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Experts, Information, Reviews, and Coordination: Evidence on How Prizes Affect Sales* 专家、信息、评论和协调：奖品如何影响销售的证据*
IF 1.3 4区 经济学
Journal of Industrial Economics Pub Date : 2023-10-12 DOI: 10.1111/joie.12347
Nicolas Lagios, Pierre-Guillaume Méon
{"title":"Experts, Information, Reviews, and Coordination: Evidence on How Prizes Affect Sales*","authors":"Nicolas Lagios,&nbsp;Pierre-Guillaume Méon","doi":"10.1111/joie.12347","DOIUrl":"10.1111/joie.12347","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Exploiting the award process, we implement a regression discontinuity design to estimate the effect of winning France's main literary prize, the Goncourt. It increases sales, especially for books that sold fewer copies before the announcement, the number of reviews on Amazon, and the probability of them being negative. The effect is partly driven by an increase in word of mouth. Those findings are consistent with a model where the prize provides information on the existence of a book and acts as a quality signal and a coordination device but prompts consumers to read books that are far from their tastes.</p>","PeriodicalId":47963,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Industrial Economics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2023-10-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135968927","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Agency Frictions and Procurement: New Evidence from U.S. Electricity Restructuring* 机构摩擦与采购：美国电力重组的新证据*
IF 1.3 4区 经济学
Journal of Industrial Economics Pub Date : 2023-10-12 DOI: 10.1111/joie.12346
Jose Miguel Abito, Jin Soo Han, Jean-François Houde, Arthur A. van Benthem
{"title":"Agency Frictions and Procurement: New Evidence from U.S. Electricity Restructuring*","authors":"Jose Miguel Abito,&nbsp;Jin Soo Han,&nbsp;Jean-François Houde,&nbsp;Arthur A. van Benthem","doi":"10.1111/joie.12346","DOIUrl":"10.1111/joie.12346","url":null,"abstract":"<p>This article presents new quantitative evidence of the sources of efficiency benefits from deregulation. We estimate the heterogeneous effects of plant divestitures on fuel procurement costs during the restructuring of the U.S. electricity industry. Guided by economic theory, we focus on three mechanisms and find that restructuring reduced fuel procurement costs for firms that (i) were not subject to earlier incentive-regulation programs, (ii) had relatively strong bargaining power as coal purchasers after restructuring, and (iii) were locked in with disadvantaged coal contracts prior to restructuring.</p>","PeriodicalId":47963,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Industrial Economics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2023-10-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/joie.12346","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135968727","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Seller Compound Search for Bidders* 卖方联合体搜索投标人*
IF 1.3 4区 经济学
Journal of Industrial Economics Pub Date : 2023-10-10 DOI: 10.1111/joie.12355
Joosung Lee, Daniel Z. Li
{"title":"Seller Compound Search for Bidders*","authors":"Joosung Lee,&nbsp;Daniel Z. Li","doi":"10.1111/joie.12355","DOIUrl":"10.1111/joie.12355","url":null,"abstract":"<p>This article studies a seller's compound search for bidders by a deadline. We show that the optimal search outcomes can be implemented by a sequence of second-price auctions, characterized by declining reserve prices and increasing search intensities (sample sizes) over time. The monotonicity results are robust in both cases of short-lived and long-lived bidders. Furthermore, a seller with short-lived bidders sets lower reserve prices and searches more intensively than one with long-lived bidders. We also show that the inefficiency of an optimal search auction can stem from its inefficient search rule.</p>","PeriodicalId":47963,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Industrial Economics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2023-10-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/joie.12355","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"136294962","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Platform Oligopoly with Endogenous Homing: Implications for Mergers and Free Entry* 具有内生归宿的平台寡头垄断：兼并和自由进入的影响*
IF 1.3 4区 经济学
Journal of Industrial Economics Pub Date : 2023-10-09 DOI: 10.1111/joie.12345
Takanori Adachi, Susumu Sato, Mark J. Tremblay
{"title":"Platform Oligopoly with Endogenous Homing: Implications for Mergers and Free Entry*","authors":"Takanori Adachi,&nbsp;Susumu Sato,&nbsp;Mark J. Tremblay","doi":"10.1111/joie.12345","DOIUrl":"10.1111/joie.12345","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Consumer multi-homing is critical for competition policy regarding digital platforms. To assess the role of multi-homing, we embed endogenous homing into a model of oligopolistic competition between two-sided platforms and apply it to mergers and free entry. We find that the required merger-specific cost reduction is larger if consumers benefit more from multi-homing and that the equilibrium level of platform entry can be insufficient in the presence of consumer multi-homing. These results contrast the belief that multi-homing mitigates the need for stricter policy. We also show that reductions to sellers' benefit from multi-homing reduces entry (is an effective entry barrier).</p>","PeriodicalId":47963,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Industrial Economics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2023-10-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135093561","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
Wholesale Pricing with Asymmetric Information about a Private Label* 自有品牌信息不对称情况下的批发定价 *
IF 1.3 4区 经济学
Journal of Industrial Economics Pub Date : 2023-10-06 DOI: 10.1111/joie.12350
Johannes Paha
{"title":"Wholesale Pricing with Asymmetric Information about a Private Label*","authors":"Johannes Paha","doi":"10.1111/joie.12350","DOIUrl":"10.1111/joie.12350","url":null,"abstract":"<p>A monopolistic manufacturer produces a branded good that is sold to final consumers by a monopolistic retailer who also sells a private label. The costs of the private label are unobserved by the manufacturer, which affects the terms of the contract offered by the manufacturer to the retailer. Given the revelation principle, the manufacturer distorts the quantity of the branded product downwards to learn those costs. The manufacturer can further reduce the retailer's information rent by distorting the quantity of the private label upwards—but this quantity is typically beyond its control. The optimum can nonetheless be achieved when combining a quantity discount with an end-of-year repayment.</p>","PeriodicalId":47963,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Industrial Economics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2023-10-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/joie.12350","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134944613","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Advance Selling in the Wake of Entry* 入驻后的预售情况*
IF 1.3 4区 经济学
Journal of Industrial Economics Pub Date : 2023-10-03 DOI: 10.1111/joie.12348
Nadia Ceschi, Marc Möller
{"title":"Advance Selling in the Wake of Entry*","authors":"Nadia Ceschi,&nbsp;Marc Möller","doi":"10.1111/joie.12348","DOIUrl":"10.1111/joie.12348","url":null,"abstract":"<p>This article provides a tractable model of inter-temporal price-discrimination by heterogeneous firms, imperative for our understanding of advance purchase markets in the wake of entry. The pricing schedule of an industry leader, whose product is more likely to match consumers' preferences, differs systematically from a newcomer's pricing. By diverting competition to a stage where consumers face uncertainty about their preferences, advance selling reduces prices while increasing the newcomer's market share and profitability relative to the industry leader. Policies curtailing firms' ability to sell in advance, although potentially beneficial for welfare, may consolidate an industry leader's position and reduce consumers' surplus.</p>","PeriodicalId":47963,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Industrial Economics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2023-10-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/joie.12348","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135740397","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Price Commitments in Standard Setting under Asymmetric Information* 不对称信息下的标准制定中的价格承诺 *
IF 1.3 4区 经济学
Journal of Industrial Economics Pub Date : 2023-10-02 DOI: 10.1111/joie.12351
Jan Boone, Florian Schuett, Emanuele Tarantino
{"title":"Price Commitments in Standard Setting under Asymmetric Information*","authors":"Jan Boone,&nbsp;Florian Schuett,&nbsp;Emanuele Tarantino","doi":"10.1111/joie.12351","DOIUrl":"10.1111/joie.12351","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Standards may create market power for the holders of standard essential patents (SEPs). To address these concerns, the literature advocates price commitments, whereby SEP holders commit to the maximum royalty they would charge were their technology included in the standard. We consider a setting in which a technology implementer holds private information about profitability. In this setting, price commitments increase efficiency not only by curbing SEP holders' market power, but also by alleviating distortions in the design of the royalty scheme. We derive conditions under which price commitments can be implemented using a simple royalty cap as used in practice.</p>","PeriodicalId":47963,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Industrial Economics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2023-10-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/joie.12351","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135790094","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Country Image and Consumer Choice: The Case of the Beer Market during the COVID-19 Pandemic* 国家形象与消费者选择：COVID-19 大流行期间的啤酒市场案例*
IF 1.3 4区 经济学
Journal of Industrial Economics Pub Date : 2023-09-30 DOI: 10.1111/joie.12343
In Kyung Kim
{"title":"Country Image and Consumer Choice: The Case of the Beer Market during the COVID-19 Pandemic*","authors":"In Kyung Kim","doi":"10.1111/joie.12343","DOIUrl":"10.1111/joie.12343","url":null,"abstract":"<p>In this article, I exploit the exogenous shock to China's image in the COVID-19 pandemic era and study the impact of country image on consumer choice in the South Korean beer market. First, I find that <i>Tsingtao</i>, a popular Chinese beer brand, lost about 4.8 million liters in sales, a 20% decrease, during the first eight months after the COVID-19 outbreak. Second, the impact of China's worsened image had not weakened by October 2020. Third, top-selling non-Chinese beers absorbed most of <i>Tsingtao</i>'s lost sales. These findings reveal that country image has a substantial influence on consumer choice.</p>","PeriodicalId":47963,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Industrial Economics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2023-09-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"136336805","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Timing Assumptions and Efficiency: Empirical Evidence in a Production Function Context 时序假设与效率：生产函数背景下的经验证据
IF 1.3 4区 经济学
Journal of Industrial Economics Pub Date : 2023-09-14 DOI: 10.1111/joie.12340
Daniel A. Ackerberg
{"title":"Timing Assumptions and Efficiency: Empirical Evidence in a Production Function Context","authors":"Daniel A. Ackerberg","doi":"10.1111/joie.12340","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/joie.12340","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Recent work estimating production functions has often used methodologies proposed in two literatures: (1) “proxy variable” estimation techniques (Olley, S. and Pakes, A., 1996, <i>Econometrica</i>, 64, pp. 1263–1295), and (2) “dynamic panel” estimation techniques. I illustrate how timing and information set assumptions are key to both, and how these assumptions can be strengthened (or weakened) almost continuously. I examinehow, in some common production datasets, strengthening or weakening these assumptions affects the precision of estimates—comparing these impacts to those achieved by imposing alternative assumptions sometimes utilized in these literatures. This illustrates efficiency tradeoffs between different possible assumptions, at least in the production function context.</p>","PeriodicalId":47963,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Industrial Economics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2023-09-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"50133170","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 12
Competition and Strategic Budget Choices in the Motion Picture Industry* 电影业的竞争与战略预算选择*
IF 1.3 4区 经济学
Journal of Industrial Economics Pub Date : 2023-09-13 DOI: 10.1111/joie.12342
Sebastiano Delre, Petros G. Sekeris
{"title":"Competition and Strategic Budget Choices in the Motion Picture Industry*","authors":"Sebastiano Delre,&nbsp;Petros G. Sekeris","doi":"10.1111/joie.12342","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/joie.12342","url":null,"abstract":"In this article, we study the effect of differentiation on firms' optimal investments in advertising and product quality in the specific context of the motion picture industry. To guide our empirical analysis, we develop a stylized model uncovering that competition in advertising is the highest for intermediate levels of horizontal differentiation, while product quality increases monotonically in differentiation. We corroborate our theoretical predictions with a large dataset on the movie industry confirming both the inverted U‐shaped relationship between advertising and differentiation, and the monotonically increasing relationship between product quality and differentiation.","PeriodicalId":47963,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Industrial Economics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2023-09-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"50132258","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
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