{"title":"Unexplored Issues in the Ethics of Nudges","authors":"Stefano Calboli, Thaddeus Metz","doi":"10.1111/japp.70043","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/japp.70043","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":47057,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Applied Philosophy","volume":"42 4","pages":"1089-1093"},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2025-08-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144897614","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Speech Acts and Unspeakable Raps","authors":"Tareeq Jalloh","doi":"10.1111/japp.70029","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/japp.70029","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Police censor drill rap music based on the claim that drill artists incite violence. In this article, I provide a framework for evaluating whether an instance of drill constitutes a speech act of incitement. I also introduce an alternative speech act that drillers may also be performing, drawn from sociological work on drill artists. I show that those who claim drill incites violence (such as the Metropolitan Police) must meet the explanatory and justificatory burden of showing that the speech act of incitement (rather than something else) has been performed, and that it may often be very challenging to meet that burden. Finally, I argue that where that burden is not met, police interventions in drill would constitute a form of illocutionary silencing and discursive injustice. Drill artists are owed careful consideration of the illocutionary acts they perform in their music – more careful than police assumptions about incitement have been.</p>","PeriodicalId":47057,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Applied Philosophy","volume":"42 4","pages":"1378-1395"},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2025-07-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/japp.70029","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144897625","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Direct-to-Consumer Telehealth and the Ambivalence of Self-Care","authors":"Mercer E. Gary","doi":"10.1111/japp.70028","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/japp.70028","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 \u0000 <p>Direct-to-consumer (DTC) telehealth is presented by marketers as a mere conduit for self-care capable of circumventing the frustrations and injustices of existing healthcare systems. If self-care is both lauded as a key tool of resistance for the marginalized <i>and</i> rejected as a hollow marketing tactic, how should we respond to technologies seeking to promote self-care? What can they tell us about where self-care is a valuable pursuit and where it becomes a social threat? I pursue these questions by examining the tensions between ethically meaningful care for the self and pernicious self-responsibilization in two different uses of DTC telehealth: ‘men's health’ services for the treatment of erectile dysfunction and gender-affirming care services for queer and trans people. Drawing on opposing views of self-care, I argue that particular self-care projects like DTC telehealth are ethically viable where they resist, rather than bolster, projects of domination and where they support, rather than undermine, caring relationships.</p>\u0000 </div>","PeriodicalId":47057,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Applied Philosophy","volume":"42 4","pages":"1359-1377"},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2025-07-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144897624","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Technological Contributions to Ethical Nudging: Enhancing Safeguards","authors":"Stefano Calboli","doi":"10.1111/japp.70033","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/japp.70033","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 \u0000 <p>This article discusses the contributions that information-access-facilitator technologies promise to deliver in implementing ethical safeguards in the use of nudging techniques. It begins by identifying two broad issues within the debate on the ethics of nudging: first, the risk of misalignment between will and action that nudges can impose, and second, citizens' tendency to be oblivious to normatively relevant information regarding nudges. The subsequent analysis focuses on the safeguards intended to mitigate these two issues. Proceeding with the main argument, the article contends that leveraging technological potential can enhance the effectiveness of safeguards. Technologies meant to facilitate access to information, such as apps, Internet of Things products, wearable technologies, virtual assistants, and augmented reality applications, can be used as friction minimizers for obtaining information, saliency enhancers, enablers of information retrieval, and proactive measures to mitigate misjudgments, and can be characterized by a polymorphic warning design, resulting in nudging interventions that optimally fulfill ethical demands.</p>\u0000 </div>","PeriodicalId":47057,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Applied Philosophy","volume":"42 4","pages":"1151-1171"},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2025-07-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144897607","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Rights, Duties, and Inviolability","authors":"Bradley Hillier-Smith","doi":"10.1111/japp.70027","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/japp.70027","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Rights entail corresponding negative duties not to violate those rights. On this, all rights theorists agree. Yet, in our non-ideal world, these negative duties and thereby persons’ rights are pervasively violated. What duties are there to right-holders whose rights are under threat and are violated? There is substantial disagreement among rights theorists here on whether rights also entail positive duties to protect and assist the right-holder if and when their rights are threatened and violated. While the Interest Justification of Rights supports such positive duties, defenders of the Inviolable Moral Status Justification of Rights reject them. On this latter view, all persons have an inviolable moral status that gives rise to particularly robust rights and stringent negative duties, but not additional positive duties, which are not necessary to reflect inviolability. This article challenges that view by demonstrating that positive duties to protect and assist right-holders against rights violations are in fact grounded by that very same justification invoked to ground robust rights and stringent negative duties: the inviolable moral status of persons.</p>","PeriodicalId":47057,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Applied Philosophy","volume":"42 4","pages":"1338-1358"},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2025-06-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/japp.70027","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144897832","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Correction to ‘A Species-Focused Approach to Assessing Speciesism’","authors":"","doi":"10.1111/japp.70030","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/japp.70030","url":null,"abstract":"<p>\u0000 <span>Murphy, Alex.</span> “ <span>A Species-Focused Approach to Assessing Speciesism</span>.” <i>Journal of Applied Philosophy</i> <span>41</span> (<span>2024</span>): <span>714</span>–<span>730</span>. https://doi.org/10.1111/japp.12725.</p><p>The article does not list the AHRC funder grant number AH/R012776/1 in the HTML or PDF version. It should be acknowledged as ‘This work was supported by the Arts and Humanities Research Council through the South, West and Wales Doctoral Training Partnership [AH/R012776/1]’.</p><p>We apologize for this error.</p>","PeriodicalId":47057,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Applied Philosophy","volume":"42 4","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2025-06-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/japp.70030","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144897829","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Rethinking the Ethics of GenAI in Higher Education: A Critique of Moral Arguments and Policy Implications","authors":"Karl de Fine Licht","doi":"10.1111/japp.70026","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/japp.70026","url":null,"abstract":"<p>This article critically examines the moral arguments for restrictive policies regarding student use of generative AI in higher education. While existing literature addresses various concerns about AI in education, there has been limited rigorous ethical analysis of arguments for restricting its use. This article analyzes two main types of moral arguments: those based on direct difference-making (where individual university actions have measurable impacts) and those centered on non-difference-making participation (where symbolic participation in harmful systems matters regardless of direct impact). Key concerns examined include environmental harm from AI energy consumption, exploitative labor practices in AI development, and privacy risks. Through careful analysis, the article argues that these arguments face significant challenges when examined in depth. The difference-making arguments often fail to establish that individual university actions meaningfully contribute to claimed harms, while the non-difference-making arguments lead to impractical conclusions when applied consistently across university operations. Rather than supporting blanket restrictions, the analysis suggests universities should focus on fostering responsible AI engagement through ethical guidelines, licensed tools, and education on responsible use. The article concludes that a balanced approach considering both moral and practical factors is more effective than restrictive policies in addressing ethical concerns while preserving educational benefits.</p>","PeriodicalId":47057,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Applied Philosophy","volume":"42 4","pages":"1317-1337"},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2025-06-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/japp.70026","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144897611","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Against Human Content Moderation: Algorithms without Trauma","authors":"Juan Espíndola","doi":"10.1111/japp.70024","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/japp.70024","url":null,"abstract":"<p>This paper explores the morality of human content moderation. It focuses on content moderation of Child Sexual Abuse Material (CSAM) as it takes place in commercial digital platforms, broadly understood. I select CSAM for examination because there is a widespread and uncontroversial consensus around the need to remove it, which furnishes the strongest possible argument for human content moderation. The paper makes the case that, even if we grant that social media platforms or chatbots are a valuable—or inevitable— force in current societies, and even if moderation plays an important role in protecting users and society more generally from the detrimental effects of these digital tools, it is far from clear that tasking humans to conduct such moderation is permissible without constraints, given the psychic toll of the practice on moderators. While a blanket prohibition of human moderation would be objectionable, given the benefits of the practice, it behooves us to identify the fundamental interests affected by the harms of human moderation, the obligations that platforms acquire to protect such interests, and the conditions under which their realization is in fact possible. I argue that the failure to comply with certain standards renders human moderation impermissible.</p>","PeriodicalId":47057,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Applied Philosophy","volume":"42 4","pages":"1285-1300"},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2025-06-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/japp.70024","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144897612","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Pregnancy, Caregiving, and a Supposed Obligation to Gestate","authors":"Christie Hartley, Ashley Lindsley-Kim","doi":"10.1111/japp.70025","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/japp.70025","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 \u0000 <p>Many people – including many feminists – believe both of the following: (i) abortion is morally permissible regardless of the moral status of the fetus (at least for most of a pregnancy) and (ii) members of society have a shared, moral obligation to provide care for dependents. Yet it has been argued that the shared, moral obligation of members of society to care for dependents entails that women may be morally obligated to gestate unwanted fetuses. Central to this argument is that fetal dependency is relevantly similar to (other) persons' dependency on care and that pregnancy itself is a kind of caregiving. We think this argument is erroneous and politically dangerous. To expose its faults, we engage in a philosophical analysis of pregnancy: how to understand it, how it differs from caregiving, how it is inherently risky, how fetal development is by its nature invasive, and why all this matters for the ethics and politics of abortion.</p>\u0000 </div>","PeriodicalId":47057,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Applied Philosophy","volume":"42 4","pages":"1301-1316"},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2025-06-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144897555","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Parental Labor as Cooperative Labor","authors":"K. Lindsey Chambers","doi":"10.1111/japp.70022","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/japp.70022","url":null,"abstract":"<p>The procreative justice debate asks whether justice, and in particular whether a principle of fair play, requires that non-parents share in the costs of procreation and child-rearing. The principle of fair play demands that persons who benefit from the cooperative labor of others share in the burdens of producing that benefit. Non-parents should share in the costs of procreation and child-rearing if reproductive and parental labor count as <i>cooperative</i> labor, but they are not obligated to share in those costs if parents incur them as part of a personal project. I argue that parental labor counts as cooperative labor because becoming a parent involves knowingly assuming a social role whereby one incurs new moral and legal obligations. Even if parents are ultimately motived by personal reasons, they nevertheless constrain their liberty in order to comply with the rules of a cooperative scheme, and, in doing so, their labor plausibly counts as <i>cooperative</i>. Parents have a claim of justice on others, then, to consider whether the benefits and burdens of procreating and child-rearing are fairly distributed.</p>","PeriodicalId":47057,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Applied Philosophy","volume":"42 4","pages":"1270-1284"},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2025-05-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144897838","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}