{"title":"Morality demands more of you the better you are","authors":"Alexander Sasha Arridge","doi":"10.1007/s11098-026-02569-z","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-026-02569-z","url":null,"abstract":"The phenomenology of heroic action seems to be at odds with commonsense morality: while the latter tells us that heroic acts of self-sacrifice are morally optional, heroes reliably believe that such acts are morally required of them. Do heroes systematically exhibit false moral beliefs, or does our commonsense commitment to the possibility of supererogation need revising? This paper argues, contrary to both supererogationists and anti-supererogationists, that we need not decide: as what we are morally required to do depends on how virtuous we are, heroes are right to believe that heroic actions are morally required <jats:italic>of them</jats:italic> , while ordinary folk morality is right that, <jats:italic>for ordinary folk</jats:italic> , these very same actions are morally optional. I arrive at this conclusion by supplementing the foremost contemporary account of supererogation with two naturally plausible claims about the virtue of selflessness.","PeriodicalId":48305,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES","volume":"26 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2026-07-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"148587174","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Comparative fundamentality and levels of reality","authors":"Stephan Leuenberger","doi":"10.1007/s11098-026-02554-6","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-026-02554-6","url":null,"abstract":"Much philosophy presupposes a picture of reality as stratified into levels or layers. Yet a precise articulation of such a picture has been missing. It is tempting to think that we now have the tools to remedy this, notably due to ground-theoretic accounts of relative fundamentality. One might expect levels of facts, and their hierarchical arrangement, to be definable from relative fundamentality among facts. I show that such a project can at best partially succeed, by establishing certain limitative results. Moreover, I argue that the limitations should not be surprising, in light of an analogy between levels of reality and instants of time. Facts may exist at more than one level, just like persisting objects exist at more than one time. Finally, I develop a new positive proposal, on which levels are not made up of facts, but of what I call “fact realisations”—roughly, facts together with a complete genealogy of their grounds.","PeriodicalId":48305,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES","volume":"26 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2026-07-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"148539315","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Against meta-skepticism","authors":"Michael Hannon","doi":"10.1007/s11098-026-02573-3","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-026-02573-3","url":null,"abstract":"This paper addresses a new skeptical challenge called “meta-skepticism.” While traditional skepticism is concerned with whether our beliefs are justified or amount to knowledge, meta-skepticism is concerned with whether the epistemic concepts we use to evaluate our beliefs are significant. The worry is that there are many knowledge-like and justification-like concepts, and no principled reason to prefer our epistemic concepts over rivals. Thus, meeting our epistemic standards might be insignificant. In response, I argue that our epistemic concepts are significant because of the role they play in identifying reliable believers, regulating inquiry, and coordinating information exchange. By comparing our concept of knowledge with alternatives, we can appreciate that our ordinary notion of knowledge is better suited to these roles than its rivals. I conclude that meta-skepticism mistakenly assumes that we must evaluate epistemic importance independently of the functions our concepts serve.","PeriodicalId":48305,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES","volume":"16 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2026-07-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"148589076","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Absolutism vs. comparativism about value","authors":"Christian Tarsney","doi":"10.1007/s11098-026-02567-1","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-026-02567-1","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":48305,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES","volume":"72 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2026-07-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"148429182","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Locating the self: Indexicals in perception and action","authors":"Catherine Hochman","doi":"10.1007/s11098-026-02539-5","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-026-02539-5","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":48305,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES","volume":"21 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2026-07-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"148429180","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Persons and their bodies","authors":"David-Hillel Ruben","doi":"10.1007/s11098-026-02580-4","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-026-02580-4","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":48305,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES","volume":"16 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2026-07-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"148429181","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Intersectionality in perception","authors":"L. E. Walker","doi":"10.1007/s11098-026-02578-y","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-026-02578-y","url":null,"abstract":"Social interactions are often interpreted differently depending on how the individuals involved are categorized.This paper argues that the categories that guide interpretation are intersectional categories, such as “Black woman” or “White man.” Drawing on empirical work in categorization and vision science, I show that person perception typically relies on categories that are highly informative. Highly informative categories are those that guide interaction. I first argue that race or gender used alone are not particularly informative as they do not reliably predict interactions. I then show that intersectional categories are informative, as they activate distinct stereotypes that directly guide interpretation. In advancing this argument, I aim to initiate a philosophical conversation about the structure of social perception itself. To understand and address how social perception shapes our everyday lives, we must acknowledge the intersectionality of perception. Until we do, we will fail to capture the nuance of intergroup dynamics and the means by which they might be improved.","PeriodicalId":48305,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES","volume":"6 1","pages":"2495-2516"},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2026-07-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"148693326","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"In defense of moderation","authors":"Jacob Barrett","doi":"10.1007/s11098-026-02579-x","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-026-02579-x","url":null,"abstract":"A decision theory is fanatical if it says that, for any sure thing of getting some finite amount of value, it would be better to almost certainly get nothing while having some tiny probability (no matter how small) of getting sufficiently more finite value. Fanaticism is extremely counterintuitive; common sense requires a more moderate view. However, a recent slew of arguments purport to vindicate it, claiming that moderate alternatives to fanaticism are sometimes similarly counterintuitive, face a powerful continuum argument, and violate widely accepted synchronic and diachronic consistency conditions. In this paper, I defend moderation. I show that certain arguments for fanaticism raise trouble for some versions of moderation—but not for more plausible moderate approaches. Other arguments raise more general difficulties for moderates—but fanatics face these problems too. There is therefore little reason to doubt our commonsensical commitment to moderation, and we can rest easy not worrying too much about tiny probabilities of enormous value.","PeriodicalId":48305,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES","volume":"16 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2026-07-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"148408914","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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