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Regulating Data Privacy and Cybersecurity* 监管数据隐私和网络安全*
IF 1.3 4区 经济学
Journal of Industrial Economics Pub Date : 2023-04-06 DOI: 10.1111/joie.12316
Wing Man Wynne Lam, Jacob Seifert
{"title":"Regulating Data Privacy and Cybersecurity*","authors":"Wing Man Wynne Lam,&nbsp;Jacob Seifert","doi":"10.1111/joie.12316","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/joie.12316","url":null,"abstract":"<p>This paper studies firms' data privacy and cybersecurity choices. We emphasise the strategic interdependence between these decisions and demonstrate that security in both the market equilibrium and the social optimum tends to be higher when data is shared. We also identify important market failures in the sense that firms tend to under-invest in security and over-share data. Our welfare analysis of a minimum security standard, disclosure and consumer education policies, liability rules and consumer mitigation strategies highlights the need for a co-ordinated approach to regulation.</p>","PeriodicalId":47963,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Industrial Economics","volume":"71 1","pages":"143-175"},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2023-04-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/joie.12316","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"50132875","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Aggregate Information and Organizational Structures* 聚合信息和组织结构*
IF 1.3 4区 经济学
Journal of Industrial Economics Pub Date : 2023-04-06 DOI: 10.1111/joie.12314
Gorkem Celik, Dongsoo Shin, Roland Strausz
{"title":"Aggregate Information and Organizational Structures*","authors":"Gorkem Celik,&nbsp;Dongsoo Shin,&nbsp;Roland Strausz","doi":"10.1111/joie.12314","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/joie.12314","url":null,"abstract":"<p>We study information flows in an organization with a top management (principal) and multiple subunits (agents) with private information that determines the organization's overall efficiency. Under centralized communication, eliciting the agents' information may induce the principal to manipulate aggregate information, which obstructs an effective use of information. Under hierarchical communication, the principal concedes more information rent due to loss of control, but is able to use the agents' information more effectively. The trade-off between the organizational structures depends on the likelihood that the agents are efficient. Centralized communication is optimal when such likelihood is low. Hierarchical communication, by contrast, is optimal when it is high.</p>","PeriodicalId":47963,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Industrial Economics","volume":"71 1","pages":"256-290"},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2023-04-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/joie.12314","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"50121958","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Vertical Contract Disclosure in Three-Tier Industries* 三级产业中的纵向合同披露*
IF 1.3 4区 经济学
Journal of Industrial Economics Pub Date : 2023-04-05 DOI: 10.1111/joie.12315
Michele Bisceglia
{"title":"Vertical Contract Disclosure in Three-Tier Industries*","authors":"Michele Bisceglia","doi":"10.1111/joie.12315","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/joie.12315","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Consider a three-tier industry with a monopolist supplying a manufacturer which sells its product to final consumers through two retailers. Contracts are linear and secret. Hence, upon receiving an out-of-equilibrium offer, each retailer must form a belief about the identity of the deviating upstream firm. This beliefs' specification problem wipes out if an Open Book Accounting (OBA) policy is implemented, whereby the input price is disclosed to retailers. Under Cournot (Bertrand) competition, OBA increases industry profits and consumer surplus if retailers believe that any out-of-equilibrium offer is more likely to reflect a deviation by the upstream supplier (by the manufacturer).</p>","PeriodicalId":47963,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Industrial Economics","volume":"71 1","pages":"1-46"},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2023-04-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/joie.12315","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"50120897","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Multimarket Contact in Health Insurance: Evidence from Medicare Advantage* 医疗保险中的多市场接触：来自医疗保险优势的证据*
IF 1.3 4区 经济学
Journal of Industrial Economics Pub Date : 2023-04-05 DOI: 10.1111/joie.12318
Haizhen Lin, Ian M. McCarthy
{"title":"Multimarket Contact in Health Insurance: Evidence from Medicare Advantage*","authors":"Haizhen Lin,&nbsp;Ian M. McCarthy","doi":"10.1111/joie.12318","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/joie.12318","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Many industries consist of large firms that compete in multiple geographic markets. Such overlap, defined as multimarket contact (MMC), may facilitate tacit collusion and soften competition. We examine the effects of MMC on health insurance prices and quality using comprehensive data on the Medicare Advantage (MA) market from 2008 through 2015. Our identification strategy exploits two plausibly exogenous changes to MMC: (1) out-of-market mergers; and (2) policy-driven changes in the benchmark rates of other markets. Our results consistently support the mutual forbearance hypothesis, where we find that prices are significantly higher and high-quality plans less pervasive as MMC increases.</p>","PeriodicalId":47963,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Industrial Economics","volume":"71 1","pages":"212-255"},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2023-04-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"50120896","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Is the Patent System an Even Playing Field? The Effect of Patent Attorney Firms 专利制度是一个公平的竞争环境吗？专利律师事务所的作用
IF 1.3 4区 经济学
Journal of Industrial Economics Pub Date : 2023-04-05 DOI: 10.1111/joie.12319
Gaétan De Rassenfosse, Paul H. Jensen, T'Mir Julius, Alfons Palangkaraya, Elizabeth Webster
{"title":"Is the Patent System an Even Playing Field? The Effect of Patent Attorney Firms","authors":"Gaétan De Rassenfosse,&nbsp;Paul H. Jensen,&nbsp;T'Mir Julius,&nbsp;Alfons Palangkaraya,&nbsp;Elizabeth Webster","doi":"10.1111/joie.12319","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/joie.12319","url":null,"abstract":"<p>The patent system underpins the business model of some of the fastest-growing companies. Used appropriately, it should support frontier technologies and nurture new firms. Used perniciously, it can stifle innovation and protect established technological behemoths. We analyze patent examination decisions at the American, European, Japanese, Korean, and Chinese patent offices and find evidence that patent attorneys have a surprisingly significant role in the patent system. Our results suggest that some forces within the examination system maintain the uneven playing field by allocating monopoly rights to inventors with better access to influential attorneys, rather than leveling it by favoring inventors with better, nonobvious ideas. Attorney quality is most important, vis-à-vis invention quality, in less codified and more rapidly changing technology areas such as software and ICT.</p>","PeriodicalId":47963,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Industrial Economics","volume":"71 1","pages":"124-142"},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2023-04-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/joie.12319","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"50120898","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 3
Uniform Pricing as a Barrier to Entry 作为进入壁垒的统一定价
IF 1.3 4区 经济学
Journal of Industrial Economics Pub Date : 2023-04-04 DOI: 10.1111/joie.12320
Hong Feng, Youping Li, Jie Shuai
{"title":"Uniform Pricing as a Barrier to Entry","authors":"Hong Feng,&nbsp;Youping Li,&nbsp;Jie Shuai","doi":"10.1111/joie.12320","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/joie.12320","url":null,"abstract":"<p>This paper considers an entry game in which an incumbent firm operates in a number of markets and a potential entrant can enter multiple or all of the markets. While price discrimination has usually been thought of as a barrier to entry, in our model it is not and instead, charging a uniform price across the markets can discourage entry. Partial entry occurs when the two firms' products are highly substitutable. In this case, uniform pricing raises the profits of both the incumbent and the entrant but reduces consumer and total welfare relative to price discrimination.</p>","PeriodicalId":47963,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Industrial Economics","volume":"71 1","pages":"176-191"},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2023-04-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"50120265","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Platform Price Parity Clauses and Consumer Obfuscation* 平台价格平价条款与消费者困惑*
IF 1.3 4区 经济学
Journal of Industrial Economics Pub Date : 2023-03-31 DOI: 10.1111/joie.12313
José Ignacio Heresi
{"title":"Platform Price Parity Clauses and Consumer Obfuscation*","authors":"José Ignacio Heresi","doi":"10.1111/joie.12313","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/joie.12313","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Several antitrust authorities have investigated platform price parity clauses around the world. I analyze the impact of these clauses when platforms design a search environment for sellers and buyers to interact. In a model where platforms choose the unit search cost faced by consumers, I show when platforms can profitably obfuscate consumers through high search costs. Then, I show that price parity clauses, when exogenously given, can increase or reduce obfuscation, prices, and consumer surplus. Finally, when price parity clauses are endogenous, they are only observed in equilibrium if they hurt consumers.</p>","PeriodicalId":47963,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Industrial Economics","volume":"71 1","pages":"291-322"},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2023-03-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"50149159","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
Modeling Competition over Multiple Variables under Limited Consumer Awareness* 有限消费者意识下的多变量竞争模型*
IF 1.3 4区 经济学
Journal of Industrial Economics Pub Date : 2023-03-29 DOI: 10.1111/joie.12317
Samir Mamadehussene, Francisco Silva
{"title":"Modeling Competition over Multiple Variables under Limited Consumer Awareness*","authors":"Samir Mamadehussene,&nbsp;Francisco Silva","doi":"10.1111/joie.12317","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/joie.12317","url":null,"abstract":"<p>When analyzing firm competition over two strategic variables (e.g., quality and price), it is important to decide whether to model it as a one-stage or a two-stage game. Our analysis focuses on markets in which consumers are not aware of all alternatives. We find that, if consumers are sufficiently unaware, both the one-stage and the two-stage equilibria of the game that explicitly models limited awareness are close to the one-stage equilibrium of the standard game, which assumes full awareness. Therefore, markets in which consumers have limited awareness can be studied with standard models, provided that the one-stage game is analyzed.</p>","PeriodicalId":47963,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Industrial Economics","volume":"71 1","pages":"192-211"},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2023-03-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"50148016","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Input Price Discrimination, Demand Forms, And Welfare* 投入价格歧视、需求形式与福利*
IF 1.3 4区 经济学
Journal of Industrial Economics Pub Date : 2023-01-18 DOI: 10.1111/joie.12306
Germain Gaudin, Romain Lestage
{"title":"Input Price Discrimination, Demand Forms, And Welfare*","authors":"Germain Gaudin,&nbsp;Romain Lestage","doi":"10.1111/joie.12306","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/joie.12306","url":null,"abstract":"<p>We analyse the effects of input price discrimination in the canonical model where an upstream monopolist sells to downstream firms with various degrees of efficiency. We first recast a series of existing results within our setting, extending previous findings related to discrimination in final-goods markets to the case of discrimination in input markets. Then, we examine the impact of input price discrimination on welfare. A key determinant of the effects of input price discrimination corresponds to the sum of demand curvature and pass-through elasticity. We provide examples relying on derived demands with constant curvature, including demands with constant pass-through rates.</p>","PeriodicalId":47963,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Industrial Economics","volume":"70 4","pages":"1033-1057"},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2023-01-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/joie.12306","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"137698807","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Fostering the Diffusion of General Purpose Technologies: Evidence from the Licensing of the Transistor Patents* 促进通用技术的传播:来自晶体管专利许可的证据*
IF 1.3 4区 经济学
Journal of Industrial Economics Pub Date : 2023-01-17 DOI: 10.1111/joie.12311
Markus Nagler, Monika Schnitzer, Martin Watzinger
{"title":"Fostering the Diffusion of General Purpose Technologies: Evidence from the Licensing of the Transistor Patents*","authors":"Markus Nagler,&nbsp;Monika Schnitzer,&nbsp;Martin Watzinger","doi":"10.1111/joie.12311","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/joie.12311","url":null,"abstract":"<p>How do licensing and technology transfer influence the spread of General Purpose Technologies? To answer this question, we analyze the diffusion of the transistor, one of the most important technologies of our time. We show that the transistor diffusion and cross-technology spillovers increased dramatically after AT&amp;T began licensing its transistor patents along with symposia to educate follow-on inventors in 1952. Both these symposia and the licensing of the patents itself played important roles in the diffusion. A subsequent reduction in royalties did not lead to further increases, suggesting that licensing and technology transfer were more important than specific royalty rates.</p>","PeriodicalId":47963,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Industrial Economics","volume":"70 4","pages":"838-866"},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2023-01-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/joie.12311","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"137531316","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
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