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The Impact of Private Label Introduction on Assortment, Prices, and Profits of Retailers* 引进自有品牌对零售商商品种类、价格和利润的影响*
IF 1.3 4区 经济学
Journal of Industrial Economics Pub Date : 2023-11-12 DOI: 10.1111/joie.12359
Meilin MA, Ralph Bernd Siebert
{"title":"The Impact of Private Label Introduction on Assortment, Prices, and Profits of Retailers*","authors":"Meilin MA,&nbsp;Ralph Bernd Siebert","doi":"10.1111/joie.12359","DOIUrl":"10.1111/joie.12359","url":null,"abstract":"<p>We study how introducing private-label brands (PLs) affects retail prices and profits, accounting for assortment adjustments of national brands (NBs). We employ an event-study framework and scanner data on the US beef market. When a PL is added to the low-priced market segment, we find that retail stores further differentiate NBs from the PL and remove same-segment NBs. When a PL is added to the high-priced segment, however, NB assortment changes are limited. PL introduction and PL-driven NB assortment changes impose small price effects on NB, but strongly cannibalize NB demand and steer consumers toward PLs, likely increasing store profits.</p>","PeriodicalId":47963,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Industrial Economics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2023-11-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135038327","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Win/Loss Data and Consumer Switching Costs: Measuring Diversion Ratios and the Impact of Mergers* 赢/输数据与消费者转换成本：衡量分流比率和合并的影响*
IF 1.3 4区 经济学
Journal of Industrial Economics Pub Date : 2023-11-10 DOI: 10.1111/joie.12371
Y. Jeff Qiu, Masayuki Sawada, Gloria Sheu
{"title":"Win/Loss Data and Consumer Switching Costs: Measuring Diversion Ratios and the Impact of Mergers*","authors":"Y. Jeff Qiu,&nbsp;Masayuki Sawada,&nbsp;Gloria Sheu","doi":"10.1111/joie.12371","DOIUrl":"10.1111/joie.12371","url":null,"abstract":"<p>We propose an identification strategy for diversion based on win/loss data. First, we show that win/loss data from the merging firms and market shares in two periods for all firms are sufficient to identify the diversion ratios between the merging partners. Second, we show that win/loss data from the merging firms alone are sufficient for partial identification, and we construct a lower bound that provides a good approximation to the diversion ratio when switching costs are high. We demonstrate the performance of our method with numerical simulations and with an application to the Anthem/Cigna merger.</p>","PeriodicalId":47963,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Industrial Economics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2023-11-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135137873","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Firm Matching in the Market for Technology: Business Stealing and Business Creation* 技术市场中的企业匹配：企业偷窃与企业创造*
IF 1.3 4区 经济学
Journal of Industrial Economics Pub Date : 2023-10-31 DOI: 10.1111/joie.12358
Pere Arqué-Castells, Daniel F. Spulber
{"title":"Firm Matching in the Market for Technology: Business Stealing and Business Creation*","authors":"Pere Arqué-Castells,&nbsp;Daniel F. Spulber","doi":"10.1111/joie.12358","DOIUrl":"10.1111/joie.12358","url":null,"abstract":"<p>We propose an empirical framework for studying the prevalence of business creation and business stealing in technology transfers from the effect of technological overlap and product market overlap. We estimate the model on a new dataset that tracks interactions in the market for technology between publicly held US companies. Product market overlap has a negative effect on matching patterns that is suggestive of business stealing while technological proximity has a positive effect that is consistent with business creation. We assess the relevance of IP rights in deterring undesirable technology adoptions and discuss the suitability of alternative strategies of technology exchange.</p>","PeriodicalId":47963,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Industrial Economics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2023-10-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135863832","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Search Frictions in Many-to-one Markets* 多对一市场中的搜索摩擦*
IF 1.3 4区 经济学
Journal of Industrial Economics Pub Date : 2023-10-26 DOI: 10.1111/joie.12357
Menghan Xu
{"title":"Search Frictions in Many-to-one Markets*","authors":"Menghan Xu","doi":"10.1111/joie.12357","DOIUrl":"10.1111/joie.12357","url":null,"abstract":"<p>This article studies how search frictions affect competition and matching efficiency in many-to-one loan markets where a borrower requires support from multiple investors and coordination is desired but absent. We develop a dynamic search model and show that borrowers employ mixed strategies in quoting interest rates. More importantly, we find that in many-to-one markets, the rate dispersion caused by search frictions facilitates coordination and hence improves allocation efficiency relative to a no friction environment. Further, we empirically present stylized facts consistent with the theoretical predictions and structurally estimate the impact of search frictions on matching efficiency.</p>","PeriodicalId":47963,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Industrial Economics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2023-10-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135016611","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Market Structure, Risk Preferences, and Forward Contracting Incentives* 市场结构、风险偏好和远期合约激励措施 *
IF 1.3 4区 经济学
Journal of Industrial Economics Pub Date : 2023-10-24 DOI: 10.1111/joie.12352
David P. Brown, David E. M. Sappington
{"title":"Market Structure, Risk Preferences, and Forward Contracting Incentives*","authors":"David P. Brown,&nbsp;David E. M. Sappington","doi":"10.1111/joie.12352","DOIUrl":"10.1111/joie.12352","url":null,"abstract":"<p>We examine the determinants of the levels of forward contracting preferred by generators and buyers of electricity. Increased forward contracting systematically reduces the variance of a generator's profit, so a generator prefers higher levels of forward contracting as market uncertainty or its aversion to risk increases. In contrast, increased forward contracting can either increase or reduce the variance of a buyer's profit. Consequently, a buyer can prefer either reduced or increased levels of forward contracting as market uncertainty or its aversion to risk increases.</p>","PeriodicalId":47963,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Industrial Economics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2023-10-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135316495","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
Bertrand under Uncertainty: Private and Common Costs* 不确定性下的伯特兰：私人成本和共同成本*
IF 1.3 4区 经济学
Journal of Industrial Economics Pub Date : 2023-10-20 DOI: 10.1111/joie.12354
Johan N. M. Lagerlöf
{"title":"Bertrand under Uncertainty: Private and Common Costs*","authors":"Johan N. M. Lagerlöf","doi":"10.1111/joie.12354","DOIUrl":"10.1111/joie.12354","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Does asymmetric information about costs in a homogeneous-good Bertrand model soften competition? Earlier literature has shown that the answer (perhaps counter-intuitively) is “no,” while assuming (i) private (i.e., independent) cost draws and (ii) no drastic innovations. I first show, in a fairly general setting, that by relaxing (i) and instead allowing for sufficiently much common (interdependent) cost draws, asymmetric information indeed softens competition. I then study a specification that yields a closed-form solution and show that relaxing (ii) but not (i) does not alter the result in the earlier literature. While relying on specific functional forms, this specification is quite rich and might be useful in applications. It allows for any (positive) degree of interdependence between the cost draws, for any demand elasticity, and for any number of firms. The closed-form solution is simple and in pure strategies.</p>","PeriodicalId":47963,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Industrial Economics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2023-10-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/joie.12354","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135513777","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Holdup, Knowledge Transferability, and Productivity: Theory and Evidence from Knowledge Workers* 滞留、知识可转移性和生产力：来自知识工作者的理论与证据*
IF 1.3 4区 经济学
Journal of Industrial Economics Pub Date : 2023-10-18 DOI: 10.1111/joie.12356
Emre Ekinci, David Wehrheim
{"title":"Holdup, Knowledge Transferability, and Productivity: Theory and Evidence from Knowledge Workers*","authors":"Emre Ekinci,&nbsp;David Wehrheim","doi":"10.1111/joie.12356","DOIUrl":"10.1111/joie.12356","url":null,"abstract":"<p>This article studies how firing costs affect the productivity of knowledge workers. We develop a holdup model in which workers are essential to knowledge transfer between firms and show that if the worker's knowledge stock is sufficiently transferable to competing firms, an increase in firing costs inhibits the firm's ability to hold up the worker and thereby leads to higher effort. We consider the passage of the wrongful discharge laws in the US as an exogenous increase in firing costs and test our theory using data on patents filed at the United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO).</p>","PeriodicalId":47963,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Industrial Economics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2023-10-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135889000","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Mediating Internal Competition for Resources* 调解内部资源竞争*
IF 1.3 4区 经济学
Journal of Industrial Economics Pub Date : 2023-10-18 DOI: 10.1111/joie.12353
Suraj Prasad, Yasunari Tamada
{"title":"Mediating Internal Competition for Resources*","authors":"Suraj Prasad,&nbsp;Yasunari Tamada","doi":"10.1111/joie.12353","DOIUrl":"10.1111/joie.12353","url":null,"abstract":"<p>We consider a model of internal competition, where projects developed by agents with different preferences compete for resources in an organization. Allowing a manager—who has moderate preferences—to control the allocation of resources has benefits when preferences are not too diverse. In particular, the manager acts as a mediator, forcing agents to compromise when competing projects succeed, thus providing better insurance to agents <i>and</i> increasing their effort. Our framework provides a theoretical foundation for two influential views of a manager—as the “visible hand” that allocates resources, and as a “power broker” who resolves conflict in an organization.</p>","PeriodicalId":47963,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Industrial Economics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2023-10-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/joie.12353","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135883593","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
How Do Start-up Acquisitions Affect the Direction of Innovation?* 初创企业收购如何影响创新方向？
IF 1.3 4区 经济学
Journal of Industrial Economics Pub Date : 2023-10-16 DOI: 10.1111/joie.12349
Esmée S. R. Dijk, José L. Moraga-González, Evgenia Motchenkova
{"title":"How Do Start-up Acquisitions Affect the Direction of Innovation?*","authors":"Esmée S. R. Dijk,&nbsp;José L. Moraga-González,&nbsp;Evgenia Motchenkova","doi":"10.1111/joie.12349","DOIUrl":"10.1111/joie.12349","url":null,"abstract":"<p>A start-up engages in an investment portfolio problem by choosing how much to invest in a “non-rival” project and a “rival” project that threatens an incumbent. Anticipating its acquisition, the start-up distorts its investment portfolio in order to raise acquisition rents. This may improve or worsen the direction of innovation and consumer surplus. The bigger the difference in social surplus appropriability across the two projects, the more likely it is that the direction of innovation improves and consumers benefit from an acquisition. These results also hold if the acquirer takes over the research facilities of the start-up.</p>","PeriodicalId":47963,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Industrial Economics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2023-10-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/joie.12349","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"136077516","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Information Generation in Vertically Differentiated Markets* 垂直差异化市场中的信息生成 *
IF 1.3 4区 经济学
Journal of Industrial Economics Pub Date : 2023-10-16 DOI: 10.1111/joie.12344
Andrea Canidio, Thomas Gall
{"title":"Information Generation in Vertically Differentiated Markets*","authors":"Andrea Canidio,&nbsp;Thomas Gall","doi":"10.1111/joie.12344","DOIUrl":"10.1111/joie.12344","url":null,"abstract":"<p>In a model of vertical competition two firms draw costly public signals that are informative about the quality of their products and then competitively set prices. When each firm generates information independently from the other, there will be overinvestment (underinvestment) in information generation if the market share of the quality follower in the subsequent market equilibrium is high (low). Moreover, information generation by one firm has a positive externality on the other firm. Hence, coordination (e.g., via industry associations) increases information generation. When product qualities are endogenous, information generation may prevent quality degradation and thus have an additional social benefit.</p>","PeriodicalId":47963,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Industrial Economics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2023-10-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"136113552","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
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