{"title":"Practices of Truth in Philosophy: Historical and Comparative Perspectives. P. Gori and L. Serini, 2024. New York, Routledge. 301 pp, £104.00 (hb)","authors":"Aftab Yunis Hakim","doi":"10.1111/japp.12736","DOIUrl":"10.1111/japp.12736","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":47057,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Applied Philosophy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2024-05-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140931053","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The Minors Strike: Reflections on the Limits and Legitimacy of Children's Political Action","authors":"Tim Fowler","doi":"10.1111/japp.12735","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/japp.12735","url":null,"abstract":"This article considers the morality of children's activism, in particular via participation in political protests. In Section 3 of the article I consider whether children can be competent to engage in activism. I argue that even if we believe children are not competent to vote it will still be true that many children are indeed competent to engage in activism. In Section 4 I consider the wellbeing effects of activism on children. I argue that political activity stands in tension with achieving the intrinsic goods of childhood, meaning there is an important sense in which activism is bad for children. However, I show that these negative outcomes flow from being made aware of the injustices in society, and that for politicised children activism is often highly beneficial.","PeriodicalId":47057,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Applied Philosophy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2024-04-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140833366","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Interpreting ‘What One Would Have Wanted’","authors":"Stephanie Beardman","doi":"10.1111/japp.12734","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/japp.12734","url":null,"abstract":"When making decisions on behalf of someone, is asking what they would have wanted a good way to respect their autonomy? Against prevalent assumptions, I argue that in decisions about the care and treatment of those with advanced dementia, the notion of ‘what one would have wanted’ is conceptually, epistemically, and practically problematic. The problem stems from the disparity between the first‐person subjectivity of the past person and that of the present person. The transformative nature of dementia renders the very meaning of ‘what the patient would have wanted’ problematic. When applied to those with advanced dementia, the subjunctive notion is either (i) incoherent, (ii) fundamentally indeterminate, or (iii) normatively irrelevant.","PeriodicalId":47057,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Applied Philosophy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2024-04-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140675780","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Social Reasons","authors":"Kevin Richardson","doi":"10.1111/japp.12732","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/japp.12732","url":null,"abstract":"The goal of this article is to motivate the idea of a social reason and demonstrate its usefulness in social theorizing. For example, in a society that values getting married young, the fact that one is young is a reason to get married. In racist and sexist societies, we have social reasons to be racist and sexist. Social reasons give rise to social requirements and obligations, where these requirements often conflict with prudential and moral requirements. My application of reasons to social philosophy parallels Charles Mills' and Carole Pateman's applications of social contract theory to political philosophy. While they use social contract theory to make sense of patriarchy and white supremacy, I use the theory of normative reasons to make sense of social injustice. The theory of normative reasons meets non-ideal theory.","PeriodicalId":47057,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Applied Philosophy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2024-04-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140580630","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Moral Gratitude","authors":"Romy Eskens","doi":"10.1111/japp.12733","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/japp.12733","url":null,"abstract":"There are many examples of persons who appear to be grateful to other people's benefactors. In at least some of these examples, such third‐party gratitude also seems fitting. However, these observations conflict with a widespread assumption in the philosophical literature about gratitude: that only beneficiaries can be fittingly grateful to benefactors. In this article, I argue that third‐party gratitude exists and can be fitting, and that the assumption is therefore mistaken. More specifically, I defend two claims: (i) that there exists a kind of gratitude to benefactors that is experienced by third parties in their capacities as moral agents (‘moral gratitude’); and (ii) that what makes this kind of gratitude fitting is the fact that, in benefitting the beneficiaries, the benefactors are responding to values that we, as moral agents, each have reason to care about and to want to see promoted.","PeriodicalId":47057,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Applied Philosophy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2024-04-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140580719","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Population Aging and the Retirement Age","authors":"Daniel Halliday","doi":"10.1111/japp.12731","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/japp.12731","url":null,"abstract":"Numerous jurisdictions have recently raised the age of retirement or plan to do so. Pressure to extend people's working lives is due to population aging, which makes it harder to fund retirement through existing methods. Raising the retirement age can improve the ‘dependency ratio’ by increasing the fraction of the population that works (and pays taxes) relative to the fraction retired. This article gives sustained attention to connecting the case for retirement with one view about wellbeing, according to which old age is subject to distinctive goods. The importance of being able to access these goods in old age favours an eventual exit from labour market participation that retirement provisions enable. This view is stronger than one that treats retirement as merely a safety net to enable people to stop work only when advanced aging makes it unreasonably burdensome. At the same time, the view likely does not justify <jats:italic>status quo</jats:italic> retirement ages, meaning that some increase to the retirement age might be defensible. The article also seeks to illuminate ways in which different aspects of population aging – in particular the distinction between dependency ratios and inequalities in longevity – bear differently on the wider debate about justice and retirement.","PeriodicalId":47057,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Applied Philosophy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2024-04-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140580841","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Markus Furendal, Huub Brouwer, Willem van der Deijl
{"title":"The Future of the Philosophy of Work","authors":"Markus Furendal, Huub Brouwer, Willem van der Deijl","doi":"10.1111/japp.12730","DOIUrl":"10.1111/japp.12730","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Work has always been a significant source of ethical questions, philosophical reflection, and political struggle. Although the <i>future</i> of work in a sense is always at stake, the issue is particularly relevant right now, in light of the advent of advanced AI systems and the collective experience of the COVID-19 pandemic. This has reinvigorated philosophical discussion and interest in the study of the future of work. The purpose of this survey article is to provide an overview of the emerging philosophical field that engages with the future of work, with a special focus on equality and justice, and to outline a research agenda that can help the field to develop further. Section 2 provides some historical context for the current surge in interest in the topic. Then, we discuss what work is and whether there is a philosophy of work (Section 3). The four main sub-debates we then turn to concern the value of work (Section 4), distributive justice and work (Section 5), productive justice (Section 6), and institutional reforms prompted by changes in how work is organized (Section 7). The final section discusses the importance of the distinction between ideal and non-ideal theory in philosophical investigations into the future of work.</p>","PeriodicalId":47057,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Applied Philosophy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2024-04-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/japp.12730","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140580622","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The Counterproductiveness Argument against Animal Rights Violence","authors":"N. Müller, Friderike Spang","doi":"10.1111/japp.12729","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/japp.12729","url":null,"abstract":"Arguments against inflicting violence on people to defend animal rights have relied on the view that inflicting violence is always wrong. But these arguments end up prohibiting too much, as defensive violence should be permissible in certain extreme cases. We argue that considerations about the counterproductiveness of defensive violence are better at distinguishing permissible and impermissible instances of animal rights violence than a blanket rejection of violence. We respond to the objection that assuming violence to be counterproductive is ad hoc, discussing real‐world and fictional examples of animal rights violence. We argue that defensive violence on behalf of animals should almost always be assumed to be counterproductive because it threatens to trigger self‐reinforcing reactions on the part of the socio‐technical regimes that violate animal rights in the first place.","PeriodicalId":47057,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Applied Philosophy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2024-03-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140363553","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The Emotion of Gratitude and Communal Relationships","authors":"Coleen Macnamara","doi":"10.1111/japp.12726","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/japp.12726","url":null,"abstract":"Emotions are typically dual‐faced: they involve both an evaluative and a practical aspect. What is more, an emotion's evaluative and practical aspects tend to exhibit a kind of fit. For example, Sakshi's fear of the bear involves apprehending the bear as a threat to something she cares about, i.e., her wellbeing. And it motivates her to act on behalf of this care: it motivates her to act in ways that protect her wellbeing. Both dimensions of Sakshi's fear are about her wellbeing. Typically, characterizations of gratitude speak to both its evaluative and practical dimensions. Gratitude is described as a way of apprehending the significance of one's benefactor's kindness, and it is said to involve a disposition to thank one's benefactor and to return the kindness. In this article I show that this characterization is incomplete insofar as it leaves us without the resources needed to discern the link between gratitude's two dimensions. I argue that discerning the fit requires an account of gratitude's focus and goal. I urge that the beneficiary's communal relationship with her benefactor is gratitude's focus and that promoting this relationship is gratitude's goal. Both dimensions of a beneficiary's gratitude are about her communal relationship with her benefactor.","PeriodicalId":47057,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Applied Philosophy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2024-03-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140203417","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Citizen Knowledge: Markets, Experts, and the Infrastructure of Democracy. L. Herzog, 2023. Oxford, Oxford University Press. xi + 338 pp, $83.00","authors":"Arshak Balayan","doi":"10.1111/japp.12728","DOIUrl":"10.1111/japp.12728","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":47057,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Applied Philosophy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2024-03-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140203213","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}