Journal of Applied Philosophy最新文献

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The Ethics of Advising. M. Jonas, 2025. Oxford, Oxford University Press. 256 pp, £77.00 (hb) 咨询的道德规范。乔纳斯先生,2025年。牛津,牛津大学出版社,256页,77英镑(磅)
IF 0.7 2区 哲学
Journal of Applied Philosophy Pub Date : 2025-05-28 DOI: 10.1111/japp.70023
David Archard
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引用次数: 0
Hopeful Pessimism. M. Lugt, 2025. Princeton, Princeton University Press. xvii + 255 pp, £35.00 (hb) 充满希望的悲观情绪。卢格特先生,2025。普林斯顿,普林斯顿大学出版社。Xvii + 255页,£35.00 (hb)
IF 0.7 2区 哲学
Journal of Applied Philosophy Pub Date : 2025-05-28 DOI: 10.1111/japp.70021
Riti Kumari
{"title":"Hopeful Pessimism. M. Lugt, 2025. Princeton, Princeton University Press. xvii + 255 pp, £35.00 (hb)","authors":"Riti Kumari","doi":"10.1111/japp.70021","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/japp.70021","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":47057,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Applied Philosophy","volume":"42 3","pages":"1081-1082"},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2025-05-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144647778","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Housing Justice, Basic Capabilities, and Self-Respect 住房正义,基本能力和自尊
IF 0.9 2区 哲学
Journal of Applied Philosophy Pub Date : 2025-05-16 DOI: 10.1111/japp.70020
Niklas Dummer, Christian Neuhäuser
{"title":"Housing Justice, Basic Capabilities, and Self-Respect","authors":"Niklas Dummer,&nbsp;Christian Neuhäuser","doi":"10.1111/japp.70020","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/japp.70020","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Housing studies often draw on what we will refer to as the capabilitarian assumption. However, this assumption – that the capability approach offers the right framework for analysing housing injustice – has received little to no philosophical scrutiny. In this article we aim to fill this lacuna. We examine the prospects of a capability approach to housing justice, focusing on Nussbaum's comprehensive list of basic capabilities. We argue that her list fails to capture fundamental concerns in housing justice and therefore requires further specification. An adequate capabilitarian view on housing justice must integrate relational egalitarian considerations. We draw on a relationally egalitarian informed conception of self-respect as a basic capability to integrate those relational aspects. In doing so we aim to provide the contours of a capabilitarian theory of housing justice.</p>","PeriodicalId":47057,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Applied Philosophy","volume":"42 4","pages":"1247-1269"},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2025-05-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/japp.70020","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144897560","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Mary Warnock's Challenges to Rights of Nature: Accepting Interests, but Not Rights, of Nature 玛丽·沃诺克对自然权利的挑战:接受自然的利益,而不是权利
IF 0.9 2区 哲学
Journal of Applied Philosophy Pub Date : 2025-05-15 DOI: 10.1111/japp.70019
Patrik Baard
{"title":"Mary Warnock's Challenges to Rights of Nature: Accepting Interests, but Not Rights, of Nature","authors":"Patrik Baard","doi":"10.1111/japp.70019","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/japp.70019","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Rights of nature (RoN) is an emerging legal tool for strengthening nature conservation, receiving increased scholarly attention and finding its way into domestic legislation. RoN is an innovation in legal thinking often justified with ethical arguments and concepts such as ‘intrinsic value’ or ‘interests’. But there are many challenges with justifying RoN based on such concepts which are rarely considered by RoN advocates, blocking the formulation of stronger arguments. Based on Mary Warnock's discussion of RoN, here I investigate two related claims: (1) that environmental entities can be said to have interests, but (2) while this means that they have moral status, it does not justify concluding that they are rights-holders. By way of critical engagement, I put Warnock's discussion in contact with scholarship on RoN and the scope and grounds of rights, scholarship that has expanded since Warnock's engagement with the concept. Warnock's observations are attentive to the relevance of concepts such as intrinsic value and interests to the environment, but also to their limits, in ways that can benefit RoN scholarship.</p>","PeriodicalId":47057,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Applied Philosophy","volume":"42 4","pages":"1230-1246"},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2025-05-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/japp.70019","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144897235","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Excess Incarceration 多余的监禁
IF 0.9 2区 哲学
Journal of Applied Philosophy Pub Date : 2025-05-09 DOI: 10.1111/japp.70018
Vincent Chiao
{"title":"Excess Incarceration","authors":"Vincent Chiao","doi":"10.1111/japp.70018","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/japp.70018","url":null,"abstract":"<p>‘Mass incarceration’, as conventionally understood, refers to an imprisoned population that is both excessive in size and racially skewed in its demographics. However, in contrast to racial skew, the appropriate size of a prison system has largely escaped analysis. This article contributes to analysis of the scale of a prison system in two ways. First, I show why non-controversial principles linking crime to punishment, such as guilt and proportionality, are insufficient. Because incarceration rates are driven more by social policy than by crime, an adequate analysis of scale presupposes an account of what we hope to get out of punishing people in the first place. Second, drawing on a generic crime-prevention account of incarceration, I sketch three increasingly resolving, but also increasingly contentious, conceptions of excess: the Pareto, social welfare, and utilitarian conceptions. Along the way, I briefly consider the trade-off between how committal a theory of incarceration is and its ability to explain what is wrong with mass incarceration, as well as the concern that the social welfare and, especially, utilitarian concepts are excessively paternalistic. The ultimate aim of the article is to contribute to our understanding of mass incarceration as a distinctive normative concept.</p>","PeriodicalId":47057,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Applied Philosophy","volume":"42 4","pages":"1210-1229"},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2025-05-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/japp.70018","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144897300","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
The Force of Equal Treatment 平等待遇的力量
IF 0.7 2区 哲学
Journal of Applied Philosophy Pub Date : 2025-04-24 DOI: 10.1111/japp.70017
Daniel Viehoff
{"title":"The Force of Equal Treatment","authors":"Daniel Viehoff","doi":"10.1111/japp.70017","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/japp.70017","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 \u0000 <p>It is widely accepted that the state ought to treat like cases alike. But what exactly is the force of this requirement of equal treatment? In particular, can treating like cases alike be sufficiently important to justify (and perhaps even require) adopting what would otherwise be a morally unjustified policy? It is these questions, made vivid by Japa Pallikkathayil's original argument that restrictive abortion laws in the United States (and perhaps also elsewhere) are incompatible with the requirement of equal treatment, that this article explores.</p>\u0000 </div>","PeriodicalId":47057,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Applied Philosophy","volume":"42 2","pages":"514-524"},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2025-04-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144140647","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Nudging and Inequality: Examining the Heterogeneous Effects of Behavioural Interventions on Low Socio-economic Status Individuals 轻推与不平等:检查行为干预对低社会经济地位个体的异质效应
IF 0.9 2区 哲学
Journal of Applied Philosophy Pub Date : 2025-04-16 DOI: 10.1111/japp.70015
Viviana Ponce de León Solís
{"title":"Nudging and Inequality: Examining the Heterogeneous Effects of Behavioural Interventions on Low Socio-economic Status Individuals","authors":"Viviana Ponce de León Solís","doi":"10.1111/japp.70015","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/japp.70015","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 \u0000 <p>This article explores the heterogeneous effects of nudging interventions on individuals from low socio-economic status (SES) backgrounds, addressing a significant gap in the existing literature on behavioural policy. While nudges are widely implemented across various social domains due to their perceived efficiency and low cost, their effectiveness can vary greatly among different demographic groups. The analysis identifies three hypotheses regarding low SES individuals' responses to nudging: they may be more susceptible, less susceptible, or exhibit similar susceptibility to nudges compared to higher SES groups. By examining the implications of these disparities, the article underscores the potential for nudging strategies to unintentionally reinforce existing inequalities or stigmatize vulnerable populations. Ethical considerations are discussed, highlighting the necessity for policymakers to design nudges with an acute awareness of the unique barriers faced by low SES individuals. Ultimately, this research advocates for a shift away from the conventional ‘one-size-fits-all’ approach towards more nuanced, context-sensitive nudging interventions that effectively address the needs and challenges of marginalized groups, emphasizing the importance of targeted strategies in promoting equitable outcomes.</p>\u0000 </div>","PeriodicalId":47057,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Applied Philosophy","volume":"42 4","pages":"1094-1110"},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2025-04-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144897236","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
The Weight of Legitimate Expectations in a Just Climate Transition 公平气候转型中合理预期的重要性
IF 0.9 2区 哲学
Journal of Applied Philosophy Pub Date : 2025-04-10 DOI: 10.1111/japp.70009
J.K.G. Hopster
{"title":"The Weight of Legitimate Expectations in a Just Climate Transition","authors":"J.K.G. Hopster","doi":"10.1111/japp.70009","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/japp.70009","url":null,"abstract":"<p>The ambition to decarbonize societies calls for a normative theory of just transitions. An important aspect of such a theory is to scrutinize the moral entitlements of stakeholders whose status quo expectations get frustrated in the course of sustainability transitions. The concept of legitimate expectations (LE) has been advanced as a core constituent of such a theory but has also been criticized for the conceptual confusion it attracts. In this article I address this criticism by elucidating the concept and its normative grounds. This yields two theoretical insights that are novel to the debate on LE. First, I argue that there are three different kinds of claims that go by the name of LE, whose normative grounding structures differ. Second, I argue that warranted appeals to having LE should have some degree of justificatory support, but that the degree of justification may weaken over time. Accordingly, while LE are morally weighty and give rise to <i>pro tanto</i> duties, they may be superseded if circumstances change. In closing, I show how this account can help to interpret and evaluate claims about transitional climate justice.</p>","PeriodicalId":47057,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Applied Philosophy","volume":"42 4","pages":"1172-1189"},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2025-04-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/japp.70009","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144897301","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
From Bednets to Rocket Ships: Efficiency in the Long-Term and Neglect for the Present 从蚊帐到火箭飞船:长期的效率与当下的忽视
IF 0.9 2区 哲学
Journal of Applied Philosophy Pub Date : 2025-04-10 DOI: 10.1111/japp.70014
Elizabeth C. Hupfer
{"title":"From Bednets to Rocket Ships: Efficiency in the Long-Term and Neglect for the Present","authors":"Elizabeth C. Hupfer","doi":"10.1111/japp.70014","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/japp.70014","url":null,"abstract":"<p>In this article I develop an objection to Longtermism – the view that concern for the long-term future is a moral imperative – that is often gestured at, but not fleshed out. I call this the Far-Future Priority Objection: Longtermism may entail significant resource reallocation and systemic neglect of the worst off today. I argue that Longtermism's endorsement of efficiency leads to repeated priority of distributive allocations to the far-future, so Longtermists must allow for moral concerns in addition to efficiency in order to mitigate the objection. The two most promising ways of doing this are to eschew strong versions of Longtermism in favor of weaker versions or incorporate deontic side-constraints. However, I argue that neither of these responses successfully undermines the Far-Future Priority Objection without abandoning fundamental tenets of Longtermism itself.</p>","PeriodicalId":47057,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Applied Philosophy","volume":"42 4","pages":"1190-1209"},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2025-04-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/japp.70014","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144897302","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Race and Racism in Education: An Educational Philosophy and Theory Reader, Volume XIII. L. Jackson and M.A. Peters, 2023. New York, Routledge. 226 pp, £125.00 (hb) £39.99 (pb) 教育中的种族和种族主义:教育哲学和理论读物,第13卷。L. Jackson和M.A. Peters, 2023。纽约,劳特利奇出版社,226页,125.00英镑(hb) 39.99英镑(pb)
IF 0.7 2区 哲学
Journal of Applied Philosophy Pub Date : 2025-04-09 DOI: 10.1111/japp.70011
Herwin Dyastuti
{"title":"Race and Racism in Education: An Educational Philosophy and Theory Reader, Volume XIII. L. Jackson and M.A. Peters, 2023. New York, Routledge. 226 pp, £125.00 (hb) £39.99 (pb)","authors":"Herwin Dyastuti","doi":"10.1111/japp.70011","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/japp.70011","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":47057,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Applied Philosophy","volume":"42 3","pages":"1076-1077"},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2025-04-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144646881","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
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