{"title":"Progress Decisions Involving Time: Sunk Cost or Completion Effects","authors":"Todd J. Thorsteinson, Christian G. Billings","doi":"10.1002/bdm.2405","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1002/bdm.2405","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 \u0000 <p>Five studies involving seven samples were conducted to examine the effects of sunk time in progress decisions. Previous research on sunk time in progress decisions has failed to control for completion effects. Studies 1a and 1b found strong evidence for completion effects and weaker effects for sunk time effects on probability of continuing. In Studies 2a and 2b, we expanded our sunk time scenarios to use multiple types. We found evidence for sunk time and completion effects on probability of continuing. An additional analysis, however, found that the sunk time effect was larger when the progress decision involved a goal focused on the accomplishment of a project (e.g., writing a paper for class), as opposed to a goal focused on enjoyment (e.g., watching a television show). Study 3 found that both sunk time and completion effects were present in progress decisions focused on the accomplishment of a project. These effects were present even when participants were informed that there was sufficient time to complete an alternative project. Study 4 failed to find a sunk time effect in a behavioral study, and Study 5 replicated Study 4 using a vignette format. Overall, these results provide some evidence of sunk time effects in progress decisions, but the effect appears to be small and may be due, at least partially, to completion effects.</p>\u0000 </div>","PeriodicalId":48112,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Behavioral Decision Making","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.8,"publicationDate":"2024-08-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142002577","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"A Clean Slate: Adapting the Realization Effect to Online Gambling and Its Effectiveness in People With Gambling Problems","authors":"Ke Zhang, Alex Imas, Luke Clark","doi":"10.1002/bdm.2406","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1002/bdm.2406","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Betting more after losses (i.e., “loss-chasing”) is a central clinical feature of disordered gambling. According to prospect theory, increasing risk-seeking following losses could arise from a failure to “re-reference.” By contrast, successful re-referencing between successive decisions closes the mental account, and any losses are regarded as final or <i>realized</i>; gamblers should not chase realized losses. The present study sought to test this “realization effect” among gamblers using an ecologically valid online gambling task. We were further interested in whether the effectiveness of the loss realization varied as a function of problem gambling severity. Using online recruitment of past-year gamblers stratified on the Problem Gambling Severity Index, we tested a group without gambling problems (<i>n</i> = 227), a group with at-risk gambling (<i>n</i> = 239), and a group with gambling problems (<i>n</i> = 223). Over a sequence of nine bets, after the sixth bet, half of the participants underwent a simulated realization procedure that entailed cashing out from the gambling website and redepositing their remaining funds on another website. The feedback comparison group were shown their account balance after the sixth bet but did not withdraw or transfer their funds. In line with the realization effect, the group with non-problem gambling significantly reduced their bet after cashing out. The realization procedure did not significantly ameliorate loss-chasing in the groups with at-risk gambling or gambling problems. We conclude that the realization effect can be elicited in an online gambling context but that stronger interventions for realizing losses may be required for people experiencing gambling problems.</p>","PeriodicalId":48112,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Behavioral Decision Making","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.8,"publicationDate":"2024-08-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1002/bdm.2406","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142002591","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Martin R. Zemborain, Gita Venkataramani Johar, Anne L. Roggeveen, Asim Ansari
{"title":"Choice Bolstering Changes Attribute Importance and Affects Future Choices","authors":"Martin R. Zemborain, Gita Venkataramani Johar, Anne L. Roggeveen, Asim Ansari","doi":"10.1002/bdm.2401","DOIUrl":"10.1002/bdm.2401","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 \u0000 <p>Prior research has established that decision-makers engage in a bolstering process by magnifying the value of a previously made choice in order to justify their choices. The current research examines the impact of bolstering on attribute importance weights and future choices. Experiments 1 and 2 demonstrate that after making a choice between a priori comparable options, consumers prefer attributes (e.g., sunlight in an apartment) that they associate with positive features of their chosen option (lot of sunlight) more than attributes they associate (a) with negative features of their chosen option or (b) with positive features of their nonchosen option. These postchoice associations and altered attribute importance weights drive subsequent preferences. In an incentive-compatible study, Experiment 3 demonstrates that bolstering goes beyond choice justification and impacts subsequent choice. After an initial choice, participants choose new products that have positive features consistent with their original chosen option rather than products with positive features consistent with their original nonchosen option. This research contributes to the literature on preference construction by examining the impact of justification for one's previous choices on constructed attribute preferences and subsequent choices.</p>\u0000 </div>","PeriodicalId":48112,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Behavioral Decision Making","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.8,"publicationDate":"2024-08-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141926838","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Mariana Vences, Filipe Loureiro, Teresa Garcia-Marques
{"title":"Do We Really Believe That “More Is Better”? Mapping Implicit and Explicit Associations Between Quantity and Quality","authors":"Mariana Vences, Filipe Loureiro, Teresa Garcia-Marques","doi":"10.1002/bdm.2403","DOIUrl":"10.1002/bdm.2403","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 \u0000 <p>The dimensions of quantity and quality play a crucial role in shaping our judgments and decisions. How these dimensions are perceived in relation to each other is of extreme importance when it comes to those decisions and judgments. The presumed positive link between them, embodied in the notion that “the more, the better,” is a common thread in decision-making. However, owing to the diverse contexts within which decisions unfold, individuals appear to acquire the understanding that such relationship is not universally applicable, leading to profess the belief that “quantity is not quality.” This dichotomy establishes a dissociation between the implicit and explicit associations formed regarding the connection between quantity and quality. In two studies, we put this hypothesis to the test. Initially, we explore the nature of this association through an Implicit Association Test (Study 1), followed by an investigation into the modulation of this association within an ecological context (Study 2). The results show that, explicitly, participants assert no inherent relationship between quantity and quality. However, at an implicit level, with consequential impacts on behavior, a robust positive association between quantity and quality persists, providing challenging to overturn.</p>\u0000 </div>","PeriodicalId":48112,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Behavioral Decision Making","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.8,"publicationDate":"2024-08-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141939770","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Robert J. Weijers, Jonas Wachner, Björn B. de Koning
{"title":"The Effect of a Default Nudge on Experienced and Expected Autonomy: A Field Study on Food Donation","authors":"Robert J. Weijers, Jonas Wachner, Björn B. de Koning","doi":"10.1002/bdm.2404","DOIUrl":"10.1002/bdm.2404","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Default nudges—making the desired option the standard option—are often criticized for hampering autonomy. However, laboratory research suggests this expectation of autonomy loss is not reflected in nudgees' experienced autonomy. In this study, we investigated whether this finding translates to a real-world setting by implementing a default nudge to increase food donations in the supermarket (Experiment 1). Upon entering the supermarket, customers were asked to donate a food item for charity and were handed a shopping cart/basket that was empty (control) or contained a food item meant for donation (default nudge). Donations were collected after checkout, and customers rated their experienced autonomy of their choice to donate. We replicated this study and added a vignette condition portraying the default nudge to measure expected autonomy for the same situation (Experiment 2). The results show the default nudge reduced participants' <i>expected</i> autonomy but not their <i>experienced</i> autonomy, shedding new light on the relation between nudging and autonomy. Furthermore, this novel form of the default nudge was found to be successful in increasing food donations in the supermarket, further expanding the field where this nudge has been successful.</p>","PeriodicalId":48112,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Behavioral Decision Making","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.8,"publicationDate":"2024-08-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1002/bdm.2404","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141939769","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Caroline K. Børsting, Christian T. Elbæk, Panagiotis Mitkidis, Guy Hochman
{"title":"Resource Constraints Lead to Biased Attention but Decrease Unethical Behavior","authors":"Caroline K. Børsting, Christian T. Elbæk, Panagiotis Mitkidis, Guy Hochman","doi":"10.1002/bdm.2402","DOIUrl":"10.1002/bdm.2402","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Subjective experiences of resource scarcity can make individuals short-term oriented, capture attention, and trigger feelings of unfairness. However, the impact of scarcity on information processing and ethical decision-making remains poorly understood. This eye-tracking study explored how acute financial scarcity affects selective information search and ethical decision-making in an economic task with competing incentives (<i>N</i> = 60, 12,000 observations). Results revealed that participants experiencing financial scarcity displayed a strong attentional bias towards financially tempting information, although they ultimately did not behave more unethically. These findings might reveal a “moral boundary” dictating when attentional biases translate into decision-making. Our results contribute to understanding how individuals in scarcity contexts process and prioritize information in ethical decision-making, helping organizations and policymakers combat stereotypes surrounding resource-deprived individuals, and design evidence-based policy interventions promoting ethical behavior in financially scarce situations.</p>","PeriodicalId":48112,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Behavioral Decision Making","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.8,"publicationDate":"2024-07-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1002/bdm.2402","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141871376","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The Zero Effect: An Eye-Tracking Study of Affect and Motivation in Risky Choices","authors":"Jonas Ludwig, Alexander Jaudas, Anja Achtziger","doi":"10.1002/bdm.2400","DOIUrl":"10.1002/bdm.2400","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Decision makers often prefer safe wins over risky gambles, even if the latter promise higher payoffs than the former. One mechanism that explains this choice pattern is the certainty effect, whereby probabilities of 0 and 1 are interpreted accurately but intermediate probabilities are distorted by diminishing sensitivity. We tested an alternative explanation that was recently proposed, the idea that people would be motivated by avoiding zero outcomes rather than being attracted to sure gains. This zero-outcome aversion in gain-domain choices was called the zero effect. By analogy, we proposed that decision makers would approach zero outcomes in the loss domain. Two eye-tracking experiments investigated visual attention as a key component of the zero effect in the gain domain (Experiment 1) and the loss domain (Experiment 2). Choices were consistent with the zero effect. In the gain domain, gambles were chosen less frequently if they included a zero outcome. In contrast, zero-outcome gambles were chosen more frequently in the loss domain. Eye movements and pupillometry indicated that zero outcomes in both domains (a) were less frequently fixated than other outcomes and (b) were associated with increased arousal. We concluded that domain-specific affective responses to zero outcomes aligned with approach/avoidance motivation. These distinct motivations in turn biased information search and choice behavior.</p>","PeriodicalId":48112,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Behavioral Decision Making","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.8,"publicationDate":"2024-07-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1002/bdm.2400","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141769786","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"How Maximizers Estimate Their Decision Time: The Mediating Effect of Memory Reduction","authors":"He Huang, Hong Li","doi":"10.1002/bdm.2398","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1002/bdm.2398","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 \u0000 <p>Previous studies have divided people into maximizers and satisficers based on their tendency to seek the best in decision-making. In the present research, we aim to unravel the time estimation process of maximizers in decision-making through four studies. The results indicate that maximizers tend to underestimate the time spent in decision-making, which is due to the difference in their memory reduction for decision-related information compared to that of satisficers. Specifically, maximizers' memories of special information (rather than common information) become worse than those of satisficers, which leads to their underestimation of decision time. These findings provide a deeper understanding of how maximizers estimate their decision time, which offers important insights into how maximizers make their decisions. Overall, this research contributes to the literature by shedding new light on maximization from the perspective of memory.</p>\u0000 </div>","PeriodicalId":48112,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Behavioral Decision Making","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.8,"publicationDate":"2024-07-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141732573","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"When Half Is at Least 50%: Effect of “Framing” and Probability Level on Frequency Estimates","authors":"David R. Mandel, Megan Kelly","doi":"10.1002/bdm.2399","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1002/bdm.2399","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Expert judgment often involves estimating magnitudes, such as the frequency of deaths due to a pandemic. Three experiments (<i>N</i>s = 902, 431, and 755, respectively) were conducted to examine the effect of outcome framing (e.g., <i>half</i> of a threatened group expected to survive vs. die), probability level (low vs. high), and probability format (verbal, numeric, or combined) on the estimated frequency of survivals/deaths. Each experiment found an interactive effect of frame and probability level, which supported the hypothesis that forecasted outcomes received by participants were implicitly quantified as lower bounds (i.e., “<i>at least</i> half”). Responding in a manner consistent with a lower-bound “at least” interpretation was unrelated to incoherence (Experiments 1 and 2) and positively related to numeracy (Experiments 1 and 3), verbal reasoning (Experiment 3), and actively open-minded thinking (Experiments 2 and 3). The correlational results indicate that implicit lower bounding is an aspect of linguistic inference and not a cognitive error. Implications for research on framing effects are discussed.</p>","PeriodicalId":48112,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Behavioral Decision Making","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.8,"publicationDate":"2024-07-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1002/bdm.2399","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141584022","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Rebecca A. Olsen, Anne C. Macaskill, Maree J. Hunt
{"title":"Episodic Future Thinking Only Reduces Delay Discounting When Future Events Involve the Self","authors":"Rebecca A. Olsen, Anne C. Macaskill, Maree J. Hunt","doi":"10.1002/bdm.2397","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1002/bdm.2397","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Vividly imagining personally relevant, future episodes (episodic future thinking) reduces delay discounting, with potential to provide many applied benefits. It is not clear whether the events imagined must involve the self, or whether vividly imagining future events that will happen to another person would also reduce delay discounting. In the current study, two groups of students wrote about future events, we then cued them to vividly imagine these future events while making delay-amount trade-off decisions (e.g., <i>would you choose $500 now or $1000 in one year?</i>). One group imagined future events happening to themselves, and another group to a specific person they knew. We compared discounting to a control condition where participants were simply instructed to “choose.” Only the group that imagined personally relevant, future events demonstrated reduced delay discounting. This suggests that episodic future thinking more effectively reduces delay discounting when future events happen to the self rather than another person. The group that imagined personally relevant future events were not more able to report the experimental hypotheses suggesting that this difference was not primarily driven by demand characteristics.</p>","PeriodicalId":48112,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Behavioral Decision Making","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.8,"publicationDate":"2024-07-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1002/bdm.2397","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141536929","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}