Welfare-Increasing垄断*

IF 1.7 4区 经济学 Q3 BUSINESS, FINANCE
Simon Cowan
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引用次数: 0

摘要

考察了垄断有利于社会福利的条件。当垄断企业以双倍利润向垄断企业出售产品时,社会福利可能会高于竞争行业以不同效率水平向下游古诺寡头垄断企业出售产品时。这就要求反向需求足够凹,而当需求是凸时就不能维持。在Lahiri和Ono(1988)的基础上,当不存在垂直问题时,发现了消除低效企业以提高福利的条件。一般来说,更大的需求凹度增加了重新分配产出对高效企业的利益的相对重要性。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。

Welfare-Increasing Monopolization*

Welfare-Increasing Monopolization*

The conditions for monopolization to be good for social welfare are examined. Social welfare can be higher when a monopoly sells to a monopoly, with double margins, than when a competitive industry sells to a downstream Cournot oligopoly with differing efficiency levels. This requires inverse demand to be sufficiently concave, and cannot hold when demand is convex. When there are no vertical issues conditions are found for elimination of an inefficient firm to raise welfare, building on Lahiri and Ono (1988). In general greater demand concavity increases the relative importance of the benefit of redistributing output to the efficient firm.

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来源期刊
CiteScore
1.60
自引率
0.00%
发文量
27
期刊介绍: First published in 1952, the Journal of Industrial Economics has a wide international circulation and is recognised as a leading journal in the field. It was founded to promote the analysis of modern industry, particularly the behaviour of firms and the functioning of markets. Contributions are welcomed in all areas of industrial economics including: - organization of industry - applied oligopoly theory - product differentiation and technical change - theory of the firm and internal organization - regulation - monopoly - merger and technology policy Necessarily, these subjects will often draw on adjacent areas such as international economics, labour economics and law.
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