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Journal of Applied Philosophy最新文献

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Robot Ethics. M. Coeckelbergh, 2022. Cambridge, MIT Press. vii + 191 pp, $16.95 (pb) 机器人伦理M.Coeckelbergh，2022。剑桥，麻省理工学院出版社。每件+191，16.95美元
IF 1.1 2区 哲学
Journal of Applied Philosophy Pub Date : 2023-08-02 DOI: 10.1111/japp.12681
Nicholas Barrow
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引用次数: 0
Online Hate: Is Hate an Infectious Disease? Is Social Media a Promoter? 网络仇恨:仇恨是一种传染病吗?社交媒体是推动者吗?
IF 1.1 2区 哲学
Journal of Applied Philosophy Pub Date : 2023-07-25 DOI: 10.1111/japp.12679
Mihaela Popa-Wyatt
{"title":"Online Hate: Is Hate an Infectious Disease? Is Social Media a Promoter?","authors":"Mihaela Popa-Wyatt","doi":"10.1111/japp.12679","DOIUrl":"10.1111/japp.12679","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Our time is marked by a resurgence of hate that threatens to increase oppression. Social media has contributed to this by acting as a medium through which hate speech is spread. How should we model the spread of hate? This article considers two models. First, I consider a simple contagion model. In this model, hate spreads like a virus through a social network. This model, however, fails to capture the fact that people do not acquire hatred from a single infectious contact. Instead, it builds up in a person's beliefs and attitudes through time until the infection reaches a level where the subject themselves becomes a generator of hate speech. Second, to accommodate this, I consider an alternative model known as <i>complex contagion</i>. I argue that not only is a complex contagion model more explanatory and predictive, but it can be used to explain why certain features of social media cause it to be a promoter of hate. I conclude by sketching some mitigation strategies.</p>","PeriodicalId":47057,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Applied Philosophy","volume":"40 5","pages":"788-812"},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2023-07-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"63360542","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
A Dissolution of the Repugnant Conclusion 撤销排斥结论
IF 1.1 2区 哲学
Journal of Applied Philosophy Pub Date : 2023-07-14 DOI: 10.1111/japp.12675
Roberto Fumagalli
{"title":"A Dissolution of the Repugnant Conclusion","authors":"Roberto Fumagalli","doi":"10.1111/japp.12675","DOIUrl":"10.1111/japp.12675","url":null,"abstract":"<p>This article articulates and defends a dissolution of the so-called repugnant conclusion, which focuses on the notion of life worth living figuring both in Parfit's formulation of the repugnant conclusion and in most responses to such a conclusion. The proposed dissolution demonstrates that the notion of life worth living is plagued by multiple ambiguities and that these ambiguities, in turn, hamper meaningful debate about both the issue of whether the repugnant conclusion can be avoided and the issue of whether the repugnant conclusion is actually repugnant. This result does not exclude that some modified versions of the repugnant conclusion may yield valuable insights about the value of populations and the tenability of different axiological/ethical theories. Still, if the proposed dissolution is correct, then the repugnant conclusion rests on an ill-defined notion and we lack the information required to assess the merits of the repugnant conclusion.</p>","PeriodicalId":47057,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Applied Philosophy","volume":"41 1","pages":"85-105"},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2023-07-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/japp.12675","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45547630","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Throwing the Embryos out with the Bathwater? A Novel Evaluation of the Value of Embryos 把胚胎和洗澡水一起倒掉?胚胎价值的新评价
IF 0.7 2区 哲学
Journal of Applied Philosophy Pub Date : 2023-07-14 DOI: 10.1111/japp.12672
Megan Kitts
{"title":"Throwing the Embryos out with the Bathwater? A Novel Evaluation of the Value of Embryos","authors":"Megan Kitts","doi":"10.1111/japp.12672","DOIUrl":"10.1111/japp.12672","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 \u0000 <p>As a growing number of embryos collect in fertility clinics, it is imperative to evaluate the permissibility of available options for genetic parents and fertility institutions. Much of the discussion on appropriate treatment of embryos has focused on the circumstances under which it is permissible to destroy embryos for instrumental purposes, and thus has little application to the fertility context. I aim to develop a new account of the value of embryos whereby embryos have final value in virtue of their relationship to persons that could exist. I call this symbolic value. To establish this value, I first show that corpses have this same symbolic value in virtue of their relationship to prior persons, and then show that the cases of corpses and embryos are relevantly similar. Because of this value, we ought to treat embryos in particular respectful ways. It is currently common practice in the United States to simply discard extra embryos that exist as a result of <i>in vitro</i> fertilization. I argue it is generally impermissible to simply discard embryos because it is an act of disrespect and does not treat them in accordance with their value.</p>\u0000 </div>","PeriodicalId":47057,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Applied Philosophy","volume":"41 5","pages":"767-784"},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2023-07-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45327164","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
‘I Am a Man’: Countering Oppression through Appeal to Kind Membership “我是一个男人”：通过呼吁善意会员来对抗压迫
IF 1.1 2区 哲学
Journal of Applied Philosophy Pub Date : 2023-07-13 DOI: 10.1111/japp.12678
Suzy Killmister
{"title":"‘I Am a Man’: Countering Oppression through Appeal to Kind Membership","authors":"Suzy Killmister","doi":"10.1111/japp.12678","DOIUrl":"10.1111/japp.12678","url":null,"abstract":"<p>All too often, social kinds function as sites of oppression. To be a woman, to be Black, to be trans – each, in its own way, situates someone at the lower end of a social hierarchy. Membership in such groups thus constitutes a liability: notwithstanding the goods people draw from sharing in these identities, they also stand at perpetual risk of those same identities exposing them to significant harm. What, if anything, can members of oppressed groups do to counter that oppression? In this article I explore one possible strategy: people can – and do – strategically invoke their membership in what I call ‘anti-oppressive kinds’, in order to contest the oppression they face <i>qua</i> members of oppressed groups. Focusing on one particularly salient anti-oppressive kind, the human, I first offer an explanation as to how and why its invocation might be politically effective, before considering some hazards with its use.</p>","PeriodicalId":47057,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Applied Philosophy","volume":"40 5","pages":"919-935"},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2023-07-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43833915","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Forgiveness: Overcoming versus Forswearing Blame 宽恕:克服与放弃责备
IF 1.1 2区 哲学
Journal of Applied Philosophy Pub Date : 2023-07-11 DOI: 10.1111/japp.12673
Julius Schönherr
{"title":"Forgiveness: Overcoming versus Forswearing Blame","authors":"Julius Schönherr","doi":"10.1111/japp.12673","DOIUrl":"10.1111/japp.12673","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 \u0000 <p>Philosophers often identify forgiveness with either <i>overcoming</i> or <i>forswearing</i> blaming attitudes such as, paradigmatically, resentment for the right reasons; yet there is little debate as to which of the two (if either) is correct. In this article, I present three arguments that aim to strengthen the forswearing view. First, on the overcoming view, many <i>paradigm</i> cases of forgiveness would turn out to be mere ‘letting go’ instead. Second, only the forswearing view plausibly allows for forgiveness in cases where the victim lost resentment before she had a reason to forgive. Third, only the forswearing view can show why victims of an offense are usually able to know whether they are in a position to forgive.</p>\u0000 </div>","PeriodicalId":47057,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Applied Philosophy","volume":"41 1","pages":"66-84"},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2023-07-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45844936","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Responsibility for Future Climate Justice: The Direct Responsibility to Mitigate Structural Injustice for Future Generations 未来气候正义的责任：减轻后代结构性不公正的直接责任
IF 1.1 2区 哲学
Journal of Applied Philosophy Pub Date : 2023-07-08 DOI: 10.1111/japp.12674
Daan Keij, Boris Robert van Meurs
{"title":"Responsibility for Future Climate Justice: The Direct Responsibility to Mitigate Structural Injustice for Future Generations","authors":"Daan Keij,&nbsp;Boris Robert van Meurs","doi":"10.1111/japp.12674","DOIUrl":"10.1111/japp.12674","url":null,"abstract":"<p>In this article we argue that duties towards future generations are situated on the collective level and that they should be understood in terms of collective responsibility for structural injustice. In the context of climate change, it seems self-evident that our moral duties pertain not only to the current generation but to future generations as well. However, conceptualizing this leads to the non-identity problem: future persons cannot be harmed by present-day choices because they would not have existed if other choices had been made. Recently, Charlotte Franziska Unruh has proposed a solution that places the duties not on the individual level but on the collective level. The current generation has a responsibility for future generations as a whole. This solution is promising, but we argue that it problematically overlooks the existence of unjust relations within the contemporary collective, as we all contribute differently to bringing future generations into existence. Therefore, we propose to graft Iris Marion Young's Social Connection Model, which is concerned with structural injustice, on to the discussion of responsibility for future generations. Our proposal incorporates the strengths of Unruh's arguments, while also allowing for a differentiated responsibility based on different implications in unjust structures.</p>","PeriodicalId":47057,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Applied Philosophy","volume":"40 4","pages":"642-657"},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2023-07-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/japp.12674","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48744332","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Stigma, Stereotype, and Self-Presentation 污名、刻板印象和自我表现
IF 1.1 2区 哲学
Journal of Applied Philosophy Pub Date : 2023-07-05 DOI: 10.1111/japp.12676
Euan Allison
{"title":"Stigma, Stereotype, and Self-Presentation","authors":"Euan Allison","doi":"10.1111/japp.12676","DOIUrl":"10.1111/japp.12676","url":null,"abstract":"<p>How should we interpret the popular objection that stigmatised subjects are not treated as individuals? The Eidelson View claims that stigma, because of its connection to stereotypes, violates an instance of the general requirement to respect autonomy. The Self-Presentation View claims that stigma inhibits the functioning of certain morally important capacities, notably the capacity for self-presentation. I argue that even if we are right to think that stigma violates a requirement to respect autonomy, this is insufficient to account for the full weight of the charge that stigmatised subjects are not treated as individuals. We need the Self-Presentation View to explain a special threat to agency. I then address the worry that focusing on a concern with being treated as individuals opens the door to the suggestion that treating as superior can be just as morally troubling as stigma. This objection is fatal for the Eidelson View. But the Self-Presentation View has a number of resources for deflating the worry. We should not exclude the possibility of a moral symmetry between some cases of stigma and some cases of treating as superior. Rather, we should provide a nuanced account of the circumstances in which either phenomenon is detrimental for self-presentation.</p>","PeriodicalId":47057,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Applied Philosophy","volume":"40 4","pages":"746-759"},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2023-07-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/japp.12676","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49093487","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
The Prospect of a Humanitarian Artificial Intelligence: Agency and Value Alignment. Carlos Montemayor, 2023. London, Bloomsbury Academic, Bloomsbury Publishing. xviii + 278 pp, £85.00 (hb) 人道主义人工智能的前景：机构与价值取向。卡洛斯·蒙特马约尔，2023年。伦敦，布鲁姆斯伯里学院出版社。xvii+278人，85.00英镑（hb）
IF 1.1 2区 哲学
Journal of Applied Philosophy Pub Date : 2023-07-02 DOI: 10.1111/japp.12677
Diego Morales
{"title":"The Prospect of a Humanitarian Artificial Intelligence: Agency and Value Alignment. Carlos Montemayor, 2023. London, Bloomsbury Academic, Bloomsbury Publishing. xviii + 278 pp, £85.00 (hb)","authors":"Diego Morales","doi":"10.1111/japp.12677","DOIUrl":"10.1111/japp.12677","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":47057,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Applied Philosophy","volume":"40 4","pages":"766-768"},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2023-07-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43199335","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
Reciprocity, Vulnerability, and the Moral Significance of Herd Immunity 互惠、脆弱性和群体免疫的道德意义
IF 1.1 2区 哲学
Journal of Applied Philosophy Pub Date : 2023-06-10 DOI: 10.1111/japp.12671
Justin Bernstein, Mark Navin
{"title":"Reciprocity, Vulnerability, and the Moral Significance of Herd Immunity","authors":"Justin Bernstein,&nbsp;Mark Navin","doi":"10.1111/japp.12671","DOIUrl":"10.1111/japp.12671","url":null,"abstract":"<p>This article proposes a novel defense of vaccine mandates: such policies are justifiable because they protect the capabilities of individuals who cannot cultivate individual immunity against infection. We begin by considering a nearby argument that has recently enjoyed popularity, which claims individuals have an enforceable obligation to get vaccinated because they have benefited from community protection (often referred to as ‘herd immunity’), and thus they ought to do their fair share in sustaining that public good by getting vaccinated. We object, however, that this kind of argument misstates the ethical basis for vaccine mandates because community protection primarily protects unvaccinated people. We contend that the duty to vaccinate is not fundamentally an obligation to make a fair contribution to a public good from which vaccinated people benefit, but a duty to protect the wellbeing of otherwise vulnerable third parties. We flesh out our view by drawing on Martha Nussbaum's capabilities approach.</p>","PeriodicalId":47057,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Applied Philosophy","volume":"40 4","pages":"725-745"},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2023-06-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/japp.12671","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45080008","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
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