PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES最新文献_第8页

Consequentializing ends Consequentializing结束

IF 1.3 1区哲学

PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES Pub Date : 2026-05-16 DOI: 10.1007/s11098-026-02492-3

Nolan Art Whitaker

引用次数: 0

Aspiration and seeking understanding 渴望与寻求理解

IF 1.3 1区哲学

PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES Pub Date : 2026-05-09 DOI: 10.1007/s11098-026-02494-1

Katelyn E. O’Dell

{"title":"Aspiration and seeking understanding","authors":"Katelyn E. O’Dell","doi":"10.1007/s11098-026-02494-1","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-026-02494-1","url":null,"abstract":"There is a certain kind of work many of us do on ourselves, in which we effortfully change something core about who we are and what we value. Call this work toward improved valuing, ‘aspiration,’ following Agnes Callard. This paper offers an account of aspiration. This account, which I’ll call the Seeking Understanding account, differs from Callard’s own. As such, it avoids a problem I raise for a view like Callard’s: on it, the aspirant is problematically self-focused. Callard is aware of this objection and responds to it, but, I argue, her response is not adequate. To set up the alternative account of aspiration, I develop a distinction increasingly theorized in epistemology: the knowledge/understanding distinction. I offer reasons for thinking of evaluative understanding as requiring not just intellectual but also affective and motivational engagement with its target. According to the Seeking Understanding account, aspiration is seeking this sort of evaluative understanding. After illuminating the contours of the account, I raise a challenge for it in the form of an interesting question that lacks a ready answer. I take initial steps toward an answer, including an important clarification about the Seeking Understanding account of aspiration.","PeriodicalId":48305,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES","volume":"253 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2026-05-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"148286089","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Attitudes of trust: experimental evidence for a morally relevant conception of trust 信任态度：与道德相关的信任概念的实验证据

IF 1.3 1区哲学

PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES Pub Date : 2026-05-05 DOI: 10.1007/s11098-026-02553-7

Sareh Pouryousefi, Caitlin C. Belfiore, Annika Hillebrandt, Jonathan Tallant

{"title":"Attitudes of trust: experimental evidence for a morally relevant conception of trust","authors":"Sareh Pouryousefi, Caitlin C. Belfiore, Annika Hillebrandt, Jonathan Tallant","doi":"10.1007/s11098-026-02553-7","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-026-02553-7","url":null,"abstract":"A multi-disciplinary body of research has long recognised trust as a pivotal feature of social and economic exchange. Empirical studies of trust by psychologists, sociologists, political scientists, and economists have examined different features of trust. Within this literature, the structure, components, preconditions, and implications of trust have received much attention. However, a question that has received comparatively little attention in the empirical literature is whether and to what extent trust is morally significant. Moral dimensions of trust have been discussed extensively by philosophers, who focus predominantly on interpersonal relationships involving trust. The purpose of this paper is to offer an experimental study of a dominant philosophical distinction between trust and mere reliance. Our findings suggest that the position taken in the philosophical literature is correct; there is a recognisable difference between trust and mere reliance, and, crucially, trust, but not reliance, has a moral dimension. These findings have significant implications for the existing body of empirical work on trust outside philosophy. They also help set the philosophy of trust subfield onto firm(er) foundations.","PeriodicalId":48305,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES","volume":"36 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2026-05-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"148355654","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Is the irrationalist story of polarization truly undesirable? 这种非理性主义的两极分化真的不受欢迎吗？

IF 1.3 1区哲学

PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES Pub Date : 2026-04-29 DOI: 10.1007/s11098-026-02525-x

Martina Calderisi

引用次数: 0

Rethinking the credal basis of rational judgment and suspension: a non-Bayesian threshold view 重新思考理性判断和暂停的信任基础：一个非贝叶斯阈值观点

IF 1.3 1区哲学

PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES Pub Date : 2026-04-29 DOI: 10.1007/s11098-025-02405-w

Berit Brogaard

引用次数: 0

A calibration theorem for risk-weighted expected utility theory 风险加权期望效用理论的一个校正定理