特许权使用费堆叠和有效性挑战:反向古诺效应*

IF 1.7 4区 经济学 Q3 BUSINESS, FINANCE
Gerard Llobet, Jorge Padilla
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引用次数: 1

摘要

本文表明,由于逆库诺效应,众所周知的特许权使用费堆叠问题对于考虑具有异质强度专利的许可方来说是不稳健的。当总特许权使用费费率较低时,下游生产商在法庭上挑战薄弱专利的动机会增加。反向库诺效应在强大的专利持有人的专利使用费率中产生了一种温和的力量,迫使较弱的许可方减少其专利使用费以避免诉讼,并导致产量增加。当所有公司的专利都很薄弱时,这种影响就会减轻,在这种情况下,专利权使用费堆积成为一个更相关的问题。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Royalty Stacking and Validity Challenges: The Inverse Cournot Effect*

This paper shows that the well-known royalty-stacking problem is not robust to considering licensors with patents of heterogeneous strength due to the Inverse Cournot effect. The incentives for a downstream producer to challenge a weak patent in court increase when the total royalty rate is lower. The Inverse Cournot effect generates a moderation force in the royalty rate of strong patent holders forcing weak licensors to reduce their royalties to avoid litigation and causing an increase in output. This effect is mitigated when all firms have weak patents, making royalty stacking a more relevant concern in that case.

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来源期刊
CiteScore
1.60
自引率
0.00%
发文量
27
期刊介绍: First published in 1952, the Journal of Industrial Economics has a wide international circulation and is recognised as a leading journal in the field. It was founded to promote the analysis of modern industry, particularly the behaviour of firms and the functioning of markets. Contributions are welcomed in all areas of industrial economics including: - organization of industry - applied oligopoly theory - product differentiation and technical change - theory of the firm and internal organization - regulation - monopoly - merger and technology policy Necessarily, these subjects will often draw on adjacent areas such as international economics, labour economics and law.
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