A simpler model of judgment: on Sosa’s Epistemic Explanations

IF 1.1 1区 哲学 0 PHILOSOPHY
Antonia Peacocke
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引用次数: 0

Abstract

In Epistemic Explanations, Sosa continues to defend a model of judgment he has long endorsed. On this complex model of judgment, judgment aims not only at correctness but also at aptness of a kind of alethic affirmation. He offers three arguments for the claim that we need this model of judgment instead of a simpler model, on which judgment aims only at correctness. The first argument cites the need to exclude knowledge-spoiling luck from apt judgment. The second argument uses the complex model to distinguish judgment from mere guessing. The third argument involves the assessment of suspension of judgment as a performance. This paper shows why none of these arguments succeeds, and so recommends adopting the simpler model of judgment.

一个更简单的判断模式:论索萨的认识论解释
在《认识论解释》一书中,索萨继续为他长期支持的判断模式辩护。在这种复杂的判断模式下,判断的目的不仅在于正确,而且在于一种真性肯定的适宜性。他提供了三个论据来证明我们需要这种判断模式,而不是一种更简单的模式,在这种模式下,判断只针对正确性。第一种观点认为,需要将破坏知识的运气排除在恰当的判断之外。第二个论点使用复杂模型来区分判断和猜测。第三个论点涉及将中止判决作为一种履行的评估。本文说明了为什么这些论点都没有成功,因此建议采用更简单的判断模型。
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来源期刊
PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES
PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES PHILOSOPHY-
CiteScore
2.60
自引率
7.70%
发文量
127
期刊介绍: Philosophical Studies was founded in 1950 by Herbert Feigl and Wilfrid Sellars to provide a periodical dedicated to work in analytic philosophy. The journal remains devoted to the publication of papers in exclusively analytic philosophy. Papers applying formal techniques to philosophical problems are welcome. The principal aim is to publish articles that are models of clarity and precision in dealing with significant philosophical issues. It is intended that readers of the journal will be kept abreast of the central issues and problems of contemporary analytic philosophy. Double-blind review procedure The journal follows a double-blind reviewing procedure. Authors are therefore requested to place their name and affiliation on a separate page. Self-identifying citations and references in the article text should either be avoided or left blank when manuscripts are first submitted. Authors are responsible for reinserting self-identifying citations and references when manuscripts are prepared for final submission.
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