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Never-Ending Search for Innovation 永无止境地寻求创新
IF 1.7 4区 经济学
Journal of Industrial Economics Pub Date : 2025-03-20 DOI: 10.1111/joie.12413
Jean-Michel Benkert, Igor Letina
{"title":"Never-Ending Search for Innovation","authors":"Jean-Michel Benkert,&nbsp;Igor Letina","doi":"10.1111/joie.12413","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/joie.12413","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 \u0000 <p>We provide a model of investment in innovation that is dynamic, features multiple heterogeneous research projects of which only one potentially leads to success, and in each period, the researcher chooses the set of projects to invest in. We show that if a search for innovation starts, it optimally does not end until the innovation is found—which will be never with a strictly positive probability.</p>\u0000 </div>","PeriodicalId":47963,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Industrial Economics","volume":"73 2","pages":"384-387"},"PeriodicalIF":1.7,"publicationDate":"2025-03-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144264713","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
How to Reach the Paradise? Inside the Edgeworth Cycle and Why a Gasoline Station Is the First to Raise Its Price 如何到达天堂？埃奇沃斯循环的内幕和为什么加油站是第一个提高价格的
IF 1.7 4区 经济学
Journal of Industrial Economics Pub Date : 2025-03-18 DOI: 10.1111/joie.12412
Mats Petter Kahl, Thomas Wein
{"title":"How to Reach the Paradise? Inside the Edgeworth Cycle and Why a Gasoline Station Is the First to Raise Its Price","authors":"Mats Petter Kahl,&nbsp;Thomas Wein","doi":"10.1111/joie.12412","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/joie.12412","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Competition in gasoline retailing is characterized by intraday price cycles in local markets worldwide. The literature describes these as corresponding to the well-known Edgeworth cycles. Previous research has mainly focused on analyzing cycles based on hourly, daily, or weekly average price data. We study the cycle initiation based on second-by-second data for one German town. We find that price considerations are not the main factors in determining which retailers raise prices first, how much they raise them, or whether they succeed. Brand affiliation is more important, and to a lesser extent, so are the services offered and location parameters.</p>","PeriodicalId":47963,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Industrial Economics","volume":"73 2","pages":"351-383"},"PeriodicalIF":1.7,"publicationDate":"2025-03-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/joie.12412","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144264440","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Price Discrimination With Nested Consideration 嵌套对价的价格歧视
IF 1.7 4区 经济学
Journal of Industrial Economics Pub Date : 2025-02-27 DOI: 10.1111/joie.12410
Ioana Chioveanu
{"title":"Price Discrimination With Nested Consideration","authors":"Ioana Chioveanu","doi":"10.1111/joie.12410","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/joie.12410","url":null,"abstract":"<p>This paper examines price discrimination by consideration in an oligopoly with nested reach. Consumers obtain a ranking of the firms and consider them consecutively, differing in how far down the list they go. A firm's product matches a consumer's preferences with an exogenous probability. In sufficiently asymmetric markets, under both uniform and discriminatory pricing, in equilibrium, competition is duopolistic: only two firms use any price interval. Firms face pricing trade-offs due to consideration heterogeneity. Price discrimination alleviates these trade-offs, but it intensifies competition. Compared to uniform pricing, it reduces industry profits and benefits consumers. In this setting, limitations on the use of consumer data may benefit the industry at the expense of consumers.</p>","PeriodicalId":47963,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Industrial Economics","volume":"73 2","pages":"333-350"},"PeriodicalIF":1.7,"publicationDate":"2025-02-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/joie.12410","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144264707","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Heterogeneous Price Technologies 异质价格技术
IF 1.7 4区 经济学
Journal of Industrial Economics Pub Date : 2025-02-24 DOI: 10.1111/joie.12411
Saara Hämäläinen
{"title":"Heterogeneous Price Technologies","authors":"Saara Hämäläinen","doi":"10.1111/joie.12411","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/joie.12411","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 \u0000 <p>We present a unified theory of dynamic oligopoly pricing with heterogeneous information technologies on each side of the market. Trackers (on the firm-side) and shoppers (on the consumer-side) can follow market prices costlessly, whereas non-trackers and non-shoppers cannot. We describe both non-collusive and collusive equilibria. While the effects of tracking may be non-monotone, the presence of trackers generally harms consumers. The price pattern that arises with trackers and non-trackers reconciles a multitude of cross-sectional price patterns, such as persistent price differences and adherence to or avoidance of certain prices. We find that non-trackers can counter tracker collusion by applying a limit-price strategy.</p>\u0000 </div>","PeriodicalId":47963,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Industrial Economics","volume":"73 2","pages":"316-332"},"PeriodicalIF":1.7,"publicationDate":"2025-02-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144264356","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Increased (Platform) Competition Reduces (Seller) Competition （平台）竞争的增加减少了（卖家）竞争
IF 1.7 4区 经济学
Journal of Industrial Economics Pub Date : 2025-02-19 DOI: 10.1111/joie.12409
Shana Cui
{"title":"Increased (Platform) Competition Reduces (Seller) Competition","authors":"Shana Cui","doi":"10.1111/joie.12409","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/joie.12409","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Policymakers have expressed concern that when a dominant online platform acts both as a marketplace and as an active seller, it might disadvantage its rival sellers and thereby harm consumers. I examine whether platform competition might be promoted to protect consumers. Perhaps surprisingly, I find that increased platform competition can reduce seller competition, and thereby harm consumers.</p>","PeriodicalId":47963,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Industrial Economics","volume":"73 2","pages":"285-315"},"PeriodicalIF":1.7,"publicationDate":"2025-02-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/joie.12409","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144264382","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Procuring Medical Devices: The Price Effect of Mergers Among Orthopedic Prostheses Producers 医疗器械采购：骨科假体生产商并购的价格效应
IF 1.7 4区 经济学
Journal of Industrial Economics Pub Date : 2025-01-20 DOI: 10.1111/joie.12408
Vincenzo Atella, Nicola Ceschin, Francesco Decarolis
{"title":"Procuring Medical Devices: The Price Effect of Mergers Among Orthopedic Prostheses Producers","authors":"Vincenzo Atella,&nbsp;Nicola Ceschin,&nbsp;Francesco Decarolis","doi":"10.1111/joie.12408","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/joie.12408","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 \u0000 <p>This paper quantifies the price effects of a merger between two major producers of orthopedic prostheses. It shows that, in the public procurement markets where these products are purchased, the effect of the merger hinges on the characteristics of both the procurement design and the organizational structure of the buyers. Using data from all public procurement events in Italy between 2012 and 2019, and exploiting a difference-in-differences model where pacemakers play the role of the control group, we find that the merger led to a 7.6% increase in prices and that this effect is concentrated in the first three years post-merger. Further insights are: (i) a heterogeneous impact among gender and age groups such that most of the burden is on female patients aged 65 and above; (ii) short-term quality does not change, but patenting activity declines; (iii) there is no evidence of the merger triggering ex-post coordinated effects in the form of bidding and entry patterns compatible with firm collusion.</p>\u0000 </div>","PeriodicalId":47963,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Industrial Economics","volume":"73 2","pages":"254-284"},"PeriodicalIF":1.7,"publicationDate":"2025-01-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144264353","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Merger and Entry With Learning 并购与学习
IF 1.7 4区 经济学
Journal of Industrial Economics Pub Date : 2025-01-06 DOI: 10.1111/joie.12407
Yves Guéron, Jihong Lee
{"title":"Merger and Entry With Learning","authors":"Yves Guéron,&nbsp;Jihong Lee","doi":"10.1111/joie.12407","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/joie.12407","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 \u0000 <p>We study dynamic market competition between a monopoly incumbent and an entrant experimenting with disruptive innovation. The incumbent can pursue the uncertain innovation after acquiring the disruptor, who may be more productive and privately know its ability. Mergers generate synergies. We characterize perfect equilibria in Markov strategies on bargaining and R&amp;D. The equilibrium path is determined by the interaction between market belief in the unobservable state and the distribution of private information. Asymmetric information generates failed mergers and buyout effects. Inefficient mergers arise from imperfect returns to R&amp;D. There may be under- or over-investment. We provide implications for antitrust policy.</p>\u0000 </div>","PeriodicalId":47963,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Industrial Economics","volume":"73 2","pages":"235-253"},"PeriodicalIF":1.7,"publicationDate":"2025-01-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144264387","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Demand Estimation with Flexible Income Effect: An Application to Pass-Through and Merger Analysis* 具有灵活收入效应的需求估算：转嫁和兼并分析的应用*
IF 1.7 4区 经济学
Journal of Industrial Economics Pub Date : 2024-11-19 DOI: 10.1111/joie.12406
Shuhei Kaneko, Yuta Toyama
{"title":"Demand Estimation with Flexible Income Effect: An Application to Pass-Through and Merger Analysis*","authors":"Shuhei Kaneko,&nbsp;Yuta Toyama","doi":"10.1111/joie.12406","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/joie.12406","url":null,"abstract":"<p>This article proposes a semiparametric discrete choice model that incorporates a nonparametric specification for income effects. The model allows for the flexible estimation of demand curvature, which has significant implications for pricing and policy analysis in oligopolistic markets. Our estimation algorithm adopts a method of sieve approximation with shape restrictions in a nested fixed-point algorithm. Applying this framework to the Japanese automobile market, we conduct a pass-through analysis of feebates and merger simulations. Our model predicts a higher pass-through rate and more significant merger effects than parametric demand models, highlighting the importance of flexibly estimating demand curvature.</p>","PeriodicalId":47963,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Industrial Economics","volume":"73 1","pages":"186-233"},"PeriodicalIF":1.7,"publicationDate":"2024-11-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/joie.12406","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143565380","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Welfare-Increasing Monopolization* Welfare-Increasing垄断*
IF 1.7 4区 经济学
Journal of Industrial Economics Pub Date : 2024-11-11 DOI: 10.1111/joie.12405
Simon Cowan
{"title":"Welfare-Increasing Monopolization*","authors":"Simon Cowan","doi":"10.1111/joie.12405","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/joie.12405","url":null,"abstract":"<p>The conditions for monopolization to be good for social welfare are examined. Social welfare can be higher when a monopoly sells to a monopoly, with double margins, than when a competitive industry sells to a downstream Cournot oligopoly with differing efficiency levels. This requires inverse demand to be sufficiently concave, and cannot hold when demand is convex. When there are no vertical issues conditions are found for elimination of an inefficient firm to raise welfare, building on Lahiri and Ono (1988). In general greater demand concavity increases the relative importance of the benefit of redistributing output to the efficient firm.</p>","PeriodicalId":47963,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Industrial Economics","volume":"73 1","pages":"167-185"},"PeriodicalIF":1.7,"publicationDate":"2024-11-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/joie.12405","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143565246","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Platform design and rent extraction* 平台设计和租金提取*
IF 1.7 4区 经济学
Journal of Industrial Economics Pub Date : 2024-09-03 DOI: 10.1111/joie.12404
Amedeo Piolatto, Florian Schuett
{"title":"Platform design and rent extraction*","authors":"Amedeo Piolatto,&nbsp;Florian Schuett","doi":"10.1111/joie.12404","DOIUrl":"10.1111/joie.12404","url":null,"abstract":"<p>We study the design of online platforms that aggregate information and facilitate transactions. Leading players in the industry (e.g., the Booking Group) hold two types of platforms in their portfolio: revealing platforms that disclose the identity of transaction partners (like Booking.com) and anonymous platforms that do not (like Hotwire.com). Anonymous platforms offer discounts but lead to inefficient matching between consumers and firms. We develop a model in which horizontally differentiated firms sell to heterogeneous consumers both directly and via a platform that enlarges the pool of consumers they can attract. The platform charges firms for transactions it intermediates and can choose to offer an anonymous sales channel in addition to a revealing one. We show that offering both sales channels is profitable not only because it allows the platform to implement price discrimination, as suggested by the literature on opaque selling, but also because it improves rent extraction. The anonymous channel breaks the link between the price on the revealing channel and the firms' outside option; moreover, it can reduce double marginalisation. The welfare impact of the anonymous channel is ambiguous: while it sometimes leads to market expansion, it also causes inefficiently high transport costs.</p>","PeriodicalId":47963,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Industrial Economics","volume":"73 1","pages":"124-166"},"PeriodicalIF":1.7,"publicationDate":"2024-09-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/joie.12404","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142222768","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
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