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Pregnancy, Caregiving, and a Supposed Obligation to Gestate 怀孕、照顾和怀孕的义务
IF 0.9 2区 哲学
Journal of Applied Philosophy Pub Date : 2025-06-04 DOI: 10.1111/japp.70025
Christie Hartley, Ashley Lindsley-Kim
{"title":"Pregnancy, Caregiving, and a Supposed Obligation to Gestate","authors":"Christie Hartley,&nbsp;Ashley Lindsley-Kim","doi":"10.1111/japp.70025","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/japp.70025","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 \u0000 <p>Many people – including many feminists – believe both of the following: (i) abortion is morally permissible regardless of the moral status of the fetus (at least for most of a pregnancy) and (ii) members of society have a shared, moral obligation to provide care for dependents. Yet it has been argued that the shared, moral obligation of members of society to care for dependents entails that women may be morally obligated to gestate unwanted fetuses. Central to this argument is that fetal dependency is relevantly similar to (other) persons' dependency on care and that pregnancy itself is a kind of caregiving. We think this argument is erroneous and politically dangerous. To expose its faults, we engage in a philosophical analysis of pregnancy: how to understand it, how it differs from caregiving, how it is inherently risky, how fetal development is by its nature invasive, and why all this matters for the ethics and politics of abortion.</p>\u0000 </div>","PeriodicalId":47057,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Applied Philosophy","volume":"42 4","pages":"1301-1316"},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2025-06-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144897555","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Parental Labor as Cooperative Labor 父母劳动作为合作劳动
IF 0.9 2区 哲学
Journal of Applied Philosophy Pub Date : 2025-05-28 DOI: 10.1111/japp.70022
K. Lindsey Chambers
{"title":"Parental Labor as Cooperative Labor","authors":"K. Lindsey Chambers","doi":"10.1111/japp.70022","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/japp.70022","url":null,"abstract":"<p>The procreative justice debate asks whether justice, and in particular whether a principle of fair play, requires that non-parents share in the costs of procreation and child-rearing. The principle of fair play demands that persons who benefit from the cooperative labor of others share in the burdens of producing that benefit. Non-parents should share in the costs of procreation and child-rearing if reproductive and parental labor count as <i>cooperative</i> labor, but they are not obligated to share in those costs if parents incur them as part of a personal project. I argue that parental labor counts as cooperative labor because becoming a parent involves knowingly assuming a social role whereby one incurs new moral and legal obligations. Even if parents are ultimately motived by personal reasons, they nevertheless constrain their liberty in order to comply with the rules of a cooperative scheme, and, in doing so, their labor plausibly counts as <i>cooperative</i>. Parents have a claim of justice on others, then, to consider whether the benefits and burdens of procreating and child-rearing are fairly distributed.</p>","PeriodicalId":47057,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Applied Philosophy","volume":"42 4","pages":"1270-1284"},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2025-05-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144897838","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
The Ethics of Advising. M. Jonas, 2025. Oxford, Oxford University Press. 256 pp, £77.00 (hb) 咨询的道德规范。乔纳斯先生，2025年。牛津，牛津大学出版社，256页，77英镑（磅）
IF 0.7 2区 哲学
Journal of Applied Philosophy Pub Date : 2025-05-28 DOI: 10.1111/japp.70023
David Archard
{"title":"The Ethics of Advising. M. Jonas, 2025. Oxford, Oxford University Press. 256 pp, £77.00 (hb)","authors":"David Archard","doi":"10.1111/japp.70023","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/japp.70023","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":47057,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Applied Philosophy","volume":"42 3","pages":"1083-1085"},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2025-05-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144647053","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Hopeful Pessimism. M. Lugt, 2025. Princeton, Princeton University Press. xvii + 255 pp, £35.00 (hb) 充满希望的悲观情绪。卢格特先生，2025。普林斯顿，普林斯顿大学出版社。Xvii + 255页，£35.00 （hb）
IF 0.7 2区 哲学
Journal of Applied Philosophy Pub Date : 2025-05-28 DOI: 10.1111/japp.70021
Riti Kumari
{"title":"Hopeful Pessimism. M. Lugt, 2025. Princeton, Princeton University Press. xvii + 255 pp, £35.00 (hb)","authors":"Riti Kumari","doi":"10.1111/japp.70021","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/japp.70021","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":47057,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Applied Philosophy","volume":"42 3","pages":"1081-1082"},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2025-05-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144647778","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Housing Justice, Basic Capabilities, and Self-Respect 住房正义，基本能力和自尊
IF 0.9 2区 哲学
Journal of Applied Philosophy Pub Date : 2025-05-16 DOI: 10.1111/japp.70020
Niklas Dummer, Christian Neuhäuser
{"title":"Housing Justice, Basic Capabilities, and Self-Respect","authors":"Niklas Dummer,&nbsp;Christian Neuhäuser","doi":"10.1111/japp.70020","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/japp.70020","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Housing studies often draw on what we will refer to as the capabilitarian assumption. However, this assumption – that the capability approach offers the right framework for analysing housing injustice – has received little to no philosophical scrutiny. In this article we aim to fill this lacuna. We examine the prospects of a capability approach to housing justice, focusing on Nussbaum's comprehensive list of basic capabilities. We argue that her list fails to capture fundamental concerns in housing justice and therefore requires further specification. An adequate capabilitarian view on housing justice must integrate relational egalitarian considerations. We draw on a relationally egalitarian informed conception of self-respect as a basic capability to integrate those relational aspects. In doing so we aim to provide the contours of a capabilitarian theory of housing justice.</p>","PeriodicalId":47057,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Applied Philosophy","volume":"42 4","pages":"1247-1269"},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2025-05-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/japp.70020","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144897560","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Mary Warnock's Challenges to Rights of Nature: Accepting Interests, but Not Rights, of Nature 玛丽·沃诺克对自然权利的挑战：接受自然的利益，而不是权利
IF 0.9 2区 哲学
Journal of Applied Philosophy Pub Date : 2025-05-15 DOI: 10.1111/japp.70019
Patrik Baard
{"title":"Mary Warnock's Challenges to Rights of Nature: Accepting Interests, but Not Rights, of Nature","authors":"Patrik Baard","doi":"10.1111/japp.70019","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/japp.70019","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Rights of nature (RoN) is an emerging legal tool for strengthening nature conservation, receiving increased scholarly attention and finding its way into domestic legislation. RoN is an innovation in legal thinking often justified with ethical arguments and concepts such as ‘intrinsic value’ or ‘interests’. But there are many challenges with justifying RoN based on such concepts which are rarely considered by RoN advocates, blocking the formulation of stronger arguments. Based on Mary Warnock's discussion of RoN, here I investigate two related claims: (1) that environmental entities can be said to have interests, but (2) while this means that they have moral status, it does not justify concluding that they are rights-holders. By way of critical engagement, I put Warnock's discussion in contact with scholarship on RoN and the scope and grounds of rights, scholarship that has expanded since Warnock's engagement with the concept. Warnock's observations are attentive to the relevance of concepts such as intrinsic value and interests to the environment, but also to their limits, in ways that can benefit RoN scholarship.</p>","PeriodicalId":47057,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Applied Philosophy","volume":"42 4","pages":"1230-1246"},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2025-05-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/japp.70019","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144897235","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Excess Incarceration 多余的监禁
IF 0.9 2区 哲学
Journal of Applied Philosophy Pub Date : 2025-05-09 DOI: 10.1111/japp.70018
Vincent Chiao
{"title":"Excess Incarceration","authors":"Vincent Chiao","doi":"10.1111/japp.70018","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/japp.70018","url":null,"abstract":"<p>‘Mass incarceration’, as conventionally understood, refers to an imprisoned population that is both excessive in size and racially skewed in its demographics. However, in contrast to racial skew, the appropriate size of a prison system has largely escaped analysis. This article contributes to analysis of the scale of a prison system in two ways. First, I show why non-controversial principles linking crime to punishment, such as guilt and proportionality, are insufficient. Because incarceration rates are driven more by social policy than by crime, an adequate analysis of scale presupposes an account of what we hope to get out of punishing people in the first place. Second, drawing on a generic crime-prevention account of incarceration, I sketch three increasingly resolving, but also increasingly contentious, conceptions of excess: the Pareto, social welfare, and utilitarian conceptions. Along the way, I briefly consider the trade-off between how committal a theory of incarceration is and its ability to explain what is wrong with mass incarceration, as well as the concern that the social welfare and, especially, utilitarian concepts are excessively paternalistic. The ultimate aim of the article is to contribute to our understanding of mass incarceration as a distinctive normative concept.</p>","PeriodicalId":47057,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Applied Philosophy","volume":"42 4","pages":"1210-1229"},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2025-05-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/japp.70018","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144897300","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
The Force of Equal Treatment 平等待遇的力量
IF 0.7 2区 哲学
Journal of Applied Philosophy Pub Date : 2025-04-24 DOI: 10.1111/japp.70017
Daniel Viehoff
{"title":"The Force of Equal Treatment","authors":"Daniel Viehoff","doi":"10.1111/japp.70017","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/japp.70017","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 \u0000 <p>It is widely accepted that the state ought to treat like cases alike. But what exactly is the force of this requirement of equal treatment? In particular, can treating like cases alike be sufficiently important to justify (and perhaps even require) adopting what would otherwise be a morally unjustified policy? It is these questions, made vivid by Japa Pallikkathayil's original argument that restrictive abortion laws in the United States (and perhaps also elsewhere) are incompatible with the requirement of equal treatment, that this article explores.</p>\u0000 </div>","PeriodicalId":47057,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Applied Philosophy","volume":"42 2","pages":"514-524"},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2025-04-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144140647","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Shame in Response to Institutional Failure 对制度失败的羞耻感
IF 0.9 2区 哲学
Journal of Applied Philosophy Pub Date : 2025-04-21 DOI: 10.1111/japp.70012
Alfred Archer, Benjamin Matheson
{"title":"Shame in Response to Institutional Failure","authors":"Alfred Archer,&nbsp;Benjamin Matheson","doi":"10.1111/japp.70012","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/japp.70012","url":null,"abstract":"<p>When an institution morally fails, what is the appropriate emotional reaction for those institution members who are causally uninvolved in bringing about this failure? Our aim in this article is to explain why it may be fitting for such people to feel ashamed about the wrongs perpetrated by the institution. We begin by explaining the main case that we focus on – the <i>Toeslagenaffaire</i> or Dutch Child Benefit Scandal. We then show how standard accounts of the fittingness of shame struggle to explain how it could be fitting for uninvolved members of the Dutch tax authority to feel shame in response to this failure. Next we consider three potential ways to explain this shame. The most plausible, we argue, is the identity explanation, according to which this shame is a response to the fact that the practical identity of workers is partly constituted by their (social, professional) role in the institution. We finish by arguing that this shame is also morally valuable because it can play an important role in reforming the wrongful culture of an institution that has committed an injustice.</p>","PeriodicalId":47057,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Applied Philosophy","volume":"43 1","pages":"54-74"},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2025-04-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/japp.70012","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"147268943","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Nudging and Inequality: Examining the Heterogeneous Effects of Behavioural Interventions on Low Socio-economic Status Individuals 轻推与不平等：检查行为干预对低社会经济地位个体的异质效应
IF 0.9 2区 哲学
Journal of Applied Philosophy Pub Date : 2025-04-16 DOI: 10.1111/japp.70015
Viviana Ponce de León Solís
{"title":"Nudging and Inequality: Examining the Heterogeneous Effects of Behavioural Interventions on Low Socio-economic Status Individuals","authors":"Viviana Ponce de León Solís","doi":"10.1111/japp.70015","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/japp.70015","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 \u0000 <p>This article explores the heterogeneous effects of nudging interventions on individuals from low socio-economic status (SES) backgrounds, addressing a significant gap in the existing literature on behavioural policy. While nudges are widely implemented across various social domains due to their perceived efficiency and low cost, their effectiveness can vary greatly among different demographic groups. The analysis identifies three hypotheses regarding low SES individuals' responses to nudging: they may be more susceptible, less susceptible, or exhibit similar susceptibility to nudges compared to higher SES groups. By examining the implications of these disparities, the article underscores the potential for nudging strategies to unintentionally reinforce existing inequalities or stigmatize vulnerable populations. Ethical considerations are discussed, highlighting the necessity for policymakers to design nudges with an acute awareness of the unique barriers faced by low SES individuals. Ultimately, this research advocates for a shift away from the conventional ‘one-size-fits-all’ approach towards more nuanced, context-sensitive nudging interventions that effectively address the needs and challenges of marginalized groups, emphasizing the importance of targeted strategies in promoting equitable outcomes.</p>\u0000 </div>","PeriodicalId":47057,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Applied Philosophy","volume":"42 4","pages":"1094-1110"},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2025-04-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144897236","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
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