{"title":"Mary Warnock and ‘Public Philosophy’","authors":"David Archard","doi":"10.1111/japp.12747","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/japp.12747","url":null,"abstract":"<p>This article responds to the familiar characterisation of Mary Warnock as someone whose major achievements as a public intellectual, such as the Report on human fertilisation and embryology, were at the expense of philosophical rigour and integrity. I explicate her lifelong commitment to practical morality, and her understanding of ethics and of the role of feelings in moral judgments, before analysing her important distinction between the private and public moral attitude. ‘Public philosophy’ is what she believes is necessary for those seeking to make a difference in the world of law and policy. I highlight the importance for her of securing ‘acceptable’ legal outcomes, especially on issues of bioscientific development which are the subject of irreconcilable moral disagreements. I compare her distinction with others and contrast its use with relevant writing by John Rawls and Thomas Nagel. Finally, I defend her against misjudged criticism from her philosophical contemporaries, most notably Richard Hare.</p>","PeriodicalId":47057,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Applied Philosophy","volume":"41 5","pages":"751-766"},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2024-06-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/japp.12747","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142665095","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Who Counts in Official Statistics? Ethical-Epistemic Issues in German Migration and the Collection of Racial or Ethnic Data","authors":"Daniel James, Morgan Thompson, Tereza Hendl","doi":"10.1111/japp.12737","DOIUrl":"10.1111/japp.12737","url":null,"abstract":"<p>In European countries (excluding the UK and Ireland), official statistics do not use racial or ethnic categories, but instead rely on proxies to collect data about discrimination. In the German microcensus, the proxy category adopted is ‘migration background’ (<i>Migrationshintergrund</i>): an individual has a ‘migration background’ when one or more of their parents does not have German citizenship by birth. We apply a coupled ethical-epistemic analysis to the ‘migration background’ category to illuminate how the epistemic issues contribute to ethical ones. Our central claim is that these ethical-epistemic issues with the ‘migration background’ category are best analysed in terms of Charles Mills's ‘white ignorance’. Appealing to Annette Martín's structural account of white ignorance, we highlight the cyclical reinforcement of ignorance and racial injustice in the use of the ‘migration background’ variable. Colourblind eliminativism about race perpetuates the use of ‘migration background’, which sustains and intensifies racial injustices.</p>","PeriodicalId":47057,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Applied Philosophy","volume":"42 1","pages":"155-174"},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2024-05-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/japp.12737","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141152181","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Indirect Discrimination and the Hospital Relocation Cases","authors":"Brian Hutler","doi":"10.1111/japp.12740","DOIUrl":"10.1111/japp.12740","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 \u0000 <p>This article develops a theory of indirect discrimination by analyzing a series of lawsuits that challenged hospital relocations in the 1970s. In these cases, civil rights groups argued that the relocation of hospitals from cities to suburbs was a form of racial discrimination. Although these lawsuits failed, I aim to support the plaintiffs' arguments that the hospital relocations were discriminatory. Drawing on three recent theories – those of Benjamin Eidelson, Deborah Hellman, and Sophia Moreau – I develop an account of indirect discrimination that is rooted in resource-specific equality rights such as those found in international human rights law. Building on this account, I argue that the human right to health equity can explain why the hospital relocations were discriminatory.</p>\u0000 </div>","PeriodicalId":47057,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Applied Philosophy","volume":"42 1","pages":"175-196"},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2024-05-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141116651","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Offensive Heritage in an Era of Globalization and Mass Migration","authors":"Dan Demetriou, Ajume Wingo","doi":"10.1111/japp.12738","DOIUrl":"10.1111/japp.12738","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Essays on the ethics of monuments tend to focus on their morality in relation to domestic populations. In this article we turn our attention to how the principles we favor for the ‘ingroup’ apply to various ‘outgroups’, including foreigners and foreign governments, guest workers, visiting scholars, forcibly annexed or colonized peoples, and migrant communities. It argues that nations have a <i>prima facie</i> moral right to erect and maintain monuments offensive to foreigners and foreign governments or (in the case of institutions) rivals. Furthermore, we hold that whereas prospective immigrants have little standing to advocate for the removal of monuments they find offensive in their receiving countries, those who have been forcibly annexed have a much greater claim to inoffensive memorialization, contingent on their willingness to be countrymen with the descendants of their former oppressors and principles of reasonably charitable interpretation. Lastly, the article advocates for the protection of heritage landscapes from foreign influence and highlights the responsibilities of migrant populations to avoid memorializing their old grievances in ways that undermine the interests of their adopted nations.</p>","PeriodicalId":47057,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Applied Philosophy","volume":"42 2","pages":"601-619"},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2024-05-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/japp.12738","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140979979","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"How to Pool Risks across Generations: The Case for Collective Pensions. M. Otsuka, 2023. Oxford, Oxford University Press. viii + 109 pp, £40.00 (hb)","authors":"Ezekiel Vergara","doi":"10.1111/japp.12739","DOIUrl":"10.1111/japp.12739","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":47057,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Applied Philosophy","volume":"41 4","pages":"748-750"},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2024-05-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140931055","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Practices of Truth in Philosophy: Historical and Comparative Perspectives. P. Gori and L. Serini, 2024. New York, Routledge. 301 pp, £104.00 (hb)","authors":"Aftab Yunis Hakim","doi":"10.1111/japp.12736","DOIUrl":"10.1111/japp.12736","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":47057,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Applied Philosophy","volume":"41 4","pages":"745-747"},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2024-05-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140931053","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The Minors Strike: Reflections on the Limits and Legitimacy of Children's Political Action","authors":"Tim Fowler","doi":"10.1111/japp.12735","DOIUrl":"10.1111/japp.12735","url":null,"abstract":"<p>This article considers the morality of children's activism, in particular via participation in political protests. In Section 3 of the article I consider whether children can be competent to engage in activism. I argue that even if we believe children are not competent to vote it will still be true that many children are indeed competent to engage in activism. In Section 4 I consider the wellbeing effects of activism on children. I argue that political activity stands in tension with achieving the intrinsic goods of childhood, meaning there is an important sense in which activism is bad for children. However, I show that these negative outcomes flow from being made aware of the injustices in society, and that for politicised children activism is often highly beneficial.</p>","PeriodicalId":47057,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Applied Philosophy","volume":"41 5","pages":"897-908"},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2024-04-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/japp.12735","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140833366","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Interpreting ‘What One Would Have Wanted’","authors":"Stephanie Beardman","doi":"10.1111/japp.12734","DOIUrl":"10.1111/japp.12734","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 \u0000 <p>When making decisions on behalf of someone, is asking what they would have wanted a good way to respect their autonomy? Against prevalent assumptions, I argue that in decisions about the care and treatment of those with advanced dementia, the notion of ‘what one would have wanted’ is conceptually, epistemically, and practically problematic. The problem stems from the disparity between the first-person subjectivity of the past person and that of the present person. The transformative nature of dementia renders the very meaning of ‘what the patient would have wanted’ problematic. When applied to those with advanced dementia, the subjunctive notion is either (i) incoherent, (ii) fundamentally indeterminate, or (iii) normatively irrelevant.</p>\u0000 </div>","PeriodicalId":47057,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Applied Philosophy","volume":"41 5","pages":"880-896"},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2024-04-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140675780","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Social Reasons","authors":"Kevin Richardson","doi":"10.1111/japp.12732","DOIUrl":"10.1111/japp.12732","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 \u0000 <p>The goal of this article is to motivate the idea of a social reason and demonstrate its usefulness in social theorizing. For example, in a society that values getting married young, the fact that one is young is a reason to get married. In racist and sexist societies, we have social reasons to be racist and sexist. Social reasons give rise to social requirements and obligations, where these requirements often conflict with prudential and moral requirements. My application of reasons to social philosophy parallels Charles Mills' and Carole Pateman's applications of social contract theory to political philosophy. While they use social contract theory to make sense of patriarchy and white supremacy, I use the theory of normative reasons to make sense of social injustice. The theory of normative reasons meets non-ideal theory.</p>\u0000 </div>","PeriodicalId":47057,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Applied Philosophy","volume":"41 5","pages":"863-879"},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2024-04-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140580630","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Moral Gratitude","authors":"Romy Eskens","doi":"10.1111/japp.12733","DOIUrl":"10.1111/japp.12733","url":null,"abstract":"<p>There are many examples of persons who appear to be grateful to other people's benefactors. In at least some of these examples, such third-party gratitude also seems fitting. However, these observations conflict with a widespread assumption in the philosophical literature about gratitude: that only beneficiaries can be fittingly grateful to benefactors. In this article, I argue that third-party gratitude exists and can be fitting, and that the assumption is therefore mistaken. More specifically, I defend two claims: (i) that there exists a kind of gratitude to benefactors that is experienced by third parties in their capacities as moral agents (‘moral gratitude’); and (ii) that what makes this kind of gratitude fitting is the fact that, in benefitting the beneficiaries, the benefactors are responding to values that we, as moral agents, each have reason to care about and to want to see promoted.</p>","PeriodicalId":47057,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Applied Philosophy","volume":"42 1","pages":"115-130"},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2024-04-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/japp.12733","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140580719","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}