规范具有网络外部性的市场中的平台竞争：限制掠夺性定价能否增加社会福利？

IF 16.4 1区化学 Q1 CHEMISTRY, MULTIDISCIPLINARY

Accounts of Chemical Research Pub Date : 2024-01-30 DOI:10.1111/joie.12385

Ohad Atad, Yaron Yehezkel

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引用次数: 0

摘要

我们考虑的是一个具有网络外部性的市场中无限重复的平台竞争。上一时期主导市场的平台在这一时期成为现任者。我们研究了禁止两个平台（对称监管）或只禁止在位者（非对称监管）收取掠夺性价格的反垄断政策的效果。我们发现，对称监管会减少消费者剩余，但不会影响效率。当市场规模长期保持不变时，非对称监管会增加消费者剩余并提高福利。然而，当市场规模随时间变化时，这种政策可能会导致无效率的进入。

本文章由计算机程序翻译，如有差异，请以英文原文为准。

Regulating Platform Competition in Markets with Network Externalities: Will Predatory Pricing Restrictions Increase Social Welfare?*

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Regulating Platform Competition in Markets with Network Externalities: Will Predatory Pricing Restrictions Increase Social Welfare?*

We consider an infinitely repeated platform competition in a market with network externalities. The platform that dominated the market in the previous period becomes the incumbent in the current period. We examine the effect of an antitrust policy that prohibits both platforms (symmetric regulation), or just the incumbent (asymmetric regulation) from charging predatory prices. We show that symmetric regulation decreases consumer surplus and does not affect efficiency. Asymmetric regulation increases consumer surplus and improves welfare when the size of the market remains constant over time. Yet, when market size varies over time, this policy may lead to inefficient entry.

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来源期刊

Accounts of Chemical Research 化学-化学综合

CiteScore

31.40

自引率

1.10%

发文量

312

审稿时长

2 months

期刊介绍： Accounts of Chemical Research presents short, concise and critical articles offering easy-to-read overviews of basic research and applications in all areas of chemistry and biochemistry. These short reviews focus on research from the author’s own laboratory and are designed to teach the reader about a research project. In addition, Accounts of Chemical Research publishes commentaries that give an informed opinion on a current research problem. Special Issues online are devoted to a single topic of unusual activity and significance. Accounts of Chemical Research replaces the traditional article abstract with an article "Conspectus." These entries synopsize the research affording the reader a closer look at the content and significance of an article. Through this provision of a more detailed description of the article contents, the Conspectus enhances the article's discoverability by search engines and the exposure for the research.