EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY最新文献_第7页

Marx's Concept of Life 马克思的生活观

IF 0.9 2区哲学

EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY Pub Date : 2026-03-18 Epub Date: 2025-09-28 DOI: 10.1111/ejop.70025

Christopher Shambaugh

引用次数: 0

History and the Will to Power: Foucault and Nietzsche on Genealogy 历史与权力意志：福柯与尼采的宗谱论

IF 0.9 2区哲学

EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY Pub Date : 2026-03-18 Epub Date: 2025-07-08 DOI: 10.1111/ejop.70010

Anthony Garruzzo

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引用次数: 0

Amphibian Habits: Freedom, Death, and History in Hegel's Account Of Second Nature 两栖动物的习性：黑格尔《第二本性》中的自由、死亡和历史

IF 0.9 2区哲学

EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY Pub Date : 2026-03-18 Epub Date: 2025-11-10 DOI: 10.1111/ejop.70039

Eskil Elling

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引用次数: 0

Knowing Who We Are and What We Mean 知道我们是谁和我们的意思

IF 0.9 2区哲学

EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY Pub Date : 2026-03-18 Epub Date: 2025-07-16 DOI: 10.1111/ejop.70012

Sam W. A. Couldrick

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引用次数: 0

Kant on Utopia 康德论乌托邦

IF 0.9 2区哲学

EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY Pub Date : 2026-03-18 Epub Date: 2026-01-30 DOI: 10.1111/ejop.70044

Karoline Reinhardt

{"title":"Kant on Utopia","authors":"Karoline Reinhardt","doi":"10.1111/ejop.70044","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/ejop.70044","url":null,"abstract":"Immanuel Kant's The Dispute between the Faculties (1798) contains a footnote referencing four utopian states — Atlantis, Utopia, Oceana, and Severambia. This passage has largely been overlooked in Kantian scholarship. This paper revisits this neglected passage to explore Kant's engagement with utopian literature and its implications for his philosophy of history and political thought. The footnote, though brief, sheds light on Kant's views regarding the feasibility of ideal states and their connection to revolutionary change. It reveals Kant's nuanced perspective on the role of utopian visions in shaping political ideals and the duties of individuals and governments in realizing such ideals. While Kant acknowledges these utopias as “sweet dreams,” he also questions their practicality and warns against revolutionary approaches to achieving them. This paper examines how Kant's references to these utopian constructs reflect his broader philosophical concerns about progress and reform, emphasizing that progress must occur through gradual, lawful reform rather than through revolutionary upheaval. By analyzing Kant's treatment of these literary fictions, the paper aims to illuminate his complex relationship with utopian thought and its place within his broader theoretical framework.","PeriodicalId":46958,"journal":{"name":"EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY","volume":"34 1","pages":"66-78"},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2026-03-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/ejop.70044","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"147570349","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Imaginative Synthesis and the Basic Function of the Second Part of Kant's Transcendental Deduction in B 想象综合与康德先验演绎第二部分的基本功能

IF 0.9 2区哲学

EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY Pub Date : 2026-03-18 Epub Date: 2025-08-04 DOI: 10.1111/ejop.70016

Michael Pendlebury

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引用次数: 0

Kant, Constitutivism, and the Shmagency Objection 康德、建构主义与紧急反对

IF 0.9 2区哲学

EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY Pub Date : 2026-03-18 Epub Date: 2025-10-14 DOI: 10.1111/ejop.70035

Vinicius Carvalho

引用次数: 0

Seeing Others as Objects: Perceptual Objectification & Affordances 视他人为对象：知觉客观化与启示

IF 0.9 2区哲学

EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY Pub Date : 2026-03-18 Epub Date: 2025-09-23 DOI: 10.1111/ejop.70027

Prof Paulina Sliwa, Dr Tom McClelland

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引用次数: 0

Hegel and Utopia 黑格尔与乌托邦

IF 0.9 2区哲学

EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY Pub Date : 2026-03-18 Epub Date: 2025-11-24 DOI: 10.1111/ejop.70046

David Leopold

{"title":"Hegel and Utopia","authors":"David Leopold","doi":"10.1111/ejop.70046","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/ejop.70046","url":null,"abstract":"G.W.F. Hegel is usually held to be anti-utopian in his political philosophy. I aim to challenge that standard reading, outlining and defending a more positive account of his relation to utopianism. The rational state described in Hegel's Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts (1820) is shown to fit an uncontroversial account of utopia without straining, and two standard reasons for resisting such a characterisation are shown to be based on misunderstandings of utopia and Hegel, respectively. In addition, I provide an alternative reading of the Preface – conventionally seen as the locus classicus of Hegel's anti-utopianism – showing that, rather than rejecting utopia as such (as usually thought), Hegel distinguishes two kinds of utopias, one of which he associates with Fries and rejects, and one of which he associates with Plato and endorses. This reading preserves textual consistency between the Preface and the rest of the volume; and helps explain Hegel's otherwise surprising suggestion that Plato's Republic exemplifies the approach that philosophy should take towards the world. Finally, I suggest a typology of the positive aims of Hegel's utopian project (including construction, criticism, clarification, and consolation), and identify the tradition of ‘realistic utopias’ that his work might be thought to belong to.","PeriodicalId":46958,"journal":{"name":"EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY","volume":"34 1","pages":"133-151"},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2026-03-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/ejop.70046","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"147568799","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Knowing Who We Are and What We Mean 知道我们是谁和我们的意思

IF 0.9 2区哲学

EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY Pub Date : 2026-03-18 Epub Date: 2025-07-16 DOI: 10.1111/ejop.70012

Sam W. A. Couldrick

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引用次数: 0