Journal of Behavioral Decision Making最新文献

{"title":"Correction to “The Mere Audience-Size Effect: How Incidental Audience Non-Normatively Influences the Perceived Product Quality”","authors":"","doi":"10.1002/bdm.70036","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1002/bdm.70036","url":null,"abstract":"<p>\u0000 <span>Qiu, T</span>, <span>Li, X</span>, <span>Lu, J</span>. <span>The Mere Audience-Size Effect: How Incidental Audience Non-Normatively Influences the Perceived Product Quality</span>. <i>Journal of Behavioral Decision Making</i> <span>2025</span>; <span>38</span>: e70022.\u0000 </p><p><b>FIGURE 4</b> Perceived product quality as a function of audience size and deliberation order in Study 5. Error bars indicate standard errors.</p><p>We apologize for this error.</p>","PeriodicalId":48112,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Behavioral Decision Making","volume":"38 4","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2025-07-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1002/bdm.70036","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144725662","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Intuition in Decision Making: Insights From Drift Diffusion Modeling","authors":"Tianqi Hu,&nbsp;Ilkka Leppänen,&nbsp;L. Alberto Franco","doi":"10.1002/bdm.70033","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1002/bdm.70033","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Research on intuition often produces conflicting results and suffers from reliability issues due to the lack of tools that can conclusively evaluate a person's latent intuitive position. It has been recently proposed that a decision maker's intuitive position can be evaluated by estimating parameters with sequential sampling models (SSMs), which provide a biologically plausible framework to measure how intuition affects decisions. In two studies, we use the drift diffusion model (DDM), as a type of SSM, to investigate topics where intuition is difficult to evaluate. In Study 1, we used the DDM to examine how the cognitive reflection test (CRT) scores relate to intuition in risky decision making and found that individuals with high CRT scores had superior performance and relied more on intuition. These findings challenge the conventional view that high CRT scores imply less reliance on intuition and that intuition is detrimental to decision performance. In Study 2, we examined the cross-domain stability of the preference for intuition and found that decision makers rely more on intuition in the social decision domain than in the risky decision domain and that these measures are not correlated across the two domains. The evidence for this unstable preference has hitherto primarily resulted from self-reports, which have a questionable ability to assess the preference for intuition. In both studies, we demonstrate that the DDM can accurately simulate the decision outcome and decision time patterns that are affected by intuition, providing evidence for the usefulness of DDM analysis in the study of intuition.</p>","PeriodicalId":48112,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Behavioral Decision Making","volume":"38 3","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.8,"publicationDate":"2025-07-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1002/bdm.70033","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144657613","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Monetary Priming Reduces Children's Sensitivity to Variations in Potential Gain Magnitude in a Cheating Scenario","authors":"Łukasz Markiewicz,&nbsp;Agata Trzcińska","doi":"10.1002/bdm.70027","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1002/bdm.70027","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 \u0000 <p>This study examines whether monetary priming increases children's cheating and moderates the effect of prize attractiveness on their cheating behavior. While rational economic theory suggests that individuals cheat more when incentives are greater, previous findings have been inconsistent. We propose that monetary priming could explain these mixed results, hypothesizing that it may not only increase cheating but also influence sensitivity to reward magnitude. We conducted a quasi-experimental study in which children (7–10 years old, <i>N</i> = 178) were primed (or not) with money (real or symbolic money) before participating in a “roll a die” task that determined the number of rewards they could obtain. This task utilized an electronic die (DICE+), which enabled us to identify both actual and self-reported values of die rolls. As expected, monetary priming (both real and symbolic) increased cheating among the children. Furthermore, our results demonstrated that while participants were more inclined to cheat for more attractive prizes in non-monetary priming conditions, they became insensitive to the attractiveness of potential gains after monetary priming. These findings suggest that monetary priming may activate a business decision frame in which rewards of any size can prompt action, and proportionality is not taken into account. Our results may help explain inconsistencies in previous studies on the relationship between incentives and cheating, suggesting that unintentional monetary priming (e.g., through monetary incentives) in some experiments could mask the effects of reward size.</p>\u0000 </div>","PeriodicalId":48112,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Behavioral Decision Making","volume":"38 3","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.8,"publicationDate":"2025-07-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144598234","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Does Time Pressure Alter the Affect Gap in Risky Choice?","authors":"R. Philips,&nbsp;T. Pachur,&nbsp;C. Vögele,&nbsp;D. Brevers","doi":"10.1002/bdm.70028","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1002/bdm.70028","url":null,"abstract":"<p>People often exhibit systematic differences in their risky choices when decisions elicit high anticipatory affect compared to choices that are relatively affect-poor—typically showing lower decision quality and greater risk aversion. This <i>affect gap</i> can be modeled by assuming that people use a compensatory strategy (i.e., a strategy that weighs outcomes against their probability of occurring) in affect-poor choices, but a simple non-compensatory strategy that considers outcome but ignores probability information in affect-rich choices. The reasons for this difference in strategy selection, however, are not yet understood. To examine whether the affect gap may reflect that in affect-rich choices, cognitive resources are more strongly taxed (leading to a simplification of the underlying decision strategy), we investigated whether the affect gap is impacted by a time pressure manipulation. Participants were asked to choose between affect-rich prospects (medical lotteries) and economically equivalent but relatively affect-poor prospects (monetary lotteries), either without a time constraint or under time pressure. The results indicated that the affect gap manifested similarly under time pressure as without time pressure. Specifically, differences between affect-rich and affect-poor choices in strategy selection did not differ between time pressure conditions, and differences in decision quality and risk aversion were even slightly attenuated under time pressure. The findings suggest that the differences in decision behavior between affect-rich and affect-poor choices are not driven by cognitive constraints. We discuss the potential psychological mechanisms involved in the affect gap.</p>","PeriodicalId":48112,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Behavioral Decision Making","volume":"38 3","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.8,"publicationDate":"2025-07-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1002/bdm.70028","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144582203","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Learning Processes in the Judge–Advisor System: A Neglected Advantage of Advice Taking","authors":"Thomas Schultze,&nbsp;Alexander Stern,&nbsp;Stefan Schulz-Hardt","doi":"10.1002/bdm.70029","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1002/bdm.70029","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Previous research in the judge–advisor paradigm has focused on how judges utilize the wisdom of others by taking their advice and on the beneficial effect of receiving advice on judges' postadvice final judgments about the exact same problem. However, a completely different possibility of how judges might benefit from advice has been overlooked so far: Learning processes could improve the accuracy of judges' subsequent <i>initial</i> judgments from one problem to another problem on the same type of task as well. Hence, we test the assumption that advice can induce individual performance enhancements that differ as a function of the advisor's judgment accuracy. The results of three experiments support our hypothesis and indicate positive learning, particularly when participants receive high-quality advice. Furthermore, we show that external information about the advisor's accuracy is not crucial for the occurrence of these individual performance enhancements. In general, our results suggest that advice can have a positive effect on judges' subsequent initial judgments.</p>","PeriodicalId":48112,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Behavioral Decision Making","volume":"38 3","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.8,"publicationDate":"2025-07-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1002/bdm.70029","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144582202","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Mouse Cursor Movements in Cognitive Bias Tasks Reveal Underlying Processing Differences","authors":"Jinjin Wu,&nbsp;George D. Farmer,&nbsp;Paul A. Warren","doi":"10.1002/bdm.70025","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1002/bdm.70025","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Biases are prevalent in human judgment and decision-making (JDM). Previous research has suggested that some biases might share common underlying causes and can be accounted for under dual-process theories in which fast and error-prone System 1 drives erroneous behavior. Here, we use an online paradigm to investigate similarities and differences in behavior across three commonly studied cognitive bias phenomena: cognitive reflection test (CRT), gambler's fallacy (GF), and conjunction fallacy (CF). These are all thought to emerge during biased System 1 processing. Critically, we examine both summative performance metrics and process tracing measures derived from mouse cursor movements and growth curve analysis (GCA). Summative performance in these tasks was broadly in line with previous studies, and we replicated correlations in accuracy between tasks (CRT vs. CF and CRT vs. GF). However, we found key differences in our GCA of mouse trajectories. Specifically, in the CRT and the CF tasks, participants tended to choose the incorrect option more quickly relative to the correct option, as might be expected. However, the opposite tendency was observed for GF—people tended to take longer to choose the wrong answer. We also found evidence from the mouse movement analyses for between-task differences in the extent to which participants were tempted by the option they did not choose. These findings challenge prominent dual-process accounts of JDM and highlight the potential of process tracing (and in particular mouse movement analyses) for revealing insights into cognitive processes.</p>","PeriodicalId":48112,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Behavioral Decision Making","volume":"38 3","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.8,"publicationDate":"2025-07-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1002/bdm.70025","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144573542","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Behavioral Research in the Shadow of Plea Bargaining","authors":"David L. Faigman","doi":"10.1002/bdm.70031","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1002/bdm.70031","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 \u0000 <p>Reyna, Reed, Meschkow, Calderon, and Helm experimentally extend to plea bargaining in criminal cases findings from numerous other behavioral contexts that how the bargain is framed affects decisions reached. Framing effects undermine the presumption among many in the law that plea decisions will be rational and made “in the shadow of trial.” This is an important extension of the psychological literature. However, given the complexity of the process of plea bargaining, and in particular, the fact that it is controlled by the prosecutor, involves bargaining with counsel, is done in secret, and there are few restrictions, the practical import of framing effects for reforming plea bargains is doubtful. Nonetheless, given that plea bargaining privileges efficiency over truth, the additional principle of fairness is too often missing from the plea bargain literature. Reyna et al. usefully bring that fundamental concern back into focus.</p>\u0000 </div>","PeriodicalId":48112,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Behavioral Decision Making","volume":"38 3","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.8,"publicationDate":"2025-07-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144573797","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Expert Decision-Making Complexity in New Industries: The Case of Security Analysts","authors":"Rajyalakshmi Kunapuli","doi":"10.1002/bdm.70026","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1002/bdm.70026","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 \u0000 <p>This paper examines how expertise influences actors' decision-making complexity. Drawing from the research on expert decision-making, and using the context of security analysts following firms in a new industry, I argue that expert analysts engage in top-down, automatic information processing that affects the complexity of their evaluations. Further, I develop the construct of <i>evaluative complexity</i>, which indicates the extent of nuance, uncertainty and inclusion of diverse perspectives in analyst evaluations. Historical data from the early internet industry (from 1995 to 2005) of approximately 1800 analyst reports on the initial public offerings in the internet industry support my predictions that expert analysts—those with either prior experience or prior status—demonstrate lesser complexity in their evaluations of internet firms as compared to novice or low-status analysts. Specifically, in new industry contexts, expert analysts are more likely to assess new firms from unitary perspectives and convey more certainty in a context that calls for caution. My research aims to contribute to our understanding of the role of expertise in new domains and the differences in decision-making complexity between experts and novices.</p>\u0000 </div>","PeriodicalId":48112,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Behavioral Decision Making","volume":"38 3","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.8,"publicationDate":"2025-06-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144519802","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Framing Biases in Plea Bargaining Decisions: Fairness Under the Law","authors":"Brent M. Wilson","doi":"10.1002/bdm.70024","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1002/bdm.70024","url":null,"abstract":"&lt;p&gt;The traditional rational choice model assumes that people seek to maximize their own expected utility, without accounting for fairness, justice, or concern for the greater good. Reyna et al. (&lt;span&gt;2025&lt;/span&gt;) provide a compelling empirical demonstration of how this model breaks down in the context of plea bargaining. Their innovative findings open the door to a wide range of new questions about how framing influences legal decision-making. Although the study focused on general attitudes toward the justice system, future research could build on this foundation by examining how the perceived fairness of a specific plea offer affects decision-making. Whether an offer feels fair is likely to play a central role in its acceptance or rejection. Across a range of contexts, fairness perceptions often shape behavior in ways that depart from the predictions of rational choice theory.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;Rational decision-making often breaks down when an offer feels unfair, even if accepting it would serve everyone's best interest. Richard Thaler (&lt;span&gt;2015&lt;/span&gt;) offers a particularly memorable example in his book &lt;i&gt;Misbehaving: The Making of Behavioral Economics&lt;/i&gt;, illustrating how fairness concerns can interfere with efficient bargaining. The Coase theorem posits that when legal rights are clearly defined and parties can bargain without significant costs, they will negotiate to reach efficient outcomes based on who values the result most. Accordingly, no matter who “owns” something at the start, the final outcome will reflect who cares most about a specific result. Thaler had a tree in his backyard that stood close to the property line and regularly dropped leaves, making cleanup a hassle in the late fall. Whereas Thaler did not care much about the tree one way or another, his neighbor hated it and asked for it to be removed. Applying Coasean logic, Thaler proposed a seemingly efficient solution: Since the neighbor disliked the tree more than Thaler valued keeping it, the neighbor could arrange to have it removed at their own expense. But instead of accepting what a rational actor might see as a fair deal, the neighbor was offended, slammed the door, and never brought up the tree again. Despite being economically rational, the offer struck the neighbor as unfair. After all, it was Thaler's tree, so they felt he should be the one to bear the cost.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;A more systematic demonstration of fairness overriding rational self-interest is found in the ultimatum game. In this two-player game, one person (the proposer) offers a split of a sum of money, and the other (the responder) decides whether to accept or reject the offer. If accepted, the money is divided as proposed. If rejected, both players receive nothing. Rational choice theory predicts that responders should accept any amount greater than zero, and proposers, anticipating this, should offer the smallest possible amount. However, this is not how people typically behave. Responders frequently reject low off","PeriodicalId":48112,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Behavioral Decision Making","volume":"38 3","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.8,"publicationDate":"2025-06-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1002/bdm.70024","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144473012","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"The Mere Audience-Size Effect: How Incidental Audience Non-Normatively Influences the Perceived Product Quality","authors":"Tian Qiu,&nbsp;Xilin Li,&nbsp;Jingyi Lu","doi":"10.1002/bdm.70022","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1002/bdm.70022","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 \u0000 <p>Previous research suggests that people may infer a product's quality from its audience size (i.e., the number of people who consume the product). However, this research cautions against the overuse of such inferences by identifying the mere audience-size effect: When audience size results from incidental factors (e.g., weather) and thus cannot accurately reflect product quality, people still perceive the quality of products with a large (vs. small) audience to be higher (vs. lower; Studies 1–3), leading to a misallocation of resources to these products. This effect weakens when people are prompted to compare diagnostic and nondiagnostic audience sizes (Study 4) and to deliberate on the cause of audience size before making quality judgments (Study 5). The mere audience-size effect is also less pronounced when people are familiar with a product (Study 6). The present study yields theoretical implications for overgeneralization and quality inference and practical implications for accurate resource commitment.</p>\u0000 </div>","PeriodicalId":48112,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Behavioral Decision Making","volume":"38 3","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.8,"publicationDate":"2025-06-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144473011","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}