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Vertical Contracts and Downstream Entry* 垂直合同和下游进入*
IF 1.3 4区 经济学
Journal of Industrial Economics Pub Date : 2023-11-14 DOI: 10.1111/joie.12367
Chrysovalantou Milliou, Emmanuel Petrakis
{"title":"Vertical Contracts and Downstream Entry*","authors":"Chrysovalantou Milliou,&nbsp;Emmanuel Petrakis","doi":"10.1111/joie.12367","DOIUrl":"10.1111/joie.12367","url":null,"abstract":"<p>We study the implications of different contractual forms in a market with an incumbent upstream monopolist and free downstream entry. We show that traditional conclusions regarding the desirability of linear contracts radically change when entry in the downstream market is endogenous rather than exogenous. By triggering more entry than two-part tariffs, wholesale price contracts can generate higher aggregate output, consumer surplus, and welfare. In light of this, the upstream monopolist may prefer to trade with wholesale price contracts as well as to give up part of its bargaining power when it is high.</p>","PeriodicalId":47963,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Industrial Economics","volume":"72 1","pages":"598-629"},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2023-11-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/joie.12367","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138496890","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Alcohol Prohibition and Pricing at the Pump* 禁酒与加油站定价*
IF 1.3 4区 经济学
Journal of Industrial Economics Pub Date : 2023-11-14 DOI: 10.1111/joie.12366
Kai Fischer
{"title":"Alcohol Prohibition and Pricing at the Pump*","authors":"Kai Fischer","doi":"10.1111/joie.12366","DOIUrl":"10.1111/joie.12366","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Firms often sell a transparent base product and a valuable add-on. If only some consumers are aware of the latter, the add-on's effect on the base product's price will be ambiguous. Cross-subsidization between products to bait uninformed consumers might lower, intrinsic utility from the add-on for informed consumers might raise the price. We study this trade-off in the gasoline market by exploiting an alcohol sales prohibition at stations as an exogenous shifter of add-on availability. Gasoline margins drop by 5% during the prohibition. The effect is mediated by shop variety and competition. Using traffic data, we unveil sizeable consumer-side reactions.</p>","PeriodicalId":47963,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Industrial Economics","volume":"72 1","pages":"548-597"},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2023-11-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/joie.12366","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138496892","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Optimal Exit Policy with Uncertain Demand* 需求不确定的最优退出政策*
IF 1.3 4区 经济学
Journal of Industrial Economics Pub Date : 2023-11-14 DOI: 10.1111/joie.12364
Michele Bisceglia, Jorge Padilla, Joe Perkins, Salvatore Piccolo
{"title":"Optimal Exit Policy with Uncertain Demand*","authors":"Michele Bisceglia,&nbsp;Jorge Padilla,&nbsp;Joe Perkins,&nbsp;Salvatore Piccolo","doi":"10.1111/joie.12364","DOIUrl":"10.1111/joie.12364","url":null,"abstract":"<p>In a framework where entrants must make sunk investment decisions with uncertain returns and have private demand information, we show that the relationship between innovation and exit value is non-monotone and features an inverted U-shaped pattern. Consumer surplus is maximised at the lowest exit value that incentivises the investment. These insights are applied to optimal merger policy. An entrant is more willing to innovate to be acquired afterwards, even if it has no bargaining power. This innovation-for-buyout effect implies that an entrant is less likely to leave the market under a lenient than a strict merger policy.</p>","PeriodicalId":47963,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Industrial Economics","volume":"72 1","pages":"516-547"},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2023-11-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138496891","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Obfuscation and Rational Inattention* 混淆视听和理性忽视*
IF 1.3 4区 经济学
Journal of Industrial Economics Pub Date : 2023-11-13 DOI: 10.1111/joie.12362
Aljoscha Janssen, Johannes Kasinger
{"title":"Obfuscation and Rational Inattention*","authors":"Aljoscha Janssen,&nbsp;Johannes Kasinger","doi":"10.1111/joie.12362","DOIUrl":"10.1111/joie.12362","url":null,"abstract":"<p>We study the behavior of duopolistic firms that can obfuscate their prices before competing on price. Obfuscation affects the rational inattentive consumers' optimal information strategy, which determines the probabilistic demand. Our model advances related models by allowing consumers to update their unrestricted prior beliefs with an informative signal of any form. We show that the game may result in an obfuscation equilibrium with high prices or a transparency equilibrium with low prices and no obfuscation, providing an argument for market regulation. Obfuscation equilibria cease to exist for low information costs and if one firm seems a priori considerably more attractive.</p>","PeriodicalId":47963,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Industrial Economics","volume":"72 1","pages":"390-428"},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2023-11-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"136348162","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Quantifying the Effects of Price Discrimination Under Imperfect Competition* 量化不完全竞争下价格歧视的影响*
IF 1.3 4区 经济学
Journal of Industrial Economics Pub Date : 2023-11-13 DOI: 10.1111/joie.12363
Juan Sebastián Vélez-Velásquez
{"title":"Quantifying the Effects of Price Discrimination Under Imperfect Competition*","authors":"Juan Sebastián Vélez-Velásquez","doi":"10.1111/joie.12363","DOIUrl":"10.1111/joie.12363","url":null,"abstract":"<p>This article analyzes the effects of broadband carriers switching from price discrimination to uniform pricing. Broadband carriers often use third-degree price discrimination. In Colombia, broadband carriers rely on government-issued socio-economic information to segment markets. I use demand and marginal cost estimates to quantify the effects of switching from price discrimination to uniform pricing in an environment of high income disparity. The results provide direct evidence of large consumer surplus transfers from poorer to wealthier households. Poorer households respond by subscribing to slower Internet plans, which may undermine prior efforts to increase download speeds in this demographic.</p>","PeriodicalId":47963,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Industrial Economics","volume":"72 1","pages":"429-458"},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2023-11-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"136351670","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
The Impact of Private Label Introduction on Assortment, Prices, and Profits of Retailers* 引进自有品牌对零售商商品种类、价格和利润的影响*
IF 1.3 4区 经济学
Journal of Industrial Economics Pub Date : 2023-11-12 DOI: 10.1111/joie.12359
Meilin MA, Ralph Bernd Siebert
{"title":"The Impact of Private Label Introduction on Assortment, Prices, and Profits of Retailers*","authors":"Meilin MA,&nbsp;Ralph Bernd Siebert","doi":"10.1111/joie.12359","DOIUrl":"10.1111/joie.12359","url":null,"abstract":"<p>We study how introducing private-label brands (PLs) affects retail prices and profits, accounting for assortment adjustments of national brands (NBs). We employ an event-study framework and scanner data on the US beef market. When a PL is added to the low-priced market segment, we find that retail stores further differentiate NBs from the PL and remove same-segment NBs. When a PL is added to the high-priced segment, however, NB assortment changes are limited. PL introduction and PL-driven NB assortment changes impose small price effects on NB, but strongly cannibalize NB demand and steer consumers toward PLs, likely increasing store profits.</p>","PeriodicalId":47963,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Industrial Economics","volume":"72 1","pages":"356-389"},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2023-11-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135038327","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Win/Loss Data and Consumer Switching Costs: Measuring Diversion Ratios and the Impact of Mergers* 赢/输数据与消费者转换成本：衡量分流比率和合并的影响*
IF 1.3 4区 经济学
Journal of Industrial Economics Pub Date : 2023-11-10 DOI: 10.1111/joie.12371
Y. Jeff Qiu, Masayuki Sawada, Gloria Sheu
{"title":"Win/Loss Data and Consumer Switching Costs: Measuring Diversion Ratios and the Impact of Mergers*","authors":"Y. Jeff Qiu,&nbsp;Masayuki Sawada,&nbsp;Gloria Sheu","doi":"10.1111/joie.12371","DOIUrl":"10.1111/joie.12371","url":null,"abstract":"<p>We propose an identification strategy for diversion based on win/loss data. First, we show that win/loss data from the merging firms and market shares in two periods for all firms are sufficient to identify the diversion ratios between the merging partners. Second, we show that win/loss data from the merging firms alone are sufficient for partial identification, and we construct a lower bound that provides a good approximation to the diversion ratio when switching costs are high. We demonstrate the performance of our method with numerical simulations and with an application to the Anthem/Cigna merger.</p>","PeriodicalId":47963,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Industrial Economics","volume":"72 1","pages":"327-355"},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2023-11-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135137873","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Firm Matching in the Market for Technology: Business Stealing and Business Creation* 技术市场中的企业匹配：企业偷窃与企业创造*
IF 1.3 4区 经济学
Journal of Industrial Economics Pub Date : 2023-10-31 DOI: 10.1111/joie.12358
Pere Arqué-Castells, Daniel F. Spulber
{"title":"Firm Matching in the Market for Technology: Business Stealing and Business Creation*","authors":"Pere Arqué-Castells,&nbsp;Daniel F. Spulber","doi":"10.1111/joie.12358","DOIUrl":"10.1111/joie.12358","url":null,"abstract":"<p>We propose an empirical framework for studying the prevalence of business creation and business stealing in technology transfers from the effect of technological overlap and product market overlap. We estimate the model on a new dataset that tracks interactions in the market for technology between publicly held US companies. Product market overlap has a negative effect on matching patterns that is suggestive of business stealing while technological proximity has a positive effect that is consistent with business creation. We assess the relevance of IP rights in deterring undesirable technology adoptions and discuss the suitability of alternative strategies of technology exchange.</p>","PeriodicalId":47963,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Industrial Economics","volume":"71 4","pages":"961-1003"},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2023-10-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135863832","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Search Frictions in Many-to-one Markets* 多对一市场中的搜索摩擦*
IF 1.3 4区 经济学
Journal of Industrial Economics Pub Date : 2023-10-26 DOI: 10.1111/joie.12357
Menghan Xu
{"title":"Search Frictions in Many-to-one Markets*","authors":"Menghan Xu","doi":"10.1111/joie.12357","DOIUrl":"10.1111/joie.12357","url":null,"abstract":"<p>This article studies how search frictions affect competition and matching efficiency in many-to-one loan markets where a borrower requires support from multiple investors and coordination is desired but absent. We develop a dynamic search model and show that borrowers employ mixed strategies in quoting interest rates. More importantly, we find that in many-to-one markets, the rate dispersion caused by search frictions facilitates coordination and hence improves allocation efficiency relative to a no friction environment. Further, we empirically present stylized facts consistent with the theoretical predictions and structurally estimate the impact of search frictions on matching efficiency.</p>","PeriodicalId":47963,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Industrial Economics","volume":"72 1","pages":"284-326"},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2023-10-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135016611","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Market Structure, Risk Preferences, and Forward Contracting Incentives* 市场结构、风险偏好和远期合约激励措施 *
IF 1.3 4区 经济学
Journal of Industrial Economics Pub Date : 2023-10-24 DOI: 10.1111/joie.12352
David P. Brown, David E. M. Sappington
{"title":"Market Structure, Risk Preferences, and Forward Contracting Incentives*","authors":"David P. Brown,&nbsp;David E. M. Sappington","doi":"10.1111/joie.12352","DOIUrl":"10.1111/joie.12352","url":null,"abstract":"<p>We examine the determinants of the levels of forward contracting preferred by generators and buyers of electricity. Increased forward contracting systematically reduces the variance of a generator's profit, so a generator prefers higher levels of forward contracting as market uncertainty or its aversion to risk increases. In contrast, increased forward contracting can either increase or reduce the variance of a buyer's profit. Consequently, a buyer can prefer either reduced or increased levels of forward contracting as market uncertainty or its aversion to risk increases.</p>","PeriodicalId":47963,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Industrial Economics","volume":"71 4","pages":"1146-1202"},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2023-10-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135316495","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
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