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Size-Based Wholesale Price Discrimination With Ex-Ante Investments Into Alternative Sourcing 基于规模的批发价格歧视与事前投资替代采购
IF 1 4区 经济学
Journal of Industrial Economics Pub Date : 2025-05-26 DOI: 10.1111/joie.12420
Charlotte B. Evensen, Øystein Foros, Atle Haugen, Hans Jarle Kind
{"title":"Size-Based Wholesale Price Discrimination With Ex-Ante Investments Into Alternative Sourcing","authors":"Charlotte B. Evensen,&nbsp;Øystein Foros,&nbsp;Atle Haugen,&nbsp;Hans Jarle Kind","doi":"10.1111/joie.12420","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/joie.12420","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 \u0000 <p>If a retailer invests in alternative sourcing for a product otherwise provided by a dominant supplier, it may gain leverage to pressure the supplier into lowering the wholesale price (bargaining effect). The reduced wholesale price, in turn, strengthens the retailer's competitive position, enabling it to capture additional market shares (business-stealing effect). To counter the latter effect, and thus reduce the retailer's incentive to invest in alternative sourcing, the supplier might commit to uniform wholesale pricing. However, we demonstrate that this strategy is unprofitable when retailers are sufficiently differentiated. Instead, if retailers differ in size, supplier profitability is maximized through size-based price discrimination. This might harm consumers. Interestingly, when substitutability is at an intermediate level, supplier and consumer preferences align.</p>\u0000 </div>","PeriodicalId":47963,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Industrial Economics","volume":"73 3","pages":"480-497"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2025-05-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144935472","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Complementary Inputs, Mutual Outsourcing, and Supplier Encroachment 互补投入、相互外包和供应商侵占
IF 1 4区 经济学
Journal of Industrial Economics Pub Date : 2025-05-26 DOI: 10.1111/joie.12419
Chrysovalantou Milliou, Konstantinos Serfes
{"title":"Complementary Inputs, Mutual Outsourcing, and Supplier Encroachment","authors":"Chrysovalantou Milliou,&nbsp;Konstantinos Serfes","doi":"10.1111/joie.12419","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/joie.12419","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Final goods are typically produced using multiple complementary inputs. We examine the incentives and implications of supplier encroachment incorporating this fact and allowing for the possibility of mutual outsourcing between the encroached supplier and the incumbent. We show that mutual outsourcing can occur when both firms are present in the final good market. We also show that, unlike the single input case, the supplier refrains from encroaching when mutual outsourcing results in high wholesale prices and that encroachment can benefit the incumbent by generating input sales. Finally, we show that nonlinear contracts play a significant role for encroachment.</p>","PeriodicalId":47963,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Industrial Economics","volume":"73 3","pages":"458-479"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2025-05-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/joie.12419","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144935471","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Using a Soft Deadline to Counter Monopoly 利用软期限对抗垄断
IF 1 4区 经济学
Journal of Industrial Economics Pub Date : 2025-05-14 DOI: 10.1111/joie.12416
Masahiro Yoshida
{"title":"Using a Soft Deadline to Counter Monopoly","authors":"Masahiro Yoshida","doi":"10.1111/joie.12416","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/joie.12416","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 \u0000 <p>A monopolist often exploits a hard deadline to raise their commitment power. I explore whether a group of buyers can employ a soft deadline to counter the monopoly. Using a simple model of a durable goods monopolist under a deadline, I show that the buyers' imperfect commitment to exit early may elicit a big sale from the monopolist and generate the buyers' premium. The soft deadline partially restores the self-competition dynamics of the Coase conjecture, which was previously constrained by the hard deadline. In the conventional wisdom on the Coase conjecture, the shorter bargaining horizon (or, interpretably, less durability of goods) augments monopoly power. A soft deadline breaks this link: the horizon appears <i>shorter</i>, but the buyers may be better off in expectation.</p>\u0000 </div>","PeriodicalId":47963,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Industrial Economics","volume":"73 3","pages":"446-457"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2025-05-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144935485","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Assigning Default Position for Digital Goods: Competition, Regulation, and Welfare 为数字产品指定默认位置：竞争、监管和福利
IF 1 4区 经济学
Journal of Industrial Economics Pub Date : 2025-05-12 DOI: 10.1111/joie.12417
Yongmin Chen, Marius Schwartz
{"title":"Assigning Default Position for Digital Goods: Competition, Regulation, and Welfare","authors":"Yongmin Chen,&nbsp;Marius Schwartz","doi":"10.1111/joie.12417","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/joie.12417","url":null,"abstract":"<p>We analyze alternative ways to assign the default position for digital goods like search engines. When two competing firms vie for the default through bidding, the higher-quality firm typically wins but delivers lower utility than the rival due to heightened monetization from exploiting consumer switching costs. The distribution of consumer switching costs plays a crucial role in driving the bidding outcome and welfare results. Paradoxically, increasing via regulation the rival's default share tends to raise profit and harm consumers, at least in the short run. Letting consumers choose the default benefits them in the short run, but harms the weaker firm.</p>","PeriodicalId":47963,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Industrial Economics","volume":"73 3","pages":"426-445"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2025-05-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/joie.12417","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144935321","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Patentability Requirements and the Direction of Innovation 专利性要求与创新方向
IF 1 4区 经济学
Journal of Industrial Economics Pub Date : 2025-04-22 DOI: 10.1111/joie.12414
Fabio M. Manenti, Luca Sandrini
{"title":"Patentability Requirements and the Direction of Innovation","authors":"Fabio M. Manenti,&nbsp;Luca Sandrini","doi":"10.1111/joie.12414","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/joie.12414","url":null,"abstract":"<p>We model a duopolistic game where firms first choose the direction of their innovation, then invest in the chosen direction, and finally, compete in the product market. Investments occur either in overlapping or non-overlapping territories. We show that, in the presence of a generous patent regime that allows the protection of innovations of little value, firms tend to invest in overlapping technologies; stricter requirements for patentability may induce firms to operate in different technological areas, thereby increasing market efficiency. We illustrate our general theory using two stylized models of Cournot competition with product and process innovations, respectively.</p>","PeriodicalId":47963,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Industrial Economics","volume":"73 3","pages":"391-410"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2025-04-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/joie.12414","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144935518","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
On the Competitive Effects of Screening in Procurement 论采购中筛选的竞争效应
IF 1 4区 经济学
Journal of Industrial Economics Pub Date : 2025-04-22 DOI: 10.1111/joie.12415
Adam Pigoń, Gyula Seres
{"title":"On the Competitive Effects of Screening in Procurement","authors":"Adam Pigoń,&nbsp;Gyula Seres","doi":"10.1111/joie.12415","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/joie.12415","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 \u0000 <p>This study estimates the effect of screening and litigation using a unique data set on highway construction procurement auctions in Poland. Procurement authorities frequently use screening to mitigate default risk. However, eliminating bidders reduces competition and may discourage entry. The examined market exhibits a screening method that <i>ex-post</i> selects eligible offers. We demonstrate with a reduced-form model that this method disproportionately affects small firms and decreases entry, indirectly inflating bids and prices as a consequence.</p>\u0000 </div>","PeriodicalId":47963,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Industrial Economics","volume":"73 3","pages":"411-425"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2025-04-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144934901","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Never-Ending Search for Innovation 永无止境地寻求创新
IF 1.7 4区 经济学
Journal of Industrial Economics Pub Date : 2025-03-20 DOI: 10.1111/joie.12413
Jean-Michel Benkert, Igor Letina
{"title":"Never-Ending Search for Innovation","authors":"Jean-Michel Benkert,&nbsp;Igor Letina","doi":"10.1111/joie.12413","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/joie.12413","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 \u0000 <p>We provide a model of investment in innovation that is dynamic, features multiple heterogeneous research projects of which only one potentially leads to success, and in each period, the researcher chooses the set of projects to invest in. We show that if a search for innovation starts, it optimally does not end until the innovation is found—which will be never with a strictly positive probability.</p>\u0000 </div>","PeriodicalId":47963,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Industrial Economics","volume":"73 2","pages":"384-387"},"PeriodicalIF":1.7,"publicationDate":"2025-03-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144264713","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
How to Reach the Paradise? Inside the Edgeworth Cycle and Why a Gasoline Station Is the First to Raise Its Price 如何到达天堂？埃奇沃斯循环的内幕和为什么加油站是第一个提高价格的
IF 1.7 4区 经济学
Journal of Industrial Economics Pub Date : 2025-03-18 DOI: 10.1111/joie.12412
Mats Petter Kahl, Thomas Wein
{"title":"How to Reach the Paradise? Inside the Edgeworth Cycle and Why a Gasoline Station Is the First to Raise Its Price","authors":"Mats Petter Kahl,&nbsp;Thomas Wein","doi":"10.1111/joie.12412","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/joie.12412","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Competition in gasoline retailing is characterized by intraday price cycles in local markets worldwide. The literature describes these as corresponding to the well-known Edgeworth cycles. Previous research has mainly focused on analyzing cycles based on hourly, daily, or weekly average price data. We study the cycle initiation based on second-by-second data for one German town. We find that price considerations are not the main factors in determining which retailers raise prices first, how much they raise them, or whether they succeed. Brand affiliation is more important, and to a lesser extent, so are the services offered and location parameters.</p>","PeriodicalId":47963,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Industrial Economics","volume":"73 2","pages":"351-383"},"PeriodicalIF":1.7,"publicationDate":"2025-03-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/joie.12412","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144264440","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Price Discrimination With Nested Consideration 嵌套对价的价格歧视
IF 1.7 4区 经济学
Journal of Industrial Economics Pub Date : 2025-02-27 DOI: 10.1111/joie.12410
Ioana Chioveanu
{"title":"Price Discrimination With Nested Consideration","authors":"Ioana Chioveanu","doi":"10.1111/joie.12410","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/joie.12410","url":null,"abstract":"<p>This paper examines price discrimination by consideration in an oligopoly with nested reach. Consumers obtain a ranking of the firms and consider them consecutively, differing in how far down the list they go. A firm's product matches a consumer's preferences with an exogenous probability. In sufficiently asymmetric markets, under both uniform and discriminatory pricing, in equilibrium, competition is duopolistic: only two firms use any price interval. Firms face pricing trade-offs due to consideration heterogeneity. Price discrimination alleviates these trade-offs, but it intensifies competition. Compared to uniform pricing, it reduces industry profits and benefits consumers. In this setting, limitations on the use of consumer data may benefit the industry at the expense of consumers.</p>","PeriodicalId":47963,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Industrial Economics","volume":"73 2","pages":"333-350"},"PeriodicalIF":1.7,"publicationDate":"2025-02-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/joie.12410","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144264707","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Heterogeneous Price Technologies 异质价格技术
IF 1.7 4区 经济学
Journal of Industrial Economics Pub Date : 2025-02-24 DOI: 10.1111/joie.12411
Saara Hämäläinen
{"title":"Heterogeneous Price Technologies","authors":"Saara Hämäläinen","doi":"10.1111/joie.12411","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/joie.12411","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 \u0000 <p>We present a unified theory of dynamic oligopoly pricing with heterogeneous information technologies on each side of the market. Trackers (on the firm-side) and shoppers (on the consumer-side) can follow market prices costlessly, whereas non-trackers and non-shoppers cannot. We describe both non-collusive and collusive equilibria. While the effects of tracking may be non-monotone, the presence of trackers generally harms consumers. The price pattern that arises with trackers and non-trackers reconciles a multitude of cross-sectional price patterns, such as persistent price differences and adherence to or avoidance of certain prices. We find that non-trackers can counter tracker collusion by applying a limit-price strategy.</p>\u0000 </div>","PeriodicalId":47963,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Industrial Economics","volume":"73 2","pages":"316-332"},"PeriodicalIF":1.7,"publicationDate":"2025-02-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144264356","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
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