{"title":"Debts of Gratitude in Cross-Cultural Perspective: Confucian and Western Ethics","authors":"George Tsai, Lok Chui Choo","doi":"10.1111/japp.12767","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/japp.12767","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 \u0000 <p>This article examines the contrasting conceptions of gratitude in Early Confucian and Western philosophy. It focuses on a key difference: the presence of the notion of ‘debts of gratitude’ in Western thought and its absence in Confucianism. We explore how this difference is rooted in contrasting ethical outlooks and values. Western philosophy often conceives of gratitude as a duty of reciprocation, furthering the values of social equality and individual autonomy. By contrast, Early Confucians viewed gratitude as proper acknowledgement that strengthens social relationships that are part of an ongoing collective project, spanning generations. This view reflects the importance of values such as community, harmony, and ritual propriety in Confucianism. Unlike the Western context, in the Early Confucian social world, there was no role for ‘debts of gratitude’ to play. There were no Confucian values that ‘debts of gratitude’ would help to realize, or would be responsive to, in the way that debts of gratitude further the values of equality and independence in the West. We conclude by noting that some Western philosophers express ideas about gratitude in collaborative contexts that align with Confucian ideas, suggesting some shared elements between Confucian and Western ethical outlooks.</p>\u0000 </div>","PeriodicalId":47057,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Applied Philosophy","volume":"42 1","pages":"131-154"},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2024-10-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143481443","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Does Lack of Commitment Undermine the Hypocrite's Standing to Blame?","authors":"Kasper Lippert-Rasmussen","doi":"10.1111/japp.12766","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/japp.12766","url":null,"abstract":"<p>According to an influential account of standing, hypocritical blamers lack standing to blame in virtue of their lack of commitment to the norm etc. which they invoke. Nevertheless, the commitment account has the wrong shape for it to explain why hypocrites lack standing to blame. Building on the lessons of that critique I propose a novel account of what undermines standing to blame – the comparative fairness account. This differs from the commitment account and the other prominent account of why hypocrites lack standing to blame offered in the literature: the moral equality account. Finally, I observe that, intuitively, lack of commitment undermines standing to blame and that many hypocrites might lack standing for that reason also. Moreover, typically the hypocrite's failure to address their own faults is a feature in virtue of which, other things being equal, the hypocrite is less committed to the norm in question. These two observations provide the basis for an error theory of the commitment account's appeal, despite its inability to explain why, <i>qua</i> hypocritical blamer, one lacks standing to blame.</p>","PeriodicalId":47057,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Applied Philosophy","volume":"42 1","pages":"375-389"},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2024-09-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/japp.12766","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143481576","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Lying to Make Friends","authors":"Charlie Richards","doi":"10.1111/japp.12768","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/japp.12768","url":null,"abstract":"<p>It is intuitively wrongful to deceive people into forming a false belief. It is especially intuitively wrongful to deceive people into forming the false belief that you are their friend. Despite these intuitions, this article argues that in a surprising number of cases, deceiving people into believing you are their friend is not only permitted, but required. The article uses this result to make some important revisions and suggestions for the emergent social rights literature: (i) it shows that social rights are feasible in a wider range of cases than previously thought, and (ii) it casts doubt on whether grounding such rights on the impersonal value of genuine intimate relationships is their most fruitful grounding.</p>","PeriodicalId":47057,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Applied Philosophy","volume":"42 1","pages":"390-414"},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2024-09-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/japp.12768","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143481361","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The Story of Romantic Love and Polyamory","authors":"Michael Milona, Lauren Weindling","doi":"10.1111/japp.12764","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/japp.12764","url":null,"abstract":"This article explores the relationship between romantic love and polyamory. Our central question is whether traditional norms of monogamy can be excised from romantic love so as to harmonize with polyamory's ethical dimensions (as we construe them). How one answers this question bears on another: whether ‘polyamory’ should principally be understood in terms of romantic love or instead some alternative conception(s). Our efforts to address these questions begin by briefly motivating our favored approach to romantic love, a ‘narratival’ one inspired by 1930s cultural theorist Denis de Rougemont, wherein such love is exclusive, supernatural or promising transcendence, painful, impeded, and, ultimately, fatal. We maintain that, even once exclusivity is removed as an official component, tensions with polyamory's ethical dimensions remain: romantic love's other elements rationalize acting and feeling in ways that privilege a singular beloved above others. A tempting solution is to further revise romantic love. However, we are skeptical that this leaves space for distinctively romantic love. Our tentative proposal, then, is that polyamory's ethical dimensions favor rejecting romantic love as ultimately desirable.","PeriodicalId":47057,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Applied Philosophy","volume":"32 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2024-09-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142267067","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Is the Gender Pension Gap Fair?","authors":"Manuel Sá Valente","doi":"10.1111/japp.12762","DOIUrl":"10.1111/japp.12762","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 \u0000 <p>The income gap between women and men expands with age, culminating in a gender pension gap in old age that is much larger than pay gaps earlier in life. In this article, I question two attempts to justify gender pension gaps. One insists that lower financial contribution justifies women's lower overall pensions. The second states that women must receive less monthly because they live longer. I argue that neither of these reasons is fair in a gender-unjust world. Rather than justifying pension gaps, female longevity is an opportunity to promote gender justice: by subsidizing longer lives, old-age redistribution attenuates lifetime gender inequality. In the case of retirement pensions, the use of age to promote gender equality may be preferable to explicit gender differentiation. There is, then, a feminist case for old-age redistribution.</p>\u0000 </div>","PeriodicalId":47057,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Applied Philosophy","volume":"42 1","pages":"320-336"},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2024-09-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142267068","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"AI and Responsibility: No Gap, but Abundance","authors":"Maximilian Kiener","doi":"10.1111/japp.12765","DOIUrl":"10.1111/japp.12765","url":null,"abstract":"<p>The best-performing AI systems, such as deep neural networks, tend to be the ones that are most difficult to control and understand. For this reason, scholars worry that the use of AI would lead to so-called <i>responsibility gaps</i>, that is, situations in which no one is morally responsible for the harm caused by AI, because no one satisfies the so-called control condition and epistemic condition of moral responsibility. In this article, I acknowledge that there is a significant challenge around responsibility and AI. Yet I don't think that this challenge is best captured in terms of a responsibility <i>gap</i>. Instead, I argue for the opposite view, namely that there is responsibility <i>abundance</i>, that is, a situation in which <i>numerous</i> agents are responsible for the harm caused by AI, and that the challenge comes from the difficulties of dealing with such abundance in practice. I conclude by arguing that reframing the challenge in this way offers distinct dialectic and theoretical advantages, promising to help overcome some obstacles in the current debate surrounding ‘responsibility gaps’.</p>","PeriodicalId":47057,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Applied Philosophy","volume":"42 1","pages":"357-374"},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2024-09-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/japp.12765","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142267069","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Responsibility Gaps and Technology: Old Wine in New Bottles?","authors":"Ann-Katrien Oimann, Fabio Tollon","doi":"10.1111/japp.12763","DOIUrl":"10.1111/japp.12763","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Recent work in philosophy of technology has come to bear on the question of responsibility gaps. Some authors argue that the increase in the autonomous capabilities of decision-making systems makes it impossible to properly attribute responsibility for AI-based outcomes. In this article we argue that one important, and often neglected, feature of recent debates on responsibility gaps is how this debate maps on to old debates in responsibility theory. More specifically, we suggest that one of the key questions that is <i>still</i> at issue is the <i>significance</i> of the reactive attitudes, and how these ought to feature in our theorizing about responsibility. We will therefore provide a new descriptive categorization of different perspectives with respect to responsibility gaps. Such reflection can provide analytical clarity about what is at stake between the various interlocutors in this debate. The main upshot of our account is the articulation of a way to frame this ‘new’ debate by drawing on the rich intellectual history of ‘old’ concepts. By regarding the question of responsibility gaps as being concerned with questions of metaphysical priority, we see that the problem of these gaps lies not in any advanced technology, but rather in how we think about responsibility.</p>","PeriodicalId":47057,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Applied Philosophy","volume":"42 1","pages":"337-356"},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2024-09-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/japp.12763","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142188668","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Parental Imprisonment and Children's Right Not to be Separated from Their Parents","authors":"William Bülow, Lars Lindblom","doi":"10.1111/japp.12757","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/japp.12757","url":null,"abstract":"It is widely known that criminal punishment, especially imprisonment, has negative effects for innocent persons, most notably the families of prisoners. This is an issue attracting increasing attention from penal theorists and philosophers. Adding to this literature, this article examines the extent to which incarceration of a parent is consistent with fundamental rights that are often ascribed to children. In particular, we focus on children's rights against being separated from their parents. To this end, we begin with a discussion of the philosophical basis for children's rights against being separated from their parents against their will. Drawing from recent work by Kimberley Brownlee and Matthew Liao, we argue that children have such a right and that it is grounded in children's welfare interest and the importance of parent–child relationships for children to develop adequately into autonomous agents. We then examine three arguments why imprisoning a parent is justified despite the fact that children have a right against being separated from their parents. For each of these arguments, we argue that while they may show the imprisonment of a particular parent to be sometimes compatible with respecting the right against parent–child separation, an extensive use of imprisonment as punishment of the sort that persists in many states is not.","PeriodicalId":47057,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Applied Philosophy","volume":"8 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2024-09-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142224621","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"National Humiliation: Emotion, Narrative, and Conflict","authors":"Raamy Majeed","doi":"10.1111/japp.12759","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/japp.12759","url":null,"abstract":"<p>National humiliation is increasingly being used as a way of explaining certain kinds of international conflict. In this article, I argue that while such explanations are presented on the back of plausible assumptions about emotion, such assumptions also make it unlikely that humiliation can play the myriad of explanatory roles attributed to it, for example, to explain the rise of Hitler, growing Chinese antagonism towards the West, Russia's invasion of Ukraine, and so on. In response, I consider some other ways humiliation may play a role in international conflict and argue that what are likely to be most relevant are not humiliating experiences, felt by individuals or groups, but rather humiliation narratives, which are often used as a discursive mechanism to justify conflict. This is important because it means a nation's willingness to engage in international conflict depends not on something which seems intractable (that is, the emotions felt by its citizens), but something more malleable: the narratives it accepts as frames for historical events.</p>","PeriodicalId":47057,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Applied Philosophy","volume":"42 1","pages":"287-302"},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2024-08-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/japp.12759","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143481604","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Revolutionary Care: Commitment and Ethos. M. Hamington, 2024. New York and London, Routledge. xiii +223 pp, $144.00 (hb) $39.99 (pb)","authors":"Shaun Respess","doi":"10.1111/japp.12760","DOIUrl":"10.1111/japp.12760","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":47057,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Applied Philosophy","volume":"41 5","pages":"928-930"},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2024-08-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142188667","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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