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Proportionality in the Aggregate 总体的比例性
IF 1.3 1区 哲学
PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES Pub Date : 2025-01-08 DOI: 10.1007/s11098-024-02275-8
Elad Uzan
{"title":"Proportionality in the Aggregate","authors":"Elad Uzan","doi":"10.1007/s11098-024-02275-8","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-024-02275-8","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Much of revisionist just war theory is individualistic in nature: morality in war is just an extension of morality in interpersonal circumstances, so that killing in war is subject to the same moral principles that govern personal self-defense and defense of others. Recent work in the ethics of self-defense suggests that this individualism leads to a puzzle, which I call the puzzle of aggregation, when many threateners contribute to a single threatened harm. In this paper, I investigate the moral problems posed by the puzzle of aggregation and develop a novel account recently proposed by Jeff McMahan, which he calls “proportionality in the aggregate”. I argue that accepting proportionality in the aggregate as a moral constraint on the use of force has significant implications for the ethics of war and self-defense.</p>","PeriodicalId":48305,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES","volume":"42 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2025-01-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142935639","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Deflationism, explanation and "because". 通货紧缩，解释和“因为”。
IF 1.3 1区 哲学
PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES Pub Date : 2025-01-01 Epub Date: 2025-06-03 DOI: 10.1007/s11098-025-02351-7
Julio De Rizzo
{"title":"Deflationism, explanation and \"because\".","authors":"Julio De Rizzo","doi":"10.1007/s11098-025-02351-7","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s11098-025-02351-7","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>Two influential objections to deflationism about truth question its ability to explain the role of true beliefs in successful actions; and to account for general compositional principles linking truth to complex sentences governed by truth-functional connectives. In this paper, I address recent formulations of these objections by Will Gamester and Richard Heck. My responses draw on recent work on explanation, grounding, and the logic of \"because\". However, each response leaves a residual concern for deflationists that these strategies alone cannot fully resolve. In the final section, I propose a view I call \"Aristotelian Deflationism,\" which incorporates specific \"because\" principles relating to truth as an alternative to standard instances of the T-schema. While not deflationist in the strictest sense, I argue that this approach offers compelling ways to address both the primary objections and the residual concerns effectively.</p>","PeriodicalId":48305,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES","volume":"182 8","pages":"2215-2242"},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2025-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC12325532/pdf/","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144800646","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Conceptual inflation, communication and understanding, and collective attention. 概念膨胀，沟通和理解，以及集体关注。
IF 1.3 1区 哲学
PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES Pub Date : 2025-01-01 Epub Date: 2025-07-14 DOI: 10.1007/s11098-025-02374-0
Eve Kitsik
{"title":"Conceptual inflation, communication and understanding, and collective attention.","authors":"Eve Kitsik","doi":"10.1007/s11098-025-02374-0","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s11098-025-02374-0","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>Some sociologists, psychologists, and philosophers, among others, have expressed worries about the inflation of concepts related to negative experiences, harm, or injustice (for example, the concepts of racism, sexual harassment, and human rights). Others welcome and contribute to the linguistic changes. What is at stake in these disagreements? In this paper, I first give an account of what conceptual inflation, in one important sense, is: change in linguistic practices that makes it easier to indicate a problem of a certain category. Then, I argue-building on work by Shen-yi Liao and Nat Hansen-that such conceptual inflation of problems neither significantly limits nor enhances our ability to communicate about the relevant sub-problems (such as workplace harassment and street harassment) and to recognize the similarities and differences between them. This is because our linguistic resources are flexible, and we are capable of creatively using and developing those resources. There is, however, another way of making sense of the disagreements. The issue at stake could be the allocation of collective attentional resources to (alleged) problems. There are plausible mechanisms whereby how we use the terms in question (such as \"sexual harassment\") influences that allocation.</p>","PeriodicalId":48305,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES","volume":"182 9","pages":"2657-2676"},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2025-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC12397196/pdf/","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144974599","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Understanding and veritism 理解与真理
IF 1.3 1区 哲学
PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES Pub Date : 2024-12-26 DOI: 10.1007/s11098-024-02271-y
Duncan Pritchard
{"title":"Understanding and veritism","authors":"Duncan Pritchard","doi":"10.1007/s11098-024-02271-y","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-024-02271-y","url":null,"abstract":"<p>My interest is in an apparent tension between two epistemological theses. The first is <i>veritism</i>, which is roughly the claim that truth is the fundamental epistemic good. The second is the idea that understanding is the proper goal of inquiry. The two theses seem to be in tension because the former seems to imply that the proper goal of inquiry should be truth rather than understanding. And yet there is a strong <i>prima facie</i> case to be made for thinking that properly conducted inquiry aims at an elevated epistemic standing like understanding rather than merely true belief. I suggest that this putative tension is one of the reasons why veritism is these days not widely endorsed. As I show, however, there is in fact no tension between these two claims, at least once they are each properly understood. Indeed, I will be suggesting that there is a plausible conception of veritism which would explain why intellectual exemplars seek out understanding in inquiry.</p>","PeriodicalId":48305,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES","volume":"144 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2024-12-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142887359","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Knowledge and merely predictive evidence 知识和仅仅是预测证据
IF 1.3 1区 哲学
PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES Pub Date : 2024-12-20 DOI: 10.1007/s11098-024-02266-9
Haley Schilling Anderson
{"title":"Knowledge and merely predictive evidence","authors":"Haley Schilling Anderson","doi":"10.1007/s11098-024-02266-9","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-024-02266-9","url":null,"abstract":"<p>A jury needs “proof beyond a reasonable doubt” in order to convict a defendant of a crime. The standard is vexingly difficult to pin down, but some legal epistemologists have given this account: knowledge is the standard of legal proof. On this account, a jury should deliver a guilty verdict just in case they know that the defendant is guilty. In this paper, I’ll argue that legal proof requires more than just knowledge that a defendant is guilty. In cases of “merely predictive evidence,” a jury knows that the defendant is guilty but does not have legal proof. What are they missing? Evidence that is causally downstream from the crime. Legal proof requires a “smoking gun.” The point generalizes outside of the courtroom. A professor needs to read a term paper before assigning a grade, even if she knows the student will produce A + work. You may know that your roommate will forget to water the plants while you are away—she is scatterbrained and always forgets these things—but you can’t blame her until you get back home and see that the plants are wilting. In order to have appropriate reactions or reactive attitudes, we must respond causally to what other people have done.</p>","PeriodicalId":48305,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2024-12-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142869930","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Causal inference from clinical experience 从临床经验得出的因果推论
IF 1.3 1区 哲学
PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES Pub Date : 2024-12-19 DOI: 10.1007/s11098-024-02264-x
Hamed Tabatabaei Ghomi, Jacob Stegenga
{"title":"Causal inference from clinical experience","authors":"Hamed Tabatabaei Ghomi, Jacob Stegenga","doi":"10.1007/s11098-024-02264-x","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-024-02264-x","url":null,"abstract":"<p>How reliable are causal inferences in complex empirical scenarios? For example, a physician prescribes a drug to a patient, and then the patient undergoes various changes to their symptoms. They then increase their confidence that it is the drug that causes such changes. Are such inferences reliable guides to the causal relation in question, particularly when the physician can gain a large volume of such clinical experience by treating many patients? The evidence-based medicine movement says no, while some physicians and philosophers support such appeals to first-person experience. We develop a formal model and simulate causal inference based on clinical experience. We conclude that in very particular clinical scenarios such inferences can be reliable, while in many other routine clinical scenarios such inferences are not reliable.</p>","PeriodicalId":48305,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES","volume":"275 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2024-12-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142869931","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Evaluating action possibilities: a procedural metacognitive view of intentional omissions 评估行动的可能性：对有意遗漏的程序性元认知观点
IF 1.3 1区 哲学
PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES Pub Date : 2024-12-19 DOI: 10.1007/s11098-024-02263-y
Kaisa Kärki
{"title":"Evaluating action possibilities: a procedural metacognitive view of intentional omissions","authors":"Kaisa Kärki","doi":"10.1007/s11098-024-02263-y","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-024-02263-y","url":null,"abstract":"<p>How do we control what we do not do? What are the relevant guiding mental states when an agent intentionally omits to perform an action? I argue that what happens when an agent intentionally omits is a two-part metacognitive process in which a representation of an action is brought to the agent’s mind for further processing and evaluated by her as something not to be done. Without a representation of the action <i>not</i> done, the agent cannot further process the possibility of her own action; she cannot intentionally try to not do something, resist performing an action, or decide or choose to not perform an action. The literature on people with frontal lobe damage suggests that without metacognitive control of action, a person automatically follows what the environment affords or what others are doing. Through at least procedural metacognitive control of action, agents are able to intentionally omit. This view has explanatory power over a variety of intentional omissions and over a variety of agents. It answers central questions in the philosophy of intentional omissions: <i>who</i> is capable of intentionally omitting, <i>when</i> and <i>where</i> intentional omissions unfold, and <i>what</i> are the relevant guiding mental states on which the control of intentional omissions is based? The answers to these questions contribute in part to naturalizing agency, at least when it comes to <i>negative agency</i>, our ability to guide the non-performance of our actions.</p>","PeriodicalId":48305,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES","volume":"24 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2024-12-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142869928","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Remembering and relearning: against exclusionism 记忆与再学习：反对排外主义
IF 1.3 1区 哲学
PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES Pub Date : 2024-12-10 DOI: 10.1007/s11098-024-02265-w
Juan F. Álvarez
{"title":"Remembering and relearning: against exclusionism","authors":"Juan F. Álvarez","doi":"10.1007/s11098-024-02265-w","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-024-02265-w","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Many philosophers endorse “exclusionism”, the view that no instance of relearning qualifies as a case of genuine remembering, and vice versa. Appealing to simulationist, distributed causalist, and trace minimalist theories of remembering, I develop three conditional arguments against exclusionism. First, if simulationism is right to hold that some cases of remembering involve reliance on post-event testimonial information, then remembering does not exclude relearning. Second, if distributed causalism is right to hold that memory traces are promiscuous, then remembering does not exclude relearning. Finally, if trace minimalism is right to hold that vicarious experiences sometimes produce the minimal traces that ground remembering, then remembering does not exclude relearning. While advocates of these theories might incorporate additional conditions designed to accommodate exclusionism, the only reason they can appeal to in favor of doing so is intuition: neither the fundamental components of the theories nor the empirical results on which they are based provide a reason to endorse exclusionism. An investigation of exclusionism thus raises metaphilosophical questions, so far overlooked in philosophy of memory, about the appropriate role of intuition in theorizing about remembering.</p>","PeriodicalId":48305,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES","volume":"5 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2024-12-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142796800","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Knowledge, skills, and creditability 知识、技能和信誉
IF 1.3 1区 哲学
PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES Pub Date : 2024-12-10 DOI: 10.1007/s11098-024-02261-0
Carlotta Pavese
{"title":"Knowledge, skills, and creditability","authors":"Carlotta Pavese","doi":"10.1007/s11098-024-02261-0","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-024-02261-0","url":null,"abstract":"<p>The article discusses the relation between skills (or competences), creditability, and aptness. The positive suggestion is that we might make progress understanding the relation between creditability and aptness by inquiring more generally about how different kinds of competences and their exercise might underwrite allocation of credit. Whether or not a competence is acquired and whether or not a competence is actively exercised might matter for the credit that the agent deserves for the exercise of that competence. A fine-grained taxonomy of competences opens up the possibility of instinctual knowledge (knowledge by mere instincts) as well as the possibility of habitual knowledge (knowledge by mere habits), alongside knowledge by skills (or alongside knowledge by yet other sorts of competences). If instinctual knowledge were possible, it is suggested that it might not be of the sort that deserves credit at all. By piggybacking from the literature in evolutionary psychology, I suggest that, as inborn social learners, merely instinctual—and so not fully creditable—knowledge might be a reality for us.</p>","PeriodicalId":48305,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2024-12-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142796795","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
The linguistic dead zone of value-aligned agency, natural and artificial 价值取向代理的语言死区，自然的和人为的
IF 1.3 1区 哲学
PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES Pub Date : 2024-12-04 DOI: 10.1007/s11098-024-02257-w
Travis LaCroix
{"title":"The linguistic dead zone of value-aligned agency, natural and artificial","authors":"Travis LaCroix","doi":"10.1007/s11098-024-02257-w","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-024-02257-w","url":null,"abstract":"<p>The value alignment problem for artificial intelligence (AI) asks how we can ensure that the “values”—i.e., objective functions—of artificial systems are aligned with the values of humanity. In this paper, I argue that linguistic communication is a necessary condition for robust value alignment. I discuss the consequences that the truth of this claim would have for research programmes that attempt to ensure value alignment for AI systems—or, more loftily, those programmes that seek to design robustly beneficial or ethical artificial <i>agents</i>.\u0000</p>","PeriodicalId":48305,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES","volume":"14 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2024-12-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142763082","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
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