Welfare Consequence of Common Ownership in a Vertically Related Market*

IF 1.7 4区经济学 Q3 BUSINESS, FINANCE

Journal of Industrial Economics Pub Date : 2023-12-27 DOI:10.1111/joie.12380

Linfeng Chen, Toshihiro Matsumura, Chenhang Zeng

引用次数: 0

Abstract

We investigate how common ownership affects welfare in a vertically related market. Although common ownership mitigates the double marginalization problem and improves welfare, it restricts competition among downstream firms and harms welfare. We find that whether common ownership is welfare-improving depends on the degree of competitiveness in the downstream market. Common ownership is more likely to improve welfare when there are fewer downstream firms and a greater degree of product differentiation. In other words, common ownership may improve welfare when competition in the downstream market is weak.

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纵向关联市场中共同所有权的福利后果 *

我们研究了共同所有权如何影响纵向关联市场的福利。虽然共同所有权可以缓解双重边缘化问题并改善福利，但它会限制下游企业之间的竞争，损害福利。我们发现，共同所有权是否能改善福利取决于下游市场的竞争程度。当下游企业数量较少、产品差异化程度较高时，共同所有权更有可能改善福利。换句话说，当下游市场竞争较弱时，共同所有权可能会改善福利。

本文章由计算机程序翻译，如有差异，请以英文原文为准。

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来源期刊

Journal of Industrial Economics Multiple-

CiteScore

1.60

自引率

0.00%

发文量

期刊介绍： First published in 1952, the Journal of Industrial Economics has a wide international circulation and is recognised as a leading journal in the field. It was founded to promote the analysis of modern industry, particularly the behaviour of firms and the functioning of markets. Contributions are welcomed in all areas of industrial economics including: - organization of industry - applied oligopoly theory - product differentiation and technical change - theory of the firm and internal organization - regulation - monopoly - merger and technology policy Necessarily, these subjects will often draw on adjacent areas such as international economics, labour economics and law.