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Unobserved Wholesale Contracts 未履行的批发合同
IF 1 4区 经济学
Journal of Industrial Economics Pub Date : 2026-03-08 Epub Date: 2025-11-18 DOI: 10.1111/joie.70014
Maarten C. W. Janssen, Santanu Roy
{"title":"Unobserved Wholesale Contracts","authors":"Maarten C. W. Janssen,&nbsp;Santanu Roy","doi":"10.1111/joie.70014","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/joie.70014","url":null,"abstract":"<p>A manufacturer with private information about product quality sells through a retailer to end consumers. By hiding wholesale pricing contracts from end consumers, the manufacturer can hide his private information, eliminate signaling distortions and earn higher (expected) profit compared to observable wholesale pricing as well as direct selling; consumers may also earn higher surplus under such contracts even though they do not learn true product quality. Policies that mandate disclosure of quality or of upstream contracts can reduce welfare relative to the equilibrium with hidden contracts. We formalize this interaction as a class of intermediated signaling games—distinct from standard signaling models because of the hidden interaction with the intermediary—and introduce a new belief refinement, IC-I, tailored to such games and analogous to the Intuitive Criterion.</p>","PeriodicalId":47963,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Industrial Economics","volume":"74 1","pages":"124-139"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2026-03-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/joie.70014","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"147566787","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Competition With Limited Attention to Quality Differences 对质量差异关注有限的竞争
IF 1 4区 经济学
Journal of Industrial Economics Pub Date : 2025-08-11 DOI: 10.1111/joie.70007
Stefanie Y. Schmitt
{"title":"Competition With Limited Attention to Quality Differences","authors":"Stefanie Y. Schmitt","doi":"10.1111/joie.70007","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/joie.70007","url":null,"abstract":"<p>I analyze the implication of consumers' limited attention to quality differences on market outcomes and welfare. I model this limited attention with a perception threshold, that is, consumers only perceive quality differences between goods that exceed their perception threshold. The model allows for equilibria with distinguishable and with indistinguishable qualities. If firms are sufficiently horizontally differentiated, firms produce goods with indistinguishable qualities. Then, limited attention harms consumers and benefits firms. If firms are not sufficiently horizontally differentiated, firms produce goods with distinguishable qualities. Then, limited attention has no effect on consumers' welfare or firms' profits.</p>","PeriodicalId":47963,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Industrial Economics","volume":"73 4","pages":"620-636"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2025-08-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/joie.70007","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145652445","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Inconspicuous Personalized Pricing 不起眼的个性化定价
IF 1 4区 经济学
Journal of Industrial Economics Pub Date : 2025-08-08 DOI: 10.1111/joie.70006
Benjamin Reed Shiller
{"title":"Inconspicuous Personalized Pricing","authors":"Benjamin Reed Shiller","doi":"10.1111/joie.70006","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/joie.70006","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Emerging tracking data enable precise predictions of individuals' reservation values. However, firms may be reluctant to overtly adopt personalized pricing. This paper proposes a strategy that embeds personalization within a dynamic pricing framework, tailoring prices privately while committing to infrequent adjustments to obscure its use. Simulation analyses based on both theoretical and empirically estimated distributions of consumer valuations reveal that profits rise most when consumer arrivals are moderately frequent. Increasing the precision of individual-level demand estimates broadens the range of products for which this strategy is profitable. These findings suggest the approach may be an auspicious strategy for online platforms.</p>","PeriodicalId":47963,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Industrial Economics","volume":"73 4","pages":"608-619"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2025-08-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/joie.70006","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145652549","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Correction to “Never-Ending Search for Innovation” 更正“永无止境地寻求创新”
IF 1 4区 经济学
Journal of Industrial Economics Pub Date : 2025-07-31 DOI: 10.1111/joie.70005
{"title":"Correction to “Never-Ending Search for Innovation”","authors":"","doi":"10.1111/joie.70005","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/joie.70005","url":null,"abstract":"<p>J.-M. Benkert and I. Letina, “Never-Ending Search for Innovation,” <i>The Journal of Industrial Economics</i> 73 (2025): 384–387. https://doi.org/10.1111/joie.12413</p><p>References 2–11 were incorrectly matched up to their intended citations during production. These references have been updated in the article online for accuracy.</p><p>We apologize for this error.</p>","PeriodicalId":47963,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Industrial Economics","volume":"73 3","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2025-07-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/joie.70005","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144935455","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Competitive Effects of Entry in Gasoline Markets 汽油市场进入的竞争效应
IF 1 4区 经济学
Journal of Industrial Economics Pub Date : 2025-07-14 DOI: 10.1111/joie.12418
Lucas W. Davis, Shaun McRae, Enrique Seira
{"title":"Competitive Effects of Entry in Gasoline Markets","authors":"Lucas W. Davis,&nbsp;Shaun McRae,&nbsp;Enrique Seira","doi":"10.1111/joie.12418","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/joie.12418","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 \u0000 <p>We use panel data on the location, prices, and quality of the universe of gas stations in Mexico to study the competitive effects of entry on incumbent firms. Using more than 1000 entry events and defining local markets based on the road network, we find that the entry of a new station within 3 min driving time decreases regular gasoline prices by 6% of the retail price spread. Competitive effects decline with travel time and are largest in markets that previously had only one station. Entry of stations with the same owner as the incumbent has near-zero effects. The effect of competition on quality is less clear, with suggestive evidence of improved service quality in some specifications.</p>\u0000 </div>","PeriodicalId":47963,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Industrial Economics","volume":"73 4","pages":"589-607"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2025-07-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145652826","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Asset Specificity and Inefficient Bargaining: Theory and Evidence From Television Shows 资产专用性与低效率议价：来自电视剧的理论与证据
IF 1 4区 经济学
Journal of Industrial Economics Pub Date : 2025-07-03 DOI: 10.1111/joie.70003
Luís Cabral, Gabriel Natividad
{"title":"Asset Specificity and Inefficient Bargaining: Theory and Evidence From Television Shows","authors":"Luís Cabral,&nbsp;Gabriel Natividad","doi":"10.1111/joie.70003","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/joie.70003","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 \u0000 <p>Evidence from TV shows suggests that failed contract negotiations may lead to inefficient show cancellation. We propose a theoretical model of bargaining with asymmetric information that allows for this possibility. We derive various testable implications, all of which are borne by the data. We show that an increase in asset specificity of the actor-show match implies an <i>increase</i> in the probability of an agreement under efficient bargaining but a <i>decrease</i> under asymmetric information. We use this result as an identification strategy to place a 2% lower bound on the probability that a TV show is cancelled even though it would be efficient for it to continue.</p>\u0000 </div>","PeriodicalId":47963,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Industrial Economics","volume":"73 4","pages":"555-568"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2025-07-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145652814","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Ramsey Pricing Revisited: Natural Monopoly Regulation With Evaders 重新审视拉姆齐定价：有逃避者的自然垄断监管
IF 1 4区 经济学
Journal of Industrial Economics Pub Date : 2025-07-03 DOI: 10.1111/joie.70004
M. Besfamille, N. Figueroa, L. Guzmán-Lizardo
{"title":"Ramsey Pricing Revisited: Natural Monopoly Regulation With Evaders","authors":"M. Besfamille,&nbsp;N. Figueroa,&nbsp;L. Guzmán-Lizardo","doi":"10.1111/joie.70004","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/joie.70004","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 \u0000 <p>We consider a model featuring a single-product natural monopoly, which faces evaders, that is, individuals who may not pay the price. By exerting costly effort, the firm can deter evasion. To maximize total surplus, a regulator sets the price, the level of deterrence effort, and socially costly transfers to ensure the monopoly's participation. We obtain a modified Ramsey formula, which clearly shows that the mere existence of evaders dampens the use of the price as a means to finance the firm's deficit. The regulated price is always below the monopoly price and, under sufficient conditions, also below marginal cost. We find conditions under which the regulated price decreases if society departs from fully crediting evaders' utilities to welfare. Then, we generalize the model to incorporate moral hazard.</p>\u0000 </div>","PeriodicalId":47963,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Industrial Economics","volume":"73 4","pages":"569-588"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2025-07-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145652815","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Revisiting the Omitted Price Bias in the Estimation of Production Functions 重新审视生产函数估计中被忽略的价格偏差
IF 1 4区 经济学
Journal of Industrial Economics Pub Date : 2025-06-30 DOI: 10.1111/joie.70001
Xulia González, Saul Lach, Daniel Miles-Touya
{"title":"Revisiting the Omitted Price Bias in the Estimation of Production Functions","authors":"Xulia González,&nbsp;Saul Lach,&nbsp;Daniel Miles-Touya","doi":"10.1111/joie.70001","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/joie.70001","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 \u0000 <p>The lack of information on quantities presents significant challenges for estimating production functions. As shown by Klette and Griliches in 1996, deflating nominal variables using aggregate price indices leads to biased estimators. In this paper, we show that a similar problem arises when firm-specific prices are recovered from reported firm-specific price <i>changes</i> via a recursive formula. This recursion formula depends on an initial condition given by the unobserved price level in the base year, which then appears in the empirical production function as a firm-specific fixed effect. The standard practice is to ignore these fixed effects by setting the firm-specific prices in the base year to a constant value common to all firms, usually unity (zero in logs). We show that this practice generates biased estimators. We examine this bias via Monte Carlo simulations and with an empirical application. Solving this problem is not straightforward and requires further assumptions because these fixed effects generate nonlinear measurement errors.</p>\u0000 </div>","PeriodicalId":47963,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Industrial Economics","volume":"73 4","pages":"540-554"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2025-06-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145652634","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Upward Pricing Pressure in Mergers Where Prices Are Determined Through Joint Bargaining 通过联合议价确定价格的并购中的价格上行压力
IF 1 4区 经济学
Journal of Industrial Economics Pub Date : 2025-06-18 DOI: 10.1111/joie.70002
Keith Brand, Christopher V. Lau
{"title":"Upward Pricing Pressure in Mergers Where Prices Are Determined Through Joint Bargaining","authors":"Keith Brand,&nbsp;Christopher V. Lau","doi":"10.1111/joie.70002","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/joie.70002","url":null,"abstract":"<p>We develop an upward pricing pressure metric for evaluating mergers when prices are negotiated through bilateral bargaining. Our framework is based on deriving the marginal cost reduction required to just offset a price increase due to a horizontal merger in a Nash-in-Nash bargaining equilibrium assuming suppliers negotiate with buyers using an all-or-nothing strategy. We assess the accuracy of our framework by applying it to a hospital merger setting, where we conduct Monte Carlo simulations and compare to observed price changes from consummated mergers. We find that our metric offers important advantages over alternative methods and only requires information that is readily available in merger investigations.</p>","PeriodicalId":47963,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Industrial Economics","volume":"73 4","pages":"523-539"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2025-06-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/joie.70002","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145652836","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
The Effect of Information and Streamline Appointments on Patient Sorting and Hospital Efficiency 信息化和流程化预约对病人分拣和医院效率的影响
IF 1 4区 经济学
Journal of Industrial Economics Pub Date : 2025-06-10 DOI: 10.1111/joie.70000
Ye Yuan, Changcheng Song, Nan Yang, Junjian Yi
{"title":"The Effect of Information and Streamline Appointments on Patient Sorting and Hospital Efficiency","authors":"Ye Yuan,&nbsp;Changcheng Song,&nbsp;Nan Yang,&nbsp;Junjian Yi","doi":"10.1111/joie.70000","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/joie.70000","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 \u0000 <p>How do information provision and consumer choices affect market efficiency in a market with misallocation and rationing? We investigate the introduction of a mobile-phone-based outpatient appointment app that provides real-time hospital information and streamlines appointment booking in China's public hospital market. We find the app can significantly improve healthcare access and the matching between patients and providers, achieved through facilitating patient sorting over time and across hospitals based on medical needs. Patients with mild conditions are directed to primary-care providers, while acute-care hospitals are better able to serve patients with severe conditions. We also observe improved patient health outcomes and reduced medical spending. Our findings underscore the power of lightweight healthcare IT innovations in enhancing medical resource utilization and patient welfare.</p>\u0000 </div>","PeriodicalId":47963,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Industrial Economics","volume":"73 3","pages":"498-519"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2025-06-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144935403","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
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