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Journal of Applied Philosophy最新文献

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The Force of Equal Treatment 平等待遇的力量
IF 0.7 2区 哲学
Journal of Applied Philosophy Pub Date : 2025-04-24 DOI: 10.1111/japp.70017
Daniel Viehoff
{"title":"The Force of Equal Treatment","authors":"Daniel Viehoff","doi":"10.1111/japp.70017","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/japp.70017","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 \u0000 <p>It is widely accepted that the state ought to treat like cases alike. But what exactly is the force of this requirement of equal treatment? In particular, can treating like cases alike be sufficiently important to justify (and perhaps even require) adopting what would otherwise be a morally unjustified policy? It is these questions, made vivid by Japa Pallikkathayil's original argument that restrictive abortion laws in the United States (and perhaps also elsewhere) are incompatible with the requirement of equal treatment, that this article explores.</p>\u0000 </div>","PeriodicalId":47057,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Applied Philosophy","volume":"42 2","pages":"514-524"},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2025-04-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144140647","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Moral Dilemmas Involving Self-Driving Cars: How to Regulate Them and Why Your Opinion Matters. N. Paulo and L. Kirchmair, 2025. New York, Routledge. xix + 88 pp, £135.00 (hb) £36.99 (pb) 涉及自动驾驶汽车的道德困境：如何监管它们以及为什么你的意见很重要。N. Paulo和L. kirchmaair, 2025。纽约，劳特利奇。19 + 88页，135.00英镑（hb） 36.99英镑（pb）
IF 0.7 2区 哲学
Journal of Applied Philosophy Pub Date : 2025-04-07 DOI: 10.1111/japp.70010
Vishal Singh Bhadauriya
{"title":"Moral Dilemmas Involving Self-Driving Cars: How to Regulate Them and Why Your Opinion Matters. N. Paulo and L. Kirchmair, 2025. New York, Routledge. xix + 88 pp, £135.00 (hb) £36.99 (pb)","authors":"Vishal Singh Bhadauriya","doi":"10.1111/japp.70010","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/japp.70010","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":47057,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Applied Philosophy","volume":"42 2","pages":"686-688"},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2025-04-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144140267","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Why Teach Philosophy in Schools? The Case for Philosophy on the Curriculum. J. Gatley, 2024. Tampa, Bloomsbury Academic. 216 pp, £26.09 (pb) 为什么要在学校教授哲学？哲学在课程中的案例。J. Gatley, 2024。坦帕，布鲁姆斯伯里学术出版社，216页，26.09英镑（pb）
IF 0.7 2区 哲学
Journal of Applied Philosophy Pub Date : 2025-03-20 DOI: 10.1111/japp.70007
Siti Maryam Ulfa, Nurdiyanti Nurdiyanti, Siti Nurul Yaqutu Burhani
{"title":"Why Teach Philosophy in Schools? The Case for Philosophy on the Curriculum. J. Gatley, 2024. Tampa, Bloomsbury Academic. 216 pp, £26.09 (pb)","authors":"Siti Maryam Ulfa,&nbsp;Nurdiyanti Nurdiyanti,&nbsp;Siti Nurul Yaqutu Burhani","doi":"10.1111/japp.70007","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/japp.70007","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":47057,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Applied Philosophy","volume":"42 2","pages":"683-685"},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2025-03-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144140733","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Bodily Rights in Intentional Pregnancies 故意怀孕中的身体权利
IF 0.7 2区 哲学
Journal of Applied Philosophy Pub Date : 2025-03-04 DOI: 10.1111/japp.70000
Serena Olsaretti
{"title":"Bodily Rights in Intentional Pregnancies","authors":"Serena Olsaretti","doi":"10.1111/japp.70000","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/japp.70000","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 \u0000 <p>In her ‘Abortion and Democratic Equality’, Japa Pallikkathayil argues that restrictive abortion laws are incompatible with equality before the law and with several core convictions from the liberal philosophical tradition, which support viewing citizens' bodily rights as inalienable in some important senses. This article raises some doubts about Pallikkathayil's arguments in the hardest case to defend: the use of surgical abortion to terminate an intentional pregnancy, especially for discretionary reasons. These doubts arise if we assume, as she does, that the fetus is a citizen. The article starts by identifying the key claims attributable to Pallikkathayil regarding what our bodily rights protect us against, before raising some questions about Pallikkathayil's argument to the effect that the bodily rights of procreators would be infringed by restrictive abortion laws in cases of intentional pregnancies and that those of fetuses would not be if those pregnancies were terminated by surgical abortion.</p>\u0000 </div>","PeriodicalId":47057,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Applied Philosophy","volume":"42 2","pages":"505-513"},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2025-03-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144140466","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Procreative Liability and Equality before the Law 生育责任与法律面前人人平等
IF 0.7 2区 哲学
Journal of Applied Philosophy Pub Date : 2025-02-12 DOI: 10.1111/japp.12792
Anca Gheaus
{"title":"Procreative Liability and Equality before the Law","authors":"Anca Gheaus","doi":"10.1111/japp.12792","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/japp.12792","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Pallikkathayil argues that restrictions on abortion are inconsistent with the usual demands that states place on their citizens. States don't require their citizens to make their bodies available for the protection of other people's interests. Yet, when abortion is restricted, women who can be pregnant are less entitled than other citizens to decide on how their bodies are to be used; then, states fail to treat women as equal before the law. The argument is supposed to hold even if one assumes that fetuses at various stages of development are as morally considerable as (already born) children, and even if, moreover, fetuses have passive citizenship status – that is, if they have claims to state protection. Pallikkathayil's argument comes at excessive theoretical costs, ruling out (a) general duties to help others in the protection of vital interests via relatively non-burdening donation, e.g. of blood, and (b) plausible although demanding special duties of procreative parents. Nevertheless, I agree with Pallikkathayil's conclusion that existing legal restrictions on abortion violate the state's duty to treat its citizens as equals, and are hence illegitimate; namely, because they fail to hold all procreators - whether or not gestational - equally liable. </p>","PeriodicalId":47057,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Applied Philosophy","volume":"42 2","pages":"499-504"},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2025-02-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/japp.12792","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144140560","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Abortion and Democratic Equality 堕胎与民主平等
IF 0.7 2区 哲学
Journal of Applied Philosophy Pub Date : 2025-02-11 DOI: 10.1111/japp.12785
Japa Pallikkathayil
{"title":"Abortion and Democratic Equality","authors":"Japa Pallikkathayil","doi":"10.1111/japp.12785","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/japp.12785","url":null,"abstract":"<p>A central tenet of the liberal tradition in political philosophy is that citizens must be able to relate to one another as equals. I argue that this commitment to what has been called democratic equality is in tension with legal prohibitions on abortion prior to fetal viability. The most minimal commitment of democratic equality is equality before the law, which requires that the state treat like cases alike. My primary argument focuses on showing how this requirement cannot be reconciled with restrictive abortion laws given the other laws and practices common in liberal democracies. This is so even if we think of fetuses as citizens, as I suggest we should. Moreover, the changes states would need to make to their other laws and practices to bring them into line with restrictive abortion laws are intuitively deeply disturbing. I give a secondary argument showing how these intuitive reactions may be vindicated by more substantive reflection on democratic equality and its presuppositions. But the primary argument has force for anyone who rejects the extensive state control over citizens' bodies that would be needed to reconcile restrictive abortion laws with equality before the law, even if they do so on other grounds.</p>","PeriodicalId":47057,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Applied Philosophy","volume":"42 2","pages":"473-491"},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2025-02-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/japp.12785","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144140634","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Evaluating the Free Speech Objection to Removing Tainted Political Symbols 论言论自由对移除污点政治符号的反对
IF 0.7 2区 哲学
Journal of Applied Philosophy Pub Date : 2025-02-04 DOI: 10.1111/japp.12795
Tuomas W. Manninen
{"title":"Evaluating the Free Speech Objection to Removing Tainted Political Symbols","authors":"Tuomas W. Manninen","doi":"10.1111/japp.12795","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/japp.12795","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 \u0000 <p>In recent years, several philosophers have argued that statues which are morally tainted ought to be removed from public display. One objection to this claim is the free speech objection: removing the statues constitutes a violation of free speech rights. This objection suffers from two flaws. First, it is rarely articulated to its fullest potential. Second, the free speech objection is largely dismissed by philosophers who support the statues' removal. In this article, I will aim to rectify this situation by providing three different formulations of the free speech objection, based, respectively, on First Amendment jurisprudence, on Mill's consequentialist defense of free speech, and on Susan Dwyer's non-consequentialist defense of the same. After formulating the three versions of the objection, I will consider them against the alleged duty to remove tainted statues and argue that even under the strongest formulation of the free speech objection, it does not amount to a defeater to the duty.</p>\u0000 </div>","PeriodicalId":47057,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Applied Philosophy","volume":"42 2","pages":"581-600"},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2025-02-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144140465","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
My Child, Whose Emissions? 我的孩子，谁的排放物？
IF 0.7 2区 哲学
Journal of Applied Philosophy Pub Date : 2025-01-27 DOI: 10.1111/japp.12794
Serena Olsaretti, Isa Trifan
{"title":"My Child, Whose Emissions?","authors":"Serena Olsaretti,&nbsp;Isa Trifan","doi":"10.1111/japp.12794","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/japp.12794","url":null,"abstract":"<p>The Moral Equivalence Thesis claims that procreation in affluent countries and eco-gluttony are morally on a par, and that both are impermissible. We argue that this ambiguates between two different theses, the Strict and the Lax. On the Strict Reading of the thesis, procreation and eco-gluttony are both wrong for the same reasons, that is, because both involve individuals overstepping their carbon budget. We argue that this is false at least with regard to a certain number of children and a range of the costs of children. By contrast, a Lax Reading of the thesis is, we think, defensible. On this reading, procreation and eco-gluttony may both be wrong, but for different reasons and under different conditions. While eco-gluttony is wrong across a range of ideal and non-ideal conditions because it is a failure to live within one's fair carbon budget, having a child is only wrong, if it is wrong, under non-ideal conditions where prospective parents have weighty reasons, or an obligation, to pick up the moral slack of others.</p>","PeriodicalId":47057,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Applied Philosophy","volume":"42 1","pages":"3-23"},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2025-01-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/japp.12794","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143481404","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
What Is Wrong with Workism? 工作主义错在哪里？
IF 0.7 2区 哲学
Journal of Applied Philosophy Pub Date : 2025-01-19 DOI: 10.1111/japp.12783
Matthew Hammerton
{"title":"What Is Wrong with Workism?","authors":"Matthew Hammerton","doi":"10.1111/japp.12783","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/japp.12783","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Workism is the phenomenon of people making their work the primary source of meaning and identity in their life. Recent critics of workism have argued that there is a growing trend towards it in many societies and that this is a bad thing. This article brings a philosophical perspective to the debate on workism. It develops a precise account of what workism is and evaluates the main objections raised against it by examining their underlying philosophical assumptions. Ultimately, it is argued that workism, as a way of life, is not as objectionable as its critics suggest.</p>","PeriodicalId":47057,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Applied Philosophy","volume":"42 2","pages":"668-682"},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2025-01-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/japp.12783","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144140511","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Old Enough to Carry, Old Enough to Vote 可以携带枪支，可以投票
IF 0.7 2区 哲学
Journal of Applied Philosophy Pub Date : 2024-12-26 DOI: 10.1111/japp.12781
Seana Valentine Shiffrin
{"title":"Old Enough to Carry, Old Enough to Vote","authors":"Seana Valentine Shiffrin","doi":"10.1111/japp.12781","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/japp.12781","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Japa Pallikkathayil persuasively argues that abortion prohibitions treat impregnable people as less than equal citizens, subject to different treatment than other citizens whose bodies are protected from compulsory service for the benefit of others. Pallikkathayil's argument could be modified to avoid a tension with arguments for conscription, to stress that democratic equality is inconsistent with requisitioning a citizen's body to serve the needs of another specific citizen. Pallikkathayil also contends that ‘[t]he changes we would need to make to our other laws and practices to bring them into line with restrictive abortion laws are intuitively unattractive’. To complement her approach, I contend that consistency would require that if we subject minors to involuntary pregnancy and labor, then we should enfranchise minors. We lowered the voting age to 18 on the grounds that if military conscripts were ‘old enough to fight’, they were ‘old enough to vote’. Abortion restrictions conscript impregnable minors and subject them to involuntary bodily intrusions, major life disruptions, and responsibility over life and death decisions. Old enough to carry; old enough to vote. If that conclusion is unpalatable because minors seem too immature to vote, then perhaps they are too immature to be forced to carry a pregnancy and to give birth.</p>","PeriodicalId":47057,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Applied Philosophy","volume":"42 2","pages":"492-498"},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2024-12-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/japp.12781","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144140654","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
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