PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES最新文献_第7页

The normative significance of God’s self 上帝自我的规范意义

IF 1.3 1区哲学

PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES Pub Date : 2025-01-08 DOI: 10.1007/s11098-024-02278-5

Troy Seagraves

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引用次数: 0

Deflationism, explanation and "because". 通货紧缩，解释和“因为”。

IF 1.3 1区哲学

PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES Pub Date : 2025-01-01 Epub Date: 2025-06-03 DOI: 10.1007/s11098-025-02351-7

Julio De Rizzo

引用次数: 0

Conceptual inflation, communication and understanding, and collective attention. 概念膨胀，沟通和理解，以及集体关注。

IF 1.3 1区哲学

PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES Pub Date : 2025-01-01 Epub Date: 2025-07-14 DOI: 10.1007/s11098-025-02374-0

Eve Kitsik

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引用次数: 0

Understanding and veritism 理解与真理

IF 1.3 1区哲学

PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES Pub Date : 2024-12-26 DOI: 10.1007/s11098-024-02271-y

Duncan Pritchard

引用次数: 0

Temporal holism 时间整体论

IF 1.3 1区哲学

PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES Pub Date : 2024-12-26 DOI: 10.1007/s11098-024-02267-8

John Michael Pemberton

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引用次数: 0

Understanding and how-possibly explanations: Why can’t they be friends? 理解和可能的解释：为什么他们不能成为朋友？

IF 1.3 1区哲学

PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES Pub Date : 2024-12-26 DOI: 10.1007/s11098-024-02251-2

Philippe Verreault-Julien, Till Grüne-Yanoff

引用次数: 0

Knowledge and merely predictive evidence 知识和仅仅是预测证据

IF 1.3 1区哲学

PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES Pub Date : 2024-12-20 DOI: 10.1007/s11098-024-02266-9

Haley Schilling Anderson

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引用次数: 0

Causal inference from clinical experience 从临床经验得出的因果推论

IF 1.3 1区哲学

PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES Pub Date : 2024-12-19 DOI: 10.1007/s11098-024-02264-x

Hamed Tabatabaei Ghomi, Jacob Stegenga

引用次数: 0

Evaluating action possibilities: a procedural metacognitive view of intentional omissions 评估行动的可能性：对有意遗漏的程序性元认知观点

IF 1.3 1区哲学

PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES Pub Date : 2024-12-19 DOI: 10.1007/s11098-024-02263-y

Kaisa Kärki

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引用次数: 0

Overdetermination and causal connections 过度决定和因果关系

IF 1.3 1区哲学

PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES Pub Date : 2024-12-19 DOI: 10.1007/s11098-024-02253-0

Ezra Rubenstein

引用次数: 0