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Pricing and Product Positioning with Relative Consumer Preferences* 具有相对消费者偏好的定价和产品定位*
IF 1.3 4区 经济学
Journal of Industrial Economics Pub Date : 2023-09-07 DOI: 10.1111/joie.12341
Roman Inderst, Martin Obradovits
{"title":"Pricing and Product Positioning with Relative Consumer Preferences*","authors":"Roman Inderst,&nbsp;Martin Obradovits","doi":"10.1111/joie.12341","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/joie.12341","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Frequent price promotions force consumers to continuously reassess their preferences over product offerings. When this leads consumers to exhibit a bias of “relative thinking”, such as may be triggered by a focus only on the most salient product attribute, we show in a model of sales (Varian, H. R., 1980, <i>American Economic Review</i>, 70(4), pp. 651–659) that this profoundly alters firms' pricing and product-positioning strategies. Vertical differentiation becomes more likely, with firms preferring to occupy the low-quality space in particular when they have few loyal consumers. More generally, product positioning now depends on the composition of consumers' consideration sets.</p>","PeriodicalId":47963,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Industrial Economics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2023-09-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/joie.12341","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"50124268","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
Shopping for Information: Implications of Consumer Learning for Optimal Pricing and Product Design* 信息购物：消费者学习对最优定价和产品设计的启示*
IF 1.3 4区 经济学
Journal of Industrial Economics Pub Date : 2023-09-01 DOI: 10.1111/joie.12333
Marilyn Pease
{"title":"Shopping for Information: Implications of Consumer Learning for Optimal Pricing and Product Design*","authors":"Marilyn Pease","doi":"10.1111/joie.12333","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/joie.12333","url":null,"abstract":"<p>I study a seller's pricing problem where consumers perform costly product research about value before purchase. They buy the product when sufficiently optimistic about value and cease research when sufficiently pessimistic. I find that the seller encourages product research when prior belief about value is high, even though he could sell immediately for a high price. The prior affects both expected value and how additional information changes consumers' beliefs. I show that an increase in research cost affects equilibrium price nonmonotonically. Finally, when the seller chooses price and product value dispersion, the optimal level of dispersion need not be extremal.</p>","PeriodicalId":47963,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Industrial Economics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2023-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"50119452","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Royalty Stacking and Validity Challenges: The Inverse Cournot Effect* 特许权使用费堆叠和有效性挑战：反向古诺效应*
IF 1.3 4区 经济学
Journal of Industrial Economics Pub Date : 2023-09-01 DOI: 10.1111/joie.12335
Gerard Llobet, Jorge Padilla
{"title":"Royalty Stacking and Validity Challenges: The Inverse Cournot Effect*","authors":"Gerard Llobet,&nbsp;Jorge Padilla","doi":"10.1111/joie.12335","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/joie.12335","url":null,"abstract":"<p>This paper shows that the well-known royalty-stacking problem is not robust to considering licensors with patents of heterogeneous strength due to the Inverse Cournot effect. The incentives for a downstream producer to challenge a weak patent in court increase when the total royalty rate is lower. The Inverse Cournot effect generates a moderation force in the royalty rate of strong patent holders forcing weak licensors to reduce their royalties to avoid litigation and causing an increase in output. This effect is mitigated when all firms have weak patents, making royalty stacking a more relevant concern in that case.</p>","PeriodicalId":47963,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Industrial Economics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2023-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"50119451","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
Welfare analysis of the subsidies in the Chinese electric vehicle industry* 中国电动汽车产业补贴的福利分析*
IF 1.3 4区 经济学
Journal of Industrial Economics Pub Date : 2023-08-21 DOI: 10.1111/joie.12337
Xiaodan Guo, Junji Xiao
{"title":"Welfare analysis of the subsidies in the Chinese electric vehicle industry*","authors":"Xiaodan Guo,&nbsp;Junji Xiao","doi":"10.1111/joie.12337","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/joie.12337","url":null,"abstract":"<p>We employ a structural model and counterfactual analysis to identify the impact of subsidies on the Chinese electric vehicle (EV) sales and examine their welfare effects. Our findings suggest that subsidies are effective in promoting the diffusion of domestic EVs, but may adversely affect technological advancement. When the subsidies on domestic EVs are reduced, the welfare on domestic EV consumers and producers decreases. However, the reduction in government spending on EV subsidies outweighs this private welfare loss. Thus, the overall welfare increases. Subsidies cannot be justified from the perspective of reducing externalities because they increase rather than decrease pollution.</p>","PeriodicalId":47963,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Industrial Economics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2023-08-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"50152956","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 2
Taxation and Durable Goods Monopoly* 税收与耐用品垄断*
IF 1.3 4区 经济学
Journal of Industrial Economics Pub Date : 2023-08-19 DOI: 10.1111/joie.12339
Changhyun Kwak, Jihong Lee
{"title":"Taxation and Durable Goods Monopoly*","authors":"Changhyun Kwak,&nbsp;Jihong Lee","doi":"10.1111/joie.12339","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/joie.12339","url":null,"abstract":"<p>This paper studies the role of taxation in durable good markets with dynamic monopolies. By conditioning the marginal tax rate on the volume of trade, the regulator can provide incentives for the monopolist to accelerate trade. When marginal cost pricing generates a loss for the monopolist, strategic delay cannot be avoided under regulatory budget constraint and the effects of tax policy depend on the monopolist's ability to commit. In the context of binary consumer types, we find a tax policy involving “back-loaded subsidy” that achieves the second-best outcome with commitment. In contrast, without commitment, a “front-loaded subsidy” improves welfare.</p>","PeriodicalId":47963,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Industrial Economics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2023-08-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"50137559","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Profitability of Noisy Certification in the Presence of Loss Averse Buyers* 无损失买家存在下噪声认证的盈利能力*
IF 1.3 4区 经济学
Journal of Industrial Economics Pub Date : 2023-08-17 DOI: 10.1111/joie.12334
Seung Huh, Dmitry A. Shapiro, Sung H. Ham
{"title":"Profitability of Noisy Certification in the Presence of Loss Averse Buyers*","authors":"Seung Huh,&nbsp;Dmitry A. Shapiro,&nbsp;Sung H. Ham","doi":"10.1111/joie.12334","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/joie.12334","url":null,"abstract":"<p>We study how the inaccuracy of a costly certification technology affects a monopolistic seller's profitability. We compare three scenarios: no certification, a 100% accurate certification, and a 50% accurate certification that produces accurate evaluations half the time. The noisy certification environment is never the most profitable and, depending on the buyers' loss aversion, can be the least profitable. However, a noisy certification can be more profitable than an accurate one, as it discourages the over-certification that occurs in an accurate certification environment. Experimentally, the noisy certification is shown to be the least profitable treatment, whereas the accurate certification is shown to be the most profitable.</p>","PeriodicalId":47963,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Industrial Economics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2023-08-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"50135640","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Local Energy Markets* 当地能源市场*
IF 1.3 4区 经济学
Journal of Industrial Economics Pub Date : 2023-08-17 DOI: 10.1111/joie.12338
Pio Baake, Sebastian Schwenen, Christian von Hirschhausen
{"title":"Local Energy Markets*","authors":"Pio Baake,&nbsp;Sebastian Schwenen,&nbsp;Christian von Hirschhausen","doi":"10.1111/joie.12338","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/joie.12338","url":null,"abstract":"<p>In current power markets, the bulk of electricity is sold wholesale and transported to consumers via long-distance transmission lines. Recently, decentralized local energy markets have evolved, often as isolated networks based on solar generation. We analyze strategic pricing, investment, and welfare in local energy markets. We show that local energy markets yield competitive equilibrium prices and provide efficient investment incentives. Yet, we find that strategic behavior leads to allocative inefficiency. We propose a clearing mechanism that induces truth-telling behavior and restores first-best welfare.</p>","PeriodicalId":47963,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Industrial Economics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2023-08-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/joie.12338","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"50135641","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Missing Price Information and Its Impact on Equilibrium Price Dispersion: Evidence From Gasoline Signboards* 价格信息缺失及其对均衡价格分散的影响——来自汽油招牌的证据*
IF 1.3 4区 经济学
Journal of Industrial Economics Pub Date : 2023-08-12 DOI: 10.1111/joie.12336
Michael D. Noel, Hongjie Qiang
{"title":"Missing Price Information and Its Impact on Equilibrium Price Dispersion: Evidence From Gasoline Signboards*","authors":"Michael D. Noel,&nbsp;Hongjie Qiang","doi":"10.1111/joie.12336","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/joie.12336","url":null,"abstract":"<p>This article seeks to quantify the importance of price information in reducing consumer search costs and equilibrium price dispersion in a competitive setting. It exploits a natural experiment in the retail gasoline industry in which stations post the prices of only certain grades of gasoline on large street-side signboards, and not others, except where required by law. Differential-by-grade signboard information predicts a specific curvature in price dispersion across grades, and differentiates itself from other noninformational factors such as income and cost. The impact of readily-available price information on search and price dispersion is found to be exceptionally large.</p>","PeriodicalId":47963,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Industrial Economics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2023-08-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"50129543","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Cursed Consumers and the Effectiveness of Consumer Protection Policies* 被诅咒的消费者与消费者保护政策的有效性*
IF 1.3 4区 经济学
Journal of Industrial Economics Pub Date : 2023-07-27 DOI: 10.1111/joie.12332
Alessandro Ispano, Peter Schwardmann
{"title":"Cursed Consumers and the Effectiveness of Consumer Protection Policies*","authors":"Alessandro Ispano,&nbsp;Peter Schwardmann","doi":"10.1111/joie.12332","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/joie.12332","url":null,"abstract":"<p>We model firms' quality disclosure and pricing in the presence of cursed consumers, who fail to be sufficiently skeptical about undisclosed quality. We show that cursed consumers are exploited in duopoly if firms are vertically differentiated, if there are few cursed consumers, and if average product quality is high. Three common consumer protection policies that work under monopoly, that is, mandatory disclosure, third party disclosure and consumer education, may all increase exploitation and decrease welfare. Even where these policies improve welfare, they often lead to a reduction in consumer surplus. Our conclusions hold in extensions with endogenous quality and horizontal differentiation.</p>","PeriodicalId":47963,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Industrial Economics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2023-07-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"50154930","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 2
Bid Coordination in Sponsored Search Auctions: Detection Methodology and Empirical Analysis* 赞助搜索拍卖中的竞价协调：检测方法与实证分析*
IF 1.3 4区 经济学
Journal of Industrial Economics Pub Date : 2023-07-22 DOI: 10.1111/joie.12331
Francesco Decarolis, Maris Goldmanis, Antonio Penta, Ksenia Shakhgildyan
{"title":"Bid Coordination in Sponsored Search Auctions: Detection Methodology and Empirical Analysis*","authors":"Francesco Decarolis,&nbsp;Maris Goldmanis,&nbsp;Antonio Penta,&nbsp;Ksenia Shakhgildyan","doi":"10.1111/joie.12331","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/joie.12331","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Bid delegation to specialized intermediaries is common in internet ad auctions. When the same intermediary bids for competing advertisers, its incentive to coordinate client bids might alter the functioning of the auctions. This study develops a methodology to detect bid coordination and presents a strategy to estimate a bound on the search engine revenue losses imposed by bid coordination. When the method is applied to data from auctions held on a major search engine, coordination is detected in 55% of the cases of delegated bidding and the search engine's revenue loss ranges between 5.3% and 10.4%.</p>","PeriodicalId":47963,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Industrial Economics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2023-07-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/joie.12331","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"50153308","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
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