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Journal of Industrial Economics最新文献

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Bad NGOs? Competition in the Market for Donations and Workers' Misconduct 坏非政府组织?捐赠市场的竞争与工人的失当行为
IF 1.5 4区 经济学
Journal of Industrial Economics Pub Date : 2026-09-04 Epub Date: 2026-05-12 DOI: 10.1111/joie.70027
Nadia Burani, Ester Manna
{"title":"Bad NGOs? Competition in the Market for Donations and Workers' Misconduct","authors":"Nadia Burani,&nbsp;Ester Manna","doi":"10.1111/joie.70027","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/joie.70027","url":null,"abstract":"<p>In this paper, we investigate how competition among NGOs to attract donations shapes the incentives that NGOs provide to their employees. NGOs hire workers to undertake development projects, which are horizontally and vertically differentiated. Workers perform constructive activities that enhance project quality, but can also engage in non-observable destructive activities that harm the employing organization. NGOs offer monetary incentives to encourage constructive effort, but also need monitoring to curb destructive behavior. Our analysis yields the following results: (i) a high mission orientation on the part of NGOs makes workers' misconduct harder to eliminate; (ii) increased competition in the market for donations leads to higher constructive effort and project quality, but also to greater destructive effort; (iii) relative to the social optimum, the market outcome entails inadequate monitoring and excessive destructive behavior.</p>","PeriodicalId":47963,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Industrial Economics","volume":"74 3","pages":"367-383"},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2026-09-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/joie.70027","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"148904093","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Incentivizing Demand Response Using Auctions: Evidence From Steel Producers in Taiwan 用拍卖激励需求反应：来自台湾钢铁生产商的证据
IF 1.5 4区 经济学
Journal of Industrial Economics Pub Date : 2026-09-04 Epub Date: 2026-02-23 DOI: 10.1111/joie.70022
Chia-Wen Chen, Jian-Da Zhu
{"title":"Incentivizing Demand Response Using Auctions: Evidence From Steel Producers in Taiwan","authors":"Chia-Wen Chen,&nbsp;Jian-Da Zhu","doi":"10.1111/joie.70022","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/joie.70022","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 \u0000 <p>This paper examines the effects of incentivizing industrial users to reduce their electricity consumption using demand response auctions, in which rewards for curtailment depend on auction outcomes. Because true baseline consumption is unobserved, firms can strategically adjust both bids and consumption, leading to upward-biased estimates of program effectiveness. Using data on bids, auction outcomes, and hourly electricity consumption from steel producers in Taiwan, this paper employs a regression discontinuity design to show that not accounting for firms' strategic bidding behavior can lead to an overestimation of electricity reductions by at least 50%.</p>\u0000 </div>","PeriodicalId":47963,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Industrial Economics","volume":"74 3","pages":"297-315"},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2026-09-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"148904376","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Media Market Structure and Confirmatory News 媒体市场结构与确认性新闻
IF 1.5 4区 经济学
Journal of Industrial Economics Pub Date : 2026-09-04 Epub Date: 2026-05-22 DOI: 10.1111/joie.70029
Elena Panova
{"title":"Media Market Structure and Confirmatory News","authors":"Elena Panova","doi":"10.1111/joie.70029","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/joie.70029","url":null,"abstract":"<p>This paper studies the effect of media market competition on confirmatory bias, the tendency to confirm common priors to appear competent, while accounting for both single- and multi-homing. It finds that competition helps sustain informative reporting when priors are relatively precise, but has the opposite effect when priors are diffuse. The reason is that when competing outlets are perceived as similarly competent, consumers optimally multi-home. This creates strategic complementarity in informative reporting and helps sustain it when the priors are relatively precise. However, when perceived competencies diverge, consumers single-home with the outlet they view as most competent, creating incentives for confirmatory reporting when the priors are diffuse.</p>","PeriodicalId":47963,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Industrial Economics","volume":"74 3","pages":"384-391"},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2026-09-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/joie.70029","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"148904207","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Microcredit From Delaying Bill Payments 小额信贷延迟支付账单
IF 1.5 4区 经济学
Journal of Industrial Economics Pub Date : 2026-09-04 Epub Date: 2026-05-01 DOI: 10.1111/joie.70028
William Violette
{"title":"Microcredit From Delaying Bill Payments","authors":"William Violette","doi":"10.1111/joie.70028","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/joie.70028","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 \u0000 <p>Delaying bill payments to public utilities may provide an important strategy for households with volatile incomes to smooth their consumption. At the same time, allowing late payments may reduce net revenues for utilities, which often leads to higher prices to cover costs. Using billing records from a large water utility in Manila, this paper estimates a household consumption and savings model to evaluate counterfactual payment policies. A popular proposal to ensure upfront payments—prepaid metering—recoups less revenue than is needed to compensate households for their loss of consumption smoothing. Alternatively, a revenue-neutral policy allowing more late payments increases welfare by encouraging greater consumption smoothing.</p>\u0000 </div>","PeriodicalId":47963,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Industrial Economics","volume":"74 3","pages":"332-348"},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2026-09-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"148903726","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
RPM and Vertical Integration With Upstream Competition and Noncontractible Efforts 上游竞争和不可收缩努力下的RPM和垂直整合
IF 1.5 4区 经济学
Journal of Industrial Economics Pub Date : 2026-09-04 Epub Date: 2026-05-04 DOI: 10.1111/joie.70026
Michele Bisceglia, Mark Israel, Salvatore Piccolo, Paolo Ramezzana
{"title":"RPM and Vertical Integration With Upstream Competition and Noncontractible Efforts","authors":"Michele Bisceglia,&nbsp;Mark Israel,&nbsp;Salvatore Piccolo,&nbsp;Paolo Ramezzana","doi":"10.1111/joie.70026","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/joie.70026","url":null,"abstract":"<p>We study RPM and vertical integration in a common agency setting with two differentiated manufacturers and one retailer, where consumer demand depends on both the manufacturers' and retailer's noncontractible efforts. Under vertical separation, the adoption of maximum RPM by both manufacturers is an equilibrium and intensifies competition, since manufacturing margins are positive to incentivize manufacturing effort. This benefits consumers and may lower industry profits relative to a scenario where RPM is not available. Vertical integration between the retailer and one of the manufacturers increases industry profits and, when retail effort is also important, may benefit consumers by mitigating double marginalization.</p>","PeriodicalId":47963,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Industrial Economics","volume":"74 3","pages":"349-366"},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2026-09-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/joie.70026","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"148903741","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Optimal Simple Ratings 最优简单评级
IF 1.5 4区 经济学
Journal of Industrial Economics Pub Date : 2026-09-04 Epub Date: 2026-03-12 DOI: 10.1111/joie.70025
Hugo Hopenhayn, Maryam Saeedi
{"title":"Optimal Simple Ratings","authors":"Hugo Hopenhayn,&nbsp;Maryam Saeedi","doi":"10.1111/joie.70025","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/joie.70025","url":null,"abstract":"<p>We study optimal simple rating systems that partition sellers into a finite number of tiers. We show that optimal ratings must be threshold partitions, and that for linear supply and Cournot competition with constant marginal cost, optimal thresholds solve a k-means clustering problem requiring only the quality distribution. For convex (concave) supply functions, optimal thresholds are higher (lower) than the k-means solution. For log-concave distributions, two-tier certification captures at least 50% of maximum welfare gains from full disclosure, with five tiers typically achieving over 90%. Applications to eBay and Medicare Advantage data illustrate our method.</p>","PeriodicalId":47963,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Industrial Economics","volume":"74 3","pages":"316-331"},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2026-09-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/joie.70025","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"148904132","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Hub-and-Spoke Collusion With a Third-Party Pricing Algorithm 与第三方定价算法的轮辐合谋
IF 1 4区 经济学
Journal of Industrial Economics Pub Date : 2026-06-03 Epub Date: 2026-01-13 DOI: 10.1111/joie.70017
Joseph E. Harrington Jr.
{"title":"Hub-and-Spoke Collusion With a Third-Party Pricing Algorithm","authors":"Joseph E. Harrington Jr.","doi":"10.1111/joie.70017","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/joie.70017","url":null,"abstract":"<p>A data analytics company delivers an efficiency by supplying a pricing algorithm that allows prices to more effectively respond to demand variation. In this setting, I consider a new form of hub-and-spoke collusion: A data analytics company (hub) coordinates the prices of competitors (spokes) through its pricing algorithm. A novel finding is that the data analytics company's efficiency is a facilitating factor for collusion; a rise in this efficiency increases the supracompetitive markup and the incremental profit from collusion. Thus, markets in which a third party's services are solidly grounded in efficiency still warrant scrutiny by competition authorities because they are more prone to the emergence of collusion and anticompetitive harm.</p>","PeriodicalId":47963,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Industrial Economics","volume":"74 2","pages":"181-196"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2026-06-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/joie.70017","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"148153198","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Patents, Antitrust, and Innovation: Evidence From the Xerox Case 专利、反垄断和创新：来自施乐案例的证据
IF 1 4区 经济学
Journal of Industrial Economics Pub Date : 2026-06-03 Epub Date: 2026-02-23 DOI: 10.1111/joie.70023
Robin Mamrak
{"title":"Patents, Antitrust, and Innovation: Evidence From the Xerox Case","authors":"Robin Mamrak","doi":"10.1111/joie.70023","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/joie.70023","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 \u0000 <p>How does antitrust enforcement affect innovation when patents are the main barrier to entry? I address this question by empirically studying the US antitrust case against Xerox, the former monopolist in the market for plain-paper copiers. In 1975, Xerox accepted a consent decree whose primary remedy was compulsory licensing of all its copier-technology patents in the US and abroad. I show that this antitrust intervention promoted innovation by other firms in the copier industry, measured by a disproportionate increase in patenting in technology classes with a higher propensity for containing copier-related inventions. This effect is driven by Japanese competitors, whose patenting became more novel and diverse as they started developing smaller desktop copiers.</p>\u0000 </div>","PeriodicalId":47963,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Industrial Economics","volume":"74 2","pages":"278-294"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2026-06-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"148153574","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Interoperability Between Ad-Financed Platforms With Endogenous Multi-Homing 内生性多归巢广告融资平台之间的互操作性
IF 1 4区 经济学
Journal of Industrial Economics Pub Date : 2026-06-03 Epub Date: 2026-01-27 DOI: 10.1111/joie.70018
Marc Bourreau, Adrien Raizonville, Guillaume Thébaudin
{"title":"Interoperability Between Ad-Financed Platforms With Endogenous Multi-Homing","authors":"Marc Bourreau,&nbsp;Adrien Raizonville,&nbsp;Guillaume Thébaudin","doi":"10.1111/joie.70018","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/joie.70018","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 \u0000 <p>Platform interoperability is considered a powerful tool to promote competition in digital markets when network effects are at play. We study the incentives of two competing ad-funded platforms to provide interoperability in a setting where consumers can single-home or multi-home and decide how much time to spend online. When the platforms are symmetric, perfect interoperability emerges in equilibrium and is socially efficient. When a larger platform has an installed base of customers, its incentive to make its services interoperable is lower than for the smaller platform. Interoperability does not emerge in equilibrium if the installed base is sufficiently large. However, mandating interoperability between the asymmetric platforms is not always socially optimal.</p>\u0000 </div>","PeriodicalId":47963,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Industrial Economics","volume":"74 2","pages":"197-215"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2026-06-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"148153253","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Gaining Control by Losing Control 从失去控制中获得控制
IF 1 4区 经济学
Journal of Industrial Economics Pub Date : 2026-06-03 Epub Date: 2026-02-06 DOI: 10.1111/joie.70019
Jaesoo Kim, Alexander Rodivilov, Dongsoo Shin
{"title":"Gaining Control by Losing Control","authors":"Jaesoo Kim,&nbsp;Alexander Rodivilov,&nbsp;Dongsoo Shin","doi":"10.1111/joie.70019","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/joie.70019","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 \u0000 <p>We study an agency model with two sequential tasks, an initial task (e.g., development), which requires unverifiable effort, and a final task (e.g., production), whose environment is privately known only to the agent. The principal can either perform the initial task herself (<i>hands-on management</i>) or delegate it to the agent (<i>hands-off management</i>). We show that when the cost of effort for the initial task is low, hands-on management is optimal, as it mitigates the distortion caused by agent shirking. However, as the cost of effort increases, hands-off management becomes preferable. Under hands-on management, the principal's inability to commit leads her to overinvest in the initial task, which in turn exacerbates inefficiencies in the final task due to the agent's information rent. In contrast, hands-off management, despite the agent's shirking incentive, helps better target effort toward favorable project environments. Our analysis also reveals how effort costs can create systematic biases toward one management style over the other.</p>\u0000 </div>","PeriodicalId":47963,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Industrial Economics","volume":"74 2","pages":"216-233"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2026-06-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"148153419","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
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