{"title":"Multimarket Contact in Health Insurance: Evidence from Medicare Advantage*","authors":"Haizhen Lin, Ian M. McCarthy","doi":"10.1111/joie.12318","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/joie.12318","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Many industries consist of large firms that compete in multiple geographic markets. Such overlap, defined as multimarket contact (MMC), may facilitate tacit collusion and soften competition. We examine the effects of MMC on health insurance prices and quality using comprehensive data on the Medicare Advantage (MA) market from 2008 through 2015. Our identification strategy exploits two plausibly exogenous changes to MMC: (1) out-of-market mergers; and (2) policy-driven changes in the benchmark rates of other markets. Our results consistently support the mutual forbearance hypothesis, where we find that prices are significantly higher and high-quality plans less pervasive as MMC increases.</p>","PeriodicalId":47963,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Industrial Economics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2023-04-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"50120896","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Gaétan De Rassenfosse, Paul H. Jensen, T'Mir Julius, Alfons Palangkaraya, Elizabeth Webster
{"title":"Is the Patent System an Even Playing Field? The Effect of Patent Attorney Firms","authors":"Gaétan De Rassenfosse, Paul H. Jensen, T'Mir Julius, Alfons Palangkaraya, Elizabeth Webster","doi":"10.1111/joie.12319","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/joie.12319","url":null,"abstract":"<p>The patent system underpins the business model of some of the fastest-growing companies. Used appropriately, it should support frontier technologies and nurture new firms. Used perniciously, it can stifle innovation and protect established technological behemoths. We analyze patent examination decisions at the American, European, Japanese, Korean, and Chinese patent offices and find evidence that patent attorneys have a surprisingly significant role in the patent system. Our results suggest that some forces within the examination system maintain the uneven playing field by allocating monopoly rights to inventors with better access to influential attorneys, rather than leveling it by favoring inventors with better, nonobvious ideas. Attorney quality is most important, vis-à-vis invention quality, in less codified and more rapidly changing technology areas such as software and ICT.</p>","PeriodicalId":47963,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Industrial Economics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2023-04-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/joie.12319","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"50120898","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Uniform Pricing as a Barrier to Entry","authors":"Hong Feng, Youping Li, Jie Shuai","doi":"10.1111/joie.12320","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/joie.12320","url":null,"abstract":"<p>This paper considers an entry game in which an incumbent firm operates in a number of markets and a potential entrant can enter multiple or all of the markets. While price discrimination has usually been thought of as a barrier to entry, in our model it is not and instead, charging a uniform price across the markets can discourage entry. Partial entry occurs when the two firms' products are highly substitutable. In this case, uniform pricing raises the profits of both the incumbent and the entrant but reduces consumer and total welfare relative to price discrimination.</p>","PeriodicalId":47963,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Industrial Economics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2023-04-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"50120265","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Platform Price Parity Clauses and Consumer Obfuscation*","authors":"José Ignacio Heresi","doi":"10.1111/joie.12313","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/joie.12313","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Several antitrust authorities have investigated platform price parity clauses around the world. I analyze the impact of these clauses when platforms design a search environment for sellers and buyers to interact. In a model where platforms choose the unit search cost faced by consumers, I show when platforms can profitably obfuscate consumers through high search costs. Then, I show that price parity clauses, when exogenously given, can increase or reduce obfuscation, prices, and consumer surplus. Finally, when price parity clauses are endogenous, they are only observed in equilibrium if they hurt consumers.</p>","PeriodicalId":47963,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Industrial Economics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2023-03-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"50149159","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Modeling Competition over Multiple Variables under Limited Consumer Awareness*","authors":"Samir Mamadehussene, Francisco Silva","doi":"10.1111/joie.12317","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/joie.12317","url":null,"abstract":"<p>When analyzing firm competition over two strategic variables (e.g., quality and price), it is important to decide whether to model it as a one-stage or a two-stage game. Our analysis focuses on markets in which consumers are not aware of all alternatives. We find that, if consumers are sufficiently unaware, both the one-stage and the two-stage equilibria of the game that explicitly models limited awareness are close to the one-stage equilibrium of the standard game, which assumes full awareness. Therefore, markets in which consumers have limited awareness can be studied with standard models, provided that the one-stage game is analyzed.</p>","PeriodicalId":47963,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Industrial Economics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2023-03-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"50148016","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Input Price Discrimination, Demand Forms, And Welfare*","authors":"Germain Gaudin, Romain Lestage","doi":"10.1111/joie.12306","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/joie.12306","url":null,"abstract":"<p>We analyse the effects of input price discrimination in the canonical model where an upstream monopolist sells to downstream firms with various degrees of efficiency. We first recast a series of existing results within our setting, extending previous findings related to discrimination in final-goods markets to the case of discrimination in input markets. Then, we examine the impact of input price discrimination on welfare. A key determinant of the effects of input price discrimination corresponds to the sum of demand curvature and pass-through elasticity. We provide examples relying on derived demands with constant curvature, including demands with constant pass-through rates.</p>","PeriodicalId":47963,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Industrial Economics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2023-01-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/joie.12306","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"137698807","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Fostering the Diffusion of General Purpose Technologies: Evidence from the Licensing of the Transistor Patents*","authors":"Markus Nagler, Monika Schnitzer, Martin Watzinger","doi":"10.1111/joie.12311","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/joie.12311","url":null,"abstract":"<p>How do licensing and technology transfer influence the spread of General Purpose Technologies? To answer this question, we analyze the diffusion of the transistor, one of the most important technologies of our time. We show that the transistor diffusion and cross-technology spillovers increased dramatically after AT&T began licensing its transistor patents along with symposia to educate follow-on inventors in 1952. Both these symposia and the licensing of the patents itself played important roles in the diffusion. A subsequent reduction in royalties did not lead to further increases, suggesting that licensing and technology transfer were more important than specific royalty rates.</p>","PeriodicalId":47963,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Industrial Economics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2023-01-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/joie.12311","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"137531316","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Bundling with Resale*","authors":"Drew Vollmer","doi":"10.1111/joie.12304","DOIUrl":"10.1111/joie.12304","url":null,"abstract":"<p>How does resale affect multiproduct bundling? I investigate using a model of monopoly bundling with costly resale. Consumers purchase in the primary market while anticipating resale, then participate in a resale market with market-clearing prices. Resale forces the monopolist to balance the additional profit from a discounted bundle against the opportunity for consumer arbitrage. In equilibrium, the monopolist may still offer a discounted bundle, but resale reduces the returns to bundling and has an ambiguous effect on consumer and total welfare. When consumers have heterogeneous costs of resale, it is possible for consumers to resell in equilibrium.</p>","PeriodicalId":47963,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Industrial Economics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2023-01-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"72891160","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"THE ROLE AND IMPORTANCE OF INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY IN E-COMMERCE","authors":"Gadzhiev N.K. Gadzhiev, Khava Movledinovna Kantaeva, Yakha Akhmudovna Khadueva","doi":"10.47576/2949-1886_2023_2_138","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.47576/2949-1886_2023_2_138","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":47963,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Industrial Economics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2023-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"78219461","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"EVALUATION OF THE EFFECTIVENESS OF INTERACTION BETWEEN TAX AUTHORITIES AND INTERNAL AFFAIRS AUTHORITIES IN THE PROCESS OF CARRYING OUT CONTROL ACTIVITIES WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF ON-SITE TAX AUDITS","authors":"Galina Alekseevna Zolotareva, Yu. Bendas","doi":"10.47576/2712-7559_2023_1_33","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.47576/2712-7559_2023_1_33","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":47963,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Industrial Economics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2023-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"77262818","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}