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Blameworthiness Implies ‘Ought not’ 应受谴责意味着 "不应该
IF 1.3 1区 哲学
PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES Pub Date : 2024-07-04 DOI: 10.1007/s11098-024-02162-2
Simon-Pierre Chevarie-Cossette
{"title":"Blameworthiness Implies ‘Ought not’","authors":"Simon-Pierre Chevarie-Cossette","doi":"10.1007/s11098-024-02162-2","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-024-02162-2","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Here is a crucial principle for debates about moral luck, responsibility, and free will: a subject is blameworthy for an act only if, in acting, she did what she ought not to have done. That is, ‘blameworthiness’ implies ‘ought not’ (BION). There are some good reasons to accept BION, but whether we accept it mainly depends on complex questions about the objectivity of ought and the subjectivity of blameworthiness. This paper offers an exploratory defence of BION: it gives three <i>prima facie</i> reasons to accept it, provides a plausible interpretation of it, and shows how holding out against objections can yield fruitful lessons. Five objections to BION are considered: the objection from conscience, from reasons, from suberogation, from objectivity, and from excuses. Their main problem is to either over-subjectify blameworthiness or to over-objectify obligations. To accept BION, we must occupy a desirable middle ground.</p>","PeriodicalId":48305,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2024-07-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141545806","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Locative grounding harmony 定位接地和谐
IF 1.3 1区 哲学
PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES Pub Date : 2024-07-01 DOI: 10.1007/s11098-024-02171-1
Samuel Baron, Kristie Miller, Jonathan Tallant
{"title":"Locative grounding harmony","authors":"Samuel Baron, Kristie Miller, Jonathan Tallant","doi":"10.1007/s11098-024-02171-1","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-024-02171-1","url":null,"abstract":"<p>In this paper, we explore locative grounding harmony, according to which the location of the grounds mirrors the location of the grounded. We proceed in three stages. First, we clarify the notion of locative harmony and describe different locative harmony principles. Second, we offer two arguments for the claim that grounding between physically located entities obeys principles of locative harmony. Third, we consider and respond to a range of cases that seem to show that grounding relations between physically located entities do not obey such principles. We conclude that grounding between such entities obeys locative harmony.</p>","PeriodicalId":48305,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2024-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141489541","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Artificial consciousness: a perspective from the free energy principle 人工意识：从自由能原理的角度看问题
IF 1.3 1区 哲学
PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES Pub Date : 2024-06-26 DOI: 10.1007/s11098-024-02182-y
Wanja Wiese
{"title":"Artificial consciousness: a perspective from the free energy principle","authors":"Wanja Wiese","doi":"10.1007/s11098-024-02182-y","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-024-02182-y","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Does the assumption of a weak form of computational functionalism, according to which the right form of neural computation is sufficient for consciousness, entail that a digital computational simulation of such neural computations is conscious? Or must this computational simulation be implemented in the right way, in order to replicate consciousness?</p><p>From the perspective of Karl Friston’s free energy principle, self-organising systems (such as living organisms) share a set of properties that could be realised in artificial systems, but are not instantiated by computers with a classical (von Neumann) architecture. I argue that at least one of these properties, viz. a certain kind of causal flow, can be used to draw a distinction between systems that merely simulate, and those that actually replicate consciousness.</p>","PeriodicalId":48305,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2024-06-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141453121","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Knowledge without dogmatism 没有教条主义的知识
IF 1.3 1区 哲学
PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES Pub Date : 2024-06-25 DOI: 10.1007/s11098-024-02159-x
Earl Conee
{"title":"Knowledge without dogmatism","authors":"Earl Conee","doi":"10.1007/s11098-024-02159-x","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-024-02159-x","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Rachel Fraser, Gilbert Harman, Saul Kripke, and Maria Lasonen-Aarnio have offered arguments for paradoxical implications of knowledge. The arguments contend that knowing a proposition justifies believing it dogmatically, or dogmatically maintaining confidence in it, or dogmatically intending to continue to believe it. Yet it is quite doubtful that knowing could justify any sort of dogmatism. The arguments will be assessed. We will see why knowledge does not justify being dogmatic. The reason is essentially that deferring to our evidence is never dogmatic, and knowledge never overrides or undercuts the justification that derives from our evidence.</p>","PeriodicalId":48305,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2024-06-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141453171","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Ability predicates, or there and back again 能力谓词，或去而复返
IF 1.3 1区 哲学
PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES Pub Date : 2024-06-21 DOI: 10.1007/s11098-024-02178-8
Julian J. Schloeder
{"title":"Ability predicates, or there and back again","authors":"Julian J. Schloeder","doi":"10.1007/s11098-024-02178-8","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-024-02178-8","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Predicates like <i>knowable</i>, <i>believable</i> or <i>evincible</i> each are associated with Fitch-like paradoxes. Given some plausible assumptions, the <i>prima facie</i> reasonable hypotheses that <i>what is true is knowable/believable/evincible</i> entail, respectively, the decidedly unreasonable conclusions that <i>what is true is known/believed/evinced</i>. I argue that all Fitch-like paradoxes admit of a common diagnosis and give a uniform semantics for predicates like <i>knowable</i> that avoids the paradoxes while accounting for the intuitive meaning of these predicates. Moreover, I argue that a semantics of the same shape is to be given to similar predicates like <i>erasable</i> or <i>legible</i>, whose simple analyses likewise face broadly Fitch-like problems. This semantics also highlights and explains the context-sensitive nature of such predicates.</p>","PeriodicalId":48305,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2024-06-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141439853","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Egyptology and fanaticism 埃及学与狂热
IF 1.3 1区 哲学
PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES Pub Date : 2024-06-21 DOI: 10.1007/s11098-024-02180-0
Hayden Wilkinson
{"title":"Egyptology and fanaticism","authors":"Hayden Wilkinson","doi":"10.1007/s11098-024-02180-0","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-024-02180-0","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Various decision theories share a troubling implication. They imply that, for any finite amount of value, it would be better to wager it all for a vanishingly small probability of some greater value. Counterintuitive as it might be, this <i>fanaticism</i> has seemingly compelling independent arguments in its favour. In this paper, I consider perhaps the most <i>prima facie</i> compelling such argument: an <i>Egyptology argument</i> (an analogue of the Egyptology argument from population ethics). I show that, despite recent objections from Russell (Noûs, 2023) and Goodsell (Analysis 81(3):420–426, 2021), the argument’s premises can be justified and defended, and the argument itself remains compelling.</p>","PeriodicalId":48305,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2024-06-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141453156","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
What does nihilism tell us about modal logic? 虚无主义对模态逻辑有何启示？
IF 1.3 1区 哲学
PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES Pub Date : 2024-06-21 DOI: 10.1007/s11098-024-02166-y
Christopher James Masterman
{"title":"What does nihilism tell us about modal logic?","authors":"Christopher James Masterman","doi":"10.1007/s11098-024-02166-y","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-024-02166-y","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Brauer (Philos Stud 179:2751–2763, https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-022-01793-7, 2022) has recently argued that if it is possible that there is nothing, then the correct modal logic for metaphysical modality cannot include <span>D</span>. Here, I argue that Brauer’s argument is unsuccessful; or at the very least significantly weaker than presented. First, I outline a simple argument for why it is not possible that there is nothing. I note that this argument has a well-known solution involving the distinction between truth in and truth at a possible world. However, I then argue that once the semantics presupposed by Brauer’s argument is reformulated in terms of truth at a world, we have good reasons to think that a crucial semantic premise in Brauer’s argument should be rejected in favour of an alternative. Brauer’s argument is, however, no longer valid with this alternative premise. Thus, plausibly Brauer’s argument against <span>D</span> is only valid, if it is not sound.</p>","PeriodicalId":48305,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2024-06-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141439864","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Opaque Options 不透明选项
IF 1.3 1区 哲学
PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES Pub Date : 2024-06-21 DOI: 10.1007/s11098-024-02134-6
Kacper Kowalczyk, Aidan B. Penn
{"title":"Opaque Options","authors":"Kacper Kowalczyk, Aidan B. Penn","doi":"10.1007/s11098-024-02134-6","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-024-02134-6","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Moral options are permissions to do less than best, impartially speaking. In this paper, we investigate the challenge of reconciling moral options with the ideal of justifiability to each individual. We examine ex-post and ex-ante views of moral options and show how they might conflict with this ideal in single-choice and sequential-choice cases, respectively. We consider some ways of avoiding this conflict in sequential-choice cases, showing that they face significant problems.</p>","PeriodicalId":48305,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2024-06-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141439841","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
The inferential constraint and if $$varvec{phi }$$ ought $$varvec{phi }$$ problem 推理约束和如果 $$varvec{phi }$ 应该 $$varvec{phi }$ 的问题
IF 1.3 1区 哲学
PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES Pub Date : 2024-06-20 DOI: 10.1007/s11098-024-02127-5
Una Stojnić
{"title":"The inferential constraint and if $$varvec{phi }$$ ought $$varvec{phi }$$ problem","authors":"Una Stojnić","doi":"10.1007/s11098-024-02127-5","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-024-02127-5","url":null,"abstract":"<p>The standard semantics for modality, together with the influential restrictor analysis of conditionals (Kratzer, 1986, 2012) renders conditional <i>ought</i> claims like “If John’s stealing, he ought to be stealing” trivially true. While this might seem like a problem specifically for the restrictor analysis, the issue is far more general. Any account must predict that modals in the consequent of a conditional sometimes receive obligatorily unrestricted interpretation, as in the example above, but sometimes appear restricted, as in, e.g., “If John’s speeding, he ought to pay the fine.” And the problem runs deeper, for there are non-conditional variants of the data. Thus, the solution cannot lie in adopting a particular analysis of conditionals, nor a specific account of the interaction between conditionals and modals. Indeed, with minimal assumptions, the standard account of modality will render a myriad of claims about what one ought to, must, or may, do trivially true. Worse, the problem extends to a wide range of non-deontic modalities, including metaphysical modality. But the disaster has a remedy. I argue that the source of the problem for the standard account lies in its failure to capture an inferential evidence constraint encoded in the meaning of a wide range of modal constructions. I offer an account that captures this constraint, and show it provides a general and independently motivated solution to the problem.\u0000</p>","PeriodicalId":48305,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2024-06-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141430384","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Powers, persistence, and the problem of temporary intrinsics 权力、持久性和临时内在要素问题
IF 1.3 1区 哲学
PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES Pub Date : 2024-06-19 DOI: 10.1007/s11098-024-02157-z
Sophie R. Allen
{"title":"Powers, persistence, and the problem of temporary intrinsics","authors":"Sophie R. Allen","doi":"10.1007/s11098-024-02157-z","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-024-02157-z","url":null,"abstract":"<p>David Lewis uses the problem of temporary intrinsics to motivate a perdurantist account of persistence in which four-dimensional individuals consist of temporal parts. Other philosophers use his argument to conclude that apparently persisting individuals are collections of temporal stages. In this paper, I investigate whether this argument is as effective in an ontology in which properties are causal powers and thus how seriously the problem should be taken. I go back to first principles to examine the ways in which individuals can change within an ontology of powers and then consider whether any of these ways are compatible with Lewis’s problem. I conclude that if powers are intrinsic, they are not temporary; and if they are temporary, they are not fully intrinsic. However, the situation with respect to changes in which powers are manifesting is not so clear cut, and so I explore how different conceptions of manifestation affect whether the problem of temporary intrinsics applies and what the powers theorist may say about them.</p>","PeriodicalId":48305,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2024-06-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141430475","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
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