thesis in Leitgeb’s stability theory of belief and Lin-Kelly’s tracking theory. We establish the impossibility results, demonstrating that those theories violate the proposed norms and consequently fail to do the job of expected utility maximization. In contrast, we discover alternative approaches that align with all of the proposed norms, such as generating beliefs that minimize a Bregman divergence from credences. Our epistemic decision theory for belief binarization can be compared to Dorst’s accuracy argument for the Lockean thesis. We conclude that deductively cogent expected accuracy maximizers are neither Lockean nor Humean.</p>","PeriodicalId":48305,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES","volume":"142 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2025-05-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144137100","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Hume’s methodological solipsism","authors":"Tamas Demeter","doi":"10.1007/s11098-025-02334-8","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-025-02334-8","url":null,"abstract":"<p>This paper offers a new interpretation of Hume’s <i>Treatise</i> as a work written by a methodological solipsist. It argues that Hume anticipates later developments by launching a Fodorian project that is to be realised by Carnapian means. Hume develops an explanatory theory of mental operations based on an analysis conducted by way of similarity recollections in the stream of experience. The paper first presents the case for Hume’s commitment to methodological solipsism and then offers a reconstruction of the methodology with which his project is to be executed. Hume proceeds by analysing perceptions and the connections between them to account for their “nature” and the “principles” underlying their interaction. His analyses reveal the solipsistic methodological credo that Hume did not make explicit.</p>","PeriodicalId":48305,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES","volume":"43 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2025-05-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144137057","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
求助内容：
应助结果提醒方式：
京公网安备 11010802042870号
