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Innovating Yourself Out of a Job* 通过创新让自己失业*
IF 1.7 4区 经济学
Journal of Industrial Economics Pub Date : 2024-06-27 DOI: 10.1111/joie.12401
Michael T. Rauh
{"title":"Innovating Yourself Out of a Job*","authors":"Michael T. Rauh","doi":"10.1111/joie.12401","DOIUrl":"10.1111/joie.12401","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Continuous improvement, where production workers suggest incremental process improvements, has become standard practice in modern manufacturing. I consider a simple two-period model where workers produce output and innovate and innovation leads to future job losses. I derive the optimal multitasking contract and show that the principal distorts optimal first period employment downwards to increase the probability of continued employment and reduce first period incentive costs. At high levels of moral hazard, first period employment does not respond to shifts in demand and other parameters. I observe similar distortions at Lincoln Electric and predict that they should be observed more broadly.</p>","PeriodicalId":47963,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Industrial Economics","volume":"73 1","pages":"31-69"},"PeriodicalIF":1.7,"publicationDate":"2024-06-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141532369","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Should We Expect Merger Synergies to be Passed Through to Consumers?* 我们是否应该预期合并的协同效应会传递给消费者？
IF 1.7 4区 经济学
Journal of Industrial Economics Pub Date : 2024-06-04 DOI: 10.1111/joie.12394
Mario Leccese, Andrew Sweeting, Xuezhen Tao
{"title":"Should We Expect Merger Synergies to be Passed Through to Consumers?*","authors":"Mario Leccese,&nbsp;Andrew Sweeting,&nbsp;Xuezhen Tao","doi":"10.1111/joie.12394","DOIUrl":"10.1111/joie.12394","url":null,"abstract":"<p>When reviewing horizontal mergers, antitrust agencies balance anticompetitive incentives, resulting from market power, with procompetitive incentives, created by efficiencies, assuming complete information and static, simultaneous move Nash equilibrium play. These models miss how a merged firm may prefer not to pass through efficiencies when rivals would respond by lowering their prices. We use an asymmetric information model, where rivals do not observe the size of the realized cost efficiency, to investigate how this incentive could affect post-merger prices. We highlight how the strength of this incentive will depend on the market structure of non-merging rivals and discuss alternative settings where similar issues arise.</p>","PeriodicalId":47963,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Industrial Economics","volume":"73 1","pages":"1-30"},"PeriodicalIF":1.7,"publicationDate":"2024-06-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/joie.12394","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141265462","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Procuring Survival* 采购生存物资*
IF 1.7 4区 经济学
Journal of Industrial Economics Pub Date : 2024-05-30 DOI: 10.1111/joie.12395
Matilde Cappelletti, Leonardo M. Giuffrida, Gabriele Rovigatti
{"title":"Procuring Survival*","authors":"Matilde Cappelletti,&nbsp;Leonardo M. Giuffrida,&nbsp;Gabriele Rovigatti","doi":"10.1111/joie.12395","DOIUrl":"10.1111/joie.12395","url":null,"abstract":"<p>We investigate the impact of public procurement on business survival. Using Italy as a laboratory, we construct a large-scale dataset of firms—covering balance-sheet, income-statement, and administrative records—and match it with public contract data. Employing a regression discontinuity design for close-call auctions, we find that winners are more likely to stay in the market than marginal losers after the award and that the boost in survival chances lasts longer than the contract duration. We document that this effect is associated with earnings substitution rather than increased business scale and that survivors experience no productivity premium. Securing contracts relaxes credit constraints and acts as a mechanism for survival.</p>","PeriodicalId":47963,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Industrial Economics","volume":"72 4","pages":"1451-1506"},"PeriodicalIF":1.7,"publicationDate":"2024-05-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/joie.12395","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141195370","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Personalized Pricing When Consumers Can Purchase Multiple Items* 当消费者可以购买多个项目时的个性化定价*
IF 1.7 4区 经济学
Journal of Industrial Economics Pub Date : 2024-05-30 DOI: 10.1111/joie.12400
Qiuyu Lu, Noriaki Matsushima
{"title":"Personalized Pricing When Consumers Can Purchase Multiple Items*","authors":"Qiuyu Lu,&nbsp;Noriaki Matsushima","doi":"10.1111/joie.12400","DOIUrl":"10.1111/joie.12400","url":null,"abstract":"<p>We study the impact of competitive personalized pricing in a Hotelling duopoly model where consumers can purchase from both firms. We show that the impact crucially depends on the magnitude of the additional utility from consuming the second product. Compared with uniform pricing, personalized pricing benefits both consumers and firms when the additional utility is moderate; but it harms consumers while benefiting firms when the additional utility is large. These results contrast with the existing research on competitive personalized pricing, which assumes that consumers purchase one product only.</p>","PeriodicalId":47963,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Industrial Economics","volume":"72 4","pages":"1507-1524"},"PeriodicalIF":1.7,"publicationDate":"2024-05-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/joie.12400","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141195205","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Horizontal Partial Cross Ownership and Innovation* 横向部分交叉所有权与创新*
IF 1.7 4区 经济学
Journal of Industrial Economics Pub Date : 2024-05-15 DOI: 10.1111/joie.12392
Sandro Shelegia, Yossi Spiegel
{"title":"Horizontal Partial Cross Ownership and Innovation*","authors":"Sandro Shelegia,&nbsp;Yossi Spiegel","doi":"10.1111/joie.12392","DOIUrl":"10.1111/joie.12392","url":null,"abstract":"<p>We study the effects of partial cross ownership (PCO) among rival firms on their incentives to innovate. PCO in our model gives rise to a <i>price effect</i> due to its effect on price competition and hence on the marginal benefit from investment, as well as a <i>cannibalization effect</i> which arises because each firm internalizes part of the negative externality of its investment on the rival's profit. We show that overall, PCO may benefit or harm consumers depending on the size of the PCO stakes, their degree of symmetry, the size of the innovation, its marginal cost, and whether it is drastic or not.</p>","PeriodicalId":47963,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Industrial Economics","volume":"72 4","pages":"1397-1450"},"PeriodicalIF":1.7,"publicationDate":"2024-05-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/joie.12392","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140976400","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Bundling in Advance Sales: Theory and Evidence from Round-Trip versus Two One-Way Tickets* 预售中的捆绑销售：往返机票与两张单程票的理论与证据*
IF 1.7 4区 经济学
Journal of Industrial Economics Pub Date : 2024-05-01 DOI: 10.1111/joie.12393
Diego Escobari, Paan Jindapon, Nicholas G. Rupp
{"title":"Bundling in Advance Sales: Theory and Evidence from Round-Trip versus Two One-Way Tickets*","authors":"Diego Escobari,&nbsp;Paan Jindapon,&nbsp;Nicholas G. Rupp","doi":"10.1111/joie.12393","DOIUrl":"10.1111/joie.12393","url":null,"abstract":"<p>We theoretically derive an optimal price for a bundle of two goods that are sold in advance to risk-averse buyers. The theory predicts that a round-trip ticket is less expensive than two one-way tickets when demands for the outbound and the inbound are uncertain and positively correlated. Using a unique airlines dataset, we find evidence that is consistent with the theory; round-trip bundle discounts exist and they are larger for passengers who buy early in advance, stay on a Saturday night, and have higher valuations. We also find that the bundle discounts decrease with competition.</p>","PeriodicalId":47963,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Industrial Economics","volume":"72 4","pages":"1369-1396"},"PeriodicalIF":1.7,"publicationDate":"2024-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140826899","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Downstream Cross-Holdings and Upstream R&D: A Comment* 下游交叉持股与上游研发：评论 *
IF 1.7 4区 经济学
Journal of Industrial Economics Pub Date : 2024-03-27 DOI: 10.1111/joie.12391
Yake Jin, Arijit Mukherjee, Chenhang Zeng
{"title":"Downstream Cross-Holdings and Upstream R&D: A Comment*","authors":"Yake Jin,&nbsp;Arijit Mukherjee,&nbsp;Chenhang Zeng","doi":"10.1111/joie.12391","DOIUrl":"10.1111/joie.12391","url":null,"abstract":"<p>According to Hu et al. [<i>Journal of Industrial Economics</i>, 70(3), pp. 775–789], downstream cross-holdings are permissible based on the social welfare standard if the investment technology in the upstream sector is highly inefficient. However, the conclusion of that paper relies on a definition of downstream producer surplus that is not so commonly found in the literature. After using a more commonly found definition of downstream producer surplus, this note demonstrates that downstream cross-holdings have detrimental impacts on both consumer surplus and social welfare, emphasizing the need for efficient and effective regulations on downstream cross-holdings in Hu et al. [<i>Journal of Industrial Economics</i>, 70(3), pp. 775–789] type economy.</p>","PeriodicalId":47963,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Industrial Economics","volume":"72 4","pages":"1360-1368"},"PeriodicalIF":1.7,"publicationDate":"2024-03-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140374711","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Common-Ownership Versus Cross-Ownership: Evidence from the Automobile Industry* 共同所有权与交叉所有权：来自汽车行业的证据*
IF 1.7 4区 经济学
Journal of Industrial Economics Pub Date : 2024-03-26 DOI: 10.1111/joie.12390
Cristian Huse, Ricardo Ribeiro, Frank Verboven
{"title":"Common-Ownership Versus Cross-Ownership: Evidence from the Automobile Industry*","authors":"Cristian Huse,&nbsp;Ricardo Ribeiro,&nbsp;Frank Verboven","doi":"10.1111/joie.12390","DOIUrl":"10.1111/joie.12390","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Overlapping ownership has gained considerable momentum in the last decades, yet little is known about the role of its sources. We quantify the relative importance of common-ownership (by shareholders external to an industry) and cross-ownership (by firms within the industry). We focus on the global automobile industry, over the period 2007–2021, and document that common-ownership links constitute between 31% and 39% of the equity ownership of automobile manufacturers, while cross-ownership links amount to 6%–9%. We show that not accounting for these relatively modest cross-ownership links has important implications: it can increase the average weight assigned by managers to the profit of competitors by between 33% and 68%.</p>","PeriodicalId":47963,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Industrial Economics","volume":"72 4","pages":"1339-1359"},"PeriodicalIF":1.7,"publicationDate":"2024-03-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/joie.12390","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140379306","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Coupling Information Disclosure with a Quality Standard in R&D Contests* 在研发竞赛中将信息披露与质量标准结合起来*。
IF 1.7 4区 经济学
Journal of Industrial Economics Pub Date : 2024-03-06 DOI: 10.1111/joie.12387
Gaoyang Cai, Qian Jiao, Jingfeng Lu, Jie Zheng
{"title":"Coupling Information Disclosure with a Quality Standard in R&D Contests*","authors":"Gaoyang Cai,&nbsp;Qian Jiao,&nbsp;Jingfeng Lu,&nbsp;Jie Zheng","doi":"10.1111/joie.12387","DOIUrl":"10.1111/joie.12387","url":null,"abstract":"<p>We study two-player R&amp;D contest design using both an information disclosure policy and a quality standard as instruments. The ability of an innovator is known only to himself. The organizer commits ex-ante to a minimum quality standard and whether to have innovators' abilities publicly revealed before they conduct R&amp;D activities. We find that without quality standards, fully concealing innovators' abilities elicits both higher expected aggregate quality and expected highest quality. With optimally set quality standards, although fully concealing ability information still elicits higher expected aggregate quality, fully disclosing this information leads to a higher level of expected highest quality. Moreover, the optimal quality standards are compared across different objectives and disclosure policies.</p>","PeriodicalId":47963,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Industrial Economics","volume":"72 3","pages":"1299-1337"},"PeriodicalIF":1.7,"publicationDate":"2024-03-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140045630","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Price Squeezes as an Exploitative Abuse* 价格挤压是一种剥削性滥用* 。
IF 1.7 4区 经济学
Journal of Industrial Economics Pub Date : 2024-03-05 DOI: 10.1111/joie.12389
Zhijun Chen
{"title":"Price Squeezes as an Exploitative Abuse*","authors":"Zhijun Chen","doi":"10.1111/joie.12389","DOIUrl":"10.1111/joie.12389","url":null,"abstract":"<p>The exclusionary theory of price squeezes, commonly debated in courts and among legal scholars, faces significant challenges. This paper introduces an exploitative rationale for price squeezes. A vertically integrated firm can exploit efficiency gains from a downstream competitor, thereby earning more than the monopoly profit, and price squeezing emerges as a necessary condition for such exploitation. Prohibiting price squeezes benefits the competitor and improves production efficiency, but may also lead to unintended, perverse effects. This paper lays an economic foundation for analyzing price squeeze cases and contributes to reconciling the divergence in the case laws between the United States and the European Union.</p>","PeriodicalId":47963,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Industrial Economics","volume":"72 3","pages":"1269-1298"},"PeriodicalIF":1.7,"publicationDate":"2024-03-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/joie.12389","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140045469","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
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