{"title":"Justice in Hiring: Why the Most Qualified Should Not (Necessarily) Get the Job","authors":"Brian Carey","doi":"10.1111/japp.12727","DOIUrl":"10.1111/japp.12727","url":null,"abstract":"<p>In this article I argue that justice often requires that candidates who are sufficiently qualified for jobs be hired via lottery on the basis that this is the best way to recognise each candidate's equal moral claim to access meaningful work. In reaching this conclusion I consider a variety of potential objections from the perspectives of the employer, of the most qualified candidate, and of third parties, but ultimately reject the idea that a person's status as the most qualified candidate can explain why they ought to be appointed over other sufficiently qualified candidates.</p>","PeriodicalId":47057,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Applied Philosophy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2024-03-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/japp.12727","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140203392","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"A Species-Focused Approach to Assessing Speciesism","authors":"Alex Murphy","doi":"10.1111/japp.12725","DOIUrl":"10.1111/japp.12725","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Speciesism, broadly understood as the view that species membership is a morally relevant property, has been a central topic of debate within animal ethics for around 50 years. However, in all this time, animal ethicists have paid relatively scant attention to the nature of species membership itself. This seems potentially regrettable, since species membership's precise nature is presumably highly pertinent to the question of its exact moral relevance. Here, I advocate for a ‘species-focused’ approach to assessing speciesism, arguing that, in debating the merits of speciesism, animal ethicists should (i) centre the nature of species membership, and (ii) consult philosophers of biology. Adherence to this second prescription appears necessary since a lot of what philosophers of biology believe regarding the nature of species membership appears contrary to what many animal ethicists have seemingly assumed.</p>","PeriodicalId":47057,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Applied Philosophy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2024-03-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/japp.12725","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140166094","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"On the Ethics of Interacting","authors":"Kimberley Brownlee","doi":"10.1111/japp.12724","DOIUrl":"10.1111/japp.12724","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Ordinary interactions are the primary vehicle through which we show respect, give social pleasure, and grease the wheels of healthy sociality. When we do an interactional wrong to someone, we not only convey disrespect by disregarding their interactional needs, but also cause them social pain and erode healthy social relations. <i>Interactional ethics</i> – the study of the ethics of interacting – concerns both our conduct within our interactions and our broader interactional style. The existing philosophical literature in this area has not yet provided a detailed analysis of the three discrete stages of an ordinary interaction – the initiation stage, the execution stage, and the conclusion stage – or of the specific wrongs beyond disrespect that we can do at each stage. This article develops novel and useful tools to analyse interactional wrongs that both compromise our wellbeing by causing us social pain and threaten healthy sociality. It then distinguishes various patterns of interactional wrongdoing – i.e. interactional vices – that we can manifest as we seek to control with whom we interact and how.</p>","PeriodicalId":47057,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Applied Philosophy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2024-03-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/japp.12724","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140115722","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Domestic Violence and Abuse: Expanding Our Conceptual Repertoire","authors":"Macy Salzberger","doi":"10.1111/japp.12722","DOIUrl":"10.1111/japp.12722","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 \u0000 <p>This article aims to clarify and expand our conceptual repertoire for understanding domestic violence and abuse by making legible different characteristic harms, particularly those that cannot be made sense of in terms of physical harm. Sections 2 and 3 of this article review popular understandings of the harms of domestic violence and abuse. These often emphasize either (a) pain and suffering or (b) the loss of capacities for self-governance as characteristic harms of domestic violence and abuse. In its second half, this article argues that domestic violence and abuse characteristically involve yet another harm to the victim, one that cannot neatly be explained in terms of hedonistic welfare or concerns for a victim's capacities for self-governance. More specifically, this article argues that through the characteristic social isolation of domestic violence and abuse, perpetrators alienate victims from what motivationally roots them to the world. Although relationships that motivationally root us to the world might make us fundamentally dependent on others and can cause us great pain, they nevertheless play a profoundly valuable role in our lives by giving us reasons to go on living.</p>\u0000 </div>","PeriodicalId":47057,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Applied Philosophy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2024-03-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140055525","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The Allocation of Refugees to Host States: Should Refugees' Interests and Preferences be Considered?","authors":"Matthias Hoesch, Susanne Mantel","doi":"10.1111/japp.12720","DOIUrl":"10.1111/japp.12720","url":null,"abstract":"<p>When states cooperate in refugee protection and implement a scheme with fixed rules allocating refugees to host states, should they consider refugees' interests and preferences regarding where they receive protection? This article briefly examines the kinds of preferences and interests that are relevant to both refugees and states before discussing the moral principles determining the respective weight that should be attributed to them. We conclude that states must adhere to some minimal constraints concerning the consideration of refugees' concerns, and should promote some further moral goals that go beyond these constraints. Finally, we suggest a scheme that meets all the moral demands we argued for and seems feasible without posing serious threats to the destination states.</p>","PeriodicalId":47057,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Applied Philosophy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2024-02-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/japp.12720","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140025405","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The Paradox of Desert","authors":"David Benatar","doi":"10.1111/japp.12721","DOIUrl":"10.1111/japp.12721","url":null,"abstract":"<p>This article describes a paradoxical phenomenon arising from the fact that those who act rightly often pay a price for doing so. The paradox is that the <i>very</i> thing – acting rightly – that incurs the cost also makes the cost (especially) undeserved. In explicating the paradox, I distinguish between two kinds of cost (internal and external), two kinds of unfairness (intrinsic and comparative), and two manifestations of the paradox (prospective and retrospective). I suggest that the problem generated by the paradox of desert arises and becomes steadily more pronounced as we regress through three kinds of cases. I then consider and reject an attempt to dissolve the paradox, and I discuss the relevance of the paradox for questions about the extent of duty. Finally, I consider a concern about drawing attention to the paradox of desert.</p>","PeriodicalId":47057,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Applied Philosophy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2024-02-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/japp.12721","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139968679","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"State Borrowing and Global Responsibilities","authors":"James Pattison","doi":"10.1111/japp.12717","DOIUrl":"10.1111/japp.12717","url":null,"abstract":"<p>This article explores the ethics of state borrowing to fulfil global responsibilities. Although borrowing may appear attractive in the face of budgetary pressures and an increased number of crises in a changing global order, the article argues that borrowing to fulfil global responsibilities is generally morally problematic. It presents two main objections to borrowing. First, borrowing is often likely to be unfair intergenerationally, violating the ‘Just Borrowing Principle’. Second, borrowing demonstrates a lack of sufficient commitment, violating the ‘Taking a Stand Principle’, and therefore weakens the expressivist justification of measures to fulfil global responsibilities.</p>","PeriodicalId":47057,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Applied Philosophy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2024-02-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/japp.12717","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139956397","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Non-Durable Solutions: The Harm of Permanently Temporary Refugee Habitation","authors":"Micah Trautmann","doi":"10.1111/japp.12718","DOIUrl":"10.1111/japp.12718","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 \u0000 <p>The notion of ‘durability’ plays a central role in the discourse, policies, and practices surrounding forced displacement. Yet, for all the talk of ‘durable solutions’ to refugee situations, durability is in many ways the quality most conspicuously absent in refugees' everyday lives and living spaces. As the world has grown progressively more inured to the practice of using provisional spaces of transit as permanent sites of residence, displaced persons are increasingly finding themselves trapped in spaces marked by a kind of permanent temporariness. In this article, I sketch three different ways in which living for long periods of time in temporary spaces can harm inhabitants: first, I argue that non-durability in the home can undermine cognitive function; second, that it can attenuate various forms of agency; and third, that it fails to furnish a ground on which refugees can build meaningful lives and futures for themselves. I conclude by arguing that the deprivation of durable living conditions is not only harmful, but wrongful.</p>\u0000 </div>","PeriodicalId":47057,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Applied Philosophy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2024-02-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139952150","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The Utilitarian's Global Warming Problem (Why Utilitarians Should Be Social Identity Theorists)","authors":"Patrick Dieveney","doi":"10.1111/japp.12719","DOIUrl":"10.1111/japp.12719","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 \u0000 <p>Global warming presents challenges to utilitarianism. Its structural features seem to suggest that individuals have no moral obligations to take steps to reduce their carbon footprints. For those who find this to be an unacceptable result, Jamieson proposes an alternative. He argues that utilitarians should embrace a version of virtue ethics. They should embrace what he calls ‘green virtues’. In this article, I argue that Jamieson's proposal does not adequately address the ethical challenges that global warming poses for utilitarianism. I propose an alternative. Rather than aiming to inculcate green virtues, we should be aiming to inculcate a certain social identity: a green identity. Not only is this approach more in keeping with utilitarianism, but recent research in the social sciences also suggests that it is much more likely to result in an impactful reduction in global emissions.</p>\u0000 </div>","PeriodicalId":47057,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Applied Philosophy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2024-02-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139952222","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}