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Bundling in Advance Sales: Theory and Evidence from Round-Trip versus Two One-Way Tickets* 预售中的捆绑销售：往返机票与两张单程票的理论与证据*
IF 1.7 4区 经济学
Journal of Industrial Economics Pub Date : 2024-05-01 DOI: 10.1111/joie.12393
Diego Escobari, Paan Jindapon, Nicholas G. Rupp
{"title":"Bundling in Advance Sales: Theory and Evidence from Round-Trip versus Two One-Way Tickets*","authors":"Diego Escobari,&nbsp;Paan Jindapon,&nbsp;Nicholas G. Rupp","doi":"10.1111/joie.12393","DOIUrl":"10.1111/joie.12393","url":null,"abstract":"<p>We theoretically derive an optimal price for a bundle of two goods that are sold in advance to risk-averse buyers. The theory predicts that a round-trip ticket is less expensive than two one-way tickets when demands for the outbound and the inbound are uncertain and positively correlated. Using a unique airlines dataset, we find evidence that is consistent with the theory; round-trip bundle discounts exist and they are larger for passengers who buy early in advance, stay on a Saturday night, and have higher valuations. We also find that the bundle discounts decrease with competition.</p>","PeriodicalId":47963,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Industrial Economics","volume":"72 4","pages":"1369-1396"},"PeriodicalIF":1.7,"publicationDate":"2024-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140826899","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Downstream Cross-Holdings and Upstream R&D: A Comment* 下游交叉持股与上游研发：评论 *
IF 1.7 4区 经济学
Journal of Industrial Economics Pub Date : 2024-03-27 DOI: 10.1111/joie.12391
Yake Jin, Arijit Mukherjee, Chenhang Zeng
{"title":"Downstream Cross-Holdings and Upstream R&D: A Comment*","authors":"Yake Jin,&nbsp;Arijit Mukherjee,&nbsp;Chenhang Zeng","doi":"10.1111/joie.12391","DOIUrl":"10.1111/joie.12391","url":null,"abstract":"<p>According to Hu et al. [<i>Journal of Industrial Economics</i>, 70(3), pp. 775–789], downstream cross-holdings are permissible based on the social welfare standard if the investment technology in the upstream sector is highly inefficient. However, the conclusion of that paper relies on a definition of downstream producer surplus that is not so commonly found in the literature. After using a more commonly found definition of downstream producer surplus, this note demonstrates that downstream cross-holdings have detrimental impacts on both consumer surplus and social welfare, emphasizing the need for efficient and effective regulations on downstream cross-holdings in Hu et al. [<i>Journal of Industrial Economics</i>, 70(3), pp. 775–789] type economy.</p>","PeriodicalId":47963,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Industrial Economics","volume":"72 4","pages":"1360-1368"},"PeriodicalIF":1.7,"publicationDate":"2024-03-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140374711","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Common-Ownership Versus Cross-Ownership: Evidence from the Automobile Industry* 共同所有权与交叉所有权：来自汽车行业的证据*
IF 1.7 4区 经济学
Journal of Industrial Economics Pub Date : 2024-03-26 DOI: 10.1111/joie.12390
Cristian Huse, Ricardo Ribeiro, Frank Verboven
{"title":"Common-Ownership Versus Cross-Ownership: Evidence from the Automobile Industry*","authors":"Cristian Huse,&nbsp;Ricardo Ribeiro,&nbsp;Frank Verboven","doi":"10.1111/joie.12390","DOIUrl":"10.1111/joie.12390","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Overlapping ownership has gained considerable momentum in the last decades, yet little is known about the role of its sources. We quantify the relative importance of common-ownership (by shareholders external to an industry) and cross-ownership (by firms within the industry). We focus on the global automobile industry, over the period 2007–2021, and document that common-ownership links constitute between 31% and 39% of the equity ownership of automobile manufacturers, while cross-ownership links amount to 6%–9%. We show that not accounting for these relatively modest cross-ownership links has important implications: it can increase the average weight assigned by managers to the profit of competitors by between 33% and 68%.</p>","PeriodicalId":47963,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Industrial Economics","volume":"72 4","pages":"1339-1359"},"PeriodicalIF":1.7,"publicationDate":"2024-03-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/joie.12390","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140379306","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Coupling Information Disclosure with a Quality Standard in R&D Contests* 在研发竞赛中将信息披露与质量标准结合起来*。
IF 1.7 4区 经济学
Journal of Industrial Economics Pub Date : 2024-03-06 DOI: 10.1111/joie.12387
Gaoyang Cai, Qian Jiao, Jingfeng Lu, Jie Zheng
{"title":"Coupling Information Disclosure with a Quality Standard in R&D Contests*","authors":"Gaoyang Cai,&nbsp;Qian Jiao,&nbsp;Jingfeng Lu,&nbsp;Jie Zheng","doi":"10.1111/joie.12387","DOIUrl":"10.1111/joie.12387","url":null,"abstract":"<p>We study two-player R&amp;D contest design using both an information disclosure policy and a quality standard as instruments. The ability of an innovator is known only to himself. The organizer commits ex-ante to a minimum quality standard and whether to have innovators' abilities publicly revealed before they conduct R&amp;D activities. We find that without quality standards, fully concealing innovators' abilities elicits both higher expected aggregate quality and expected highest quality. With optimally set quality standards, although fully concealing ability information still elicits higher expected aggregate quality, fully disclosing this information leads to a higher level of expected highest quality. Moreover, the optimal quality standards are compared across different objectives and disclosure policies.</p>","PeriodicalId":47963,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Industrial Economics","volume":"72 3","pages":"1299-1337"},"PeriodicalIF":1.7,"publicationDate":"2024-03-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140045630","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Price Squeezes as an Exploitative Abuse* 价格挤压是一种剥削性滥用* 。
IF 1.7 4区 经济学
Journal of Industrial Economics Pub Date : 2024-03-05 DOI: 10.1111/joie.12389
Zhijun Chen
{"title":"Price Squeezes as an Exploitative Abuse*","authors":"Zhijun Chen","doi":"10.1111/joie.12389","DOIUrl":"10.1111/joie.12389","url":null,"abstract":"<p>The exclusionary theory of price squeezes, commonly debated in courts and among legal scholars, faces significant challenges. This paper introduces an exploitative rationale for price squeezes. A vertically integrated firm can exploit efficiency gains from a downstream competitor, thereby earning more than the monopoly profit, and price squeezing emerges as a necessary condition for such exploitation. Prohibiting price squeezes benefits the competitor and improves production efficiency, but may also lead to unintended, perverse effects. This paper lays an economic foundation for analyzing price squeeze cases and contributes to reconciling the divergence in the case laws between the United States and the European Union.</p>","PeriodicalId":47963,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Industrial Economics","volume":"72 3","pages":"1269-1298"},"PeriodicalIF":1.7,"publicationDate":"2024-03-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/joie.12389","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140045469","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Vertical Collusion to Exclude Product Improvement* 排除产品改进的纵向串通行为*
IF 1.7 4区 经济学
Journal of Industrial Economics Pub Date : 2024-02-28 DOI: 10.1111/joie.12388
David Gilo, Yaron Yehezkel
{"title":"Vertical Collusion to Exclude Product Improvement*","authors":"David Gilo,&nbsp;Yaron Yehezkel","doi":"10.1111/joie.12388","DOIUrl":"10.1111/joie.12388","url":null,"abstract":"<p>A manufacturer of an established product repeatedly interacts with a retailer that can sell an inferior new product thereby improving it. The manufacturer's exclusionary strategy consists of a permanently below-cost wholesale price and “vertical collusion” with the retailer to exclude via a future reward of a reduced fixed fee. The latter tool is available only in an infinite game. Although contracts include fixed fees, the retailer sells the new product more than what maximizes industry profits. Exclusive dealing or a vertical merger between the manufacturer of the established product and the retailer replicate the vertically integrated outcome and increase prices.</p>","PeriodicalId":47963,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Industrial Economics","volume":"72 3","pages":"1227-1268"},"PeriodicalIF":1.7,"publicationDate":"2024-02-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/joie.12388","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140025370","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Collusion Between Supply Chains under Asymmetric Information* 不对称信息下供应链之间的合谋行为*
IF 1.7 4区 经济学
Journal of Industrial Economics Pub Date : 2024-02-22 DOI: 10.1111/joie.12386
Yaron Yehezkel
{"title":"Collusion Between Supply Chains under Asymmetric Information*","authors":"Yaron Yehezkel","doi":"10.1111/joie.12386","DOIUrl":"10.1111/joie.12386","url":null,"abstract":"<p>This paper considers an infinitely repeated competition between manufacturer-retailer supply chains. In every period, retailers privately observe the demand and manufacturers pay retailers ‘information rents’. I study collusive equilibria between the supply chains that may or may not involve the retailers. I find that including forward-looking retailers in the collusive scheme may facilitate or hinder collusion, depending on the likelihood of a high demand and the gap between a high and a low demand. Moreover, collusion on monopoly profits can be easier or more difficult to implement than collusion on upstream profits.</p>","PeriodicalId":47963,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Industrial Economics","volume":"72 3","pages":"1195-1226"},"PeriodicalIF":1.7,"publicationDate":"2024-02-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/joie.12386","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139951504","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Managing Seller Conduct in Online Marketplaces and Platform Most-Favored Nation Clauses* 管理网上市场和平台最惠国条款中的卖方行为*
IF 1.7 4区 经济学
Journal of Industrial Economics Pub Date : 2024-02-22 DOI: 10.1111/joie.12384
Frank Schlütter
{"title":"Managing Seller Conduct in Online Marketplaces and Platform Most-Favored Nation Clauses*","authors":"Frank Schlütter","doi":"10.1111/joie.12384","DOIUrl":"10.1111/joie.12384","url":null,"abstract":"<p>This article investigates the incentive and ability of a platform to limit the extent of competition between the sellers it hosts. Absent contractual restrictions, a platform has an incentive to ensure competition between the sellers. This incentive can change with the introduction of so-called platform most-favored nation clauses (PMFN) that require the online sellers not to offer better conditions on other distribution channels. Such clauses can align the interests between sellers and platforms to restrict competition. I illustrate that a platform can stabilize seller collusion to its own benefit. These results offer a novel rationale to treat PMFNs with scrutiny.</p>","PeriodicalId":47963,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Industrial Economics","volume":"72 3","pages":"1139-1194"},"PeriodicalIF":1.7,"publicationDate":"2024-02-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/joie.12384","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139951649","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Regulating Platform Competition in Markets with Network Externalities: Will Predatory Pricing Restrictions Increase Social Welfare?* 规范具有网络外部性的市场中的平台竞争：限制掠夺性定价能否增加社会福利？
IF 1.7 4区 经济学
Journal of Industrial Economics Pub Date : 2024-01-30 DOI: 10.1111/joie.12385
Ohad Atad, Yaron Yehezkel
{"title":"Regulating Platform Competition in Markets with Network Externalities: Will Predatory Pricing Restrictions Increase Social Welfare?*","authors":"Ohad Atad,&nbsp;Yaron Yehezkel","doi":"10.1111/joie.12385","DOIUrl":"10.1111/joie.12385","url":null,"abstract":"<p>We consider an infinitely repeated platform competition in a market with network externalities. The platform that dominated the market in the previous period becomes the incumbent in the current period. We examine the effect of an antitrust policy that prohibits both platforms (symmetric regulation), or just the incumbent (asymmetric regulation) from charging predatory prices. We show that symmetric regulation decreases consumer surplus and does not affect efficiency. Asymmetric regulation increases consumer surplus and improves welfare when the size of the market remains constant over time. Yet, when market size varies over time, this policy may lead to inefficient entry.</p>","PeriodicalId":47963,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Industrial Economics","volume":"72 3","pages":"1114-1138"},"PeriodicalIF":1.7,"publicationDate":"2024-01-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/joie.12385","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139644926","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Manufacturer Collusion and Resale Price Maintenance* 制造商合谋和维持转售价格*
IF 1.7 4区 经济学
Journal of Industrial Economics Pub Date : 2024-01-23 DOI: 10.1111/joie.12382
Matthias Hunold, Johannes Muthers
{"title":"Manufacturer Collusion and Resale Price Maintenance*","authors":"Matthias Hunold,&nbsp;Johannes Muthers","doi":"10.1111/joie.12382","DOIUrl":"10.1111/joie.12382","url":null,"abstract":"<p>We provide a novel theory of harm for resale price maintenance (RPM). In a model with two manufacturers and two retailers, we show that RPM facilitates manufacturer collusion when retailers have alternatives to selling a manufacturer's product. Because of the alternatives, manufacturers can only ensure that retailers sell their products by leaving sufficient retail margins. This restricts the wholesale price level even when the manufacturers collude. RPM allows colluding manufacturers to establish higher prices.</p>","PeriodicalId":47963,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Industrial Economics","volume":"72 3","pages":"1089-1113"},"PeriodicalIF":1.7,"publicationDate":"2024-01-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/joie.12382","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139579379","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
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