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Objective imperatives. By Ralph Walker 拉尔夫-沃克的评论 客观要求
IF 0.9 2区 哲学
EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY Pub Date : 2024-03-06 DOI: 10.1111/ejop.12941
Lucy Allais
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引用次数: 0
Blaming the dead 指责死者
IF 0.9 2区 哲学
EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY Pub Date : 2024-03-06 DOI: 10.1111/ejop.12947
Anneli Jefferson
{"title":"Blaming the dead","authors":"Anneli Jefferson","doi":"10.1111/ejop.12947","DOIUrl":"10.1111/ejop.12947","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Should moral blame stop at the grave? We often blame the dead for the bad things they did while alive. But blaming the dead poses a prima facie challenge to accounts which take our blaming practices to aim at communicating moral disapproval to wrongdoers or at improving their moral agency. If these kinds of aims are made definitional for blame, blaming the dead becomes impossible. But even on accounts which say that paradigmatically, blame is a form of moral engagement which aims to effect changes in the wrongdoer, blaming the dead may seem unjustified, pointless or even irrational. In this paper, I explain how blaming the dead can be made sense of and justified. However, not all cases of blaming the dead fit this explanation, because blaming the dead is not a homogenous practice.</p>","PeriodicalId":46958,"journal":{"name":"EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2024-03-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/ejop.12947","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140055466","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Kant, race, and racism: Views from somewhere. By Huaping Lu-Adler, Oxford University Press. 2023 康德、种族和种族主义：来自某处的观点。作者：HuapingLu-Adler，牛津大学出版社。2023
IF 0.9 2区 哲学
EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY Pub Date : 2024-03-04 DOI: 10.1111/ejop.12945
Andrew Cooper
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引用次数: 0
Du Châtelet, induction, and Newton's rules for reasoning 杜沙泰莱、归纳法和牛顿的推理规则
IF 0.9 2区 哲学
EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY Pub Date : 2024-03-04 DOI: 10.1111/ejop.12942
Aaron Wells
{"title":"Du Châtelet, induction, and Newton's rules for reasoning","authors":"Aaron Wells","doi":"10.1111/ejop.12942","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/ejop.12942","url":null,"abstract":"I examine Du Châtelet's methodology for physics and metaphysics through the lens of her engagement with Newton's Rules for Reasoning in Natural Philosophy. I first show that her early manuscript writings discuss and endorse these Rules. Then, I argue that her famous published account of hypotheses continues to invoke close analogues of Rules 3 and 4, despite various developments in her position. Once relevant experimental evidence and some basic constraints are met, it is legitimate to inductively generalize from observations; general hypotheses can thereafter be assumed as true until contrary experiments show otherwise. I conclude by arguing that this account of induction plays an essential role in her metaphysics, both in an argument for simple substances—which has an inductive premise—and in her attempt to distinguish acceptable and unacceptable metaphysical commitments.","PeriodicalId":46958,"journal":{"name":"EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2024-03-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140055816","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Phenomenology is explanatory: Science and metascience 现象学是解释性的：科学与元科学
IF 0.9 2区 哲学
EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY Pub Date : 2024-03-01 DOI: 10.1111/ejop.12943
Heath Williams, Thomas Byrne
{"title":"Phenomenology is explanatory: Science and metascience","authors":"Heath Williams, Thomas Byrne","doi":"10.1111/ejop.12943","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/ejop.12943","url":null,"abstract":"This essay disambiguates the relationship between phenomenology and explanation, whereby we uncover a fundamentally new way to understand the function of phenomenology within the sciences. These objectives are accomplished in two stages. First, we propose an original way to interpret Husserl's claim that his phenomenology is non‐explanatory. We demonstrate, contra accepted interpretations, that Husserl did not think phenomenology is non‐explanatory, because it is descriptive or because it does not deal with causes. Instead, we demonstrate that Husserl concluded that phenomenology is non‐explanatory, because it engages in a dialectical process of conceptual clarification. To substantiate this interpretation, we examine how Husserl understood the function of explanation in three different tiers of standard science and how he grasped the role of phenomenology in pure logic. Having properly clarified Husserl's conclusion—that phenomenology is non‐explanatory—we then execute our second task, namely to challenge just that idea. We argue that Husserl has—despite his claims to the contrary—de facto and inadvertently described his phenomenology as an explanatory nomological science. Our paper therefore not only clears up a longstanding misinterpretation of Husserl, but opens a new area of debate concerning the status of phenomenology within the scientific nexus.","PeriodicalId":46958,"journal":{"name":"EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2024-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140055483","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Schlick, intuition, and the history of epistemology 施利克、直觉和认识论史
IF 0.9 2区 哲学
EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY Pub Date : 2024-02-29 DOI: 10.1111/ejop.12940
Andreas Vrahimis
{"title":"Schlick, intuition, and the history of epistemology","authors":"Andreas Vrahimis","doi":"10.1111/ejop.12940","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/ejop.12940","url":null,"abstract":"Maria Rosa Antognazza's work has issued a historical challenge to the thesis that the analysis of knowledge (as justified true belief) attacked by epistemologists from Gettier onwards was indeed the standard view traditionally upheld from Plato onwards. This challenge led to an ongoing reappraisal of the historical significance of intuitive knowledge, in which the knower is intimately connected to what is known. Such traditional accounts of intuition, and their accompanying claims to epistemological primacy, constituted the precise target of Moritz Schlick's critique. Schlick engages with this topic throughout his <jats:italic>oeuvre</jats:italic>, from some of his early epistemological writings, to his anti‐metaphysical stance as a leading Logical Empiricist. Schlick crucially distinguishes knowledge from mere acquaintance, denying that the latter has epistemic status. He therefore argues that the very notion of ‘intuitive knowledge’ is a <jats:italic>contradictio in adjecto</jats:italic>.","PeriodicalId":46958,"journal":{"name":"EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2024-02-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140044529","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Hume and the fiction of the self 休谟与自我的虚构
IF 0.9 2区 哲学
EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY Pub Date : 2024-02-27 DOI: 10.1111/ejop.12939
Matthew Parrott
{"title":"Hume and the fiction of the self","authors":"Matthew Parrott","doi":"10.1111/ejop.12939","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/ejop.12939","url":null,"abstract":"In the <jats:italic>Treatise</jats:italic>, Hume attempts to explain why we all believe that the self is a single unified entity that persists over time, a belief which Hume calls a fiction. In this paper, I demonstrate how Hume uses a type of functional explanation to account for this belief. After explicating Hume's view, I shall argue that it faces two related problems, which constitute a sort of dilemma. In the final section, I show how one of the horns of this dilemma is plausibly what troubles Hume in the famous <jats:italic>Appendix</jats:italic> passage where he retracts his positive account of personal identity.","PeriodicalId":46958,"journal":{"name":"EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2024-02-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140025295","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Husserl on knowing essences: Transworld identity and epistemic progression 胡塞尔论认识本质：跨世界同一性与认识论的进步
IF 0.9 2区 哲学
EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY Pub Date : 2024-02-19 DOI: 10.1111/ejop.12936
Andrew P. Butler
{"title":"Husserl on knowing essences: Transworld identity and epistemic progression","authors":"Andrew P. Butler","doi":"10.1111/ejop.12936","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/ejop.12936","url":null,"abstract":"Husserl's proposed method for knowing the essences of universals, which he calls “free variation,” has been widely criticized for involving viciously circular reasoning. In this paper, I review existing attempts to resolve this problem, and I argue that they all fail. I then show that extant accounts are all guilty of a common mistake: they assume that circularity is inevitable as long as the exercise of free variation presupposes the ability to identify the universal whose essence is in question, that is, the ability to recognize entities as instances of it. I reject this assumption: I argue on both Husserlian and independent philosophical grounds that knowledge of a universal's essence is not required for identifying it, but only for re-identifying it at every possible world in which it is instantiated. I then defend a reading on which free variation's purpose is to move its practitioner from non-essentialistic knowledge of a universal's identity (its actual instantiation-pattern) to essentialistic knowledge of its transworld identity (its instantiation-pattern in every possible world in which it is present). And I show that such a transformation is a non-circular progression from non-modal to modal knowledge.","PeriodicalId":46958,"journal":{"name":"EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2024-02-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139920120","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Defending (perceptual) attitudes 捍卫（感知）态度
IF 0.9 2区 哲学
EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY Pub Date : 2024-02-16 DOI: 10.1111/ejop.12933
Valentina Martinis
{"title":"Defending (perceptual) attitudes","authors":"Valentina Martinis","doi":"10.1111/ejop.12933","DOIUrl":"10.1111/ejop.12933","url":null,"abstract":"<p>In this paper, I defend a tripartite metaphysics of intentional mental states, according to which mental states are divided into subject, content, and attitude, against recent attempts at eliminating the attitude component (e.g., Montague, Oxford studies in philosophy of mind, 2022, 2, Oxford University Press). I suggest that a metaphysics composed of only subject and content cannot account for (a) multisensory perceptual experiences and (b) phenomenological differences between episodes of perception and imagination. Finally, I suggest that some of the motivations behind the rejection of the attitude component can be accommodated within the tripartite framework.</p>","PeriodicalId":46958,"journal":{"name":"EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2024-02-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139920121","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Acting from knowledge 根据知识采取行动
IF 0.7 2区 哲学
EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY Pub Date : 2024-02-15 DOI: 10.1111/ejop.12938
Sebastian Rödl
{"title":"Acting from knowledge","authors":"Sebastian Rödl","doi":"10.1111/ejop.12938","DOIUrl":"10.1111/ejop.12938","url":null,"abstract":"<p>This essay explores the idea of acting from knowledge. This idea is a thought of ourselves: the distinctive way in which we act, in which we live, resides in this, that our actions, our life, may rest on knowledge. Yet the idea of action resting on knowledge is puzzling, even mysterious. The difficulty springs from the character of judgment that is knowledge: its objectivity. The objectivity of a judgment is a character of its validity: it is objectively valid. Yet it is equally, and therefore, a character of the source of the reality of a valid judgment: a judgment that is knowledge is explained by nothing other than that which constitutes its validity. Now, action from knowledge partakes of this character of the knowledge on which it rests: it is explained by nothing other than what constitutes its validity, that is, its goodness. This dissolves the idea that action springs from a natural power, a power of change, a physis. That is the mystery. What could action be but the act of a natural power, and what could we be but agents of such a power?</p>","PeriodicalId":46958,"journal":{"name":"EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2024-02-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/ejop.12938","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139765676","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
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