发布求助
文献互助 智能选刊 最新文献

Journal of Industrial Economics最新文献

筛选
英文 中文
Monopsony Power and Upstream Innovation* 垄断势力与上游创新*
IF 1.3 4区 经济学
Journal of Industrial Economics Pub Date : 2023-12-29 DOI: 10.1111/joie.12379
Álvaro Parra, Guillermo Marshall
{"title":"Monopsony Power and Upstream Innovation*","authors":"Álvaro Parra,&nbsp;Guillermo Marshall","doi":"10.1111/joie.12379","DOIUrl":"10.1111/joie.12379","url":null,"abstract":"<p>How does a monopsonist incentivize its supplier to innovate? By decreasing the short-run profit of the supplier, the monopsonist can increase the supplier's incentive to invest in R&amp;D by lessening the supplier's Arrow's replacement effect. The monopsonist engages in this practice despite a distortion in its trade volume with the supplier that causes inefficiency. We discuss implications for the boundaries of the firm.</p>","PeriodicalId":47963,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Industrial Economics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2023-12-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139067934","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Welfare Consequence of Common Ownership in a Vertically Related Market* 纵向关联市场中共同所有权的福利后果 *
IF 1.3 4区 经济学
Journal of Industrial Economics Pub Date : 2023-12-27 DOI: 10.1111/joie.12380
Linfeng Chen, Toshihiro Matsumura, Chenhang Zeng
{"title":"Welfare Consequence of Common Ownership in a Vertically Related Market*","authors":"Linfeng Chen,&nbsp;Toshihiro Matsumura,&nbsp;Chenhang Zeng","doi":"10.1111/joie.12380","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/joie.12380","url":null,"abstract":"<p>We investigate how common ownership affects welfare in a vertically related market. Although common ownership mitigates the double marginalization problem and improves welfare, it restricts competition among downstream firms and harms welfare. We find that whether common ownership is welfare-improving depends on the degree of competitiveness in the downstream market. Common ownership is more likely to improve welfare when there are fewer downstream firms and a greater degree of product differentiation. In other words, common ownership may improve welfare when competition in the downstream market is weak.</p>","PeriodicalId":47963,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Industrial Economics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2023-12-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141251518","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Double Marginalization and Misplacement in Online Advertising* 网络广告中的双重边缘化和错位 *
IF 1.3 4区 经济学
Journal of Industrial Economics Pub Date : 2023-12-20 DOI: 10.1111/joie.12376
Alexander White, Kamal Jain, Shota Ichihashi, Byung-Cheol Kim
{"title":"Double Marginalization and Misplacement in Online Advertising*","authors":"Alexander White,&nbsp;Kamal Jain,&nbsp;Shota Ichihashi,&nbsp;Byung-Cheol Kim","doi":"10.1111/joie.12376","DOIUrl":"10.1111/joie.12376","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Internet users often surf multiple websites as a bundle to fulfill their needs and ‘pay’ for the content by viewing ads. We study how such complementary websites choose advertising policies. Two forces distort the equilibrium away from the industry optimum and the efficient outcome. First, websites place too many ads (double marginalization). Second, given the total advertising volume at equilibrium, websites misallocate ads among themselves (misplacement). Competition in one market segment may eliminate double marginalization but exacerbate misplacement. Introducing micropayments removes misplacement, but the welfare consequences are ambiguous. Policymakers must thus be cautious when applying standard remedies to zero-price markets.</p>","PeriodicalId":47963,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Industrial Economics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2023-12-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138823881","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
How Do Shoppers Respond to Noisy Signals on Price Changes? Evidence from a Field Experiment in Online Supermarket Shopping* 购物者如何应对价格变动的噪音信号？来自网上超市购物现场实验的证据*
IF 1.3 4区 经济学
Journal of Industrial Economics Pub Date : 2023-12-20 DOI: 10.1111/joie.12378
Kfir Eliaz, Orli Oren-Kolbinger, Sarit Weisburd
{"title":"How Do Shoppers Respond to Noisy Signals on Price Changes? Evidence from a Field Experiment in Online Supermarket Shopping*","authors":"Kfir Eliaz,&nbsp;Orli Oren-Kolbinger,&nbsp;Sarit Weisburd","doi":"10.1111/joie.12378","DOIUrl":"10.1111/joie.12378","url":null,"abstract":"<p>What is the effect on the demand for both discounted and nondiscounted products, when promotional material informs shoppers that some product categories feature discounts? We address this question by conducting a field experiment on a website for online grocery shopping. We find that shoppers who had purchased in a certain food category prior to the experiment responded to noisy promotional information by purchasing items in the discounted category that they had already purchased in the past, regardless of whether the item purchased was currently discounted. Our results suggest that coarse information on discounts increases both consumer spending and seller revenue.</p>","PeriodicalId":47963,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Industrial Economics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2023-12-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/joie.12378","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138823799","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Product Repositioning by Merging Firms* 合并公司的产品重新定位*
IF 1.3 4区 经济学
Journal of Industrial Economics Pub Date : 2023-11-29 DOI: 10.1111/joie.12373
Enghin Atalay, Alan Sorensen, Christopher Sullivan, Wanjia Zhu
{"title":"Product Repositioning by Merging Firms*","authors":"Enghin Atalay,&nbsp;Alan Sorensen,&nbsp;Christopher Sullivan,&nbsp;Wanjia Zhu","doi":"10.1111/joie.12373","DOIUrl":"10.1111/joie.12373","url":null,"abstract":"<p>We examine merging firms' additions and removals of products for a sample of 66 mergers across a wide variety of consumer packaged goods markets. We find that mergers lead to a net reduction in the number of products offered by merging firms. Merging firms tend to both drop and add products at the periphery of their joint product portfolios, with the net effect of increasing within-firm product similarity. These results are consistent with theories of the firm that emphasize cost synergies among similar types of products or managerial core competencies linked to particular segments of the product market.</p>","PeriodicalId":47963,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Industrial Economics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2023-11-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/joie.12373","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138496903","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Vertical Mergers in Ecosystems with Consumer Hold-Up* 具有消费者支撑的生态系统中的垂直合并*
IF 1.3 4区 经济学
Journal of Industrial Economics Pub Date : 2023-11-29 DOI: 10.1111/joie.12377
Daniele Condorelli, Jorge Padilla, Youngji Sohn
{"title":"Vertical Mergers in Ecosystems with Consumer Hold-Up*","authors":"Daniele Condorelli,&nbsp;Jorge Padilla,&nbsp;Youngji Sohn","doi":"10.1111/joie.12377","DOIUrl":"10.1111/joie.12377","url":null,"abstract":"<p>An ecosystem comprises all downstream products that employ a certain upstream input. In many cases, final consumers make irreversible investments to join an ecosystem before downstream prices are set. By committing to buy products that use the specific ecosystem input, they are at risk of being held-up. Unable to observe future prices, consumers base their decisions on what they observe about the market structure within each ecosystem, including vertical contracts signed by the upstream firms. By entering into vertical agreements with multiple competing downstream firms, thus creating a credible expectation of lower prices, an upstream firm is able to mitigate consumers' hold-up problem and, as a result, increase ecosystem demand. Our main observation is that, in contrast to conventional wisdom, an upstream monopolist merging with one of its downstream affiliates will find it profitable to continue to serve downstream competitors, even when products sold downstream are homogeneous.</p>","PeriodicalId":47963,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Industrial Economics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2023-11-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/joie.12377","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138496904","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Firm Competition and Cooperation with Norm-Based Preferences for Sustainability 基于规范的可持续偏好下的企业竞争与合作
IF 1.3 4区 经济学
Journal of Industrial Economics Pub Date : 2023-11-27 DOI: 10.1111/joie.12360
Roman Inderst, Eftichios S. Sartzetakis, Anastasios Xepapadeas
{"title":"Firm Competition and Cooperation with Norm-Based Preferences for Sustainability","authors":"Roman Inderst,&nbsp;Eftichios S. Sartzetakis,&nbsp;Anastasios Xepapadeas","doi":"10.1111/joie.12360","DOIUrl":"10.1111/joie.12360","url":null,"abstract":"<p>We analyze firms' incentives to coordinate on the introduction of a sustainable product variant when consumers' preferences for sustainability depend on the perceived social norm, which in turn is shaped by average consumption behavior. We show that such preferences could lead to multiple equilibria. If the level of competition among potential adopters is very low and adoption of the sustainable variant allows them to sufficiently expand their aggregate market share, they will coordinate on introducing the sustainable variant when a lenient legal regime makes this feasible. If competition among them is intense and market expansion under the sustainable variant is very limited, coordination can forestall the adoption of the sustainable variant. Our analysis thus both confirms and qualifies the notion of a sustainability “first-mover disadvantage” as a justification for an agreement between competitors, which has gained traction in antitrust. We also provide empirical evidence for norm-based sustainability preferences.</p>","PeriodicalId":47963,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Industrial Economics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2023-11-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/joie.12360","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138496899","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
Import License, Misallocation, and Aggregate Total Factor Productivity in the Chinese Steel Industry* 中国钢铁业的进口许可、错配和全要素生产率总量* * 中国钢铁业的进口许可、错配和全要素生产率总量* * 中国钢铁业的进口许可、错配和全要素生产率总量
IF 1.3 4区 经济学
Journal of Industrial Economics Pub Date : 2023-11-20 DOI: 10.1111/joie.12375
Li Su, Su Zhang
{"title":"Import License, Misallocation, and Aggregate Total Factor Productivity in the Chinese Steel Industry*","authors":"Li Su,&nbsp;Su Zhang","doi":"10.1111/joie.12375","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/joie.12375","url":null,"abstract":"<p>This paper examines how import license restriction-induced resource misallocation affects industry aggregate total factor productivity (TFP). We apply a recently proposed consistent estimator to micro-level data from the Chinese steel industry, considering material price heterogeneity. We back out the potential extent of misallocation, finding the importers' TFP is not significantly higher than that of the nonimporters, and resource misallocation caused by the iron-ore import license lowers aggregate productivity. Our analysis indicates that removing the trade barrier counterfactually would increase the industrial TFP by 76.8%, on average.</p>","PeriodicalId":47963,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Industrial Economics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2023-11-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141251509","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Resale Price Maintenance in a Successive Monopoly Model* 连续垄断模型下的转售价格维持*
IF 1.3 4区 经济学
Journal of Industrial Economics Pub Date : 2023-11-20 DOI: 10.1111/joie.12368
Markus Dertwinkel-Kalt, Christian Wey
{"title":"Resale Price Maintenance in a Successive Monopoly Model*","authors":"Markus Dertwinkel-Kalt,&nbsp;Christian Wey","doi":"10.1111/joie.12368","DOIUrl":"10.1111/joie.12368","url":null,"abstract":"<p>We explain why a manufacturer may impose a minimum resale price in a successive monopoly setting. Our argument relies on the retailer having noncontractible choice variables such as the price of a substitute good and/or the retailer's service effort. Our explanation for minimum resale prices is empirically distinguishable from alternative justifications that rely, for instance, on retailer competition and service free riding among retailers. Whether a min RPM benefits or harms consumers depends on its effects: if it softens competition with the substitute product, it tends to harm consumers, and if it secures service provision, it tends to benefit consumers.</p>","PeriodicalId":47963,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Industrial Economics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2023-11-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/joie.12368","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138496897","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Secret Bilateral Forward Contracting* 秘密双边远期合同*
IF 1.3 4区 经济学
Journal of Industrial Economics Pub Date : 2023-11-20 DOI: 10.1111/joie.12372
Geert Van Moer
{"title":"Secret Bilateral Forward Contracting*","authors":"Geert Van Moer","doi":"10.1111/joie.12372","DOIUrl":"10.1111/joie.12372","url":null,"abstract":"<p>I analyze secret bilateral forward contracting in a Cournot oligopoly. A secret bilateral forward contract affects the production quantities of the firms which are party to the contract but not of the outsiders. On the one hand, forward contracts facilitate for heterogeneous firms to rationalize production across facilities. On the other hand, firms also consider how forward contracting affects their combined production. I show that the spot market is less concentrated than the ownership of dispatchable facilities in the industry. Furthermore, the ownership distribution of nondispatchable facilities is irrelevant for consumer welfare. I discuss implications for policy in electricity markets.</p>","PeriodicalId":47963,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Industrial Economics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2023-11-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/joie.12372","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138496898","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
首页 上一页 下一页 尾页
0
×
引用
GB/T 7714-2015
复制
MLA
复制
APA
复制
导出至
BibTeX EndNote RefMan NoteFirst NoteExpress
×
提示
您的信息不完整，为了账户安全，请先补充。
现在去补充
×
提示
您因"违规操作"
具体请查看互助需知
我知道了
×
提示
现在去查看 取消
×
提示
确定
请完成安全验证×
相关产品
×
本文献相关产品
联系我们：info@booksci.cn Book学术提供免费学术资源搜索服务，方便国内外学者检索中英文文献。致力于提供最便捷和优质的服务体验。 Copyright © 2023 布克学术 All rights reserved.
京ICP备2023020795号-1
ghs 京公网安备 11010802042870号
Book学术文献互助
Book学术文献互助群
群 号：481959085
Book学术官方微信