{"title":"Destigmatizing Stigma: A Reply to Allison","authors":"Roger López","doi":"10.1111/japp.70045","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/japp.70045","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 \u0000 <p>This article deals with the moral evaluation of stigma. I respond to Euan Allison's recent critique of stigma, calling into question his major arguments for its wrongness. Allison's foundational premise is that stigma is wrong because it fails to treat the stigmatized as individuals. He accepts that stigma denies the autonomy of those it attaches to but concludes that its distinctive wrongness lies in the harm it does to their agency by limiting their ability to self-present. I challenge these criticisms, arguing that stigma can actually be quite congenial to acknowledging the individuality and autonomy of the stigmatized, and questioning whether limitations on one's ability to self-present are necessarily harms. I conclude by suggesting that stigma should be evaluated morally on different grounds than those Allison employs, such as the value of the ends it pursues and its ability to fulfill them.</p>\u0000 </div>","PeriodicalId":47057,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Applied Philosophy","volume":"43 1","pages":"146-156"},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2025-09-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"146224175","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Permissible Purchasing, Obligatory Abstention: The Strict Vegan Case against New Omnivorism","authors":"Daniel White","doi":"10.1111/japp.70044","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/japp.70044","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Recent developments in consumer ethics have given rise to a new breed of animal protectionist: the new omnivore. These new wave animal protectionists claim that strict veganism is impermissible for the very reason that typically motivates strict veganism; that is, animal protectionism. To the strict vegan, such a position will seem highly implausible, for many who adopt strict vegan practices do so because of deeply held animal-regarding convictions. Yet the new omnivore appeals to plausible common-sense principles of harm to justify their claims. In this article I tackle the newest variant of this argument, that animal protectionists are required to abandon veganism, instead consuming a plethora of everyday animal-based products that will otherwise go to waste, because the alternative (buying plant-based products) involves harm to animals in arable agriculture. To do this I advance three central claims: (i) that a principle of new omnivorous ethical consumption is implausible when taken seriously, (ii) that non-ideal circumstances mean that a plausible consumer ethic will standardly permit purchasing plant products, even when such purchases generate harms to animals, and (iii) that we have non-trivial reasons, based in complicity, to not consume animal products, even if they will otherwise go to waste.</p>","PeriodicalId":47057,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Applied Philosophy","volume":"43 1","pages":"128-145"},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2025-08-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/japp.70044","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"146224516","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Moderate Structural Exploitation","authors":"Benjamin Ferguson, Lavender McKittrick-Sweitzer","doi":"10.1111/japp.70034","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/japp.70034","url":null,"abstract":"<p>We consider the apparent inability of theories of exploitation to capture common intuitions about structural exploitation. For example, it seems that consumers participate in the exploitation of sweatshop workers, but there is no direct transaction between the parties. This poses a problem for transactional accounts of exploitation. Many address this problem by appealing to structural exploitation. Existing structural accounts fall, primarily, into two families: weak structural exploitation and strong structural exploitation. We argue neither appropriately captures intuitions about sweatshops. Weak accounts can capture aggregate inequalities but fail to consider relationships or discrete connections. Strong accounts, on the other hand, are sensitive to relationships between exploiters and exploitees, but too demanding about what it takes to exploit to capture consumers' role in sweatshops. We propose a third option, ‘moderate structural exploitation’, that fits ‘between’ existing approaches. Moderate structural exploitation focuses on relationships between the exploited and their exploiter (unlike weak accounts), without appealing to overly strong conditions for who counts as an exploiter (like strong accounts do). We then show that our moderate structural account can not only accommodate intuitions about sweatshops, but also helps assess the exploitation of teachers in the US public education system.</p>","PeriodicalId":47057,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Applied Philosophy","volume":"42 5","pages":"1454-1475"},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2025-08-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/japp.70034","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145429449","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Unexplored Issues in the Ethics of Nudges","authors":"Stefano Calboli, Thaddeus Metz","doi":"10.1111/japp.70043","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/japp.70043","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":47057,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Applied Philosophy","volume":"42 4","pages":"1089-1093"},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2025-08-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144897614","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Jan-Willem van der Rijt, Dimitri Coelho Mollo, Bram Vaassen
{"title":"AI Mimicry and Human Dignity: Chatbot Use as a Violation of Self-Respect","authors":"Jan-Willem van der Rijt, Dimitri Coelho Mollo, Bram Vaassen","doi":"10.1111/japp.70037","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/japp.70037","url":null,"abstract":"<p>This article investigates how human interactions with AI-powered chatbots may offend human dignity. Current chatbots, driven by large language models, mimic human linguistic behaviour but lack the moral and rational capacities essential for genuine interpersonal respect. Human beings are prone to anthropomorphize chatbots – indeed, chatbots appear to be deliberately designed to elicit that response. As a result, human beings' behaviour towards chatbots often resembles behaviours typical of interaction between moral agents. Drawing on a second-personal, relational account of dignity, we argue that interacting with chatbots in this way is incompatible with the dignity of users. We show that, since second-personal respect is premised on reciprocal recognition of second-personal moral authority, behaving towards chatbots in ways that convey second-personal respect is bound to misfire in morally problematic ways, given the lack of reciprocity. Consequently, such chatbot interactions amount to subtle but significant violations of self-respect – the respect we are duty-bound to show for our own dignity. We illustrate this by discussing four actual chatbot use cases (information retrieval, customer service, advising, and companionship), and propound that the increasing societal pressure to engage in such interactions with chatbots poses a hitherto underappreciated threat to human dignity.</p>","PeriodicalId":47057,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Applied Philosophy","volume":"43 1","pages":"95-111"},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2025-08-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/japp.70037","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"146224041","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Animal Rights, Moral Motivation, and the Experience of Wonder","authors":"Steve Cooke","doi":"10.1111/japp.70040","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/japp.70040","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Despite being strong, arguments for animal rights often fail to motivate. One reason for this is that rights are associated with concepts, such as respect, that are difficult to apply to nonhuman animals. These concepts are difficult to apply because they are implicitly grounded in the special status of humans. Respect for persons includes an element of reverence-based respect. The human/animal dichotomy is reinforced by cultural forces and farming practices that strip nonhuman animals of individuality and render their lives mundane, invisible, and uninteresting. To facilitate progress towards justice for nonhuman animals, this article proposes cultivating and safeguarding an attitude of wonder towards individual animals. Feelings of wonder, it is argued, have the potential to spark a shift in moral perspective and ground a form of reverence-based respect for nonhuman animals.</p>","PeriodicalId":47057,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Applied Philosophy","volume":"43 1","pages":"112-127"},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2025-08-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/japp.70040","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"146224042","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Absence: On the Culture and Philosophy of the Far East. B.-C. Han, 2023. Transl. D. Steuer. Cambridge, Polity Press. vii + 115 pp, $51.77 (hb) $12.17 (pb)","authors":"Andreas Vavvos","doi":"10.1111/japp.70038","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/japp.70038","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":47057,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Applied Philosophy","volume":"42 5","pages":"1511-1513"},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2025-08-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145429249","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The Moral Evaluation of Repeated Risks","authors":"Vishnu Sridharan","doi":"10.1111/japp.70036","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/japp.70036","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 \u0000 <p>In this article, I argue that there is a tension between our moral evaluation of risky actions and our moral evaluation of sequences of risky actions. In particular, I argue that both of the following may be true: (1) each particular risky action constituting the sequence is permissible, but (2) the sequence of risky actions is one that the agent ought not to perform. I show how these claims are compatible by distinguishing between the moral evaluation of actions and the moral evaluation of sequences of actions.</p>\u0000 </div>","PeriodicalId":47057,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Applied Philosophy","volume":"42 5","pages":"1496-1510"},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2025-07-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145429445","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}