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Managing Seller Conduct in Online Marketplaces and Platform Most-Favored Nation Clauses* 管理网上市场和平台最惠国条款中的卖方行为*
IF 1.7 4区 经济学
Journal of Industrial Economics Pub Date : 2024-02-22 DOI: 10.1111/joie.12384
Frank Schlütter
{"title":"Managing Seller Conduct in Online Marketplaces and Platform Most-Favored Nation Clauses*","authors":"Frank Schlütter","doi":"10.1111/joie.12384","DOIUrl":"10.1111/joie.12384","url":null,"abstract":"<p>This article investigates the incentive and ability of a platform to limit the extent of competition between the sellers it hosts. Absent contractual restrictions, a platform has an incentive to ensure competition between the sellers. This incentive can change with the introduction of so-called platform most-favored nation clauses (PMFN) that require the online sellers not to offer better conditions on other distribution channels. Such clauses can align the interests between sellers and platforms to restrict competition. I illustrate that a platform can stabilize seller collusion to its own benefit. These results offer a novel rationale to treat PMFNs with scrutiny.</p>","PeriodicalId":47963,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Industrial Economics","volume":"72 3","pages":"1139-1194"},"PeriodicalIF":1.7,"publicationDate":"2024-02-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/joie.12384","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139951649","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Regulating Platform Competition in Markets with Network Externalities: Will Predatory Pricing Restrictions Increase Social Welfare?* 规范具有网络外部性的市场中的平台竞争：限制掠夺性定价能否增加社会福利？
IF 1.7 4区 经济学
Journal of Industrial Economics Pub Date : 2024-01-30 DOI: 10.1111/joie.12385
Ohad Atad, Yaron Yehezkel
{"title":"Regulating Platform Competition in Markets with Network Externalities: Will Predatory Pricing Restrictions Increase Social Welfare?*","authors":"Ohad Atad,&nbsp;Yaron Yehezkel","doi":"10.1111/joie.12385","DOIUrl":"10.1111/joie.12385","url":null,"abstract":"<p>We consider an infinitely repeated platform competition in a market with network externalities. The platform that dominated the market in the previous period becomes the incumbent in the current period. We examine the effect of an antitrust policy that prohibits both platforms (symmetric regulation), or just the incumbent (asymmetric regulation) from charging predatory prices. We show that symmetric regulation decreases consumer surplus and does not affect efficiency. Asymmetric regulation increases consumer surplus and improves welfare when the size of the market remains constant over time. Yet, when market size varies over time, this policy may lead to inefficient entry.</p>","PeriodicalId":47963,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Industrial Economics","volume":"72 3","pages":"1114-1138"},"PeriodicalIF":1.7,"publicationDate":"2024-01-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/joie.12385","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139644926","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Manufacturer Collusion and Resale Price Maintenance* 制造商合谋和维持转售价格*
IF 1.7 4区 经济学
Journal of Industrial Economics Pub Date : 2024-01-23 DOI: 10.1111/joie.12382
Matthias Hunold, Johannes Muthers
{"title":"Manufacturer Collusion and Resale Price Maintenance*","authors":"Matthias Hunold,&nbsp;Johannes Muthers","doi":"10.1111/joie.12382","DOIUrl":"10.1111/joie.12382","url":null,"abstract":"<p>We provide a novel theory of harm for resale price maintenance (RPM). In a model with two manufacturers and two retailers, we show that RPM facilitates manufacturer collusion when retailers have alternatives to selling a manufacturer's product. Because of the alternatives, manufacturers can only ensure that retailers sell their products by leaving sufficient retail margins. This restricts the wholesale price level even when the manufacturers collude. RPM allows colluding manufacturers to establish higher prices.</p>","PeriodicalId":47963,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Industrial Economics","volume":"72 3","pages":"1089-1113"},"PeriodicalIF":1.7,"publicationDate":"2024-01-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/joie.12382","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139579379","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
User Data and Endogenous Entry in Online Markets* 在线市场的用户数据和内生性进入*
IF 1.7 4区 经济学
Journal of Industrial Economics Pub Date : 2024-01-10 DOI: 10.1111/joie.12383
Laura Abrardi, Carlo Cambini, Raffaele Congiu, Flavio Pino
{"title":"User Data and Endogenous Entry in Online Markets*","authors":"Laura Abrardi,&nbsp;Carlo Cambini,&nbsp;Raffaele Congiu,&nbsp;Flavio Pino","doi":"10.1111/joie.12383","DOIUrl":"10.1111/joie.12383","url":null,"abstract":"<p>We investigate how the presence of a Data Broker (DB), who sells consumer data to downstream firms, affects firm entry and competition in a horizontally differentiated oligopoly market, in which data allow firms to price discriminate. The DB chooses the price and amount of data sold to each firm. We show that the data sale by the DB reduces excessive market entry, as the competition induced by personalized prices exerts a downward pressure on prices and profits. The data-induced entry barrier and resulting weakened competition dominates the pro-competitive effect of personalized prices. Consequently, while the DB's presence might alleviate excessive market entry, it also diminishes consumer surplus.</p>","PeriodicalId":47963,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Industrial Economics","volume":"72 3","pages":"1052-1088"},"PeriodicalIF":1.7,"publicationDate":"2024-01-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/joie.12383","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139420509","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Positive and Negative Sorting in Team Contests* 团队竞赛中的正排序和负排序 *
IF 1.7 4区 经济学
Journal of Industrial Economics Pub Date : 2024-01-02 DOI: 10.1111/joie.12381
Qiang Fu, Zenan Wu, Hanyao Zhang, Yangfan Zhou
{"title":"Positive and Negative Sorting in Team Contests*","authors":"Qiang Fu,&nbsp;Zenan Wu,&nbsp;Hanyao Zhang,&nbsp;Yangfan Zhou","doi":"10.1111/joie.12381","DOIUrl":"10.1111/joie.12381","url":null,"abstract":"<p>This paper investigates the formation of teams in a contest. A manager sorts four workers—who differ in their productivity—into two teams. Workers on each team join forces to produce team output, and one team wins a prize; for example, a bonus package. Two sorting patterns are possible: Positive sorting requires that each team consist of players of same caliber and negative sorting the opposite. We characterize the optimum. We further extend the model to allow the manager to set a prize schedule for the workers on each team upon a win, allocate productive resources between teams, and pick the level of competition of the contest.</p>","PeriodicalId":47963,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Industrial Economics","volume":"72 3","pages":"1021-1051"},"PeriodicalIF":1.7,"publicationDate":"2024-01-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139375660","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Monopsony Power and Upstream Innovation* 垄断势力与上游创新*
IF 1.3 4区 经济学
Journal of Industrial Economics Pub Date : 2023-12-29 DOI: 10.1111/joie.12379
Álvaro Parra, Guillermo Marshall
{"title":"Monopsony Power and Upstream Innovation*","authors":"Álvaro Parra,&nbsp;Guillermo Marshall","doi":"10.1111/joie.12379","DOIUrl":"10.1111/joie.12379","url":null,"abstract":"<p>How does a monopsonist incentivize its supplier to innovate? By decreasing the short-run profit of the supplier, the monopsonist can increase the supplier's incentive to invest in R&amp;D by lessening the supplier's Arrow's replacement effect. The monopsonist engages in this practice despite a distortion in its trade volume with the supplier that causes inefficiency. We discuss implications for the boundaries of the firm.</p>","PeriodicalId":47963,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Industrial Economics","volume":"72 2","pages":"1005-1020"},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2023-12-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139067934","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Welfare Consequence of Common Ownership in a Vertically Related Market* 纵向关联市场中共同所有权的福利后果 *
IF 1.3 4区 经济学
Journal of Industrial Economics Pub Date : 2023-12-27 DOI: 10.1111/joie.12380
Linfeng Chen, Toshihiro Matsumura, Chenhang Zeng
{"title":"Welfare Consequence of Common Ownership in a Vertically Related Market*","authors":"Linfeng Chen,&nbsp;Toshihiro Matsumura,&nbsp;Chenhang Zeng","doi":"10.1111/joie.12380","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/joie.12380","url":null,"abstract":"<p>We investigate how common ownership affects welfare in a vertically related market. Although common ownership mitigates the double marginalization problem and improves welfare, it restricts competition among downstream firms and harms welfare. We find that whether common ownership is welfare-improving depends on the degree of competitiveness in the downstream market. Common ownership is more likely to improve welfare when there are fewer downstream firms and a greater degree of product differentiation. In other words, common ownership may improve welfare when competition in the downstream market is weak.</p>","PeriodicalId":47963,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Industrial Economics","volume":"72 2","pages":"996-1004"},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2023-12-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141251518","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Double Marginalization and Misplacement in Online Advertising* 网络广告中的双重边缘化和错位 *
IF 1.3 4区 经济学
Journal of Industrial Economics Pub Date : 2023-12-20 DOI: 10.1111/joie.12376
Alexander White, Kamal Jain, Shota Ichihashi, Byung-Cheol Kim
{"title":"Double Marginalization and Misplacement in Online Advertising*","authors":"Alexander White,&nbsp;Kamal Jain,&nbsp;Shota Ichihashi,&nbsp;Byung-Cheol Kim","doi":"10.1111/joie.12376","DOIUrl":"10.1111/joie.12376","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Internet users often surf multiple websites as a bundle to fulfill their needs and ‘pay’ for the content by viewing ads. We study how such complementary websites choose advertising policies. Two forces distort the equilibrium away from the industry optimum and the efficient outcome. First, websites place too many ads (double marginalization). Second, given the total advertising volume at equilibrium, websites misallocate ads among themselves (misplacement). Competition in one market segment may eliminate double marginalization but exacerbate misplacement. Introducing micropayments removes misplacement, but the welfare consequences are ambiguous. Policymakers must thus be cautious when applying standard remedies to zero-price markets.</p>","PeriodicalId":47963,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Industrial Economics","volume":"72 2","pages":"940-964"},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2023-12-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138823881","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
How Do Shoppers Respond to Noisy Signals on Price Changes? Evidence from a Field Experiment in Online Supermarket Shopping* 购物者如何应对价格变动的噪音信号？来自网上超市购物现场实验的证据*
IF 1.3 4区 经济学
Journal of Industrial Economics Pub Date : 2023-12-20 DOI: 10.1111/joie.12378
Kfir Eliaz, Orli Oren-Kolbinger, Sarit Weisburd
{"title":"How Do Shoppers Respond to Noisy Signals on Price Changes? Evidence from a Field Experiment in Online Supermarket Shopping*","authors":"Kfir Eliaz,&nbsp;Orli Oren-Kolbinger,&nbsp;Sarit Weisburd","doi":"10.1111/joie.12378","DOIUrl":"10.1111/joie.12378","url":null,"abstract":"<p>What is the effect on the demand for both discounted and nondiscounted products, when promotional material informs shoppers that some product categories feature discounts? We address this question by conducting a field experiment on a website for online grocery shopping. We find that shoppers who had purchased in a certain food category prior to the experiment responded to noisy promotional information by purchasing items in the discounted category that they had already purchased in the past, regardless of whether the item purchased was currently discounted. Our results suggest that coarse information on discounts increases both consumer spending and seller revenue.</p>","PeriodicalId":47963,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Industrial Economics","volume":"72 2","pages":"965-995"},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2023-12-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/joie.12378","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138823799","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Product Repositioning by Merging Firms* 合并公司的产品重新定位*
IF 1.3 4区 经济学
Journal of Industrial Economics Pub Date : 2023-11-29 DOI: 10.1111/joie.12373
Enghin Atalay, Alan Sorensen, Christopher Sullivan, Wanjia Zhu
{"title":"Product Repositioning by Merging Firms*","authors":"Enghin Atalay,&nbsp;Alan Sorensen,&nbsp;Christopher Sullivan,&nbsp;Wanjia Zhu","doi":"10.1111/joie.12373","DOIUrl":"10.1111/joie.12373","url":null,"abstract":"<p>We examine merging firms' additions and removals of products for a sample of 66 mergers across a wide variety of consumer packaged goods markets. We find that mergers lead to a net reduction in the number of products offered by merging firms. Merging firms tend to both drop and add products at the periphery of their joint product portfolios, with the net effect of increasing within-firm product similarity. These results are consistent with theories of the firm that emphasize cost synergies among similar types of products or managerial core competencies linked to particular segments of the product market.</p>","PeriodicalId":47963,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Industrial Economics","volume":"72 2","pages":"868-908"},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2023-11-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/joie.12373","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138496903","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
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