{"title":"Environmental Just Wars: Jus ad Bellum and the Natural Environment","authors":"Tamar Meisels","doi":"10.1111/japp.12770","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/japp.12770","url":null,"abstract":"<p>War is bad for the environment, yet the environmental ramifications of warfare have not been widely addressed by just war theorists and revisionist philosophers of war. The law and legal scholars have paid more attention to protecting nature during armed conflict. But because the law focuses invariably on rules mitigating the conduct of hostilities rather than on objective justice of cause, environmental <i>jus ad bellum</i> has been explored even less extensively than environmental ethics in war. Setting out with the presumption against the use of force and its exceptions, this article considers whether environmental harm can trigger a new justification for war, at whose behest, and what might be a proportionate response to aggressive or negligent harm to nature. Force is clearly justified against military attacks. Where environmental harm is not caused by military aggression, proportionality points towards a response short of war. Full-scale warfare will likely be counterproductive in protecting nature. This is less true if war is fought by drones destroying specific targets, or by cyber-war, or by alternatives (or supplements) to war such as boycotts, ‘lawfare’, and ‘information/media warfare’. Responding in ways that minimize harm to nature also helps demonstrate ‘right intention’.</p>","PeriodicalId":47057,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Applied Philosophy","volume":"42 2","pages":"620-638"},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2024-10-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/japp.12770","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144140460","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Self-Deception in Human–Sex Robot Intimacy","authors":"Jin Hee Lee, Christina Chuang","doi":"10.1111/japp.12761","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/japp.12761","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 \u0000 <p>A common sentiment among anti-sex-robot scholars is the apprehension that sex robots will normalize and perpetuate sexual violence towards humans. In this new chapter within the feminist sex war, the authors of this article tend to agree with anti-sex-robot concerns and seek to further identify potential harms of sex robots. However, instead of characterizing the harm in terms of what the robots represent and symbolize, we are primarily interested in the internal state of the user and the type of relationship that will emerge between human users and sex robots, which we argue is an unprecedented sexual relation. Unlike other comparable sex products and services, sex robots occupy a liminal space between being perceived as both a sexual property and agent, oscillating based on the preferences and convenience of the user. We argue that this oscillation that enables human–sex robot intimacy requires self-deception, which in turn entails individual moral responsibility. Thus, we articulate a novel virtue-based approach of examining human–robot intimacy that focuses on cultivating erotic flourishing. We conclude that people have a moral responsibility to exhibit self-awareness within the dynamics of their intimate relationship with sex robots and the (contradictory) beliefs required to maintain such intimacy.</p>\u0000 </div>","PeriodicalId":47057,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Applied Philosophy","volume":"42 1","pages":"303-319"},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2024-10-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143481442","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"City of Equals. J. Wolff and A. de-Shalit, 2023. Oxford, Oxford University Press. xii + 201 pp, open access","authors":"Elisabetta Gobbo","doi":"10.1111/japp.12769","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/japp.12769","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":47057,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Applied Philosophy","volume":"42 1","pages":"460-461"},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2024-10-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143481510","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Debts of Gratitude in Cross-Cultural Perspective: Confucian and Western Ethics","authors":"George Tsai, Lok Chui Choo","doi":"10.1111/japp.12767","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/japp.12767","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 \u0000 <p>This article examines the contrasting conceptions of gratitude in Early Confucian and Western philosophy. It focuses on a key difference: the presence of the notion of ‘debts of gratitude’ in Western thought and its absence in Confucianism. We explore how this difference is rooted in contrasting ethical outlooks and values. Western philosophy often conceives of gratitude as a duty of reciprocation, furthering the values of social equality and individual autonomy. By contrast, Early Confucians viewed gratitude as proper acknowledgement that strengthens social relationships that are part of an ongoing collective project, spanning generations. This view reflects the importance of values such as community, harmony, and ritual propriety in Confucianism. Unlike the Western context, in the Early Confucian social world, there was no role for ‘debts of gratitude’ to play. There were no Confucian values that ‘debts of gratitude’ would help to realize, or would be responsive to, in the way that debts of gratitude further the values of equality and independence in the West. We conclude by noting that some Western philosophers express ideas about gratitude in collaborative contexts that align with Confucian ideas, suggesting some shared elements between Confucian and Western ethical outlooks.</p>\u0000 </div>","PeriodicalId":47057,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Applied Philosophy","volume":"42 1","pages":"131-154"},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2024-10-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143481443","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Does Lack of Commitment Undermine the Hypocrite's Standing to Blame?","authors":"Kasper Lippert-Rasmussen","doi":"10.1111/japp.12766","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/japp.12766","url":null,"abstract":"<p>According to an influential account of standing, hypocritical blamers lack standing to blame in virtue of their lack of commitment to the norm etc. which they invoke. Nevertheless, the commitment account has the wrong shape for it to explain why hypocrites lack standing to blame. Building on the lessons of that critique I propose a novel account of what undermines standing to blame – the comparative fairness account. This differs from the commitment account and the other prominent account of why hypocrites lack standing to blame offered in the literature: the moral equality account. Finally, I observe that, intuitively, lack of commitment undermines standing to blame and that many hypocrites might lack standing for that reason also. Moreover, typically the hypocrite's failure to address their own faults is a feature in virtue of which, other things being equal, the hypocrite is less committed to the norm in question. These two observations provide the basis for an error theory of the commitment account's appeal, despite its inability to explain why, <i>qua</i> hypocritical blamer, one lacks standing to blame.</p>","PeriodicalId":47057,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Applied Philosophy","volume":"42 1","pages":"375-389"},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2024-09-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/japp.12766","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143481576","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Lying to Make Friends","authors":"Charlie Richards","doi":"10.1111/japp.12768","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/japp.12768","url":null,"abstract":"<p>It is intuitively wrongful to deceive people into forming a false belief. It is especially intuitively wrongful to deceive people into forming the false belief that you are their friend. Despite these intuitions, this article argues that in a surprising number of cases, deceiving people into believing you are their friend is not only permitted, but required. The article uses this result to make some important revisions and suggestions for the emergent social rights literature: (i) it shows that social rights are feasible in a wider range of cases than previously thought, and (ii) it casts doubt on whether grounding such rights on the impersonal value of genuine intimate relationships is their most fruitful grounding.</p>","PeriodicalId":47057,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Applied Philosophy","volume":"42 1","pages":"390-414"},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2024-09-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/japp.12768","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143481361","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The Story of Romantic Love and Polyamory","authors":"Michael Milona, Lauren Weindling","doi":"10.1111/japp.12764","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/japp.12764","url":null,"abstract":"This article explores the relationship between romantic love and polyamory. Our central question is whether traditional norms of monogamy can be excised from romantic love so as to harmonize with polyamory's ethical dimensions (as we construe them). How one answers this question bears on another: whether ‘polyamory’ should principally be understood in terms of romantic love or instead some alternative conception(s). Our efforts to address these questions begin by briefly motivating our favored approach to romantic love, a ‘narratival’ one inspired by 1930s cultural theorist Denis de Rougemont, wherein such love is exclusive, supernatural or promising transcendence, painful, impeded, and, ultimately, fatal. We maintain that, even once exclusivity is removed as an official component, tensions with polyamory's ethical dimensions remain: romantic love's other elements rationalize acting and feeling in ways that privilege a singular beloved above others. A tempting solution is to further revise romantic love. However, we are skeptical that this leaves space for distinctively romantic love. Our tentative proposal, then, is that polyamory's ethical dimensions favor rejecting romantic love as ultimately desirable.","PeriodicalId":47057,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Applied Philosophy","volume":"32 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2024-09-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142267067","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Is the Gender Pension Gap Fair?","authors":"Manuel Sá Valente","doi":"10.1111/japp.12762","DOIUrl":"10.1111/japp.12762","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 \u0000 <p>The income gap between women and men expands with age, culminating in a gender pension gap in old age that is much larger than pay gaps earlier in life. In this article, I question two attempts to justify gender pension gaps. One insists that lower financial contribution justifies women's lower overall pensions. The second states that women must receive less monthly because they live longer. I argue that neither of these reasons is fair in a gender-unjust world. Rather than justifying pension gaps, female longevity is an opportunity to promote gender justice: by subsidizing longer lives, old-age redistribution attenuates lifetime gender inequality. In the case of retirement pensions, the use of age to promote gender equality may be preferable to explicit gender differentiation. There is, then, a feminist case for old-age redistribution.</p>\u0000 </div>","PeriodicalId":47057,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Applied Philosophy","volume":"42 1","pages":"320-336"},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2024-09-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142267068","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"AI and Responsibility: No Gap, but Abundance","authors":"Maximilian Kiener","doi":"10.1111/japp.12765","DOIUrl":"10.1111/japp.12765","url":null,"abstract":"<p>The best-performing AI systems, such as deep neural networks, tend to be the ones that are most difficult to control and understand. For this reason, scholars worry that the use of AI would lead to so-called <i>responsibility gaps</i>, that is, situations in which no one is morally responsible for the harm caused by AI, because no one satisfies the so-called control condition and epistemic condition of moral responsibility. In this article, I acknowledge that there is a significant challenge around responsibility and AI. Yet I don't think that this challenge is best captured in terms of a responsibility <i>gap</i>. Instead, I argue for the opposite view, namely that there is responsibility <i>abundance</i>, that is, a situation in which <i>numerous</i> agents are responsible for the harm caused by AI, and that the challenge comes from the difficulties of dealing with such abundance in practice. I conclude by arguing that reframing the challenge in this way offers distinct dialectic and theoretical advantages, promising to help overcome some obstacles in the current debate surrounding ‘responsibility gaps’.</p>","PeriodicalId":47057,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Applied Philosophy","volume":"42 1","pages":"357-374"},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2024-09-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/japp.12765","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142267069","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Responsibility Gaps and Technology: Old Wine in New Bottles?","authors":"Ann-Katrien Oimann, Fabio Tollon","doi":"10.1111/japp.12763","DOIUrl":"10.1111/japp.12763","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Recent work in philosophy of technology has come to bear on the question of responsibility gaps. Some authors argue that the increase in the autonomous capabilities of decision-making systems makes it impossible to properly attribute responsibility for AI-based outcomes. In this article we argue that one important, and often neglected, feature of recent debates on responsibility gaps is how this debate maps on to old debates in responsibility theory. More specifically, we suggest that one of the key questions that is <i>still</i> at issue is the <i>significance</i> of the reactive attitudes, and how these ought to feature in our theorizing about responsibility. We will therefore provide a new descriptive categorization of different perspectives with respect to responsibility gaps. Such reflection can provide analytical clarity about what is at stake between the various interlocutors in this debate. The main upshot of our account is the articulation of a way to frame this ‘new’ debate by drawing on the rich intellectual history of ‘old’ concepts. By regarding the question of responsibility gaps as being concerned with questions of metaphysical priority, we see that the problem of these gaps lies not in any advanced technology, but rather in how we think about responsibility.</p>","PeriodicalId":47057,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Applied Philosophy","volume":"42 1","pages":"337-356"},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2024-09-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/japp.12763","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142188668","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}