EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY最新文献

{"title":"Comments on Macdonald, What Would Be Different","authors":"Taylor Carman","doi":"10.1111/ejop.13015","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/ejop.13015","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Iain Macdonald suggests that, in spite of their differences, Adorno and Heidegger are alike in advancing what he calls critiques of actuality and “models of redemptive possibility.” I argue that that similarity is superficial in light of the difference between their conceptions of actuality and possibility. For Adorno, as for the metaphysical tradition since Aristotle, possibility and necessity are defined in terms of actuality. The privileging of actuality, Heidegger maintains, foregrounds entities and obscures the question of being.</p>","PeriodicalId":46958,"journal":{"name":"EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2024-09-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142404885","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Personal Agency, Personal Identity, and Danto's Philosophy of Action†","authors":"Carol Rovane","doi":"10.1111/ejop.13009","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/ejop.13009","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":46958,"journal":{"name":"EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2024-09-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142404784","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"The Culmination: Reply to my Critics","authors":"Robert Pippin","doi":"10.1111/ejop.13001","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/ejop.13001","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":46958,"journal":{"name":"EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2024-09-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142404782","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Some Reflections on Iain Macdonald's What Would Be Different? Figures of Possibility in Adorno","authors":"Nicholas Walker","doi":"10.1111/ejop.13013","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/ejop.13013","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":46958,"journal":{"name":"EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2024-09-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142404884","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"The Possible in the Actual: Comments on Iain Macdonald's What Would be Different: Figures of Possibility in Adorno","authors":"Peter E. Gordon","doi":"10.1111/ejop.13014","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/ejop.13014","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":46958,"journal":{"name":"EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2024-09-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142404886","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"The wonder of being: Varieties of rationalism and its critique","authors":"Andrea Kern","doi":"10.1111/ejop.12952","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/ejop.12952","url":null,"abstract":"<p>In his book <i>The Culmination</i>, Pippin leaves no doubt that he still thinks that German Idealism has achieved a level of understanding and radicality that makes its proponents the best conversational partners to develop an understanding of what philosophy is about. It is the question of the very possibility of understanding that comes to be at the center of their writings and informs every page. Yet this radicality is now seen in a different light. It is now conceived as a culmination, not of an understanding that comes to itself but of a misunderstanding that informs, unavoidably, Western philosophical tradition as a whole. The resources for the idea that there is something fundamentally wrong in the conception of what it is to be a being that is able to know anything at all Pippin finds most vividly and forcefully articulated in Heidegger. I will argue that there is something profoundly true about Pippin's idea that, at the bottom of any knowledge we have of ourselves and the world, there is something that Heidegger calls <i>Stimmung</i>, which is essentially non-discursive. However, I will argue that to defend the latter thought, one has to read Heidegger's notion of <i>Stimmung</i> in a more radical way than Pippin seems to be willing to.</p>","PeriodicalId":46958,"journal":{"name":"EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2024-09-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/ejop.12952","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142404783","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"The Dissatisfactions of Self-Consciousness","authors":"Joseph K. Schear","doi":"10.1111/ejop.13002","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/ejop.13002","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Robert Pippin has long defended the Hegelian ‘satisfactions of self-consciousness’ against virtually all attacks, including Heidegger's. He now concedes in a striking reversal that ‘Heidegger is right’. Pippin diagnoses his past allegiance to the Western rationalist tradition culminating in Hegel as resting on ‘a misplaced confidence in the inescapably self-reflective character of any orientation or attunement to the meaningfulness of Being’. What were once the satisfactions of self-consciousness have become its dissatisfactions. But does Pippin's presentation of the rationalist position ultimately make it too easy for Heidegger to topple it? Will the rationalist impulse, interpreted more charitably, rest undisturbed by Pippin's Heideggerian challenge? I identify three assumptions Pippin's Heidegger makes about the role of reason in our orientation towards the world. If these assumptions are considered not only optional but falsifying by any sound rationalist, this will damage the power of Pippin's Heidegerrian critique. For it is only against the background of a credible picture of the presence of reason in human life that the dissatisfactions of self-consciousness can emerge to reveal a genuine alternative.</p>","PeriodicalId":46958,"journal":{"name":"EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2024-09-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/ejop.13002","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142404778","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Bradley's Regress and a Problem in Action Theory","authors":"Helen Steward","doi":"10.1111/ejop.13016","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/ejop.13016","url":null,"abstract":"&lt;p&gt;There is a problem which often arises during the course of various discussions in action theory and related fields about how exactly we are to characterise the relation which obtains between an agent and her (token) actions. An agent is a particular individual; it is often assumed that any token action of hers must be another.&lt;sup&gt;1&lt;/sup&gt; But what is the relation between these two particulars, when the agent is the agent of the action in question? Obviously, one asymmetric relation between them is this: the agent, S, &lt;i&gt;is the agent of&lt;/i&gt; the action, A. But is there a &lt;i&gt;further&lt;/i&gt; relation between agent and action &lt;i&gt;in virtue of which&lt;/i&gt; it is correct to say that A is S's action? The idea that agency must be reducible to something assumed to be more basic, such as causation, has sometimes tempted philosophers to think so – and there are also fairly common locutions which can make it seem as though S's being the agent of an action, A might hold in virtue of another, perhaps more basic relationship – ‘execution’ or ‘performance’, or simply ‘doing’, for example. But as I shall try to show below, it is not at all easy to make any of these ideas work.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;In order to have a handy label for the problem which attaches to this search for a relation to undergird propositions of the form ‘S is the agent of A', I am going to call it the ‘agent-action problem’. The problem has rarely been acknowledged as a &lt;i&gt;general&lt;/i&gt; difficulty – although it gives rise to various sub-problems, which have been often enough remarked upon.&lt;sup&gt;2&lt;/sup&gt; Moreover, even when the sub-problems are observed, they are sometimes noted merely as passing curiosities which perhaps constitute nothing more than minor linguistic inconveniences to the philosopher of action. In a way, then, neither the sub-problems nor the fundamental problem which in my view underlies the sub-problems has really received any serious, sustained scrutiny of a properly wide-ranging sort. In this paper, I want to suggest, however, that it deserves such scrutiny – and that a failure properly to get to grips with the general form of the problem is indicative of philosophy of action's failure to get a decent ontological understanding of its own subject matter. This failure, I believe, is connected to some of the puzzles in which philosophers find themselves embroiled, with respect to such issues as whether agents are causes of their actions&lt;sup&gt;3&lt;/sup&gt;; whether the agent ‘disappears' in a problematic way from certain pictures of what action involves&lt;sup&gt;4&lt;/sup&gt;; and which physical events, precisely, compose or constitute our actions.&lt;sup&gt;5&lt;/sup&gt; I want to argue that once we understand the true source of the agent-action problem, it can be seen that the problem is related in certain interesting ways to the philosophical difficulty which has come to be known as ‘Bradley's Regress'. The range of options for responding to it can, I think, therefore be usefully illuminated by reflecting on those that have be","PeriodicalId":46958,"journal":{"name":"EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2024-09-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/ejop.13016","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142404779","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"The Exteriority of Thinking: Hegel and Heidegger","authors":"Thomas Khurana","doi":"10.1111/ejop.13000","DOIUrl":"10.1111/ejop.13000","url":null,"abstract":"<p>In <i>The Culmination</i>, Robert Pippin offers a stunning reassessment of the achievements of absolute idealism. Having developed some of the most persuasive defenses of Hegel's absolute idealism to date, Pippin now argues that Heidegger's trenchant critique of Hegel has revealed a dogmatism at the very heart of absolute idealism: an unwarranted identification of what is with what is discursively knowable. This dogmatic identification leads to a distorted understanding of the meaning of Being, a reifying account of beings, and a neglect of our own finitude. In this article, I defend Hegel against these charges. The upshot of this discussion is twofold. Rather than evading the question of the exteriority of being, I argue, Hegel in fact aims to reveal that this exteriority is internal to thinking itself. And rather than identifying the meaning of being with discursive knowability, Hegel shows that the meaning of being resides in a form of freedom that goes beyond the self-transparency of knowing.</p>","PeriodicalId":46958,"journal":{"name":"EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2024-09-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/ejop.13000","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142215332","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Replies to Nicholas Walker, Taylor Carman, and Peter Gordon","authors":"Iain Macdonald","doi":"10.1111/ejop.13003","DOIUrl":"10.1111/ejop.13003","url":null,"abstract":"<p>In what follows, I present my replies to Nicholas Walker, Taylor Carman, and Peter Gordon's reflections on my <i>What Would Be Different? Figures of Possibility in Adorno.</i> I begin by summarizing what is at stake in the book. My reply to Nicholas Walker and Taylor Carman focusses on Adorno's criticisms of Heidegger, who claims that the history of metaphysics has blocked our access to an “other beginning” for thinking. This prepares the ground for a comparison of Adorno's and Heidegger's notions of what I call “blocked possibility.” My reply to Peter Gordon clarifies the relation of “blocked possibility” to actuality and, more specifically, to the actuality of happiness in Adorno's writings.</p>","PeriodicalId":46958,"journal":{"name":"EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2024-09-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/ejop.13003","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142215333","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}