默认保留:认识理性与实践理性的区别

IF 1.1 1区 哲学 0 PHILOSOPHY
Chris Tucker
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引用次数: 0

摘要

在实践理性中,如果替代行动的两个理由是并列的,那么任一行动都是*可允许的*。在认识论理性中,我们得到了认识论纽带数据:如果相信和不相信的理由是一致的,那么暂不做出判断就是*必须的。我认为,这种差异可以用默认偏见的不同来解释。实践理性偏向于可允许性。除非情况的具体特征(如适用的成本和收益)使某一行为被禁止,否则该行为就是被允许的。与此相反,认识理性偏向于暂不做出判断。除非情况的具体特征(如证据)使相信或不相信成为可能,否则就需要暂不做出判断。这种差异解释了认识论纽带数据。当相信和不相信的理由同样重要时,它们就会相互抵消。但是,剩下的唯一理由就是默认理由或默认偏见,即暂不做出判断。既然这是唯一剩下的理由,它就要求我们不做判断。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Withhold by default: a difference between epistemic and practical rationality

In practical rationality, if two reasons for alternative actions are tied, then either action is *permissible*. In epistemic rationality, we get the Epistemic Ties Datum: if the reasons for belief and disbelief are tied, then withholding judgment is *required*. I argue that this difference is explained by a difference in default biases. Practical rationality is biased toward permissibility. An action is permissible unless the specific features of the situation (e.g., the costs and benefits that apply) make it prohibited. In contrast, epistemic rationality is biased toward withholding judgment. Withholding judgment is required unless the specific features of the situation (e.g., the evidence) makes belief or disbelief permissible. This difference explains the Epistemic Ties Datum. When the reasons for belief and disbelief are equally weighty, they cancel each other out. But then the only remaining reason is the default reason, or default bias, to withhold judgment. Since it is the only remaining reason, it requires us to withhold judgment.

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来源期刊
PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES
PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES PHILOSOPHY-
CiteScore
2.60
自引率
7.70%
发文量
127
期刊介绍: Philosophical Studies was founded in 1950 by Herbert Feigl and Wilfrid Sellars to provide a periodical dedicated to work in analytic philosophy. The journal remains devoted to the publication of papers in exclusively analytic philosophy. Papers applying formal techniques to philosophical problems are welcome. The principal aim is to publish articles that are models of clarity and precision in dealing with significant philosophical issues. It is intended that readers of the journal will be kept abreast of the central issues and problems of contemporary analytic philosophy. Double-blind review procedure The journal follows a double-blind reviewing procedure. Authors are therefore requested to place their name and affiliation on a separate page. Self-identifying citations and references in the article text should either be avoided or left blank when manuscripts are first submitted. Authors are responsible for reinserting self-identifying citations and references when manuscripts are prepared for final submission.
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