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A Structural Empirical Model of R&D, Firm Heterogeneity, and Industry Evolution* R&D、企业异质性与产业演化的结构实证模型*
IF 1.3 4区 经济学
Journal of Industrial Economics Pub Date : 2023-07-05 DOI: 10.1111/joie.12327
Yanyou Chen, Daniel Yi Xu
{"title":"A Structural Empirical Model of R&D, Firm Heterogeneity, and Industry Evolution*","authors":"Yanyou Chen,&nbsp;Daniel Yi Xu","doi":"10.1111/joie.12327","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/joie.12327","url":null,"abstract":"<p>This article develops and estimates an industry equilibrium model of the Korean electric motor industry from 1991 to 1996. Plant-level decisions on R&amp;D, physical capital investment, entry, and exit are integrated in a dynamic setting with knowledge spillovers. We apply the novel approximation of oblivious equilibrium to estimate the R&amp;D cost, magnitude of knowledge spillovers, adjustment costs of physical investment, and plant scrap value distribution. Knowledge spillovers are essential to explaining the firm-level productivity evolution and the equilibrium market configuration. A <math>\u0000 <semantics>\u0000 <mrow>\u0000 <mn>15</mn>\u0000 <mo>%</mo>\u0000 </mrow>\u0000 <annotation>$$ 15% $$</annotation>\u0000 </semantics></math> R&amp;D subsidy maximizes industry output and is broadly consistent with a past policy initiative of the Korean government.</p>","PeriodicalId":47963,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Industrial Economics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2023-07-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"50130895","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 8
Platform Investment and price parity clauses* 平台投资和价格平价条款*
IF 1.3 4区 经济学
Journal of Industrial Economics Pub Date : 2023-07-05 DOI: 10.1111/joie.12329
Chengsi Wang, Julian Wright
{"title":"Platform Investment and price parity clauses*","authors":"Chengsi Wang,&nbsp;Julian Wright","doi":"10.1111/joie.12329","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/joie.12329","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Platforms use price parity clauses to prevent sellers setting lower prices when selling through other channels. They claim these restraints are needed so platforms have incentives to invest in providing search services—without them, consumers would search on the platform but then switch to buy in a cheaper channel. In a model incorporating these effects, we find that wide price parity clauses lead to excessive platform investment while narrow (or no) price parity clauses lead to insufficient platform investment. Taking these investment effects into account, wide price parity clauses lower consumer surplus but have ambiguous effects on total welfare.</p>","PeriodicalId":47963,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Industrial Economics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2023-07-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/joie.12329","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"50130894","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Mixed Oligopoly and Market Power Mitigation: Evidence from the Colombian Wholesale Electricity Market* 混合寡头垄断与市场力量缓解——来自哥伦比亚电力批发市场的证据*
IF 1.3 4区 经济学
Journal of Industrial Economics Pub Date : 2023-07-04 DOI: 10.1111/joie.12328
Carlos Suarez
{"title":"Mixed Oligopoly and Market Power Mitigation: Evidence from the Colombian Wholesale Electricity Market*","authors":"Carlos Suarez","doi":"10.1111/joie.12328","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/joie.12328","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Using information on price bids in wholesale electricity pools and empirical techniques described in the literature on electricity markets, this study identifies the market power mitigation effect of public firms in the Colombian market. The results suggest that while private firms exercise less market power than is predicted by a profit-maximization model, there are marked differences between private and public firms in their exercise of unilateral market power. These findings support the hypothesis of the market power mitigation effect of public firms.</p>","PeriodicalId":47963,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Industrial Economics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2023-07-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/joie.12328","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"50127862","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Third-Degree Price Discrimination in Oligopoly when Markets are Covered* 市场覆盖下寡头垄断中的三级价格歧视*
IF 1.3 4区 经济学
Journal of Industrial Economics Pub Date : 2023-07-04 DOI: 10.1111/joie.12325
Markus Dertwinkel-Kalt, Christian Wey
{"title":"Third-Degree Price Discrimination in Oligopoly when Markets are Covered*","authors":"Markus Dertwinkel-Kalt,&nbsp;Christian Wey","doi":"10.1111/joie.12325","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/joie.12325","url":null,"abstract":"<p>We analyze oligopolistic third-degree price discrimination relative to uniform pricing when markets are covered. Pricing equilibria are critically determined by supply-side features such as the number of firms and their marginal cost differences. It follows that each firm's Lerner index under uniform pricing is equal to the weighted harmonic mean of the firm's relative margins under discriminatory pricing. Uniform pricing then lowers average prices and raises consumer surplus. We can calculate the gain in consumer surplus and loss in firms' profits from uniform pricing based only on the market data of the discriminatory equilibrium (i.e., prices and quantities).</p>","PeriodicalId":47963,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Industrial Economics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2023-07-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/joie.12325","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"50127861","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Industry Structure, Segmentation, and Quality Competition in the U.S. Hotel Industry* 美国酒店业的产业结构、细分和质量竞争*
IF 1.3 4区 经济学
Journal of Industrial Economics Pub Date : 2023-07-03 DOI: 10.1111/joie.12330
R. Andrew Butters, Thomas N. Hubbard
{"title":"Industry Structure, Segmentation, and Quality Competition in the U.S. Hotel Industry*","authors":"R. Andrew Butters,&nbsp;Thomas N. Hubbard","doi":"10.1111/joie.12330","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/joie.12330","url":null,"abstract":"<p>We examine how quality competition affects the relationship between market size and industry structure at the product level using evidence from the U.S. hotel industry. Starting in the early 1980s, quality competition for business travelers became more based on variable and less on fixed costs, and became less scale intensive. Since then, market size increases have been met by more, but smaller, hotels in business travel destinations but continued to be met by larger hotels in personal travel destinations. Our results illustrate how the way consumers benefit from increases in market size depends on how firms compete.</p>","PeriodicalId":47963,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Industrial Economics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2023-07-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/joie.12330","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"50119251","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Defending Home against Giants: Exclusive Dealing as a Survival Strategy for Local Firms* 保卫家园对抗巨人：独家交易是当地企业的生存策略*
IF 1.3 4区 经济学
Journal of Industrial Economics Pub Date : 2023-07-02 DOI: 10.1111/joie.12326
Hiroshi Kitamura, Noriaki Matsushima, Misato Sato
{"title":"Defending Home against Giants: Exclusive Dealing as a Survival Strategy for Local Firms*","authors":"Hiroshi Kitamura,&nbsp;Noriaki Matsushima,&nbsp;Misato Sato","doi":"10.1111/joie.12326","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/joie.12326","url":null,"abstract":"<p>We consider exclusive contracts a survival strategy for a local incumbent manufacturer facing a multinational manufacturer's entry. Although both manufacturers prefer to trade with an efficient local distributor, trading with inefficient competitive distributors is acceptable only to the entrant, because of the entrant's efficiency. Hence, such competitive distributors can be an outside option for the entrant. As the entrant becomes efficient, the outside option works effectively, implying that the entry does not considerably benefit the efficient local distributor. Thus, the local manufacturer is more likely to sign an anticompetitive exclusive contract with the efficient distributor as the entrant becomes efficient.</p>","PeriodicalId":47963,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Industrial Economics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2023-07-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/joie.12326","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"50121364","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Simulating Hospital Merger Simulations* 模拟医院合并模拟*
IF 1.3 4区 经济学
Journal of Industrial Economics Pub Date : 2023-04-10 DOI: 10.1111/joie.12312
David J. Balan, Keith Brand
{"title":"Simulating Hospital Merger Simulations*","authors":"David J. Balan,&nbsp;Keith Brand","doi":"10.1111/joie.12312","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/joie.12312","url":null,"abstract":"<p>We perform a Monte Carlo experiment to assess the performance of three hospital merger simulation methods. Our analysis proceeds as follows: (i) specify a theoretical model of hospital markets and use it to generate “true” price effects for many simulated mergers; (ii) for each simulated merger, generate data of the kind commonly available in real-world merger analysis and apply the simulation methods to those data; and (iii) compare the predictions of the simulation methods to the true price effects. All three simulation methods perform reasonably well. We also develop a method for predicting price effects that extends Garmon [2017].</p>","PeriodicalId":47963,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Industrial Economics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2023-04-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"50127166","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Regulating Data Privacy and Cybersecurity* 监管数据隐私和网络安全*
IF 1.3 4区 经济学
Journal of Industrial Economics Pub Date : 2023-04-06 DOI: 10.1111/joie.12316
Wing Man Wynne Lam, Jacob Seifert
{"title":"Regulating Data Privacy and Cybersecurity*","authors":"Wing Man Wynne Lam,&nbsp;Jacob Seifert","doi":"10.1111/joie.12316","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/joie.12316","url":null,"abstract":"<p>This paper studies firms' data privacy and cybersecurity choices. We emphasise the strategic interdependence between these decisions and demonstrate that security in both the market equilibrium and the social optimum tends to be higher when data is shared. We also identify important market failures in the sense that firms tend to under-invest in security and over-share data. Our welfare analysis of a minimum security standard, disclosure and consumer education policies, liability rules and consumer mitigation strategies highlights the need for a co-ordinated approach to regulation.</p>","PeriodicalId":47963,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Industrial Economics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2023-04-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/joie.12316","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"50132875","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Aggregate Information and Organizational Structures* 聚合信息和组织结构*
IF 1.3 4区 经济学
Journal of Industrial Economics Pub Date : 2023-04-06 DOI: 10.1111/joie.12314
Gorkem Celik, Dongsoo Shin, Roland Strausz
{"title":"Aggregate Information and Organizational Structures*","authors":"Gorkem Celik,&nbsp;Dongsoo Shin,&nbsp;Roland Strausz","doi":"10.1111/joie.12314","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/joie.12314","url":null,"abstract":"<p>We study information flows in an organization with a top management (principal) and multiple subunits (agents) with private information that determines the organization's overall efficiency. Under centralized communication, eliciting the agents' information may induce the principal to manipulate aggregate information, which obstructs an effective use of information. Under hierarchical communication, the principal concedes more information rent due to loss of control, but is able to use the agents' information more effectively. The trade-off between the organizational structures depends on the likelihood that the agents are efficient. Centralized communication is optimal when such likelihood is low. Hierarchical communication, by contrast, is optimal when it is high.</p>","PeriodicalId":47963,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Industrial Economics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2023-04-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/joie.12314","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"50121958","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Vertical Contract Disclosure in Three-Tier Industries* 三级产业中的纵向合同披露*
IF 1.3 4区 经济学
Journal of Industrial Economics Pub Date : 2023-04-05 DOI: 10.1111/joie.12315
Michele Bisceglia
{"title":"Vertical Contract Disclosure in Three-Tier Industries*","authors":"Michele Bisceglia","doi":"10.1111/joie.12315","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/joie.12315","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Consider a three-tier industry with a monopolist supplying a manufacturer which sells its product to final consumers through two retailers. Contracts are linear and secret. Hence, upon receiving an out-of-equilibrium offer, each retailer must form a belief about the identity of the deviating upstream firm. This beliefs' specification problem wipes out if an Open Book Accounting (OBA) policy is implemented, whereby the input price is disclosed to retailers. Under Cournot (Bertrand) competition, OBA increases industry profits and consumer surplus if retailers believe that any out-of-equilibrium offer is more likely to reflect a deviation by the upstream supplier (by the manufacturer).</p>","PeriodicalId":47963,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Industrial Economics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2023-04-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/joie.12315","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"50120897","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
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