Evaluating the Free Speech Objection to Removing Tainted Political Symbols

In recent years, several philosophers have argued that statues which are morally tainted ought to be removed from public display. One objection to this claim is the free speech objection: removing the statues constitutes a violation of free speech rights. This objection suffers from two flaws. First, it is rarely articulated to its fullest potential. Second, the free speech objection is largely dismissed by philosophers who support the statues' removal. In this article, I will aim to rectify this situation by providing three different formulations of the free speech objection, based, respectively, on First Amendment jurisprudence, on Mill's consequentialist defense of free speech, and on Susan Dwyer's non-consequentialist defense of the same. After formulating the three versions of the objection, I will consider them against the alleged duty to remove tainted statues and argue that even under the strongest formulation of the free speech objection, it does not amount to a defeater to the duty.