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Correction to “Estimating Consumer Inertia in Repeated Choices of Smartphones” 对 "智能手机重复选择中的消费者惯性估计 "的更正
IF 1.7 4区 经济学
Journal of Industrial Economics Pub Date : 2024-08-04 DOI: 10.1111/joie.12402
{"title":"Correction to “Estimating Consumer Inertia in Repeated Choices of Smartphones”","authors":"","doi":"10.1111/joie.12402","DOIUrl":"10.1111/joie.12402","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Grzybowski, L. and Nicolle, A., 2021, ‘Estimating Consumer Inertia in Repeated Choices of Smartphones,’ <i>The Journal of Industrial Economics</i>, 69(1), pp. 33–82. https://doi.org/10.1111/joie.12239</p><p>In the footnote on the first page of the paper, Ambre Nicolle acknowledges funding from “the European Union's Framework Programme for Research and Innovation Horizon 2020 (2014-2020) under the Marie Skłodowska-Curie Grant Agreement No. 75388 and from LMU Munich's Institutional Strategy LMUexcellent within the framework of the German Excellence Initiative (No. ZUK22).”</p><p>The Marie Skłodowska-Curie Grant Agreement number indicated is not correct. It should be No. 75<b>4</b>388, rather than No. 75388.</p><p>We apologize for this error.</p>","PeriodicalId":47963,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Industrial Economics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.7,"publicationDate":"2024-08-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/joie.12402","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141935548","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Coupling Information Disclosure with a Quality Standard in R&D Contests* 在研发竞赛中将信息披露与质量标准结合起来*。
IF 1.7 4区 经济学
Journal of Industrial Economics Pub Date : 2024-03-06 DOI: 10.1111/joie.12387
Gaoyang Cai, Qian Jiao, Jingfeng Lu, Jie Zheng
{"title":"Coupling Information Disclosure with a Quality Standard in R&D Contests*","authors":"Gaoyang Cai,&nbsp;Qian Jiao,&nbsp;Jingfeng Lu,&nbsp;Jie Zheng","doi":"10.1111/joie.12387","DOIUrl":"10.1111/joie.12387","url":null,"abstract":"<p>We study two-player R&amp;D contest design using both an information disclosure policy and a quality standard as instruments. The ability of an innovator is known only to himself. The organizer commits ex-ante to a minimum quality standard and whether to have innovators' abilities publicly revealed before they conduct R&amp;D activities. We find that without quality standards, fully concealing innovators' abilities elicits both higher expected aggregate quality and expected highest quality. With optimally set quality standards, although fully concealing ability information still elicits higher expected aggregate quality, fully disclosing this information leads to a higher level of expected highest quality. Moreover, the optimal quality standards are compared across different objectives and disclosure policies.</p>","PeriodicalId":47963,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Industrial Economics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.7,"publicationDate":"2024-03-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140045630","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Price Squeezes as an Exploitative Abuse* 价格挤压是一种剥削性滥用* 。
IF 1.7 4区 经济学
Journal of Industrial Economics Pub Date : 2024-03-05 DOI: 10.1111/joie.12389
Zhijun Chen
{"title":"Price Squeezes as an Exploitative Abuse*","authors":"Zhijun Chen","doi":"10.1111/joie.12389","DOIUrl":"10.1111/joie.12389","url":null,"abstract":"<p>The exclusionary theory of price squeezes, commonly debated in courts and among legal scholars, faces significant challenges. This paper introduces an exploitative rationale for price squeezes. A vertically integrated firm can exploit efficiency gains from a downstream competitor, thereby earning more than the monopoly profit, and price squeezing emerges as a necessary condition for such exploitation. Prohibiting price squeezes benefits the competitor and improves production efficiency, but may also lead to unintended, perverse effects. This paper lays an economic foundation for analyzing price squeeze cases and contributes to reconciling the divergence in the case laws between the United States and the European Union.</p>","PeriodicalId":47963,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Industrial Economics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.7,"publicationDate":"2024-03-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/joie.12389","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140045469","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Vertical Collusion to Exclude Product Improvement* 排除产品改进的纵向串通行为*
IF 1.7 4区 经济学
Journal of Industrial Economics Pub Date : 2024-02-28 DOI: 10.1111/joie.12388
David Gilo, Yaron Yehezkel
{"title":"Vertical Collusion to Exclude Product Improvement*","authors":"David Gilo,&nbsp;Yaron Yehezkel","doi":"10.1111/joie.12388","DOIUrl":"10.1111/joie.12388","url":null,"abstract":"<p>A manufacturer of an established product repeatedly interacts with a retailer that can sell an inferior new product thereby improving it. The manufacturer's exclusionary strategy consists of a permanently below-cost wholesale price and “vertical collusion” with the retailer to exclude via a future reward of a reduced fixed fee. The latter tool is available only in an infinite game. Although contracts include fixed fees, the retailer sells the new product more than what maximizes industry profits. Exclusive dealing or a vertical merger between the manufacturer of the established product and the retailer replicate the vertically integrated outcome and increase prices.</p>","PeriodicalId":47963,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Industrial Economics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.7,"publicationDate":"2024-02-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/joie.12388","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140025370","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Collusion Between Supply Chains under Asymmetric Information* 不对称信息下供应链之间的合谋行为*
IF 1.7 4区 经济学
Journal of Industrial Economics Pub Date : 2024-02-22 DOI: 10.1111/joie.12386
Yaron Yehezkel
{"title":"Collusion Between Supply Chains under Asymmetric Information*","authors":"Yaron Yehezkel","doi":"10.1111/joie.12386","DOIUrl":"10.1111/joie.12386","url":null,"abstract":"<p>This paper considers an infinitely repeated competition between manufacturer-retailer supply chains. In every period, retailers privately observe the demand and manufacturers pay retailers ‘information rents’. I study collusive equilibria between the supply chains that may or may not involve the retailers. I find that including forward-looking retailers in the collusive scheme may facilitate or hinder collusion, depending on the likelihood of a high demand and the gap between a high and a low demand. Moreover, collusion on monopoly profits can be easier or more difficult to implement than collusion on upstream profits.</p>","PeriodicalId":47963,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Industrial Economics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.7,"publicationDate":"2024-02-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/joie.12386","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139951504","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Managing Seller Conduct in Online Marketplaces and Platform Most-Favored Nation Clauses* 管理网上市场和平台最惠国条款中的卖方行为*
IF 1.7 4区 经济学
Journal of Industrial Economics Pub Date : 2024-02-22 DOI: 10.1111/joie.12384
Frank Schlütter
{"title":"Managing Seller Conduct in Online Marketplaces and Platform Most-Favored Nation Clauses*","authors":"Frank Schlütter","doi":"10.1111/joie.12384","DOIUrl":"10.1111/joie.12384","url":null,"abstract":"<p>This article investigates the incentive and ability of a platform to limit the extent of competition between the sellers it hosts. Absent contractual restrictions, a platform has an incentive to ensure competition between the sellers. This incentive can change with the introduction of so-called platform most-favored nation clauses (PMFN) that require the online sellers not to offer better conditions on other distribution channels. Such clauses can align the interests between sellers and platforms to restrict competition. I illustrate that a platform can stabilize seller collusion to its own benefit. These results offer a novel rationale to treat PMFNs with scrutiny.</p>","PeriodicalId":47963,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Industrial Economics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.7,"publicationDate":"2024-02-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/joie.12384","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139951649","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Regulating Platform Competition in Markets with Network Externalities: Will Predatory Pricing Restrictions Increase Social Welfare?* 规范具有网络外部性的市场中的平台竞争：限制掠夺性定价能否增加社会福利？
IF 1.7 4区 经济学
Journal of Industrial Economics Pub Date : 2024-01-30 DOI: 10.1111/joie.12385
Ohad Atad, Yaron Yehezkel
{"title":"Regulating Platform Competition in Markets with Network Externalities: Will Predatory Pricing Restrictions Increase Social Welfare?*","authors":"Ohad Atad,&nbsp;Yaron Yehezkel","doi":"10.1111/joie.12385","DOIUrl":"10.1111/joie.12385","url":null,"abstract":"<p>We consider an infinitely repeated platform competition in a market with network externalities. The platform that dominated the market in the previous period becomes the incumbent in the current period. We examine the effect of an antitrust policy that prohibits both platforms (symmetric regulation), or just the incumbent (asymmetric regulation) from charging predatory prices. We show that symmetric regulation decreases consumer surplus and does not affect efficiency. Asymmetric regulation increases consumer surplus and improves welfare when the size of the market remains constant over time. Yet, when market size varies over time, this policy may lead to inefficient entry.</p>","PeriodicalId":47963,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Industrial Economics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.7,"publicationDate":"2024-01-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/joie.12385","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139644926","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Manufacturer Collusion and Resale Price Maintenance* 制造商合谋和维持转售价格*
IF 1.7 4区 经济学
Journal of Industrial Economics Pub Date : 2024-01-23 DOI: 10.1111/joie.12382
Matthias Hunold, Johannes Muthers
{"title":"Manufacturer Collusion and Resale Price Maintenance*","authors":"Matthias Hunold,&nbsp;Johannes Muthers","doi":"10.1111/joie.12382","DOIUrl":"10.1111/joie.12382","url":null,"abstract":"<p>We provide a novel theory of harm for resale price maintenance (RPM). In a model with two manufacturers and two retailers, we show that RPM facilitates manufacturer collusion when retailers have alternatives to selling a manufacturer's product. Because of the alternatives, manufacturers can only ensure that retailers sell their products by leaving sufficient retail margins. This restricts the wholesale price level even when the manufacturers collude. RPM allows colluding manufacturers to establish higher prices.</p>","PeriodicalId":47963,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Industrial Economics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.7,"publicationDate":"2024-01-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/joie.12382","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139579379","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
User Data and Endogenous Entry in Online Markets* 在线市场的用户数据和内生性进入*
IF 1.7 4区 经济学
Journal of Industrial Economics Pub Date : 2024-01-10 DOI: 10.1111/joie.12383
Laura Abrardi, Carlo Cambini, Raffaele Congiu, Flavio Pino
{"title":"User Data and Endogenous Entry in Online Markets*","authors":"Laura Abrardi,&nbsp;Carlo Cambini,&nbsp;Raffaele Congiu,&nbsp;Flavio Pino","doi":"10.1111/joie.12383","DOIUrl":"10.1111/joie.12383","url":null,"abstract":"<p>We investigate how the presence of a Data Broker (DB), who sells consumer data to downstream firms, affects firm entry and competition in a horizontally differentiated oligopoly market, in which data allow firms to price discriminate. The DB chooses the price and amount of data sold to each firm. We show that the data sale by the DB reduces excessive market entry, as the competition induced by personalized prices exerts a downward pressure on prices and profits. The data-induced entry barrier and resulting weakened competition dominates the pro-competitive effect of personalized prices. Consequently, while the DB's presence might alleviate excessive market entry, it also diminishes consumer surplus.</p>","PeriodicalId":47963,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Industrial Economics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.7,"publicationDate":"2024-01-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/joie.12383","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139420509","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Positive and Negative Sorting in Team Contests* 团队竞赛中的正排序和负排序 *
IF 1.7 4区 经济学
Journal of Industrial Economics Pub Date : 2024-01-02 DOI: 10.1111/joie.12381
Qiang Fu, Zenan Wu, Hanyao Zhang, Yangfan Zhou
{"title":"Positive and Negative Sorting in Team Contests*","authors":"Qiang Fu,&nbsp;Zenan Wu,&nbsp;Hanyao Zhang,&nbsp;Yangfan Zhou","doi":"10.1111/joie.12381","DOIUrl":"10.1111/joie.12381","url":null,"abstract":"<p>This paper investigates the formation of teams in a contest. A manager sorts four workers—who differ in their productivity—into two teams. Workers on each team join forces to produce team output, and one team wins a prize; for example, a bonus package. Two sorting patterns are possible: Positive sorting requires that each team consist of players of same caliber and negative sorting the opposite. We characterize the optimum. We further extend the model to allow the manager to set a prize schedule for the workers on each team upon a win, allocate productive resources between teams, and pick the level of competition of the contest.</p>","PeriodicalId":47963,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Industrial Economics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.7,"publicationDate":"2024-01-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139375660","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
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