{"title":"理解和可能的解释:为什么他们不能成为朋友?","authors":"Philippe Verreault-Julien, Till Grüne-Yanoff","doi":"10.1007/s11098-024-02251-2","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<p>In the current debate on the relation between how-possibly explanations (HPEs) and understanding, two seemingly irreconcilable positions have emerged, which either deny or assert HPEs’ contribution to understanding. We argue, in contrast, that there is substantial room for reconciliation between these positions. First, we show that a shared assumption is unfounded: HPEs can be interpreted as being correct explanations. Second, we argue that what we call the standard account is actually compatible with the claim that HPEs may improve understanding. Our analysis not only indicates that there is room for reconciliation, but also specifies the potential remaining disagreements.</p>","PeriodicalId":48305,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES","volume":"63 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.1000,"publicationDate":"2024-12-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Understanding and how-possibly explanations: Why can’t they be friends?\",\"authors\":\"Philippe Verreault-Julien, Till Grüne-Yanoff\",\"doi\":\"10.1007/s11098-024-02251-2\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"<p>In the current debate on the relation between how-possibly explanations (HPEs) and understanding, two seemingly irreconcilable positions have emerged, which either deny or assert HPEs’ contribution to understanding. We argue, in contrast, that there is substantial room for reconciliation between these positions. First, we show that a shared assumption is unfounded: HPEs can be interpreted as being correct explanations. Second, we argue that what we call the standard account is actually compatible with the claim that HPEs may improve understanding. Our analysis not only indicates that there is room for reconciliation, but also specifies the potential remaining disagreements.</p>\",\"PeriodicalId\":48305,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES\",\"volume\":\"63 1\",\"pages\":\"\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":1.1000,\"publicationDate\":\"2024-12-26\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-024-02251-2\",\"RegionNum\":1,\"RegionCategory\":\"哲学\",\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"0\",\"JCRName\":\"PHILOSOPHY\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-024-02251-2","RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"0","JCRName":"PHILOSOPHY","Score":null,"Total":0}
Understanding and how-possibly explanations: Why can’t they be friends?
In the current debate on the relation between how-possibly explanations (HPEs) and understanding, two seemingly irreconcilable positions have emerged, which either deny or assert HPEs’ contribution to understanding. We argue, in contrast, that there is substantial room for reconciliation between these positions. First, we show that a shared assumption is unfounded: HPEs can be interpreted as being correct explanations. Second, we argue that what we call the standard account is actually compatible with the claim that HPEs may improve understanding. Our analysis not only indicates that there is room for reconciliation, but also specifies the potential remaining disagreements.
期刊介绍:
Philosophical Studies was founded in 1950 by Herbert Feigl and Wilfrid Sellars to provide a periodical dedicated to work in analytic philosophy. The journal remains devoted to the publication of papers in exclusively analytic philosophy. Papers applying formal techniques to philosophical problems are welcome. The principal aim is to publish articles that are models of clarity and precision in dealing with significant philosophical issues. It is intended that readers of the journal will be kept abreast of the central issues and problems of contemporary analytic philosophy.
Double-blind review procedure
The journal follows a double-blind reviewing procedure. Authors are therefore requested to place their name and affiliation on a separate page. Self-identifying citations and references in the article text should either be avoided or left blank when manuscripts are first submitted. Authors are responsible for reinserting self-identifying citations and references when manuscripts are prepared for final submission.