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Overbuying, Demand Withholding, and Single Sourcing Under Decreasing Returns 收益递减下的超买、需求抑制与单一采购
IF 1 4区 经济学
Journal of Industrial Economics Pub Date : 2026-06-03 Epub Date: 2026-02-18 DOI: 10.1111/joie.70021
Christophe Bernard, Sébastien Mitraille
{"title":"Overbuying, Demand Withholding, and Single Sourcing Under Decreasing Returns","authors":"Christophe Bernard,&nbsp;Sébastien Mitraille","doi":"10.1111/joie.70021","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/joie.70021","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 \u0000 <p>Consider suppliers whose comparative advantages, which are unknown to a buyer, depend on the quantity procured. The distortions of the buyer purchase policy differs depending on the market characteristics. In a large market, either it overbuys to suppliers with steep marginal costs, who are better at producing a small volume; or it withholds the demand it addresses to suppliers with flatter marginal costs, who are better at producing a large volume. The latter policy is implemented through a concave tariff offered to the less capacity constrained suppliers. In a small market, demand withholding prevails and some suppliers can be excluded.</p>\u0000 </div>","PeriodicalId":47963,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Industrial Economics","volume":"74 2","pages":"261-277"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2026-06-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"148153570","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
The Determinants of Negotiated Pharmaceutical Prices 药品价格谈判的决定因素
IF 1 4区 经济学
Journal of Industrial Economics Pub Date : 2026-06-03 Epub Date: 2026-02-10 DOI: 10.1111/joie.70020
Ralph B. Siebert, Sebastian Linde, Brandon Norton
{"title":"The Determinants of Negotiated Pharmaceutical Prices","authors":"Ralph B. Siebert,&nbsp;Sebastian Linde,&nbsp;Brandon Norton","doi":"10.1111/joie.70020","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/joie.70020","url":null,"abstract":"<p>We focus on the determinants of pharmaceutical drug prices. Using data from the Brazilian pharmaceutical market, we find large variations in drug prices across buyers, drug classes, and time periods. Our estimation results provide evidence that transaction-specific determinants between buyers and sellers (e.g., transaction volume, buyer's loyalty, multiple drug purchases from the same seller) exert strong effects on drug prices. Our counterfactuals show that group purchasing organizations achieve price reductions that vary across drug classes and that these price reductions primarily depend on buyer price sensitivity.</p>","PeriodicalId":47963,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Industrial Economics","volume":"74 2","pages":"234-260"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2026-06-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/joie.70020","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"148153194","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Innovation, Licensing, and Competition: Evidence From Genetically Engineered Crops 创新、许可和竞争：来自基因工程作物的证据
IF 1 4区 经济学
Journal of Industrial Economics Pub Date : 2026-06-03 Epub Date: 2026-01-06 DOI: 10.1111/joie.70016
GianCarlo Moschini, Edward D. Perry
{"title":"Innovation, Licensing, and Competition: Evidence From Genetically Engineered Crops","authors":"GianCarlo Moschini,&nbsp;Edward D. Perry","doi":"10.1111/joie.70016","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/joie.70016","url":null,"abstract":"<p>We provide a novel empirical analysis of the role of technology licensing, between competitors, for genetically engineered (GE) traits in the US seed industry. We extend the standard differentiated-product Bertrand pricing model to include trait licensing, which permits us to recover marginal costs and (otherwise unobserved) royalty rates. Estimation relies on a large dataset of farm-level seed purchases. We find that markups over marginal cost are sizeable, and royalties for GE traits contribute a non-trivial amount to these markups. Licensing GE traits to competitors benefits all seed sellers and, notwithstanding its strategic effect on pricing, also increases total market surplus.</p>","PeriodicalId":47963,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Industrial Economics","volume":"74 2","pages":"161-180"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2026-06-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/joie.70016","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"148153420","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Flagship Entry in Online Marketplaces 旗舰进入在线市场
IF 1 4区 经济学
Journal of Industrial Economics Pub Date : 2026-03-08 Epub Date: 2025-11-02 DOI: 10.1111/joie.70009
Ginger Zhe Jin, Zhentong Lu, Xiaolu Zhou, Lu Fang
{"title":"Flagship Entry in Online Marketplaces","authors":"Ginger Zhe Jin,&nbsp;Zhentong Lu,&nbsp;Xiaolu Zhou,&nbsp;Lu Fang","doi":"10.1111/joie.70009","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/joie.70009","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 \u0000 <p>In this paper, we empirically study how flagship entry in an online marketplace affects consumers, the platform, and various sellers on the platform. We find flagship entry may benefit consumers by expanding the choice set, by intensifying price competition within the entry brand, and by improving consumer perception for parts of the platform. In the meantime, flagship entry cannibalizes the sales of same-brand sellers, while other brands may gain as the buyer base expands on the platform. Counterfactual simulation suggests that flagship entry improves the gross merchandise value (GMV) of the platform and overall consumer welfare in most cases.</p>\u0000 </div>","PeriodicalId":47963,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Industrial Economics","volume":"74 1","pages":"60-101"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2026-03-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"147562582","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Multiproduct Firms, Consumer Search, and Demand Heterogeneity 多产品企业、消费者搜索和需求异质性
IF 1 4区 经济学
Journal of Industrial Economics Pub Date : 2026-03-08 Epub Date: 2025-10-15 DOI: 10.1111/joie.70012
Yuta Kittaka
{"title":"Multiproduct Firms, Consumer Search, and Demand Heterogeneity","authors":"Yuta Kittaka","doi":"10.1111/joie.70012","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/joie.70012","url":null,"abstract":"<p>I construct a consumer search model with demand-side heterogeneity, in which some consumers search for a single product while others search for multiple products. I show that a positive demand shock to one product induces firms to increase that product's price while decreasing the other product's price, and the latter effect is greater than the former one. Such a price adjustment is strengthened if a demand shock to one product negatively affects the other product's demand. By contrast, if a positive demand shock affects both products, it decreases both prices, providing a rational explanation for price falls during demand peaks.</p>","PeriodicalId":47963,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Industrial Economics","volume":"74 1","pages":"48-59"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2026-03-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/joie.70012","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"147566124","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
The Productivity Effect of Public–Private Partnership 公私伙伴关系的生产力效应
IF 1 4区 经济学
Journal of Industrial Economics Pub Date : 2026-03-08 Epub Date: 2025-11-12 DOI: 10.1111/joie.70013
Vincenzo Mollisi
{"title":"The Productivity Effect of Public–Private Partnership","authors":"Vincenzo Mollisi","doi":"10.1111/joie.70013","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/joie.70013","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Public–Private partnerships (PPPs) are often employed by public authorities to deliver infrastructure and public services through contracts bundling construction, operation, and maintenance over extended periods. Using a novel dataset covering the universe of Italian district heating plants (DHs) from 2007 to 2014, I show that PPP improves firm-level productivity by incentivizing investments in higher capital quality. Capital quality—proxied by a thermal density index derived from the characteristics of the DH pipeline network—significantly improves productivity only when combined with PPP procurement. A structural production function approach reveals that a one-unit increase in capital quality raises output by 19% in PPP firms, with negligible effects in non-PPP firms. Counterfactual calculations suggest that enforcing PPP-like quality standards across all plants would increase average output by 3266 MWh and reduce CO<sub>2</sub> emissions by 1568 tons per plant per year. The results are robust to selection bias, measurement error, and functional form misspecification. While this paper provides the first evidence that PPPs enhance productivity in network utilities by internalizing technological externalities between construction and operation, whether these gains fully translate into welfare improvements through pricing and Value for Money remains an open question for future research.</p>","PeriodicalId":47963,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Industrial Economics","volume":"74 1","pages":"102-123"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2026-03-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/joie.70013","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"147565553","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Share to Scare: Technology Sharing in the Absence of Intellectual Property Rights 从共享到恐慌：缺乏知识产权的技术共享
IF 1 4区 经济学
Journal of Industrial Economics Pub Date : 2026-03-08 Epub Date: 2025-09-02 DOI: 10.1111/joie.70008
Jos Jansen
{"title":"Share to Scare: Technology Sharing in the Absence of Intellectual Property Rights","authors":"Jos Jansen","doi":"10.1111/joie.70008","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/joie.70008","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Cournot duopolists choose between sharing their technologies, for example, through scientific publications, or keeping them secret. The disadvantage of sharing efficient technologies is that a less efficient competitor imitates and becomes tougher. The advantage is that the competitor learns that the sharing firm is tougher than expected. Limited technology diffusion occurs in equilibrium, with at most one firm sharing. Unilateral sharing incentives are strongest for intermediate technologies. For identical distributions skewed towards efficient technologies, this yields equilibria where one firm shares all or only intermediate technologies, besides an equilibrium without sharing. Further, I consider profit implications, non-identical distributions, and several extensions.</p>","PeriodicalId":47963,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Industrial Economics","volume":"74 1","pages":"1-16"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2026-03-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/joie.70008","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"147562618","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Financial Incentives for the Development of Blockchain-Based Platforms 区块链平台发展的财政激励
IF 1 4区 经济学
Journal of Industrial Economics Pub Date : 2026-03-08 Epub Date: 2025-09-27 DOI: 10.1111/joie.70010
Andrea Canidio
{"title":"Financial Incentives for the Development of Blockchain-Based Platforms","authors":"Andrea Canidio","doi":"10.1111/joie.70010","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/joie.70010","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 \u0000 <p>I develop a theoretical model showing that an entrepreneur prefers to create a decentralized digital platform with a crypto-token as its internal currency (rather than a traditional platform) when the total surplus from trade is low relative to the dollar value of transactions. I then study inefficiencies in the development of such platforms. When external funding is not required, effort may be above or below its efficient level. When external funding is required, multiple Pareto-ranked equilibria arise: in each, with strictly positive probability, the entrepreneur liquidates his tokens and halts development.</p>\u0000 </div>","PeriodicalId":47963,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Industrial Economics","volume":"74 1","pages":"34-47"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2026-03-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"147570074","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Transparency and Innovation in Organizations 组织中的透明度和创新
IF 1 4区 经济学
Journal of Industrial Economics Pub Date : 2026-03-08 Epub Date: 2025-09-24 DOI: 10.1111/joie.70011
Osamu Hayashida, Kimiyuki Morita, Takeharu Sogo
{"title":"Transparency and Innovation in Organizations","authors":"Osamu Hayashida,&nbsp;Kimiyuki Morita,&nbsp;Takeharu Sogo","doi":"10.1111/joie.70011","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/joie.70011","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 \u0000 <p>We study how transparency—the observability of interim performance measures—affects innovation incentives. In each of two periods, an agent selects either a new or well-established idea and exerts effort to implement that idea into products or services. Transparency promotes idea exploration by allowing idea switching in response to negative signals. However, this can become counterproductive by wasting the knowledge acquired through implementation effort and reducing effort incentives if the output relies heavily on implementation effort rather than idea quality. Paradoxically, transparency can be further counterproductive if (1) the acquired knowledge becomes less idea-specific, (2) the variance in idea quality increases, or (3) the interim performance measure becomes more precise.</p>\u0000 </div>","PeriodicalId":47963,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Industrial Economics","volume":"74 1","pages":"17-33"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2026-03-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"147568592","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
The High Cost of Low Range: Estimating the Hidden Cost of Range Anxiety in Electric Vehicles 低里程的高成本：电动汽车里程焦虑的隐性成本估算
IF 1 4区 经济学
Journal of Industrial Economics Pub Date : 2026-03-08 Epub Date: 2025-11-27 DOI: 10.1111/joie.70015
Jonathan B. Scott, Molin Qin
{"title":"The High Cost of Low Range: Estimating the Hidden Cost of Range Anxiety in Electric Vehicles","authors":"Jonathan B. Scott,&nbsp;Molin Qin","doi":"10.1111/joie.70015","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/joie.70015","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 \u0000 <p>Electric vehicle (EV) drivers experience range anxiety (RA) due to a gap between latent travel demand and battery range. Low fuel prices or limited range exacerbate RA. Range relevance diminishes under high fuel prices, as driving demand is suppressed, while low fuel prices have small effects on RA when range is sufficiently high. We formalize and estimate RA, leveraging the implicit interaction between local electricity prices and range. Results suggest average prospective EV consumers expect $2500–3400/year welfare costs through the RA mechanism. These estimates have strong implications for policies targeting EV ownership, underscoring another channel EV costs exceed conventional vehicles.</p>\u0000 </div>","PeriodicalId":47963,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Industrial Economics","volume":"74 1","pages":"140-158"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2026-03-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"147569860","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
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