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Understanding and veritism 理解与真理
IF 1.3 1区 哲学
PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES Pub Date : 2024-12-26 DOI: 10.1007/s11098-024-02271-y
Duncan Pritchard
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引用次数: 0
Temporal holism 时间整体论
IF 1.3 1区 哲学
PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES Pub Date : 2024-12-26 DOI: 10.1007/s11098-024-02267-8
John Michael Pemberton
{"title":"Temporal holism","authors":"John Michael Pemberton","doi":"10.1007/s11098-024-02267-8","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-024-02267-8","url":null,"abstract":"<p>How can a persisting object change whilst remaining the same object? Lewis, who frames this as the problem of temporary intrinsics, presents us with the perdurance solution: objects persist by having temporal parts which may have differing properties. And in doing so he characterises the opposing view as persisting but not by having temporal parts – a view he calls endurance. But this dichotomous picture of Lewis, although now widely embraced, misses out the orthodox historic view – a view I call temporal holism: objects persist by having temporal parts to which they are ontologically prior. (In the perduring solution, by contrast, the temporal parts are ontologically prior.) This paper sets out this temporal holist solution and makes clear its differences from perdurantist and endurantist solutions. Although temporal holism has a long and illustrious history, this history has not been explicitly recognised. I begin the task of recognising this history in this paper, in order to make clear the nature of temporal holism, and to show that it is a long-established, well supported and distinctive position. The paper sets out, too, how temporal holism solves other ontological problems so that, despite its current neglect, temporary holism has the potential to greatly enrich contemporary philosophical debates.</p>","PeriodicalId":48305,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES","volume":"14 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2024-12-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142887346","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Understanding and how-possibly explanations: Why can’t they be friends? 理解和可能的解释：为什么他们不能成为朋友？
IF 1.3 1区 哲学
PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES Pub Date : 2024-12-26 DOI: 10.1007/s11098-024-02251-2
Philippe Verreault-Julien, Till Grüne-Yanoff
{"title":"Understanding and how-possibly explanations: Why can’t they be friends?","authors":"Philippe Verreault-Julien, Till Grüne-Yanoff","doi":"10.1007/s11098-024-02251-2","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-024-02251-2","url":null,"abstract":"<p>In the current debate on the relation between how-possibly explanations (HPEs) and understanding, two seemingly irreconcilable positions have emerged, which either deny or assert HPEs’ contribution to understanding. We argue, in contrast, that there is substantial room for reconciliation between these positions. First, we show that a shared assumption is unfounded: HPEs can be interpreted as being correct explanations. Second, we argue that what we call the standard account is actually compatible with the claim that HPEs may improve understanding. Our analysis not only indicates that there is room for reconciliation, but also specifies the potential remaining disagreements.</p>","PeriodicalId":48305,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES","volume":"63 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2024-12-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142887348","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Knowledge and merely predictive evidence 知识和仅仅是预测证据
IF 1.3 1区 哲学
PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES Pub Date : 2024-12-20 DOI: 10.1007/s11098-024-02266-9
Haley Schilling Anderson
{"title":"Knowledge and merely predictive evidence","authors":"Haley Schilling Anderson","doi":"10.1007/s11098-024-02266-9","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-024-02266-9","url":null,"abstract":"<p>A jury needs “proof beyond a reasonable doubt” in order to convict a defendant of a crime. The standard is vexingly difficult to pin down, but some legal epistemologists have given this account: knowledge is the standard of legal proof. On this account, a jury should deliver a guilty verdict just in case they know that the defendant is guilty. In this paper, I’ll argue that legal proof requires more than just knowledge that a defendant is guilty. In cases of “merely predictive evidence,” a jury knows that the defendant is guilty but does not have legal proof. What are they missing? Evidence that is causally downstream from the crime. Legal proof requires a “smoking gun.” The point generalizes outside of the courtroom. A professor needs to read a term paper before assigning a grade, even if she knows the student will produce A + work. You may know that your roommate will forget to water the plants while you are away—she is scatterbrained and always forgets these things—but you can’t blame her until you get back home and see that the plants are wilting. In order to have appropriate reactions or reactive attitudes, we must respond causally to what other people have done.</p>","PeriodicalId":48305,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2024-12-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142869930","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Causal inference from clinical experience 从临床经验得出的因果推论
IF 1.3 1区 哲学
PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES Pub Date : 2024-12-19 DOI: 10.1007/s11098-024-02264-x
Hamed Tabatabaei Ghomi, Jacob Stegenga
{"title":"Causal inference from clinical experience","authors":"Hamed Tabatabaei Ghomi, Jacob Stegenga","doi":"10.1007/s11098-024-02264-x","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-024-02264-x","url":null,"abstract":"<p>How reliable are causal inferences in complex empirical scenarios? For example, a physician prescribes a drug to a patient, and then the patient undergoes various changes to their symptoms. They then increase their confidence that it is the drug that causes such changes. Are such inferences reliable guides to the causal relation in question, particularly when the physician can gain a large volume of such clinical experience by treating many patients? The evidence-based medicine movement says no, while some physicians and philosophers support such appeals to first-person experience. We develop a formal model and simulate causal inference based on clinical experience. We conclude that in very particular clinical scenarios such inferences can be reliable, while in many other routine clinical scenarios such inferences are not reliable.</p>","PeriodicalId":48305,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES","volume":"275 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2024-12-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142869931","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Evaluating action possibilities: a procedural metacognitive view of intentional omissions 评估行动的可能性：对有意遗漏的程序性元认知观点
IF 1.3 1区 哲学
PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES Pub Date : 2024-12-19 DOI: 10.1007/s11098-024-02263-y
Kaisa Kärki
{"title":"Evaluating action possibilities: a procedural metacognitive view of intentional omissions","authors":"Kaisa Kärki","doi":"10.1007/s11098-024-02263-y","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-024-02263-y","url":null,"abstract":"<p>How do we control what we do not do? What are the relevant guiding mental states when an agent intentionally omits to perform an action? I argue that what happens when an agent intentionally omits is a two-part metacognitive process in which a representation of an action is brought to the agent’s mind for further processing and evaluated by her as something not to be done. Without a representation of the action <i>not</i> done, the agent cannot further process the possibility of her own action; she cannot intentionally try to not do something, resist performing an action, or decide or choose to not perform an action. The literature on people with frontal lobe damage suggests that without metacognitive control of action, a person automatically follows what the environment affords or what others are doing. Through at least procedural metacognitive control of action, agents are able to intentionally omit. This view has explanatory power over a variety of intentional omissions and over a variety of agents. It answers central questions in the philosophy of intentional omissions: <i>who</i> is capable of intentionally omitting, <i>when</i> and <i>where</i> intentional omissions unfold, and <i>what</i> are the relevant guiding mental states on which the control of intentional omissions is based? The answers to these questions contribute in part to naturalizing agency, at least when it comes to <i>negative agency</i>, our ability to guide the non-performance of our actions.</p>","PeriodicalId":48305,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES","volume":"24 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2024-12-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142869928","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Overdetermination and causal connections 过度决定和因果关系
IF 1.3 1区 哲学
PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES Pub Date : 2024-12-19 DOI: 10.1007/s11098-024-02253-0
Ezra Rubenstein
{"title":"Overdetermination and causal connections","authors":"Ezra Rubenstein","doi":"10.1007/s11098-024-02253-0","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-024-02253-0","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Some theories are alleged to be implausible because they are committed to systematic ‘overdetermination’. In response, some authors defend ‘compatibilism’: the view that the putative overdetermination is benign, like other unproblematic cases of a single effect having many sufficient causes. The literature has tended to focus on the following question: which relations between sufficient causes of a single effect ensure that problematic overdetermination is avoided? This paper argues that several widely endorsed answers to this question are subject to counterexample. It then proposes a diagnosis of this failure: the standard answers neglect what really matters––how the causes are connected to their shared effect. In particular, overdetermination is avoided when there are no independent causal connections.</p>","PeriodicalId":48305,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES","volume":"11 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2024-12-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142869929","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Climate change and state interference: the case of privacy 气候变化与国家干预：隐私权的案例
IF 1.3 1区 哲学
PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES Pub Date : 2024-12-16 DOI: 10.1007/s11098-024-02269-6
Leonhard Menges
{"title":"Climate change and state interference: the case of privacy","authors":"Leonhard Menges","doi":"10.1007/s11098-024-02269-6","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-024-02269-6","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Climate change is one of the most important issues we are currently facing. There are many ways in which states can fight climate change. Some of them involve interfering with citizens’ personal lives. The question of whether such interference is justified is under-explored in philosophy. This paper focuses on a specific aspect of people’s personal lives, namely their informational privacy. It discusses the question of whether, given certain empirical assumptions, it is proportional of the state to risk its citizens’ privacy or to risk infringing its citizens’ right to privacy to fight climate change. The main claim this paper argues for is that if fighting climate change and protecting our privacy conflict, we have good reason to fight climate change rather than protect our privacy.</p>","PeriodicalId":48305,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES","volume":"29 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2024-12-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142825050","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Remembering and relearning: against exclusionism 记忆与再学习：反对排外主义
IF 1.3 1区 哲学
PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES Pub Date : 2024-12-10 DOI: 10.1007/s11098-024-02265-w
Juan F. Álvarez
{"title":"Remembering and relearning: against exclusionism","authors":"Juan F. Álvarez","doi":"10.1007/s11098-024-02265-w","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-024-02265-w","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Many philosophers endorse “exclusionism”, the view that no instance of relearning qualifies as a case of genuine remembering, and vice versa. Appealing to simulationist, distributed causalist, and trace minimalist theories of remembering, I develop three conditional arguments against exclusionism. First, if simulationism is right to hold that some cases of remembering involve reliance on post-event testimonial information, then remembering does not exclude relearning. Second, if distributed causalism is right to hold that memory traces are promiscuous, then remembering does not exclude relearning. Finally, if trace minimalism is right to hold that vicarious experiences sometimes produce the minimal traces that ground remembering, then remembering does not exclude relearning. While advocates of these theories might incorporate additional conditions designed to accommodate exclusionism, the only reason they can appeal to in favor of doing so is intuition: neither the fundamental components of the theories nor the empirical results on which they are based provide a reason to endorse exclusionism. An investigation of exclusionism thus raises metaphilosophical questions, so far overlooked in philosophy of memory, about the appropriate role of intuition in theorizing about remembering.</p>","PeriodicalId":48305,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES","volume":"5 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2024-12-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142796800","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Knowledge, skills, and creditability 知识、技能和信誉
IF 1.3 1区 哲学
PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES Pub Date : 2024-12-10 DOI: 10.1007/s11098-024-02261-0
Carlotta Pavese
{"title":"Knowledge, skills, and creditability","authors":"Carlotta Pavese","doi":"10.1007/s11098-024-02261-0","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-024-02261-0","url":null,"abstract":"<p>The article discusses the relation between skills (or competences), creditability, and aptness. The positive suggestion is that we might make progress understanding the relation between creditability and aptness by inquiring more generally about how different kinds of competences and their exercise might underwrite allocation of credit. Whether or not a competence is acquired and whether or not a competence is actively exercised might matter for the credit that the agent deserves for the exercise of that competence. A fine-grained taxonomy of competences opens up the possibility of instinctual knowledge (knowledge by mere instincts) as well as the possibility of habitual knowledge (knowledge by mere habits), alongside knowledge by skills (or alongside knowledge by yet other sorts of competences). If instinctual knowledge were possible, it is suggested that it might not be of the sort that deserves credit at all. By piggybacking from the literature in evolutionary psychology, I suggest that, as inborn social learners, merely instinctual—and so not fully creditable—knowledge might be a reality for us.</p>","PeriodicalId":48305,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2024-12-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142796795","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
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