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引用次数: 0
摘要
我们主要论证三个主张。首先,句子'A 和 B 应该φ 和ψ'可以表达我们称之为联合要求的主张:即复数 A 和 B 分别应该φ 和ψ的主张。其次,这种联合要求的真值可能不同于'A应该φ'和'B应该ψ'这一对要求的真值。这是因为 A 和 B 共同应该做的事可能与他们各自应该做的事不同:A 和 B 共同应该φ 和ψ 分别是真的,但 A 应该φ 和 B 应该ψ 是假的;反之亦然。第三,两种著名的 "应该 "语义分析--马克-施罗德的关系语义学和安杰利卡-克拉泽尔的模态语义学--都可以模拟联合应该主张和这种真值差异。
What are we to do? Making sense of ‘joint ought’ talk
We argue for three main claims. First, the sentence ‘A and B ought to φ and ψ’ can express what we a call a joint-ought claim: the claim that the plurality A and B ought to φ and ψ respectively. Second, the truth-value of this joint-ought claim can differ from the truth-value of the pair of claims ‘A ought to φ’ and ‘B ought to ψ.’ This is because what A and B jointly ought to do can diverge from what they individually ought to do: it may be true that A and B jointly ought to φ and ψ respectively, yet false that A ought to φ and false that B ought to ψ; and vice-versa. Third, either of two prominent semantic analyses of ‘ought’—Mark Schroeder’s relational semantics, and Angelika Kratzer’s modal semantics—can model joint-ought claims and this difference in truth-value.
期刊介绍:
Philosophical Studies was founded in 1950 by Herbert Feigl and Wilfrid Sellars to provide a periodical dedicated to work in analytic philosophy. The journal remains devoted to the publication of papers in exclusively analytic philosophy. Papers applying formal techniques to philosophical problems are welcome. The principal aim is to publish articles that are models of clarity and precision in dealing with significant philosophical issues. It is intended that readers of the journal will be kept abreast of the central issues and problems of contemporary analytic philosophy.
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