{"title":"The Productivity Effects Of Corporate Diversification*","authors":"Germán Bet","doi":"10.1111/joie.12370","DOIUrl":"10.1111/joie.12370","url":null,"abstract":"<p>This paper studies the productivity effects of corporate diversification. I estimate a model that allows diversification decisions to affect future productivity. I apply the model to a panel of U.S. manufacturing firms to measure the impact of diversification on productivity. My estimates suggest that diversification plays a key role in explaining differences in productivity across productive units and time. The average productivity effect of diversification is estimated to be positive at the productive unit level. However, the effect varies considerably across productive units and sectors of activity, depending crucially on already attained productivity.</p>","PeriodicalId":47963,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Industrial Economics","volume":"72 2","pages":"685-728"},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2023-11-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138496895","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Privacy Regulation and Quality-Enhancing Innovation*","authors":"Yassine Lefouili, Leonardo Madio, Ying Lei Toh","doi":"10.1111/joie.12374","DOIUrl":"10.1111/joie.12374","url":null,"abstract":"<p>We analyze how a privacy regulation taking the form of a cap on information disclosure affects quality-enhancing innovation incentives by a monopolist—who derives revenues solely from disclosing user data to third parties—and consumer surplus. If the share of privacy-concerned users is sufficiently small, privacy regulation has a negative effect on innovation and may harm users. However, if the share of privacy-concerned users is sufficiently large, privacy regulation has a positive effect on innovation. In this case, there is no trade-off between privacy and innovation and users always benefit from privacy regulation.</p>","PeriodicalId":47963,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Industrial Economics","volume":"72 2","pages":"662-684"},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2023-11-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138496894","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Search and Competition Under Product Quality Uncertainty*","authors":"Yongmin Chen","doi":"10.1111/joie.12365","DOIUrl":"10.1111/joie.12365","url":null,"abstract":"<p>I review models of consumer search and competition when product quality is uncertain and differs across firms. Although firms are vertically—and possibly also horizontally—differentiated, an appropriate symmetric price equilibrium with optimal consumer search can be neatly characterized. I propose a “random-quality” framework that unifies these models and discuss their insights on the operation of consumer search markets, focusing on (i) online advertising and search through platforms, (ii) the welfare effects of entry in search markets, and (iii) the role of quality observability under search frictions. I suggest directions for further research on these and related topics.</p>","PeriodicalId":47963,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Industrial Economics","volume":"72 2","pages":"633-661"},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2023-11-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138496893","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Unobserved Worker Quality and Inter-Industry Wage Differentials*","authors":"Suqin Ge, João Macieira","doi":"10.1111/joie.12361","DOIUrl":"10.1111/joie.12361","url":null,"abstract":"<p>This study quantitatively assesses two alternative explanations for inter-industry wage differentials: worker heterogeneity in the form of unobserved quality and firm heterogeneity in the form of a firm's willingness to pay (WTP) for workers' productive attributes. Building on hedonic models of differentiated product demand, we develop an empirical hedonic model of labor demand and apply a two-stage nonparametric procedure to recover worker and firm heterogeneities. In the first stage we recover unmeasured worker quality by estimating market-specific hedonic wage functions nonparametrically. In the second stage we infer each firm's WTP parameters for worker attributes by using first-order conditions from the demand model. We apply our approach to quantify inter-industry wage differentials on the basis of individual data from the NLSY79 and find that worker quality accounts for approximately two thirds of the inter-industry wage differentials.</p>","PeriodicalId":47963,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Industrial Economics","volume":"72 1","pages":"459-515"},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2023-11-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/joie.12361","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"136229846","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Vertical Contracts and Downstream Entry*","authors":"Chrysovalantou Milliou, Emmanuel Petrakis","doi":"10.1111/joie.12367","DOIUrl":"10.1111/joie.12367","url":null,"abstract":"<p>We study the implications of different contractual forms in a market with an incumbent upstream monopolist and free downstream entry. We show that traditional conclusions regarding the desirability of linear contracts radically change when entry in the downstream market is endogenous rather than exogenous. By triggering more entry than two-part tariffs, wholesale price contracts can generate higher aggregate output, consumer surplus, and welfare. In light of this, the upstream monopolist may prefer to trade with wholesale price contracts as well as to give up part of its bargaining power when it is high.</p>","PeriodicalId":47963,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Industrial Economics","volume":"72 1","pages":"598-629"},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2023-11-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/joie.12367","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138496890","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Alcohol Prohibition and Pricing at the Pump*","authors":"Kai Fischer","doi":"10.1111/joie.12366","DOIUrl":"10.1111/joie.12366","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Firms often sell a transparent base product and a valuable add-on. If only some consumers are aware of the latter, the add-on's effect on the base product's price will be ambiguous. Cross-subsidization between products to bait uninformed consumers might lower, intrinsic utility from the add-on for informed consumers might raise the price. We study this trade-off in the gasoline market by exploiting an alcohol sales prohibition at stations as an exogenous shifter of add-on availability. Gasoline margins drop by 5% during the prohibition. The effect is mediated by shop variety and competition. Using traffic data, we unveil sizeable consumer-side reactions.</p>","PeriodicalId":47963,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Industrial Economics","volume":"72 1","pages":"548-597"},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2023-11-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/joie.12366","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138496892","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Michele Bisceglia, Jorge Padilla, Joe Perkins, Salvatore Piccolo
{"title":"Optimal Exit Policy with Uncertain Demand*","authors":"Michele Bisceglia, Jorge Padilla, Joe Perkins, Salvatore Piccolo","doi":"10.1111/joie.12364","DOIUrl":"10.1111/joie.12364","url":null,"abstract":"<p>In a framework where entrants must make sunk investment decisions with uncertain returns and have private demand information, we show that the relationship between innovation and exit value is non-monotone and features an inverted U-shaped pattern. Consumer surplus is maximised at the lowest exit value that incentivises the investment. These insights are applied to optimal merger policy. An entrant is more willing to innovate to be acquired afterwards, even if it has no bargaining power. This innovation-for-buyout effect implies that an entrant is less likely to leave the market under a lenient than a strict merger policy.</p>","PeriodicalId":47963,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Industrial Economics","volume":"72 1","pages":"516-547"},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2023-11-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138496891","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Obfuscation and Rational Inattention*","authors":"Aljoscha Janssen, Johannes Kasinger","doi":"10.1111/joie.12362","DOIUrl":"10.1111/joie.12362","url":null,"abstract":"<p>We study the behavior of duopolistic firms that can obfuscate their prices before competing on price. Obfuscation affects the rational inattentive consumers' optimal information strategy, which determines the probabilistic demand. Our model advances related models by allowing consumers to update their unrestricted prior beliefs with an informative signal of any form. We show that the game may result in an obfuscation equilibrium with high prices or a transparency equilibrium with low prices and no obfuscation, providing an argument for market regulation. Obfuscation equilibria cease to exist for low information costs and if one firm seems a priori considerably more attractive.</p>","PeriodicalId":47963,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Industrial Economics","volume":"72 1","pages":"390-428"},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2023-11-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"136348162","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Quantifying the Effects of Price Discrimination Under Imperfect Competition*","authors":"Juan Sebastián Vélez-Velásquez","doi":"10.1111/joie.12363","DOIUrl":"10.1111/joie.12363","url":null,"abstract":"<p>This article analyzes the effects of broadband carriers switching from price discrimination to uniform pricing. Broadband carriers often use third-degree price discrimination. In Colombia, broadband carriers rely on government-issued socio-economic information to segment markets. I use demand and marginal cost estimates to quantify the effects of switching from price discrimination to uniform pricing in an environment of high income disparity. The results provide direct evidence of large consumer surplus transfers from poorer to wealthier households. Poorer households respond by subscribing to slower Internet plans, which may undermine prior efforts to increase download speeds in this demographic.</p>","PeriodicalId":47963,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Industrial Economics","volume":"72 1","pages":"429-458"},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2023-11-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"136351670","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The Impact of Private Label Introduction on Assortment, Prices, and Profits of Retailers*","authors":"Meilin MA, Ralph Bernd Siebert","doi":"10.1111/joie.12359","DOIUrl":"10.1111/joie.12359","url":null,"abstract":"<p>We study how introducing private-label brands (PLs) affects retail prices and profits, accounting for assortment adjustments of national brands (NBs). We employ an event-study framework and scanner data on the US beef market. When a PL is added to the low-priced market segment, we find that retail stores further differentiate NBs from the PL and remove same-segment NBs. When a PL is added to the high-priced segment, however, NB assortment changes are limited. PL introduction and PL-driven NB assortment changes impose small price effects on NB, but strongly cannibalize NB demand and steer consumers toward PLs, likely increasing store profits.</p>","PeriodicalId":47963,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Industrial Economics","volume":"72 1","pages":"356-389"},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2023-11-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135038327","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}