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Climate Absurdism 气候荒诞主义
IF 0.7 2区 哲学
Journal of Applied Philosophy Pub Date : 2025-02-11 DOI: 10.1111/japp.12797
Daniel G. Dick
{"title":"Climate Absurdism","authors":"Daniel G. Dick","doi":"10.1111/japp.12797","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/japp.12797","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Many arguments in the popular discourse around climate change seem intended to give the impression that climate action is an absurd endeavor. These ‘climate absurdist’ arguments are reflected in the question: ‘if the climate is going to change anyway, why should we care about anthropogenic climate change?’ Classic absurdist philosophy suggests that absurdity (also called ‘the absurd’) arises due to a conflict between our desire for meaning and a universe that seems devoid of meaning. Others argue the absurd is not a consequence of specific facts about the universe but is rather a matter of perspective – we live our lives with a seriousness that can always be undercut by ‘stepping back’ and viewing our goals and aspirations with indifference. Although climate absurdist claims are structured similarly to classic absurdist claims (positing a conflict between our climate stabilizing efforts and specific physical facts like a constantly changing climate), I argue that climate absurdist arguments are primarily rhetorical claims intended to encourage the listener to ‘step back’ and view our climate stabilizing efforts on a geologic or cosmic scale, where they can appear insignificant. I show that this approach results in a self-defeating argument that cannot justify climate inaction.</p>","PeriodicalId":47057,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Applied Philosophy","volume":"42 3","pages":"946-961"},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2025-02-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/japp.12797","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144646980","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Abortion and Democratic Equality 堕胎与民主平等
IF 0.7 2区 哲学
Journal of Applied Philosophy Pub Date : 2025-02-11 DOI: 10.1111/japp.12785
Japa Pallikkathayil
{"title":"Abortion and Democratic Equality","authors":"Japa Pallikkathayil","doi":"10.1111/japp.12785","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/japp.12785","url":null,"abstract":"<p>A central tenet of the liberal tradition in political philosophy is that citizens must be able to relate to one another as equals. I argue that this commitment to what has been called democratic equality is in tension with legal prohibitions on abortion prior to fetal viability. The most minimal commitment of democratic equality is equality before the law, which requires that the state treat like cases alike. My primary argument focuses on showing how this requirement cannot be reconciled with restrictive abortion laws given the other laws and practices common in liberal democracies. This is so even if we think of fetuses as citizens, as I suggest we should. Moreover, the changes states would need to make to their other laws and practices to bring them into line with restrictive abortion laws are intuitively deeply disturbing. I give a secondary argument showing how these intuitive reactions may be vindicated by more substantive reflection on democratic equality and its presuppositions. But the primary argument has force for anyone who rejects the extensive state control over citizens' bodies that would be needed to reconcile restrictive abortion laws with equality before the law, even if they do so on other grounds.</p>","PeriodicalId":47057,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Applied Philosophy","volume":"42 2","pages":"473-491"},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2025-02-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/japp.12785","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144140634","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Emergent Discrimination: Should We Protect Algorithmic Groups? 紧急歧视：我们应该保护算法群体吗？
IF 0.7 2区 哲学
Journal of Applied Philosophy Pub Date : 2025-02-05 DOI: 10.1111/japp.12793
Jannik Zeiser
{"title":"Emergent Discrimination: Should We Protect Algorithmic Groups?","authors":"Jannik Zeiser","doi":"10.1111/japp.12793","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/japp.12793","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Discrimination is usually thought of in terms of socially salient groups, such as race or gender. Some scholars argue that the rise of algorithmic decision-making poses a challenge to this notion. Algorithms are not bound by a social view of the world. Therefore, they may not only inherit pre-existing social biases and injustices but may also discriminate based on entirely new categories that have little or no meaning to humans at all, such as ‘being born on a Tuesday’. Should this prospect change how we theorize about discrimination, and should we protect these <i>algorithmic groups</i>, as some have suggested? I argue that the phenomenon is adequately described as ‘discrimination’ when a group is <i>systematically</i> disadvantaged. At present, we lack information about whether any algorithmic group meets this criterion, so it is difficult to protect such groups. Instead, we should <i>prevent</i> algorithms from disproportionately disadvantaging certain individuals, and I outline strategies for doing so.</p>","PeriodicalId":47057,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Applied Philosophy","volume":"42 3","pages":"910-928"},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2025-02-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/japp.12793","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144646908","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Evaluating the Free Speech Objection to Removing Tainted Political Symbols 论言论自由对移除污点政治符号的反对
IF 0.7 2区 哲学
Journal of Applied Philosophy Pub Date : 2025-02-04 DOI: 10.1111/japp.12795
Tuomas W. Manninen
{"title":"Evaluating the Free Speech Objection to Removing Tainted Political Symbols","authors":"Tuomas W. Manninen","doi":"10.1111/japp.12795","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/japp.12795","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 \u0000 <p>In recent years, several philosophers have argued that statues which are morally tainted ought to be removed from public display. One objection to this claim is the free speech objection: removing the statues constitutes a violation of free speech rights. This objection suffers from two flaws. First, it is rarely articulated to its fullest potential. Second, the free speech objection is largely dismissed by philosophers who support the statues' removal. In this article, I will aim to rectify this situation by providing three different formulations of the free speech objection, based, respectively, on First Amendment jurisprudence, on Mill's consequentialist defense of free speech, and on Susan Dwyer's non-consequentialist defense of the same. After formulating the three versions of the objection, I will consider them against the alleged duty to remove tainted statues and argue that even under the strongest formulation of the free speech objection, it does not amount to a defeater to the duty.</p>\u0000 </div>","PeriodicalId":47057,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Applied Philosophy","volume":"42 2","pages":"581-600"},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2025-02-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144140465","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Institutionalized Policy Evaluation within the Democratic System: Why? When? How? 民主制度下的制度化政策评价：为什么？什么时候?如何?
IF 0.7 2区 哲学
Journal of Applied Philosophy Pub Date : 2025-02-04 DOI: 10.1111/japp.12796
Corrado Fumagalli
{"title":"Institutionalized Policy Evaluation within the Democratic System: Why? When? How?","authors":"Corrado Fumagalli","doi":"10.1111/japp.12796","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/japp.12796","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Philosophers have expressed concerns about elite capture at various stages of the democratic decision-making process. However, there has been no sustained normative analysis of government-driven feedback platforms that enable different actors to formulate recommendations for revising or canceling existing laws and policies. My article addresses and fills this gap. I contend that government-driven feedback platforms serve a dual purpose of influencing the policy-making process and demonstrating that decisions are open to revision. I also argue that these feedback platforms are intended to generate a normatively salient, forward-looking, and balanced integration of technical knowledge and local knowledge, establishing the epistemic foundation for future deliberation. I then provide three normative standards that serve as a guide to balance expert knowledge with citizens' experience and values.</p>","PeriodicalId":47057,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Applied Philosophy","volume":"42 3","pages":"929-945"},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2025-02-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/japp.12796","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144647054","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Pregnancy, Gender Identity, Autonomy, and Trust 怀孕、性别认同、自主和信任
IF 0.7 2区 哲学
Journal of Applied Philosophy Pub Date : 2025-01-29 DOI: 10.1111/japp.12789
Amy Mullin
{"title":"Pregnancy, Gender Identity, Autonomy, and Trust","authors":"Amy Mullin","doi":"10.1111/japp.12789","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/japp.12789","url":null,"abstract":"<p>I ask what is required for pregnant trans and gender diverse (TGD) people to receive trustworthy reproductive healthcare which supports their autonomy. My focus is on wanted pregnancies. I understand interpersonal trust as a positive attitude towards the competence and motivation or commitment of a person trusted in a particular role, such as a healthcare professional, and autonomy as self-governance shaped by what one cares about. I conceive of autonomy as relational and potentially enhanced or damaged by social interactions. I argue that mainstream bioethical conceptions of autonomy can accommodate my claims about how the autonomy of pregnant TGD persons can be diminished or supported, especially in relation to trust. I argue that support for the autonomy of pregnant TGD persons requires acknowledgement and understanding of their gender identity even when it is not relevant to their healthcare. My discussion has implications for whether morality requires us to affirm trans identities and what this means in healthcare. I conclude with remarks about what else we can learn by centering the experiences of pregnant TGD persons.</p>","PeriodicalId":47057,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Applied Philosophy","volume":"42 3","pages":"851-870"},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2025-01-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/japp.12789","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144647855","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
My Child, Whose Emissions? 我的孩子，谁的排放物？
IF 0.7 2区 哲学
Journal of Applied Philosophy Pub Date : 2025-01-27 DOI: 10.1111/japp.12794
Serena Olsaretti, Isa Trifan
{"title":"My Child, Whose Emissions?","authors":"Serena Olsaretti,&nbsp;Isa Trifan","doi":"10.1111/japp.12794","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/japp.12794","url":null,"abstract":"<p>The Moral Equivalence Thesis claims that procreation in affluent countries and eco-gluttony are morally on a par, and that both are impermissible. We argue that this ambiguates between two different theses, the Strict and the Lax. On the Strict Reading of the thesis, procreation and eco-gluttony are both wrong for the same reasons, that is, because both involve individuals overstepping their carbon budget. We argue that this is false at least with regard to a certain number of children and a range of the costs of children. By contrast, a Lax Reading of the thesis is, we think, defensible. On this reading, procreation and eco-gluttony may both be wrong, but for different reasons and under different conditions. While eco-gluttony is wrong across a range of ideal and non-ideal conditions because it is a failure to live within one's fair carbon budget, having a child is only wrong, if it is wrong, under non-ideal conditions where prospective parents have weighty reasons, or an obligation, to pick up the moral slack of others.</p>","PeriodicalId":47057,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Applied Philosophy","volume":"42 1","pages":"3-23"},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2025-01-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/japp.12794","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143481404","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Should Non-Monogamy Be Consensual? 非一夫一妻制应该是双方自愿的吗？
IF 0.7 2区 哲学
Journal of Applied Philosophy Pub Date : 2025-01-21 DOI: 10.1111/japp.12787
R.A. Briggs
{"title":"Should Non-Monogamy Be Consensual?","authors":"R.A. Briggs","doi":"10.1111/japp.12787","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/japp.12787","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Non-monogamists sometimes defend their practices on the grounds that, unlike cheating, practices like polyamory are <i>consensual</i>. I argue that advocates of non-monogamy should not be satisfied with this consent-based defense. The slogan ‘non-monogamy should be consensual’ concedes too much to the hegemonic presumption of monogamy – that is, the idea that monogamous expectations of sexual and emotional exclusivity are the right default setting for romantic relationships. I consider the three most plausible readings of the slogan ‘non-monogamy should be consensual’: that the consent involved is something like sexual consent; that it applies to the relationship as a whole, and not to the non-monogamy in particular; and that it is necessary for releasing someone from a promise or commitment of monogamy. I argue that none of these readings should be acceptable to someone who rejects hegemonic monogamy. I then sketch what a positive alternative to hegemonic monogamy might look like.</p>","PeriodicalId":47057,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Applied Philosophy","volume":"42 3","pages":"758-776"},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2025-01-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/japp.12787","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144647256","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Confucian Harmony, Civility, and Echo Chambers 儒家的和谐、文明与回音室
IF 0.7 2区 哲学
Journal of Applied Philosophy Pub Date : 2025-01-20 DOI: 10.1111/japp.12791
Kyle van Oosterum
{"title":"Confucian Harmony, Civility, and Echo Chambers","authors":"Kyle van Oosterum","doi":"10.1111/japp.12791","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/japp.12791","url":null,"abstract":"<p>How should we interact with people in echo chambers? Recently, some have argued that echo-chambered individuals are not entitled to civility. Civility is the virtue whereby we communicate respect for persons to manage our profound disagreements with them. But for civil exchanges to work, people must trust one another and their testimony. Therefore, some argue, we can be moderately uncivil toward those in echo chambers who are unlikely to trust our attempts to be civil. I argue against this position. I suggest the focus should be on trying to rebuild these social relationships in alignment with the Confucian value of harmony. In this tradition, we aim to manage social relationships with disagreeable others by turning <i>inward</i> and cultivating certain dispositions in ourselves: open-mindedness, amenability, tactfulness, and courage. I argue this helps us craft a concept of ‘reparative civility’: an ideal for managing our fraught social relations in a world of echo chambers.</p>","PeriodicalId":47057,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Applied Philosophy","volume":"42 3","pages":"887-909"},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2025-01-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/japp.12791","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144647553","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
What Is Wrong with Workism? 工作主义错在哪里？
IF 0.7 2区 哲学
Journal of Applied Philosophy Pub Date : 2025-01-19 DOI: 10.1111/japp.12783
Matthew Hammerton
{"title":"What Is Wrong with Workism?","authors":"Matthew Hammerton","doi":"10.1111/japp.12783","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/japp.12783","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Workism is the phenomenon of people making their work the primary source of meaning and identity in their life. Recent critics of workism have argued that there is a growing trend towards it in many societies and that this is a bad thing. This article brings a philosophical perspective to the debate on workism. It develops a precise account of what workism is and evaluates the main objections raised against it by examining their underlying philosophical assumptions. Ultimately, it is argued that workism, as a way of life, is not as objectionable as its critics suggest.</p>","PeriodicalId":47057,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Applied Philosophy","volume":"42 2","pages":"668-682"},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2025-01-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/japp.12783","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144140511","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
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