{"title":"Explaining transparency the simple way","authors":"Sophie Archer","doi":"10.1007/s11098-026-02557-3","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-026-02557-3","url":null,"abstract":"If one asks oneself <italic>whether to believe that p</italic> from the first-person perspective, one understands this question is answered in, and only in, answering a second question – <italic>whether p</italic>. I propose a straightforward new explanation of such ‘transparency’: it is because one understands believing something is thinking it is true. This ‘Simple Explanation’ was overlooked due to the notion in the early literature (Shah, <xref ref-type=\"bibr\">2003</xref>; Shah & Velleman, <xref ref-type=\"bibr\">2005</xref>) that ‘thinking it is true that <italic>p</italic>’ does not uniquely identify belief. I argue that this is false and hence that we can explain transparency the simple way.","PeriodicalId":48305,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES","volume":"35 1","pages":"2417-2426"},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2026-06-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"148693309","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Defining structural discrimination","authors":"Hugo Cossette-Lefebvre","doi":"10.1007/s11098-026-02556-4","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-026-02556-4","url":null,"abstract":"Structural discrimination is sometimes presented as a unique subtype of discrimination. Yet, it is unclear how this concept should be defined. I argue that structural discrimination against a group G obtains when (1) G is a social group in society S; (2) members of G typically experience enduring, cross-cutting comparative disadvantages that are plural, multi-facetted, and that affect different significant spheres of life; and (3) the comparative disadvantages are created by the combined effects of different interdependent social practices. I show how structural discrimination is distinct from individual instances of direct and indirect discrimination and that this concept is different from the notion of structural injustice.","PeriodicalId":48305,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES","volume":"55 1","pages":"2391-2415"},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2026-06-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"148693311","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Talkative AI and the fiction of artificial minds","authors":"Tom Roberts","doi":"10.1007/s11098-026-02560-8","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-026-02560-8","url":null,"abstract":"Talkative artificial systems can sustain a realistic impression of intelligent agency, by generating quick, fluent, and context-sensitive strings of text in response to human input. Realism about AI treats this linguistic proficiency as evidence for an underlying suite of cognitive capacities, and so regards these technologies as subjects of psychological states. Firstly, I raise a challenge for the realist view from the perspective of embodied cognition: how might digital systems undergo interoceptive, affective, perceptual, and action-oriented mental states that seem to bear an important connection to the animate body? Secondly, I propose that the anti-realist view is consistent with taking a fictionalist attitude towards artificial speakers. When we converse with a talkative AI, we often imagine, pretend, or make-believe that our interlocutor is an autonomous agent with thoughts and experiences of its own, just as we do for more traditional fictional characters. These fictions are distinctive in being interactive, co-constructed, and self-involving; and in being capable of blending the world of the real with the world of the imaginary.","PeriodicalId":48305,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES","volume":"29 1","pages":"2353-2372"},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2026-06-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"148693304","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The direction of fit of affective forecasting","authors":"Bence Nanay","doi":"10.1007/s11098-026-02565-3","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-026-02565-3","url":null,"abstract":"Affective forecasting is the mental action of predicting what kind of emotional state we will be in at some future time. Affective forecasting plays a crucial role in our decision-making, emotion regulation and in our life in general. This paper is about the direction of fit of affective forecasting. I argue that affective forecasting, unlike other forecasts, for example, the weather forecast, does not have a mind-to-world, but rather a world-to-mind direction of fit: it prescribes, not describes. The consequences of this way of thinking about affective forecasting are considered for philosophical questions about decision-making.","PeriodicalId":48305,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES","volume":"9 1","pages":"2457-2469"},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2026-06-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"148693289","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Zetetic and epistemic deference in standpoint epistemology","authors":"Catharine Saint-Croix","doi":"10.1007/s11098-026-02559-1","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-026-02559-1","url":null,"abstract":"The Advantage Thesis is the centerpiece of standpoint epistemology. According to this thesis, standpoint occupants—those who bear a particular sort of epistemically fruitful relationship to marginalized social locations—have an epistemic advantage over those who do not, at least when it comes to questions concerning those social locations. Given this thesis, a question immediately arises: How should non-occupants respond? A common answer is epistemic deference. Non-occupants ought to defer to standpoint occupants when inquiring on relevant matters. Recently, however, the idea that standpoint epistemology calls for deference has been challenged. Opponents argue that epistemic deference is incurious, cowardly, or potentially harmful. But these worries are misplaced. They rest on three missteps: (1) conflating social and epistemic deference, (2) conflating settling <italic>p</italic> with settling <italic>why p</italic>, and (3) presupposing a maximalist conception of epistemic deference. Maximalism, however, falls short as a general account of epistemic deference, independent of the concerns of standpoint epistemology. Drawing on alternative accounts of deference in the literature, I show that epistemic deference is not inimical, but rather essential to the practices of inquiry that standpoint epistemologists recommend. After introducing and defending the term \"zetetic deference\" for the central feature of these practices, I show that epistemic deference is an essential component of them. In sum, epistemic deference is part, parcel, and prerequisite of the particular sort of courageous, inclusive inquiry standpoint theorists envision.","PeriodicalId":48305,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES","volume":"41 1","pages":"2427-2455"},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2026-06-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"148693308","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Conjoined twins share no parts","authors":"Jeremy W. Skrzypek","doi":"10.1007/s11098-026-02581-3","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-026-02581-3","url":null,"abstract":"Dicephalus conjoined twins, conjoined twins fused below the neck, pose a unique problem for animalism, the view that each of us is identical to a living human organism. If dicephalus twins are, or share, the same human organism, then at least some of us are not numerically identical to living human organisms. Some animalists have responded by arguing that dicephalus twins are numerically distinct but overlapping human organisms. Another option is to say that dicephalus twins are merely conjoined: they are intimately connected with one another, but they do not overlap or share any of their parts. In this paper, I argue that there are both metaphysical and practical or ethical considerations that weigh in favor of the non-overlapping option. Animalists who already have good reason to think that there are two living human organisms in a case of dicephalus twins should prefer the non-overlapping option to the overlapping option.","PeriodicalId":48305,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES","volume":"26 1","pages":"2517-2535"},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2026-06-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"148693298","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Mereological emergentism and agent-causal libertarianism","authors":"Dwayne Moore","doi":"10.1007/s11098-026-02574-2","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-026-02574-2","url":null,"abstract":"Agent-causal libertarianism is the view that agents-qua-agents, rather than being determined by external factors beyond their control, can choose for themselves, among various possibilities, how they will act. Numerous philosophers yoke their agent-causal libertarianism with an emergentist metaphysic, according to which nature is mereologically layered such that novel wholes emerge from, and causally influence, the parts constituting them. In this paper I present an emergentist model of agent causal libertarianism, according to which agents as emergent wholes of higher-level parts such as reasons, desires and choices, arise out of and causally influence, their lower-level neural parts. I then compare and contrast this model with two other contemporary agent-causal emergentist models, one from Timothy O’Connor, the other from Juan Morales. After arguing that my model is preferable in several respects to these models, I consider a leading concern with all forms of emergentism, namely, outlining how it integrates with the doctrine of physicalism.","PeriodicalId":48305,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES","volume":"360 1","pages":"2471-2493"},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2026-06-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"148693300","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Suboptimal knowledge","authors":"Nathan Lauffer","doi":"10.1007/s11098-026-02563-5","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-026-02563-5","url":null,"abstract":"I argue for the possibility of suboptimal knowledge: knowledge that’s defective given that the knower ought to inquire. I do this by uniting two independently plausible claims from the literature on inquiry that, at first glance, appear incompatible: there’s the Ignorance Norm, according to which one ought not know that <italic>p</italic> and inquire into whether <italic>p</italic>; and there’s the idea that, even if one knows that <italic>p</italic>, they may still be obligated to inquire into whether <italic>p</italic>. As I explain, these principles entail the possibility of suboptimal knowledge. Once this argument for suboptimal knowledge is in place, I go on to defend it. Along the way, I identify the relevance and utility of suboptimal knowledge for debates about the epistemic significance of unpossessed evidence, the relationship between knowledge and stakes, and zetetic normativity more generally.","PeriodicalId":48305,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES","volume":"55 1","pages":"2373-2389"},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2026-06-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"148693303","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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