{"title":"The Mere Audience-Size Effect: How Incidental Audience Non-Normatively Influences the Perceived Product Quality","authors":"Tian Qiu, Xilin Li, Jingyi Lu","doi":"10.1002/bdm.70022","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1002/bdm.70022","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 \u0000 <p>Previous research suggests that people may infer a product's quality from its audience size (i.e., the number of people who consume the product). However, this research cautions against the overuse of such inferences by identifying the mere audience-size effect: When audience size results from incidental factors (e.g., weather) and thus cannot accurately reflect product quality, people still perceive the quality of products with a large (vs. small) audience to be higher (vs. lower; Studies 1–3), leading to a misallocation of resources to these products. This effect weakens when people are prompted to compare diagnostic and nondiagnostic audience sizes (Study 4) and to deliberate on the cause of audience size before making quality judgments (Study 5). The mere audience-size effect is also less pronounced when people are familiar with a product (Study 6). The present study yields theoretical implications for overgeneralization and quality inference and practical implications for accurate resource commitment.</p>\u0000 </div>","PeriodicalId":48112,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Behavioral Decision Making","volume":"38 3","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.8,"publicationDate":"2025-06-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144473011","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Andrew M. Parker, Annie H. Somerville, Rowan Kemmerly, Eric R. Stone
{"title":"Psychological and Behavioral Consequences of Confidence in Knowledge: An Exploratory Examination of General Public and JDM Researcher Perspectives","authors":"Andrew M. Parker, Annie H. Somerville, Rowan Kemmerly, Eric R. Stone","doi":"10.1002/bdm.70023","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1002/bdm.70023","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 \u0000 <p>A cursory read of the popular press and the JDM research field suggest that they have very different beliefs regarding the consequences of confidence. And these beliefs have important consequences themselves. For individuals, how one views the consequences of confidence (and whether they are positive or negative) likely influences the extent to which one pursues the development of confidence and how one interprets confidence in others. For JDM researchers, their beliefs about the consequences of confidence inform research programs. For example, a belief that overconfidence leads to inappropriate medical treatments, legal advice, or investments suggests an emphasis on reducing overconfidence rather than on developing confidence. This paper aims to improve understanding of both the general public's and JDM researchers' beliefs about the consequences of confidence in knowledge. We present a general theoretical framework for thinking about the consequences of confidence, followed by two exploratory studies designed to access these beliefs, first with the general public and then with JDM researchers. We used structured, open-ended questioning to generate a large dataset (over 10,000 responses) of potential consequences of low confidence, high confidence, overconfidence, and underconfidence. Qualitative coding identified a broad set of respondent-generated beliefs regarding psychological and behavioral consequences, organized into antonym pairs (e.g., arrogant/high self-image vs. low self-image). Respondents made few distinctions between low confidence and underconfidence, viewing both negatively. However, the general public drew a sharp distinction between high confidence (described positively) and overconfidence (described negatively), a trend less prevalent among JDM researchers.</p>\u0000 </div>","PeriodicalId":48112,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Behavioral Decision Making","volume":"38 3","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.8,"publicationDate":"2025-06-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144255896","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Development and Validation of the Calculated and Spontaneous Risk-Taking Scale (CASPRT)","authors":"Don C. Zhang, Rachel Williamson Smith","doi":"10.1002/bdm.70020","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1002/bdm.70020","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 \u0000 <p>Risk preference is a key concept across social, economic, and decision sciences. While existing measures assess risk taking either as domain-specific preferences (e.g., finance and health) or as a general trait, they have largely overlooked individual differences in the narrow, domain-general aspects of risk preference. Drawing from a dual-process framework, we advance a multidimensional domain-general measure of risk preference. We develop and validate the Calculated and Spontaneous Risk-Taking Scale across seven studies (<i>N</i> = 2116). Results show (1) the two risk styles are moderately correlated and align with existing risk preference measures; (2) they are distinct from personality traits like the Big Five and cognitive traits like decision style; (3) calculated risk-takers show more variability in risk attitudes across contexts; (4) calculated risk-taking predicts adaptive outcomes (e.g., creativity and entrepreneurship), while spontaneous risk-taking predicts maladaptive behaviors (e.g., crime, safety violations); and (5) the scale is invariant across sex and age. Overall, calculated risk-takers engage in more adaptive risks, leading to healthier, more meaningful lives.</p>\u0000 </div>","PeriodicalId":48112,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Behavioral Decision Making","volume":"38 3","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.8,"publicationDate":"2025-05-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144118139","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The Impact of the Timing of Advice on Its Utilization","authors":"Sriraj Aiyer, Nick Yeung","doi":"10.1002/bdm.70021","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1002/bdm.70021","url":null,"abstract":"<p>There is theoretical and practical interest in characterizing the factors that affect the use of advice when making decisions. Here, we investigated how the timing of advice affects its utilization. We conducted three experiments to compare the integration of advice shown before versus after participants had the chance themselves to evaluate evidence relevant to a decision. We used a perceptual discrimination task in a judge–advisor system, allowing careful control over both the participants' task performance and the task structure across conditions except for the timing of advice. Across all experiments, we found that advice provided after stimulus presentation was agreed with more, and influenced participants' judgments to a greater extent, than advice provided beforehand. In Experiment 1, we observed this tendency to hold when advice varied in accuracy and, in Experiment 2, across variations in task difficulty. Experiment 2 also revealed participants' preference for poststimulus advice when they were given choice over when to receive advice. In Experiment 3, we found greater influence of poststimulus advice to hold both for binary judgments and continuous estimations. These results provide interesting implications for research on the mechanisms of advice integration.</p>","PeriodicalId":48112,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Behavioral Decision Making","volume":"38 3","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.8,"publicationDate":"2025-05-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1002/bdm.70021","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144074325","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Preceding Options Affect Subsequent Listwise but Not Pairwise Choice, Even for Experts","authors":"Mattias Forsgren, Lars Frimanson, Peter Juslin","doi":"10.1002/bdm.70019","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1002/bdm.70019","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Recent theories of decision-making, such as Decision by Sampling, suggest that people lack stable preferences. Instead, preferences are malleable and constructed in the moment by comparisons of target attributes to small samples of attribute values active in working memory. Manipulating the distribution of attribute values observed before a choice has therefore been suggested to affect subsequent choices. In a series of four experiments, we investigate if prior exposure to different distributions of attribute values affect subsequent pairwise, two-alternative forced choices and listwise choices between multiple options. We also investigate if these suggested effects are attenuated by domain expertise. We typically find that listwise choices are affected by prior experience of attributes in the predicted manner but that the pairwise choices are not. This occurs even when we hold range constant, and the effect is reduced but not eliminated by substantial domain expertise. We propose that this format dependence of the malleability of choices is an important challenge for any theory of their cognitive origin.</p>","PeriodicalId":48112,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Behavioral Decision Making","volume":"38 3","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.8,"publicationDate":"2025-04-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1002/bdm.70019","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143879962","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Rafał Muda, Paweł Niszczota, Damian Hamerski, Michał Białek
{"title":"Using a Foreign Language Increases Risk-Taking in Prenatal Testing Decisions but Not due to Attenuated Emotional Responses","authors":"Rafał Muda, Paweł Niszczota, Damian Hamerski, Michał Białek","doi":"10.1002/bdm.70016","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1002/bdm.70016","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 \u0000 <p>People take more risks when deciding on their foreign language. In three lab experiments (<i>N</i> = 424), we explored two explanations of this phenomenon: reduced anticipation of regret or increased accessibility of risk-increasing thoughts. Participants in native or foreign language conditions considered two prenatal tests: a less sensitive but safe and a more sensitive one—their task was to specify the level of risk of miscarriage of the more sensitive test while still choosing it. Subsequently, they estimated the anticipated regret associated with not selecting the riskier test and discovering the child has a detectable disorder (Experiments 1 and 2) or with taking the riskier test and miscarrying (Experiment 3). Three studies confirmed a greater willingness to accept risk when using a foreign language (meta-analytic effect <i>d</i> = 0.40), but this effect was not mediated by changes in the accessibility of thoughts or anticipated regret.</p>\u0000 </div>","PeriodicalId":48112,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Behavioral Decision Making","volume":"38 2","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.8,"publicationDate":"2025-04-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143866014","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"An Exploration of How Motivations and Perceived Ability Influence an Advisor's Willingness to Give Advice","authors":"Ishani Banerji, Robin Dillon, Kurt Carlson","doi":"10.1002/bdm.70017","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1002/bdm.70017","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Decision-makers frequently rely on advice from advisors, yet little is known about the factors influencing advisors' willingness to give advice (WTGA). This paper explores WTGA through three studies, investigating its relationship to advice quality, an advisor's motivations, and abilities. Our findings show that advisors frequently demonstrate a willingness to give advice even when their solution to the specific problem is incorrect, resulting in the dissemination of poor-quality advice. We find that both the helping and influence motives predict WTGA, with the helping motivation playing a more dominant role. Finally, we find that WTGA varies significantly as a function of advisors' perceptions of their ability to solve advice problems but is not consistently linked to their actual ability in the domain. This research highlights the importance of understanding the motivations and abilities of advisors in order to improve the quality of advice, with implications for decision-makers who rely on such guidance.</p>","PeriodicalId":48112,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Behavioral Decision Making","volume":"38 2","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.8,"publicationDate":"2025-04-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1002/bdm.70017","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143831444","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Framing Biases in Plea Bargaining Decisions: Insights From the Psychology of Medical Decision Making","authors":"Christopher R. Wolfe","doi":"10.1002/bdm.70018","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1002/bdm.70018","url":null,"abstract":"<p>The vast majority of criminal cases in the United States are resolved by plea bargains, yet the philosophical underpinnings of “bargaining in the shadow of trial” are a strong version of rationality that appears to be at odds with research conducted by cognitive psychologists on framing. Reyna et al. (<span>2025</span>) provide empirical evidence that directly demonstrates that the way identical plea bargain options are framed has a significant influence on decision making. Of course, even the best of studies are not in and of themselves the final word on a topic of this importance. With a dearth of research on framing effects in plea bargaining, it seems useful to consider relevant research in related domains. The psychology of medical decision making, especially judgments and decisions made by patients in consultation with healthcare providers, is ripe for instructive comparisons. Like the decisions of criminal defendants, medical decisions are among the most important ordinary people can make. Such decisions are often made between unfavorable options (e.g., chemotherapy or invasive surgery), in unfamiliar and complex knowledge domains, and with the assistance of professionals who may not be fully trusted. Yet, they are also distinct from the well-worn lessons of market economics.</p><p>Given these structural parallels, it is worth asking whether the way options and decision-relevant information are framed have any measurable influence on judgments and decisions in medicine. The answer is decisively yes. For example, Armstrong et al. (<span>2002</span>) presented participants with graphs of curves representing how long people live after being treated for a disease over several years. These representations are useful, for example, in comparing different treatment options. Two mathematically identical ways of presenting the same data are survival curves, showing how many people are still alive after different time intervals, and mortality curves, showing how many people have died after those same intervals. Despite their mathematical equivalence, Armstrong et al. (<span>2002</span>) found that participants who were given survival curves (or both survival and mortality curves together) preferred preventive surgery significantly more often, and were significantly more accurate in answering knowledge questions, than participants who only received mortality curves. Donovan and Jalleh (<span>2000</span>) told participants about a hypothetical immunization that protected infants against respiratory problems. Side effects were framed either negatively (10% chance of side effects) or positively (90% chance of no side effects). They found that positive framing yielded better performance for participants without a young infant at home. Farrell et al. (<span>2001</span>) presented information to participants about the safety of donated blood in either a gain frame (lives saved), a loss frame (lives lost), or a combined loss frame presented in a positive ","PeriodicalId":48112,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Behavioral Decision Making","volume":"38 2","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.8,"publicationDate":"2025-04-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1002/bdm.70018","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143831210","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Daisung Jang, William P. Bottom, Hillary Anger Elfenbein
{"title":"From Preparation to Performance: Conscientiousness Predicts Negotiation Planning and Value Claiming","authors":"Daisung Jang, William P. Bottom, Hillary Anger Elfenbein","doi":"10.1002/bdm.70015","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1002/bdm.70015","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Individual difference researchers observe that conscientiousness predicts job but not negotiation performance. This may reflect a genuine absence of this trait's impact on negotiation. But this could also be due to methodological choices in studies to date. Most studies relied on small sample sizes and highly structured negotiation problems that limit opportunities for preparation. This paper takes a novel approach to examining conscientiousness in negotiation by (1) deploying a complex simulation that demands considerable planning effort, (2) examining variation in planning behavior, and (3) using dyadic data analysis methods with an adequately powered sample. In the two samples comprising Studies 1A and 1B (combined <i>N</i> = 566), higher conscientiousness predicted more value claimed, and counterpart conscientiousness predicted less value claimed in settlements. Follow-up studies examined planning behavior. Study 2 (<i>N</i> = 301) demonstrated that conscientious negotiators spent more time planning and placed greater import on information relevant to the negotiation. Conscientiousness correlated positively with peer ratings of distributive efficiency. Study 3 (<i>N</i> = 153) not only replicated the positive relationship between conscientiousness and greater time spent planning but also identified a U-shaped relationship between the trait and effortful planning behaviors. The results suggest that conscientiousness represents a previously underappreciated contributor to effective negotiation. By loosening the constraints on bargaining present in most negotiation studies, we observed a pattern consistent with many prior studies of job performance—conscientiousness predicts individual outcomes and planning behavior. These studies highlight a need to expand the empirical and theoretical exploration of negotiation processes beyond the bargaining phase.</p>","PeriodicalId":48112,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Behavioral Decision Making","volume":"38 2","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.8,"publicationDate":"2025-03-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1002/bdm.70015","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143698764","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Eleonore Batteux, Zarema Khon, Avri Bilovich, Samuel G. B. Johnson, David Tuckett
{"title":"When Certainty Backfires: The Effects of Unwarranted Precision on Consumer Loyalty","authors":"Eleonore Batteux, Zarema Khon, Avri Bilovich, Samuel G. B. Johnson, David Tuckett","doi":"10.1002/bdm.70013","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1002/bdm.70013","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Consumers are drawn to the promise of certainty that precise forecasts seem to provide, even though they are often misleading. Yet we know less about how consumers respond when precise forecasts prove inaccurate. In this paper, we investigate how inaccurate precise compared to range forecasts affect consumer judgments and decisions over time in an investment context. Specifically, we assess how they affect consumers' loyalty towards the forecaster as well as their willingness to make the same kind of investment again. Consumers were less trusting of and loyal to investment management firms that communicated inaccurate precise forecasts compared to firms that communicated inaccurate range forecasts, which acknowledged uncertainty. But we did not find evidence that consumers changed their minds as to the sector into which they wanted to invest. In other words, they seem to punish the firm for inaccurate forecasts, but this did not shift their preference for their type of investment. Interestingly, these effects largely persisted when consumers encountered similar inaccurate forecasts 1 week later, suggesting they do not learn to be suspicious of precise forecasts in general from exposure to inaccurate forecasts. Overall, our findings show that it is not in firms' interest to communicate overly precise forecasts under uncertainty as they risk punishment by consumers.</p>","PeriodicalId":48112,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Behavioral Decision Making","volume":"38 2","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.8,"publicationDate":"2025-03-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1002/bdm.70013","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143646138","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}