Journal of Applied Philosophy最新文献

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Something AI Should Tell You – The Case for Labelling Synthetic Content 人工智能应该告诉你的事情--合成内容标签化的理由
IF 0.7 2区 哲学
Journal of Applied Philosophy Pub Date : 2024-08-18 DOI: 10.1111/japp.12758
Sarah A. Fisher
{"title":"Something AI Should Tell You – The Case for Labelling Synthetic Content","authors":"Sarah A. Fisher","doi":"10.1111/japp.12758","DOIUrl":"10.1111/japp.12758","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Synthetic content, which has been produced by generative artificial intelligence, is beginning to spread through the public sphere. Increasingly, we find ourselves exposed to convincing ‘deepfakes’ and powerful chatbots in our online environments. How should we mitigate the emerging risks to individuals and society? This article argues that labelling synthetic content in public forums is an essential first step. While calls for labelling have already been growing in volume, no principled argument has yet been offered to justify this measure (which inevitably comes with some additional costs). Rectifying that deficit, I conduct a close examination of our epistemic and expressive interests in identifying synthetic content as such. In so doing, I develop a cumulative case for social media platforms to enforce a labelling duty. I argue that this represents an important element of good platform governance, helping to shore up the integrity of our contemporary public discourse, which takes place increasingly online.</p>","PeriodicalId":47057,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Applied Philosophy","volume":"42 1","pages":"272-286"},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2024-08-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/japp.12758","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142188669","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Why it Can Be Permissible to Have Kids in the Climate Emergency 为什么在气候紧急情况下可以生孩子?
IF 0.7 2区 哲学
Journal of Applied Philosophy Pub Date : 2024-08-14 DOI: 10.1111/japp.12756
Elizabeth Cripps
{"title":"Why it Can Be Permissible to Have Kids in the Climate Emergency","authors":"Elizabeth Cripps","doi":"10.1111/japp.12756","DOIUrl":"10.1111/japp.12756","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Having a child is one of the highest-carbon decisions made by affluent individuals. Does this uncomfortable fact mean they should limit biological family size? This salient question also forces attention to two key issues. One is just <i>how</i> demanding individual climate justice duties are. The other is the danger of ‘ivory tower’ reasoning by privileged philosophers. On some topics, it is imperative carefully to integrate philosophical discussion with sociological and psychological research. Assuming individual climate justice duties include cutting one's carbon impact, the discussion goes as follows. Should affluent couples and individuals have no biological children, because of the carbon cost? Not unless emissions-cutting duties are extremely demanding, or we make dangerous, generalised socio-psychological assumptions. Is there any individual duty to consider carbon impact when determining family size? Yes, because individual emissions-cutting duties are more than trivially demanding. Should all duty-bearers ‘stop at’ some fixed maximum number of biological kids? Not unless that number is one and we are prepared to accept very demanding individual emissions-cutting duties <i>and</i> make problematic sociological assumptions. Finally, the article outlines three further individual duties following from the ‘uncomfortable fact’: to raise good climate citizens, become activists, and cut the family carbon footprint.</p>","PeriodicalId":47057,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Applied Philosophy","volume":"42 1","pages":"24-43"},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2024-08-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/japp.12756","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142188671","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Entitled to Love: Relationships, Commandability, and Obligation 爱的权利关系、命令性和义务
IF 0.7 2区 哲学
Journal of Applied Philosophy Pub Date : 2024-08-12 DOI: 10.1111/japp.12752
Anna Hartford, Dan J. Stein
{"title":"Entitled to Love: Relationships, Commandability, and Obligation","authors":"Anna Hartford,&nbsp;Dan J. Stein","doi":"10.1111/japp.12752","DOIUrl":"10.1111/japp.12752","url":null,"abstract":"<p>The notion of uncommandability has been central to how we perceive our emotional lives, and particularly romantic love. According to this notion, while we can control how we treat people, we have little control over how we <i>feel</i> about them. The argument from uncommandability is often evoked as a way of sidestepping moral obligations regarding our romantic emotions. One challenge to uncommandability is the potential to manipulate our emotions through psychopharmaceuticals. Much of the debate on so-called ‘love drugs’ has concerned the permissibility and worth of these interventions. By comparison, there has been less exploration of their implications for moral obligation and responsibility. How might the emergence of these interventions change what can be emotionally demanded of us? We ultimately suggest that it is necessary to view the complex morality of our emotional lives through different evaluative paradigms: one concerning moral duty and obligation, where we have no claim to each other's romantic love irrespective of its commandability, and the other concerning the appropriateness of our reactive attitudes, where we are at times justified in feeling morally injured by another person on account of their failure to love us, regardless of whether they had control in the matter.</p>","PeriodicalId":47057,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Applied Philosophy","volume":"42 1","pages":"234-249"},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2024-08-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/japp.12752","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142224623","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Procreative Obligations and the Directed Duty of Care 生育义务和定向照管责任
IF 0.7 2区 哲学
Journal of Applied Philosophy Pub Date : 2024-08-11 DOI: 10.1111/japp.12755
Reuven Brandt
{"title":"Procreative Obligations and the Directed Duty of Care","authors":"Reuven Brandt","doi":"10.1111/japp.12755","DOIUrl":"10.1111/japp.12755","url":null,"abstract":"<p>There is much dispute about what we owe the children we are responsible for creating. Some argue that so long as we provide offspring with lives worth living we do no wrong. Others argue that our procreative obligations are weightier and oblige us to provide (or attempt to provide) our offspring with a reasonable opportunity to thrive, or meet some other standard beyond merely providing a life worth living. Our practices and intuitions on this matter are inconsistent. For example, gamete donors who intentionally participate in the project of creating a child are thought to have few obligations to their offspring, but those who create a child accidentally are thought to have weighty obligations. Furthermore, a justification for why we are obliged to provide offspring with more than a life worth living has been elusive. To resolve this puzzle I argue that an under-theorized element of morality, the directed duty of care, explains why we owe our offspring more than a life worth living.</p>","PeriodicalId":47057,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Applied Philosophy","volume":"41 5","pages":"785-803"},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2024-08-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/japp.12755","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141943781","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
On the Morality of Enjoying Simulated Rape with Robots and by Other Fictional Means 论通过机器人和其他虚构手段享受模拟强奸的道德性
IF 0.7 2区 哲学
Journal of Applied Philosophy Pub Date : 2024-08-06 DOI: 10.1111/japp.12751
Garry Young
{"title":"On the Morality of Enjoying Simulated Rape with Robots and by Other Fictional Means","authors":"Garry Young","doi":"10.1111/japp.12751","DOIUrl":"10.1111/japp.12751","url":null,"abstract":"<p>I argue that there is no morally relevant difference, based solely on motivation for enjoyment, between enjoying simulated rape with a sexbot compared to other media. In defence of this claim, I distinguish between two types of enjoyment – enjoyment <i>qua</i> simulation and enjoyment <i>qua</i> substitution – and further claim that each type of enjoyment shares corresponding similarities with either idle or surrogate fantasies. Given this, the enjoyment of one's rape fantasy is, I contend, immoral if one enjoys <i>qua</i> substitution one's surrogate fantasy about (for example) sexualized enslavement and rape, but not if one enjoys <i>qua</i> simulation one's idle fantasy about the same sexualized enslavement and rape. I therefore conclude that whether one's <i>enjoyment</i> is immoral depends on the motivation for the enjoyment and the type of fantasy one creates to procure it (where the motivation for enjoyment and fantasy share the same desire), and not the media used to facilitate one's fantasy and subsequent enjoyment.</p>","PeriodicalId":47057,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Applied Philosophy","volume":"42 1","pages":"217-233"},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2024-08-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/japp.12751","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141943782","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Thoughtfulness and the Rule of Law. J. Waldron, 2023. Cambridge, Harvard University Press. 336 pp, $49.00 (hb) 深思熟虑与法治。J.Waldron,2023 年。剑桥,哈佛大学出版社。336 pp, $49.00 (hb)
IF 0.7 2区 哲学
Journal of Applied Philosophy Pub Date : 2024-08-02 DOI: 10.1111/japp.12754
Eric Scarffe
{"title":"Thoughtfulness and the Rule of Law. J. Waldron, 2023. Cambridge, Harvard University Press. 336 pp, $49.00 (hb)","authors":"Eric Scarffe","doi":"10.1111/japp.12754","DOIUrl":"10.1111/japp.12754","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":47057,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Applied Philosophy","volume":"41 5","pages":"925-927"},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2024-08-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141884625","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Respect and Asylum 尊重与庇护
IF 0.7 2区 哲学
Journal of Applied Philosophy Pub Date : 2024-07-02 DOI: 10.1111/japp.12750
Rebecca Buxton
{"title":"Respect and Asylum","authors":"Rebecca Buxton","doi":"10.1111/japp.12750","DOIUrl":"10.1111/japp.12750","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Asylum seekers are rarely treated with respect. This is perhaps especially true of institutions that adjudicate the extension of refugee status. In asylum interviews, those seeking refuge are sometimes asked to reveal deeply upsetting stories of their persecution while facing hostility and distrust from their interviewers. I argue that this arises from a failure to properly balance respect with fairness. A maximally fair scheme may not promote respect because ‘fairness-first’ systems require extensive information to make their judgements. A maximally respectful system might be unfair: without any questioning, some may free-ride on the trust of others. This article argues that we often place too much emphasis on fairness to the detriment of respect, with a particular focus on the asylum interview. First, I outline the limited discussion of asylum interviews in political philosophy. Second, I consider striking a ‘dynamic balance’ between fairness and respect, as set out by Jonathan Wolff. Third, I argue that a highly idealised version of contemporary asylum interviews puts fairness first at the cost of respect. This fairness-first model leads to respect deficits in how asylum seekers are treated. Finally, I consider what a respectful asylum determination system might look like, offering three possible routes: civility, humility, and abolition.</p>","PeriodicalId":47057,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Applied Philosophy","volume":"41 5","pages":"909-924"},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2024-07-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/japp.12750","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141515611","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Polyamory in Black: A Companion Justification for Minimal Marriage 黑色多角恋最低限度婚姻的配套理由
IF 0.7 2区 哲学
Journal of Applied Philosophy Pub Date : 2024-06-26 DOI: 10.1111/japp.12749
Justin L. Clardy
{"title":"Polyamory in Black: A Companion Justification for Minimal Marriage","authors":"Justin L. Clardy","doi":"10.1111/japp.12749","DOIUrl":"10.1111/japp.12749","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 \u0000 <p>A number of Black writers have cast Black marriage in a state of emergency – Black folks are not getting (or staying) married like they used to. Yet in seeking to address the Black marriage problem many have left marriage's ‘monogamous-only’ condition unexamined. In this article, I take a different approach. I draw on a long-standing prevalence of <i>de facto</i> non-monogamy among those marked Black and argue that the numerical constraint making marriage between two people violates equal treatment. To make the case, I show how anti-non-monogamy attitudes have been racialized in ways that are expressive of anti-Blackness. In my view, the effects of this racialization include ongoing and disproportionate impacts on an already burdened group – Black polyamorists. A failure to reform the monogamous-only condition of marriage tacitly endorses anti-non-monogamous attitudes of the past where Black intimate relationships were thought inferior and therefore deserving of an inferior social standing. Finally, I look to an account of minimal marriage as a site of possibility for establishing a marriage institution that is more just in relation to equal treatment and a site of repair for racialized non-monogamists whose historical denial to accessing marriage has had the effect of accumulated social and political disadvantage.</p>\u0000 </div>","PeriodicalId":47057,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Applied Philosophy","volume":"42 3","pages":"777-794"},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2024-06-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141501957","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
The Epistemology of Corporate Power: The Limits of the Firm–State Analogy 公司权力的认识论:公司与国家类比的局限性
IF 0.7 2区 哲学
Journal of Applied Philosophy Pub Date : 2024-06-24 DOI: 10.1111/japp.12748
Chi Kwok
{"title":"The Epistemology of Corporate Power: The Limits of the Firm–State Analogy","authors":"Chi Kwok","doi":"10.1111/japp.12748","DOIUrl":"10.1111/japp.12748","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Political theorists frequently utilize the ‘firm–state analogy’ (FSA) to support the arguments for democratic governance in firms. This article presents the FSA as an analogy with both justificatory and epistemic functions. Its justificatory function provides valid justificatory strategies for workplace democracy, while its epistemic function offers models that shape the understanding of corporate power. In this article, four limitations of the justificatory function of the FSA are identified: (i) the problem of ambiguity, (ii) the boundary problem, (iii) the issue of normative redundancy, and (iv) the universality problem. Furthermore, the article argues that the epistemic function of the FSA fails to adequately address some of the most concerning forms of corporate power wielded by large, particularly multinational, corporations in the realm of international trade. As a result, the FSA misses crucial reasons for the normative desirability of democracy in corporate governance.</p>","PeriodicalId":47057,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Applied Philosophy","volume":"42 1","pages":"197-216"},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2024-06-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/japp.12748","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141501958","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Our Statues of Wrongdoers 我们的违法者雕像
IF 0.7 2区 哲学
Journal of Applied Philosophy Pub Date : 2024-06-19 DOI: 10.1111/japp.12746
Craig K. Agule
{"title":"Our Statues of Wrongdoers","authors":"Craig K. Agule","doi":"10.1111/japp.12746","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/japp.12746","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Many of those memorialized around us in statues are wrongdoers, and so we are often called to consider whether we should take down those statues. Some of those statutes are memorialized for reasons now taken to be wrong; others are memorialized not for but rather despite their wrongdoing. How should we consider those latter cases? One tempting analysis suggests that we need only consider whether the wrongdoing was sufficiently transgressive. In this article, however, I reject that constrained focus. Instead, these cases have as much to do with us, our priorities, and what those priorities should be as they have to do with the particulars of the lives of the subjects of the statues. Recognizing the central role that our priorities play in blame and condemnation better captures the contours of the debate about statue removal than any categorical rule about types of wrongs.</p>","PeriodicalId":47057,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Applied Philosophy","volume":"42 2","pages":"564-580"},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2024-06-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/japp.12746","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144140512","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
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