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Edibility and In Vitro Meat: Ethical Considerations. Rachel Robison-Greene, 2022. Lanham, Lexington Books. x + 150 pp, £73.00 (hb) 可食用性和体外肉:伦理考虑。RachelRobison高格林在2022年。兰哈姆，列克星敦出版社。X + 150页，73.00英镑(磅)
IF 1.1 2区 哲学
Journal of Applied Philosophy Pub Date : 2023-08-14 DOI: 10.1111/japp.12686
Kyle Johannsen
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引用次数: 0
Justice for Animals: Our Collective Responsibility. Martha Nussbaum, 2023. New York, Simon & Schuster. 400 pp, $28.99 (hb) 为动物伸张正义:我们的集体责任。MarthaNussbaum, 2023年。纽约，西蒙与舒斯特出版社，400页，28.99美元
IF 1.1 2区 哲学
Journal of Applied Philosophy Pub Date : 2023-08-10 DOI: 10.1111/japp.12687
B.V.E. Hyde
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引用次数: 0
Why Refugees Should Be Enfranchised 为什么难民应该被赋予公民权
IF 1.1 2区 哲学
Journal of Applied Philosophy Pub Date : 2023-08-08 DOI: 10.1111/japp.12682
Zsolt Kapelner
{"title":"Why Refugees Should Be Enfranchised","authors":"Zsolt Kapelner","doi":"10.1111/japp.12682","DOIUrl":"10.1111/japp.12682","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Many authors argue that refugees should be enfranchised independently of citizenship. The enfranchisement of refugees is often seen as crucial for affirming their agency in the politics of asylum. However, most arguments in the literature do not explain why precisely it matters that they exercise their agency in the realm of democratic decision-making, i.e. why it matters that refugees participate in collectively wielding the public power to which they are subjected, rather than passively enjoy protection against the excessive and intrusive exercise of this power. This leaves it unclear what value refugee enfranchisement realises precisely, and what function or role it is meant to play within the overall provision of asylum. My goal is to propose a plausible explanation of the significance of democratic inclusion from the viewpoint of refugees' agency. I argue that refugee enfranchisement affirms refugees' agency by advancing their interest in acting as makers of justice within the political context in which they find themselves.</p>","PeriodicalId":47057,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Applied Philosophy","volume":"41 1","pages":"106-121"},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2023-08-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/japp.12682","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47363301","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
When Is Work Unjust? Confronting the Choice between ‘Pluralistic’ and ‘Unifying’ Approaches 工作何时不公正？直面“多元”与“统一”的选择
IF 1.1 2区 哲学
Journal of Applied Philosophy Pub Date : 2023-08-08 DOI: 10.1111/japp.12684
Sarah C. Goff
{"title":"When Is Work Unjust? Confronting the Choice between ‘Pluralistic’ and ‘Unifying’ Approaches","authors":"Sarah C. Goff","doi":"10.1111/japp.12684","DOIUrl":"10.1111/japp.12684","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Individuals have different experiences of work when they are self-employed, when they perform tasks in the gig economy, and when they follow directives from managers. But such differences are not represented in some of the most prominent non-ideal theories of work. These describe workers as a coherent group, with a position in the structure of the liberal capitalist economy. I present an alternative that does better at acknowledging difference, through a description of work and workers that has greater ‘pluralism’ and less ‘unifying coherence’. Some might insist that their ‘unifying’ description has superior empirical plausibility. But if ‘pluralistic’ descriptions are valid rivals to provide an accurate characterization of our current condition, then we should consider whether their use in theory can serve valuable aims. I identify the distinctive and valuable non-ideal aims – epistemic, evaluative, and normative – that can be pursued with ‘pluralistic’ descriptions of work and workers.</p>","PeriodicalId":47057,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Applied Philosophy","volume":"41 2","pages":"218-234"},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2023-08-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/japp.12684","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41864415","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Non-Ideal Epistemology. Robin McKenna, 2023. Oxford, Oxford University Press. 224 pp, £60.00 (hb) 这不是理想的情感学。RobinMcKenna，2023年。牛津大学出版社。224 pp，£60.00（hb）
IF 1.1 2区 哲学
Journal of Applied Philosophy Pub Date : 2023-08-02 DOI: 10.1111/japp.12680
Jack Idris Sagar
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引用次数: 0
Robot Ethics. M. Coeckelbergh, 2022. Cambridge, MIT Press. vii + 191 pp, $16.95 (pb) 机器人伦理M.Coeckelbergh，2022。剑桥，麻省理工学院出版社。每件+191，16.95美元
IF 1.1 2区 哲学
Journal of Applied Philosophy Pub Date : 2023-08-02 DOI: 10.1111/japp.12681
Nicholas Barrow
{"title":"Robot Ethics. M. Coeckelbergh, 2022. Cambridge, MIT Press. vii + 191 pp, $16.95 (pb)","authors":"Nicholas Barrow","doi":"10.1111/japp.12681","DOIUrl":"10.1111/japp.12681","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":47057,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Applied Philosophy","volume":"40 5","pages":"970-972"},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2023-08-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49613096","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Online Hate: Is Hate an Infectious Disease? Is Social Media a Promoter? 网络仇恨:仇恨是一种传染病吗?社交媒体是推动者吗?
IF 1.1 2区 哲学
Journal of Applied Philosophy Pub Date : 2023-07-25 DOI: 10.1111/japp.12679
Mihaela Popa-Wyatt
{"title":"Online Hate: Is Hate an Infectious Disease? Is Social Media a Promoter?","authors":"Mihaela Popa-Wyatt","doi":"10.1111/japp.12679","DOIUrl":"10.1111/japp.12679","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Our time is marked by a resurgence of hate that threatens to increase oppression. Social media has contributed to this by acting as a medium through which hate speech is spread. How should we model the spread of hate? This article considers two models. First, I consider a simple contagion model. In this model, hate spreads like a virus through a social network. This model, however, fails to capture the fact that people do not acquire hatred from a single infectious contact. Instead, it builds up in a person's beliefs and attitudes through time until the infection reaches a level where the subject themselves becomes a generator of hate speech. Second, to accommodate this, I consider an alternative model known as <i>complex contagion</i>. I argue that not only is a complex contagion model more explanatory and predictive, but it can be used to explain why certain features of social media cause it to be a promoter of hate. I conclude by sketching some mitigation strategies.</p>","PeriodicalId":47057,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Applied Philosophy","volume":"40 5","pages":"788-812"},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2023-07-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"63360542","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
A Dissolution of the Repugnant Conclusion 撤销排斥结论
IF 1.1 2区 哲学
Journal of Applied Philosophy Pub Date : 2023-07-14 DOI: 10.1111/japp.12675
Roberto Fumagalli
{"title":"A Dissolution of the Repugnant Conclusion","authors":"Roberto Fumagalli","doi":"10.1111/japp.12675","DOIUrl":"10.1111/japp.12675","url":null,"abstract":"<p>This article articulates and defends a dissolution of the so-called repugnant conclusion, which focuses on the notion of life worth living figuring both in Parfit's formulation of the repugnant conclusion and in most responses to such a conclusion. The proposed dissolution demonstrates that the notion of life worth living is plagued by multiple ambiguities and that these ambiguities, in turn, hamper meaningful debate about both the issue of whether the repugnant conclusion can be avoided and the issue of whether the repugnant conclusion is actually repugnant. This result does not exclude that some modified versions of the repugnant conclusion may yield valuable insights about the value of populations and the tenability of different axiological/ethical theories. Still, if the proposed dissolution is correct, then the repugnant conclusion rests on an ill-defined notion and we lack the information required to assess the merits of the repugnant conclusion.</p>","PeriodicalId":47057,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Applied Philosophy","volume":"41 1","pages":"85-105"},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2023-07-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/japp.12675","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45547630","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Throwing the Embryos out with the Bathwater? A Novel Evaluation of the Value of Embryos 把胚胎和洗澡水一起倒掉?胚胎价值的新评价
IF 0.7 2区 哲学
Journal of Applied Philosophy Pub Date : 2023-07-14 DOI: 10.1111/japp.12672
Megan Kitts
{"title":"Throwing the Embryos out with the Bathwater? A Novel Evaluation of the Value of Embryos","authors":"Megan Kitts","doi":"10.1111/japp.12672","DOIUrl":"10.1111/japp.12672","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 \u0000 <p>As a growing number of embryos collect in fertility clinics, it is imperative to evaluate the permissibility of available options for genetic parents and fertility institutions. Much of the discussion on appropriate treatment of embryos has focused on the circumstances under which it is permissible to destroy embryos for instrumental purposes, and thus has little application to the fertility context. I aim to develop a new account of the value of embryos whereby embryos have final value in virtue of their relationship to persons that could exist. I call this symbolic value. To establish this value, I first show that corpses have this same symbolic value in virtue of their relationship to prior persons, and then show that the cases of corpses and embryos are relevantly similar. Because of this value, we ought to treat embryos in particular respectful ways. It is currently common practice in the United States to simply discard extra embryos that exist as a result of <i>in vitro</i> fertilization. I argue it is generally impermissible to simply discard embryos because it is an act of disrespect and does not treat them in accordance with their value.</p>\u0000 </div>","PeriodicalId":47057,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Applied Philosophy","volume":"41 5","pages":"767-784"},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2023-07-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45327164","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
‘I Am a Man’: Countering Oppression through Appeal to Kind Membership “我是一个男人”：通过呼吁善意会员来对抗压迫
IF 1.1 2区 哲学
Journal of Applied Philosophy Pub Date : 2023-07-13 DOI: 10.1111/japp.12678
Suzy Killmister
{"title":"‘I Am a Man’: Countering Oppression through Appeal to Kind Membership","authors":"Suzy Killmister","doi":"10.1111/japp.12678","DOIUrl":"10.1111/japp.12678","url":null,"abstract":"<p>All too often, social kinds function as sites of oppression. To be a woman, to be Black, to be trans – each, in its own way, situates someone at the lower end of a social hierarchy. Membership in such groups thus constitutes a liability: notwithstanding the goods people draw from sharing in these identities, they also stand at perpetual risk of those same identities exposing them to significant harm. What, if anything, can members of oppressed groups do to counter that oppression? In this article I explore one possible strategy: people can – and do – strategically invoke their membership in what I call ‘anti-oppressive kinds’, in order to contest the oppression they face <i>qua</i> members of oppressed groups. Focusing on one particularly salient anti-oppressive kind, the human, I first offer an explanation as to how and why its invocation might be politically effective, before considering some hazards with its use.</p>","PeriodicalId":47057,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Applied Philosophy","volume":"40 5","pages":"919-935"},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2023-07-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43833915","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
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