Mariana Vences, Filipe Loureiro, Teresa Garcia-Marques
{"title":"Do We Really Believe That “More Is Better”? Mapping Implicit and Explicit Associations Between Quantity and Quality","authors":"Mariana Vences, Filipe Loureiro, Teresa Garcia-Marques","doi":"10.1002/bdm.2403","DOIUrl":"10.1002/bdm.2403","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 \u0000 <p>The dimensions of quantity and quality play a crucial role in shaping our judgments and decisions. How these dimensions are perceived in relation to each other is of extreme importance when it comes to those decisions and judgments. The presumed positive link between them, embodied in the notion that “the more, the better,” is a common thread in decision-making. However, owing to the diverse contexts within which decisions unfold, individuals appear to acquire the understanding that such relationship is not universally applicable, leading to profess the belief that “quantity is not quality.” This dichotomy establishes a dissociation between the implicit and explicit associations formed regarding the connection between quantity and quality. In two studies, we put this hypothesis to the test. Initially, we explore the nature of this association through an Implicit Association Test (Study 1), followed by an investigation into the modulation of this association within an ecological context (Study 2). The results show that, explicitly, participants assert no inherent relationship between quantity and quality. However, at an implicit level, with consequential impacts on behavior, a robust positive association between quantity and quality persists, providing challenging to overturn.</p>\u0000 </div>","PeriodicalId":48112,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Behavioral Decision Making","volume":"37 4","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.8,"publicationDate":"2024-08-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141939770","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Robert J. Weijers, Jonas Wachner, Björn B. de Koning
{"title":"The Effect of a Default Nudge on Experienced and Expected Autonomy: A Field Study on Food Donation","authors":"Robert J. Weijers, Jonas Wachner, Björn B. de Koning","doi":"10.1002/bdm.2404","DOIUrl":"10.1002/bdm.2404","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Default nudges—making the desired option the standard option—are often criticized for hampering autonomy. However, laboratory research suggests this expectation of autonomy loss is not reflected in nudgees' experienced autonomy. In this study, we investigated whether this finding translates to a real-world setting by implementing a default nudge to increase food donations in the supermarket (Experiment 1). Upon entering the supermarket, customers were asked to donate a food item for charity and were handed a shopping cart/basket that was empty (control) or contained a food item meant for donation (default nudge). Donations were collected after checkout, and customers rated their experienced autonomy of their choice to donate. We replicated this study and added a vignette condition portraying the default nudge to measure expected autonomy for the same situation (Experiment 2). The results show the default nudge reduced participants' <i>expected</i> autonomy but not their <i>experienced</i> autonomy, shedding new light on the relation between nudging and autonomy. Furthermore, this novel form of the default nudge was found to be successful in increasing food donations in the supermarket, further expanding the field where this nudge has been successful.</p>","PeriodicalId":48112,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Behavioral Decision Making","volume":"37 4","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.8,"publicationDate":"2024-08-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1002/bdm.2404","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141939769","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Caroline K. Børsting, Christian T. Elbæk, Panagiotis Mitkidis, Guy Hochman
{"title":"Resource Constraints Lead to Biased Attention but Decrease Unethical Behavior","authors":"Caroline K. Børsting, Christian T. Elbæk, Panagiotis Mitkidis, Guy Hochman","doi":"10.1002/bdm.2402","DOIUrl":"10.1002/bdm.2402","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Subjective experiences of resource scarcity can make individuals short-term oriented, capture attention, and trigger feelings of unfairness. However, the impact of scarcity on information processing and ethical decision-making remains poorly understood. This eye-tracking study explored how acute financial scarcity affects selective information search and ethical decision-making in an economic task with competing incentives (<i>N</i> = 60, 12,000 observations). Results revealed that participants experiencing financial scarcity displayed a strong attentional bias towards financially tempting information, although they ultimately did not behave more unethically. These findings might reveal a “moral boundary” dictating when attentional biases translate into decision-making. Our results contribute to understanding how individuals in scarcity contexts process and prioritize information in ethical decision-making, helping organizations and policymakers combat stereotypes surrounding resource-deprived individuals, and design evidence-based policy interventions promoting ethical behavior in financially scarce situations.</p>","PeriodicalId":48112,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Behavioral Decision Making","volume":"37 4","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.8,"publicationDate":"2024-07-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1002/bdm.2402","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141871376","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The Zero Effect: An Eye-Tracking Study of Affect and Motivation in Risky Choices","authors":"Jonas Ludwig, Alexander Jaudas, Anja Achtziger","doi":"10.1002/bdm.2400","DOIUrl":"10.1002/bdm.2400","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Decision makers often prefer safe wins over risky gambles, even if the latter promise higher payoffs than the former. One mechanism that explains this choice pattern is the certainty effect, whereby probabilities of 0 and 1 are interpreted accurately but intermediate probabilities are distorted by diminishing sensitivity. We tested an alternative explanation that was recently proposed, the idea that people would be motivated by avoiding zero outcomes rather than being attracted to sure gains. This zero-outcome aversion in gain-domain choices was called the zero effect. By analogy, we proposed that decision makers would approach zero outcomes in the loss domain. Two eye-tracking experiments investigated visual attention as a key component of the zero effect in the gain domain (Experiment 1) and the loss domain (Experiment 2). Choices were consistent with the zero effect. In the gain domain, gambles were chosen less frequently if they included a zero outcome. In contrast, zero-outcome gambles were chosen more frequently in the loss domain. Eye movements and pupillometry indicated that zero outcomes in both domains (a) were less frequently fixated than other outcomes and (b) were associated with increased arousal. We concluded that domain-specific affective responses to zero outcomes aligned with approach/avoidance motivation. These distinct motivations in turn biased information search and choice behavior.</p>","PeriodicalId":48112,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Behavioral Decision Making","volume":"37 3","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.8,"publicationDate":"2024-07-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1002/bdm.2400","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141769786","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"How Maximizers Estimate Their Decision Time: The Mediating Effect of Memory Reduction","authors":"He Huang, Hong Li","doi":"10.1002/bdm.2398","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1002/bdm.2398","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 \u0000 <p>Previous studies have divided people into maximizers and satisficers based on their tendency to seek the best in decision-making. In the present research, we aim to unravel the time estimation process of maximizers in decision-making through four studies. The results indicate that maximizers tend to underestimate the time spent in decision-making, which is due to the difference in their memory reduction for decision-related information compared to that of satisficers. Specifically, maximizers' memories of special information (rather than common information) become worse than those of satisficers, which leads to their underestimation of decision time. These findings provide a deeper understanding of how maximizers estimate their decision time, which offers important insights into how maximizers make their decisions. Overall, this research contributes to the literature by shedding new light on maximization from the perspective of memory.</p>\u0000 </div>","PeriodicalId":48112,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Behavioral Decision Making","volume":"37 3","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.8,"publicationDate":"2024-07-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141732573","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"When Half Is at Least 50%: Effect of “Framing” and Probability Level on Frequency Estimates","authors":"David R. Mandel, Megan Kelly","doi":"10.1002/bdm.2399","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1002/bdm.2399","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Expert judgment often involves estimating magnitudes, such as the frequency of deaths due to a pandemic. Three experiments (<i>N</i>s = 902, 431, and 755, respectively) were conducted to examine the effect of outcome framing (e.g., <i>half</i> of a threatened group expected to survive vs. die), probability level (low vs. high), and probability format (verbal, numeric, or combined) on the estimated frequency of survivals/deaths. Each experiment found an interactive effect of frame and probability level, which supported the hypothesis that forecasted outcomes received by participants were implicitly quantified as lower bounds (i.e., “<i>at least</i> half”). Responding in a manner consistent with a lower-bound “at least” interpretation was unrelated to incoherence (Experiments 1 and 2) and positively related to numeracy (Experiments 1 and 3), verbal reasoning (Experiment 3), and actively open-minded thinking (Experiments 2 and 3). The correlational results indicate that implicit lower bounding is an aspect of linguistic inference and not a cognitive error. Implications for research on framing effects are discussed.</p>","PeriodicalId":48112,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Behavioral Decision Making","volume":"37 3","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.8,"publicationDate":"2024-07-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1002/bdm.2399","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141584022","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Rebecca A. Olsen, Anne C. Macaskill, Maree J. Hunt
{"title":"Episodic Future Thinking Only Reduces Delay Discounting When Future Events Involve the Self","authors":"Rebecca A. Olsen, Anne C. Macaskill, Maree J. Hunt","doi":"10.1002/bdm.2397","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1002/bdm.2397","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Vividly imagining personally relevant, future episodes (episodic future thinking) reduces delay discounting, with potential to provide many applied benefits. It is not clear whether the events imagined must involve the self, or whether vividly imagining future events that will happen to another person would also reduce delay discounting. In the current study, two groups of students wrote about future events, we then cued them to vividly imagine these future events while making delay-amount trade-off decisions (e.g., <i>would you choose $500 now or $1000 in one year?</i>). One group imagined future events happening to themselves, and another group to a specific person they knew. We compared discounting to a control condition where participants were simply instructed to “choose.” Only the group that imagined personally relevant, future events demonstrated reduced delay discounting. This suggests that episodic future thinking more effectively reduces delay discounting when future events happen to the self rather than another person. The group that imagined personally relevant future events were not more able to report the experimental hypotheses suggesting that this difference was not primarily driven by demand characteristics.</p>","PeriodicalId":48112,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Behavioral Decision Making","volume":"37 3","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.8,"publicationDate":"2024-07-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1002/bdm.2397","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141536929","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Money Versus Time: The Effects of Social Media Exclusion on Mental Construal and Donation Behaviors","authors":"Dajun Li, Nan Zhang, Huihui Li","doi":"10.1002/bdm.2396","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1002/bdm.2396","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 \u0000 <p>The development of social media platforms has ushered in a new era in which online media interactions, such as Facebook and Twitter, have largely supplanted traditional means of interpersonal interaction. This has resulted in problems such as cyberbullying and social exclusion. Previous research has indicated that people who feel socially excluded react more positively to altruistic behaviors, which could effectively restore connection and happiness from the exclusion. This study investigates two distinct types of social media exclusion (being rejected vs. being ignored) to determine their subsequent donation preferences (money vs. time). In three substudies, this study explores donation behaviors and demonstrates that people who feel socially rejected (ignored) react more positively to the donation of money (time). Study 1 reveals that being rejected (ignored) by social media leads people to form low (high)-level mental construals, resulting in preferences for the donation of money (time). Study 2 examines how matching the exclusion type with the abstractness of appeals (abstract vs. concrete) affects donation preference. Similarly, Study 3 demonstrates the matching effects of exclusion type and the temporal distance of appeals (current vs. future) on subsequent charitable behaviors. Charitable fundraisers are advised to align their charitable appeals with people's construal levels to help these excluded media users not only reconnect their belonging with the community but also recover their happiness after the exclusion experiences.</p>\u0000 </div>","PeriodicalId":48112,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Behavioral Decision Making","volume":"37 3","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.8,"publicationDate":"2024-06-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141488647","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Framing the Default Option Right","authors":"Luc Meunier, Yashar Bashirzadeh, Sima Ohadi","doi":"10.1002/bdm.2395","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1002/bdm.2395","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Defaults are powerful nudges to shape individuals' behavior: In three experiments, including a large experiment using representative samples from five European countries (<i>n</i> = 4207), we show that they can significantly affect risk-taking by medium to large effect sizes. We also show that implementing a default nudge leads to a lower rating of the advice delivered by the wealth manager compared to no default, an effect that has a medium to large effect size. In addition, defaults the targeted individuals refuse result in lower advice ratings. These side effects call for caution before applying nudges and individualized defaults rather than a one-size-fits-all approach. Additionally, we find evidence pointing to two small effects of framing in default presentation. First, asking how much individuals want to invest in the risky asset emphasizes risk. It reduces investment in the risky asset compared to asking them how much they want to leave on the safe account, particularly for more risk-averse individuals. Second, asking individuals if they want to change a default allocation of 100% in the risky asset leads to more investment in the risky asset than asking them whether they accept such an allocation. Perceived wealth manager honesty appears to mediate the relationship between the default nudge and the rating of the advice.</p>","PeriodicalId":48112,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Behavioral Decision Making","volume":"37 3","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.0,"publicationDate":"2024-06-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1002/bdm.2395","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141286860","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Ulrike Senftleben, Martin Schoemann, Stefan Scherbaum
{"title":"Choice Repetition Bias in Intertemporal Choice: An Eye-Tracking Study","authors":"Ulrike Senftleben, Martin Schoemann, Stefan Scherbaum","doi":"10.1002/bdm.2388","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1002/bdm.2388","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Intertemporal choices (i.e., the choice between a sooner available but smaller reward and a later available but larger reward) were initially thought to reflect stable preferences for immediate or delayed rewards. However, recently, it has been shown that intertemporal choices are influenced by factors such as context variables and attentional processes. Here, we investigate if another factor, the choice repetition bias, affects decision making and attentional processes in intertemporal choice. The choice repetition bias is characterized by the tendency to repeat previous choices and to be slower when switching to an alternative choice. In a series of two experiments (including a preregistered, eye-tracking study), we find that the choice repetition bias exists in intertemporal choice. We also find tentative support for an early attentional bias towards the favored attribute dimension of the previous choice; however, this effect disappears when taking the whole decision process into account. This finding raises interesting questions about the cognitive processes underlying the choice repetition bias. In addition, we successfully replicate other attentional effects from the intertemporal choice literature (e.g., more fixations on monetary dimension, gaze cascade effect).</p>","PeriodicalId":48112,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Behavioral Decision Making","volume":"37 3","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.0,"publicationDate":"2024-05-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1002/bdm.2388","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141085079","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}