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Epistemic luminosity, factives, and anti-factives 认识的明晰性，事实和反事实
IF 1.3 1区 哲学
PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES Pub Date : 2026-06-06 DOI: 10.1007/s11098-026-02504-2
Alexander Dinges, Julia Zakkou
{"title":"Epistemic luminosity, factives, and anti-factives","authors":"Alexander Dinges, Julia Zakkou","doi":"10.1007/s11098-026-02504-2","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-026-02504-2","url":null,"abstract":"KK, or Epistemic Luminosity, is the thesis that knowledge is transparent. While unpopular for quite some time, KK has lately had a comeback. Most of the discussion aims to defuse anti KK arguments concerning inexact knowledge and the norm of assertion. Dorst (Mind 128(512):1227–1259, 2019), however, presents an entirely novel argument for KK. He argues that conditionals of the form ‘If <inline-formula><tex-math>documentclass[12pt]{minimal} usepackage{amsmath} usepackage{wasysym} usepackage{amsfonts} usepackage{amssymb} usepackage{amsbsy} usepackage{mathrsfs} usepackage{upgreek} setlength{oddsidemargin}{-69pt} begin{document}$$lnot$$end{document}</tex-math></inline-formula>Kp, then p’, such as ‘If I don’t know that Padua is in Italy, it’s in Italy’, are strange and that KK can explain why. In this paper, we argue that this explanation fails. If we accept it, we cannot explain why seemingly similar conditionals of the form ‘If <inline-formula><tex-math>documentclass[12pt]{minimal} usepackage{amsmath} usepackage{wasysym} usepackage{amsfonts} usepackage{amssymb} usepackage{amsbsy} usepackage{mathrsfs} usepackage{upgreek} setlength{oddsidemargin}{-69pt} begin{document}$$lnot$$end{document}</tex-math></inline-formula>FBp, then <inline-formula><tex-math>documentclass[12pt]{minimal} usepackage{amsmath} usepackage{wasysym} usepackage{amsfonts} usepackage{amssymb} usepackage{amsbsy} usepackage{mathrsfs} usepackage{upgreek} setlength{oddsidemargin}{-69pt} begin{document}$$lnot$$end{document}</tex-math></inline-formula>p’, such as ‘If I don’t falsely believe that Padua is in France, it’s not in France’, are strange as well. Along the way, we offer further support for a relevance based account of the strangeness of both types of conditionals.","PeriodicalId":48305,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES","volume":"64 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2026-06-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"148355649","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Owning failure: reason-responsiveness and responsibility for failed actions 承认失败：对失败行为的理性反应和责任
IF 1.3 1区 哲学
PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES Pub Date : 2026-05-30 DOI: 10.1007/s11098-026-02555-5
Ulrike Heuer
{"title":"Owning failure: reason-responsiveness and responsibility for failed actions","authors":"Ulrike Heuer","doi":"10.1007/s11098-026-02555-5","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-026-02555-5","url":null,"abstract":"On some views of responsibility, the core case of actions for which we can be responsible are intentional actions or actions done for reasons. But our ordinary understanding of responsibility is broader: it includes responsibility for at least some failed actions when the failure is unintentional or inadvertent. I propose an account of responsibility for such failings based on the notion of control we have over our actions through skills and abilities. We are responsible for what we do, if an action is an exercise of the agent’s relevant abilities, be it successful or failed.","PeriodicalId":48305,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES","volume":"155 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2026-05-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"148286050","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Higher-order metaphysics of ground: introduction and overview 高阶地的形而上学：介绍与概述
IF 1.3 1区 哲学
PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES Pub Date : 2026-05-30 DOI: 10.1007/s11098-026-02535-9
Lukas Skiba
{"title":"Higher-order metaphysics of ground: introduction and overview","authors":"Lukas Skiba","doi":"10.1007/s11098-026-02535-9","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-026-02535-9","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":48305,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES","volume":"14 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2026-05-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"148289643","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
From belief change to modality: Epistemic semantics for modal and conditional logic 从信念变化到情态：情态与条件逻辑的认知语义
IF 1.3 1区 哲学
PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES Pub Date : 2026-05-30 DOI: 10.1007/s11098-025-02459-w
Niklas Dahl
{"title":"From belief change to modality: Epistemic semantics for modal and conditional logic","authors":"Niklas Dahl","doi":"10.1007/s11098-025-02459-w","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-025-02459-w","url":null,"abstract":"This paper sets out to extend the epistemic semantics presented in Dahl (2023) to modal and conditional logics. To do so, I extend the notion of belief expansion systems, inspired by the AGM-model of belief change, to include <jats:italic>belief revision</jats:italic> , and use the resulting structures as models for both conditional and modal logic. In the first case, this applies the well-known approach to conditionals initiated by Gärdenfors (1978), but in a weaker setting which doesn’t assume an underlying logic. As such, we get semantics for both classical conditional logic and the intuitionistic conditionals studied by Weiss (2019). For modal logics, I use the condition that <jats:inline-formula> <jats:tex-math>$$Box varphi$$</jats:tex-math> </jats:inline-formula> is accepted if and only if <jats:inline-formula> <jats:tex-math>$$varphi$$</jats:tex-math> </jats:inline-formula> is accepted under every belief revision. As a result of this system of semantics, we get soundness and completeness theorems for both classical and non-classical systems of modal and conditional logic on the basis of a single type of structure. Finally, I briefly discuss how models based on belief change can still be thought to explain the semantics of objective modal claims.","PeriodicalId":48305,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES","volume":"22 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2026-05-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"148286085","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
The changing content of remembering 记忆内容的变化
IF 1.3 1区 哲学
PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES Pub Date : 2026-05-27 DOI: 10.1007/s11098-026-02552-8
Bence Nanay
{"title":"The changing content of remembering","authors":"Bence Nanay","doi":"10.1007/s11098-026-02552-8","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-026-02552-8","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":48305,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES","volume":"37 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2026-05-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"148286053","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
It might be nothing 可能什么都没有
IF 1.3 1区 哲学
PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES Pub Date : 2026-05-27 DOI: 10.1007/s11098-026-02529-7
Imogen Dickie
{"title":"It might be nothing","authors":"Imogen Dickie","doi":"10.1007/s11098-026-02529-7","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-026-02529-7","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":48305,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES","volume":"70 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2026-05-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"148286054","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Defensive debunking arguments: Why Moorean objections to the moral error theory fail 防御性揭穿论据：为什么摩尔对道德错误理论的反对失败了
IF 1.3 1区 哲学
PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES Pub Date : 2026-05-20 DOI: 10.1007/s11098-026-02534-w
Declan O’Gara
{"title":"Defensive debunking arguments: Why Moorean objections to the moral error theory fail","authors":"Declan O’Gara","doi":"10.1007/s11098-026-02534-w","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-026-02534-w","url":null,"abstract":"Debunking arguments in metaethics are generally viewed as arguments against moral realism. In this paper, I distinguish these kinds of arguments, which I label <jats:italic>offensive</jats:italic> debunking arguments, from <jats:italic>defensive</jats:italic> debunking arguments, which are used to defuse specific pieces of evidence. I then argue that moral error theorists can use defensive debunking arguments to undermine Moorean arguments against the view by providing plausible debunking explanations for our moral beliefs. Crucially, these explanations have a much lower burden of proof than in explanations within offensive debunking arguments. Rather than needing to meet a high empirical bar, these explanations merely need to provide a plausible explanation for our moral beliefs on which they are not truth tracking. Not only does this distinction strengthen extant responses to Moorean arguments by showing that they have a low burden of proof, but it also helps to show why recent versions of the Moorean objection fail.","PeriodicalId":48305,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES","volume":"47 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2026-05-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"148286086","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Well-being and psychological continuity 幸福感和心理连续性
IF 1.3 1区 哲学
PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES Pub Date : 2026-05-20 DOI: 10.1007/s11098-026-02537-7
Travis Rebello
{"title":"Well-being and psychological continuity","authors":"Travis Rebello","doi":"10.1007/s11098-026-02537-7","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-026-02537-7","url":null,"abstract":"This paper tries to support the view that the permanent severing of one’s psychological connections across time is a distinctive harm; we are harmed when our mental lives, either in whole or in part, are prevented from being carried forward or developed continuously into the future. To support this view, I aim to show that it offers a better solution to an otherwise vexing explanatory problem than plausible alternatives, and at least as good a solution as the leading alternative. The problem is that of explaining why it would sometimes be rational to refuse life-saving treatment where such treatment would entail the loss of one’s memory and personality. Among the alternative explanations I consider is the view—advanced by Jeff McMahan and others—that the appropriateness of prudential concern for one’s future self is partly determined by the degree of psychological unity one experiences over time.","PeriodicalId":48305,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES","volume":"11 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2026-05-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"148286057","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Free will, luck and control 自由意志，运气和控制
IF 1.3 1区 哲学
PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES Pub Date : 2026-05-16 DOI: 10.1007/s11098-026-02531-z
John Wright
{"title":"Free will, luck and control","authors":"John Wright","doi":"10.1007/s11098-026-02531-z","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-026-02531-z","url":null,"abstract":"One challenge to the notion of libertarian free will arises from the Luck Argument. This argument has been claimed to undermine the idea that if an agent only makes probable a particular decision, then the agent is not in control of the decision. The present paper argues the claims of the Luck Argument do not seem to seem very plausible with respect to the choices we make in response to pleasure and pain. In the paper it is argued that the way we respond to pleasure and pain provides us with a way of responding to the influential version of the Luck Argument due to Peter van Inwagen. The approach suggested here is contrasted with a response to the problem by Alfred Mele. It is also argued that the approached suggested here enables us to deal with a reformulation of the argument due to Seth Shabo. It is concluded that focussing on our responses to pleasure and pain is a promising way of dealing with the challenge to libertarian free will arising from the Luck Argument.","PeriodicalId":48305,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES","volume":"76 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2026-05-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"148286088","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Non-Humeanism and determinism 非人道主义和决定论
IF 1.3 1区 哲学
PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES Pub Date : 2026-05-16 DOI: 10.1007/s11098-026-02536-8
David Builes
{"title":"Non-Humeanism and determinism","authors":"David Builes","doi":"10.1007/s11098-026-02536-8","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-026-02536-8","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":48305,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES","volume":"43 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2026-05-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"148286058","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
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