EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY最新文献_第6页

Heidegger's Social Ontology: The Phenomenology of Self, World, and Others by Nicolai K. KnudsenCambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2023, xvi + 278pp., ISBN: 9781009100694 《海德格尔的社会本体论：自我、世界和他者的现象学》，尼科莱·克努森著，剑桥：剑桥大学出版社，2023年，16 + 278页。， isbn: 9781009100694

IF 0.7 2区哲学

EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY Pub Date : 2024-11-14 DOI: 10.1111/ejop.13029

Stephan Käufer

引用次数: 0

Nietzsche's Philosophical Psychology by Mattia RiccardiOxford: Oxford University Press, 2021 ISBN:9780198803287 《尼采的哲学心理学》，作者：Mattia riccardi牛津：牛津大学出版社，2021 ISBN:9780198803287

IF 0.7 2区哲学

EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY Pub Date : 2024-11-12 DOI: 10.1111/ejop.13027

Richard Elliott

引用次数: 0

Kant on Self-Legislation as the Foundation of Duty* 康德论自我立法作为义务的基础*

IF 0.9 2区哲学

EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY Pub Date : 2024-10-27 DOI: 10.1111/ejop.13026

Bennett Eckert-Kuang

{"title":"Kant on Self-Legislation as the Foundation of Duty*","authors":"Bennett Eckert-Kuang","doi":"10.1111/ejop.13026","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/ejop.13026","url":null,"abstract":"Duties to oneself are central to Kant's moral thought. Indeed, in his Lectures on Ethics, he claims that they “take first place, and are the most important of all” (LE: 27:341). Despite this, Kant is not clear about what they are or why they are ‘the most important.’ What is it for a duty to be owed to oneself? And in what sense do such duties ‘take first place’? I answer these questions: a duty to oneself is a self-legislated duty, and they ‘take first place’ in that all ethical duties are, fundamentally, duties to oneself. Based on a close reading of Kant's “Apparent Antinomy” regarding duties to oneself in The Doctrine of Virtue §§1–3, I argue that Kant holds that (1) a duty is owed to its legislator, and (2) all duties are self-legislated. I then argue that this interpretation is further supported by Kant's understanding of the Categorical Imperative as a “principle of autonomy” in the Groundwork (G: 4:433). I conclude by offering an interpretation of the Categorical Imperative on which even though all duties are ultimately owed to oneself, there remains an important sense in which some duties are owed to others as well.","PeriodicalId":46958,"journal":{"name":"EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY","volume":"33 3","pages":"910-926"},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2024-10-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/ejop.13026","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144927790","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

How the Rejection of Incompatible Speech Acts Transforms Human Cognition 拒绝不相容的言语行为如何改变人类的认知

IF 0.7 2区哲学

EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY Pub Date : 2024-10-27 DOI: 10.1111/ejop.13022

Preston Stovall

引用次数: 0

Interpersonal Reasoning: A Philosophical Psychology of Testimonial Trust 人际推理：证言信任的哲学心理学

IF 0.7 2区哲学

EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY Pub Date : 2024-10-27 DOI: 10.1111/ejop.13023

Berislav Marušić

引用次数: 0

Why There Must Be Something Rather Than Nothing: A New Argument From the PSR 为什么一定有而不是没有：PSR的新论点

IF 0.9 2区哲学

EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY Pub Date : 2024-10-24 DOI: 10.1111/ejop.13018

Dylan Shaul

引用次数: 0

Thinking Against Humanism? Heidegger on the Human Essence, the Inhuman, and Evil 反人文主义的思考？海德格尔论人的本质、非人与恶

IF 0.7 2区哲学

EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY Pub Date : 2024-10-24 DOI: 10.1111/ejop.13024

Jack Wearing

{"title":"Thinking Against Humanism? Heidegger on the Human Essence, the Inhuman, and Evil","authors":"Jack Wearing","doi":"10.1111/ejop.13024","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/ejop.13024","url":null,"abstract":"In his ‘Letter on “Humanism”’, Martin Heidegger advances a critique of humanism while insisting that this critique does not imply that he ‘advocates the inhuman’. There are two reasons why Heidegger might be concerned to rebut this accusation. First, one might worry that any rejection of humanism commits one to rejecting its central values, such as the idea that human beings have an essential worth. Second, Heidegger might be concerned to distance his critique from the inhuman policies of National Socialism, with which he was associated in the early 1930s.In this paper, I offer an interpretation of Heidegger's conception of ‘the inhuman’ to shed light on his critique's normative implications. Through this examination of Heidegger's views, I raise concerns about the political prospects of his anti-humanism, and, more tentatively, of anti-humanistic thought in general. First, I reconstruct Heidegger's critique of humanism, his positive conception of the human essence, and his cryptic account of evil in the Letter. I argue that the view that emerges involves a problematic displacement of human responsibility for evil, which Heidegger interprets as symptomatic of the modern epoch in the ‘history of Being’. Moreover, while his account opposes ‘the inhuman’ in a ‘Being-historical’ sense, I argue that it disavows crucial normative resources for resisting ‘the inhuman’ in the ordinary moral sense.","PeriodicalId":46958,"journal":{"name":"EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY","volume":"33 2","pages":"660-681"},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2024-10-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/ejop.13024","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144118002","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Philosophy of Devotion: The Longing for Invulnerable Ideals by Paul Katsafanas, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2023, ISBN: 9780192867674. 《献身哲学：对无懈可击理想的渴望》，保罗·卡萨法纳斯著，牛津：牛津大学出版社，2023年，ISBN: 9780192867674。

IF 0.7 2区哲学

EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY Pub Date : 2024-10-24 DOI: 10.1111/ejop.13025

Simone Gubler

引用次数: 0

From the ethics of procreation to the ethics of parenthood 从生育伦理到为人父母伦理

IF 0.7 2区哲学

EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY Pub Date : 2024-10-19 DOI: 10.1111/ejop.13020

Tom Whyman

引用次数: 0

Sartre's Exclusion Claim: Perception and Imagination as Radically Distinct Consciousnesses 萨特的排他性主张：知觉和想象是截然不同的意识

IF 0.7 2区哲学

EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY Pub Date : 2024-10-14 DOI: 10.1111/ejop.13017

Jonathan Mitchell

{"title":"Sartre's Exclusion Claim: Perception and Imagination as Radically Distinct Consciousnesses","authors":"Jonathan Mitchell","doi":"10.1111/ejop.13017","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/ejop.13017","url":null,"abstract":"In The Imaginary Jean-Paul Sartre makes what will strike many as an implausibly strong claim, namely that perception and imagination are incompatible kinds of experience - I call this the exclusion claim. This paper offers a reconstruction of Sartre's exclusion claim. First, it frames the claim in terms of cross-modal attention distribution, such that it is not possible to simultaneously attend to what one is imagining and what one is perceiving. However, this leaves it open that a subject can simultaneously imagine and perceive on the condition that either the perceived or imagined objects are not attended to. While this is a philosophically plausible position it fails to do justice to Sartre's intended position, which suggests a more radical exclusion between perception and imagination. In light of this section 3 develops a supplementary argument to remove one of the possible configurations of attention that the ban on divided attention leaves in place by arguing that the objects of imagining must be attended to, which follows from Sartre's characterisation of imagination as spontaneous. The resulting exclusion is as follows: attentive perception excludes imagination (and vice versa), given that the latter is necessarily attentive, but attentive imagination can co-occur with non-attentive or background perception (in this sense the exclusion is asymmetric in a way that Sartre fails to recognise). In concluding I detail how from this exclusion we get an important consequence – which Sartre wants the exclusion claim to have – namely that it rules out an imagination-based solution to the problem of perceptual presence.","PeriodicalId":46958,"journal":{"name":"EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY","volume":"33 2","pages":"682-699"},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2024-10-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/ejop.13017","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144117927","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0