私隐规管及提升质素创新*

IF 1.7 4区 经济学 Q3 BUSINESS, FINANCE
Yassine Lefouili, Leonardo Madio, Ying Lei Toh
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引用次数: 0

摘要

我们分析了以信息披露上限为形式的隐私监管如何影响垄断者(仅从向第三方披露用户数据中获取收入)提高质量的创新激励和消费者剩余。如果关注隐私的用户比例足够小,隐私监管对创新有负面影响,可能会损害用户。然而,如果关注隐私的用户比例足够大,隐私监管对创新具有积极作用。在这种情况下,隐私和创新之间没有权衡,用户总是从隐私监管中受益。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Privacy Regulation and Quality-Enhancing Innovation*

We analyze how a privacy regulation taking the form of a cap on information disclosure affects quality-enhancing innovation incentives by a monopolist—who derives revenues solely from disclosing user data to third parties—and consumer surplus. If the share of privacy-concerned users is sufficiently small, privacy regulation has a negative effect on innovation and may harm users. However, if the share of privacy-concerned users is sufficiently large, privacy regulation has a positive effect on innovation. In this case, there is no trade-off between privacy and innovation and users always benefit from privacy regulation.

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来源期刊
CiteScore
1.60
自引率
0.00%
发文量
27
期刊介绍: First published in 1952, the Journal of Industrial Economics has a wide international circulation and is recognised as a leading journal in the field. It was founded to promote the analysis of modern industry, particularly the behaviour of firms and the functioning of markets. Contributions are welcomed in all areas of industrial economics including: - organization of industry - applied oligopoly theory - product differentiation and technical change - theory of the firm and internal organization - regulation - monopoly - merger and technology policy Necessarily, these subjects will often draw on adjacent areas such as international economics, labour economics and law.
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