{"title":"A Project View of the Right to Parent","authors":"Benjamin Lange","doi":"10.1111/japp.12660","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/japp.12660","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":47057,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Applied Philosophy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2023-05-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45359718","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Fairness, Care, and Abortion","authors":"David O'Brien","doi":"10.1111/japp.12661","DOIUrl":"10.1111/japp.12661","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 \u0000 <p>Only women can bear the burdens of gestating fetuses. That fact, I suggest, bears on the morality of abortion. To illustrate and explain this point, I frame my discussion around Judith Jarvis Thomson's classic defense of abortion and Gina Schouten's recent feminist challenge to Thomson's defense. Thomson argued that, even assuming that fetuses are morally equivalent to persons, abortions are typically morally permissible. According to Schouten's feminist challenge to Thomson, however, if fetuses are morally equivalent to persons, then abortions are typically morally impermissible because there is a collective moral obligation to care for the vulnerable. The consideration that is my topic, however, poses a problem for that feminist challenge to Thomson. There is reason to believe, I argue, that it is unfair that only women can bear the burdens of gestating fetuses. And, if that is unfair, it would undermine that feminist challenge to Thomson. I show, in other words, that there is a plausible and well-motivated basis for believing that, even if fetuses are morally equivalent to persons and there is a collective obligation to care for the vulnerable, then abortions are nevertheless typically morally permissible. That is how fairness bears on the morality of abortion.</p>\u0000 </div>","PeriodicalId":47057,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Applied Philosophy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2023-05-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46621775","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Public Health Officials Should Almost Always Tell the Truth","authors":"Samuel Director","doi":"10.1111/japp.12659","DOIUrl":"10.1111/japp.12659","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 \u0000 <p>One of the lessons of the COVID-19 pandemic is that the lay public relies immensely on the knowledge of public health officials. At every phase of the pandemic, the testimony of public health officials has been crucial for guiding public policy and individual behavior. The reason is simple: public health officials know a lot more than you and I do about public health. As lay people, we rely on experts. This seems straightforward. But the COVID-19 pandemic has shown that public health officials seem undecided as to what, precisely, their role is; are they providing the public information as it presents itself, or are they informing the public in a way that produces a desired or optimal outcome? In this article, I answer the following question: what are public health officials morally obligated to tell the public? As I see it, these are the main options: (1) public health officials should tell the full truth, regardless of outcome; or (2) they should tell partial truths or lies that are aimed to promote a socially optimal outcome. My answer to this question is that public health officials are only allowed to lie under very narrow and rare conditions.</p>\u0000 </div>","PeriodicalId":47057,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Applied Philosophy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2023-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41497538","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"What We Owe Past Selves","authors":"Lauritz Aastrup Munch","doi":"10.1111/japp.12657","DOIUrl":"10.1111/japp.12657","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Some say that we should respect the privacy of dead people. In this article, I take this idea for granted and use it to motivate the stronger claim that we sometimes ought to respect the privacy of our past selves.</p>","PeriodicalId":47057,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Applied Philosophy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2023-04-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46062087","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Relational Justice: Egalitarian and Sufficientarian","authors":"Andreas Bengtson, Lasse Nielsen","doi":"10.1111/japp.12658","DOIUrl":"10.1111/japp.12658","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Relational egalitarianism is a theory of justice according to which people must relate as equals. In this article, we develop relational sufficientarianism – a view of justice according to which people must relate as sufficients. We distinguish between three versions of this ideal, one that is incompatible with relational egalitarianism and two that are not. Building on this, we argue that relational theorists have good reason to support a pluralist view that is both egalitarian and sufficientarian.</p>","PeriodicalId":47057,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Applied Philosophy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2023-04-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46645399","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Against ‘Hate Speech’","authors":"Dirk Kindermann","doi":"10.1111/japp.12648","DOIUrl":"10.1111/japp.12648","url":null,"abstract":"<p>This article argues against the term and concept of ‘hate speech’ and in favour of using the concept and term ‘discriminatory speech’. ‘Hate speech’ is a misnomer; we should name the harmful speech in question by what it in fact does: it discriminates. The article argues for this conceptual replacement claim by identifying a number of functions the concept ‘hate speech’ has been meant to serve and by arguing that extant concepts of hate speech have not served this function well. Roughly, they do not serve the functions well because of five properties of hate speech: hate centricity, perpetrator centricity, intention centricity, emotion centricity, and individual centricity. The article then proposes a definition of discriminatory speech and argues that it fulfils the conceptual functions better.</p>","PeriodicalId":47057,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Applied Philosophy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2023-04-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44602582","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The Balanced View of the Value of Conscience","authors":"Doug McConnell, Julian Savulescu","doi":"10.1111/japp.12655","DOIUrl":"10.1111/japp.12655","url":null,"abstract":"<p>On the mainstream view, consciences are valuable because they promote moral unity. However, conscience, so defined, will systematically prevent moral growth that threatens unity, even when unity has formed around oppressive moral values. This motivates Carolyn McLeod's alternative ‘Dynamic View’ whereby consciences are valuable to the extent that they are dynamic. Consciences are dynamic when they interact with our best moral judgements to shape or ‘retool’ the moral values underpinning conscience, sometimes at an initial cost to unity. We modify and extend McLeod's account in two ways: (1) We object to her claim that conscience encourages its own retooling. We argue that the opposite is true – conscience creates a motivational barrier to change that moral judgement must overcome to successfully retool conscience. The task of ensuring dynamism, therefore, falls to moral judgement. (2) However, this motivational barrier enables conscience to play a valuable role that McLeod overlooks – compensating for the limitations of moral judgement. On our Balanced View, the value of conscience depends on it being sufficiently open to being shaped by our best moral judgements but inert enough to compensate for distorted moral judgements and to guide action when under cognitive load.</p>","PeriodicalId":47057,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Applied Philosophy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2023-03-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46022583","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Black Dignity: The Struggle against Domination. Vincent W. Lloyd, 2022. New Haven, Yale University Press. 208 pp, £17.99 (hb)","authors":"Eric Scarffe","doi":"10.1111/japp.12656","DOIUrl":"10.1111/japp.12656","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":47057,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Applied Philosophy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2023-03-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46472872","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Punishment, Public Safety, and Collateral Legal Consequences","authors":"Richard L. Lippke","doi":"10.1111/japp.12653","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/japp.12653","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":47057,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Applied Philosophy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2023-03-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42226649","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Fitting Moral Admiration: Achievements and Character","authors":"Kyle Fruh","doi":"10.1111/japp.12654","DOIUrl":"10.1111/japp.12654","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 \u0000 <p>I develop three arguments in support of my contention that we should favor achievements over agents as objects of fitting moral admiration. The first argument impugns the epistemic standing with which characterological admiration is standardly issued. The second argument alleges that there is likely to be a difference between widely held folk concepts of character and traits, on the one hand, and an empirically supported view of the reality of those things, on the other. The final argument concerns one way in which characterological admiration renders some aspects of our practices of admiring subject to undesirable revision. In each case I use an analogy to athletic admiration to show how achievement admiration avoids the problems of characterological admiration. I then suggest an alternative role for characterological considerations in fitting admiration, as a loose constraint on what is appropriate to admire rather than as an object of admiration. The upshot of the article is theoretical, inasmuch as it develops a tension between the conditions governing fitting admiration and an empirically informed view of character. But there is also practical upshot, especially in the context of public practices of admiring, as when we build statues of heroes or name buildings after them.</p>\u0000 </div>","PeriodicalId":47057,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Applied Philosophy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2023-03-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42263325","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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