制造商合谋和维持转售价格*

IF 1.7 4区经济学 Q3 BUSINESS, FINANCE

Journal of Industrial Economics Pub Date : 2024-01-23 DOI:10.1111/joie.12382

Matthias Hunold, Johannes Muthers

{"title":"制造商合谋和维持转售价格*","authors":"Matthias Hunold, Johannes Muthers","doi":"10.1111/joie.12382","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<p>We provide a novel theory of harm for resale price maintenance (RPM). In a model with two manufacturers and two retailers, we show that RPM facilitates manufacturer collusion when retailers have alternatives to selling a manufacturer's product. Because of the alternatives, manufacturers can only ensure that retailers sell their products by leaving sufficient retail margins. This restricts the wholesale price level even when the manufacturers collude. RPM allows colluding manufacturers to establish higher prices.</p>","PeriodicalId":47963,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Industrial Economics","volume":"72 3","pages":"1089-1113"},"PeriodicalIF":1.7000,"publicationDate":"2024-01-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/joie.12382","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Manufacturer Collusion and Resale Price Maintenance*\",\"authors\":\"Matthias Hunold, Johannes Muthers\",\"doi\":\"10.1111/joie.12382\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"<p>We provide a novel theory of harm for resale price maintenance (RPM). In a model with two manufacturers and two retailers, we show that RPM facilitates manufacturer collusion when retailers have alternatives to selling a manufacturer's product. Because of the alternatives, manufacturers can only ensure that retailers sell their products by leaving sufficient retail margins. This restricts the wholesale price level even when the manufacturers collude. RPM allows colluding manufacturers to establish higher prices.</p>\",\"PeriodicalId\":47963,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Journal of Industrial Economics\",\"volume\":\"72 3\",\"pages\":\"1089-1113\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":1.7000,\"publicationDate\":\"2024-01-23\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/joie.12382\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Journal of Industrial Economics\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"96\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/joie.12382\",\"RegionNum\":4,\"RegionCategory\":\"经济学\",\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q3\",\"JCRName\":\"BUSINESS, FINANCE\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Journal of Industrial Economics","FirstCategoryId":"96","ListUrlMain":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/joie.12382","RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q3","JCRName":"BUSINESS, FINANCE","Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

摘要

我们为转售价格维护（RPM）提供了一种新颖的危害理论。在一个有两家制造商和两家零售商的模型中，我们表明，当零售商有销售制造商产品的替代品时，转售价格维持机制会助长制造商的合谋行为。由于存在其他选择，制造商只能通过留出足够的零售利润来确保零售商销售其产品。这就限制了批发价格水平，即使在制造商合谋的情况下也是如此。RPM 允许串通的制造商制定更高的价格。

本文章由计算机程序翻译，如有差异，请以英文原文为准。

查看原文本刊更多论文

Manufacturer Collusion and Resale Price Maintenance*

We provide a novel theory of harm for resale price maintenance (RPM). In a model with two manufacturers and two retailers, we show that RPM facilitates manufacturer collusion when retailers have alternatives to selling a manufacturer's product. Because of the alternatives, manufacturers can only ensure that retailers sell their products by leaving sufficient retail margins. This restricts the wholesale price level even when the manufacturers collude. RPM allows colluding manufacturers to establish higher prices.

求助全文

通过发布文献求助，成功后即可免费获取论文全文。去求助

来源期刊

Journal of Industrial Economics Multiple-

CiteScore

1.60

自引率

0.00%

发文量

期刊介绍： First published in 1952, the Journal of Industrial Economics has a wide international circulation and is recognised as a leading journal in the field. It was founded to promote the analysis of modern industry, particularly the behaviour of firms and the functioning of markets. Contributions are welcomed in all areas of industrial economics including: - organization of industry - applied oligopoly theory - product differentiation and technical change - theory of the firm and internal organization - regulation - monopoly - merger and technology policy Necessarily, these subjects will often draw on adjacent areas such as international economics, labour economics and law.