EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY最新文献

{"title":"Kantian Imagination and the Extent of Exhibition: Reply to Grüne, Williams, and Biss","authors":"Samantha Matherne","doi":"10.1111/ejop.70020","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/ejop.70020","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":46958,"journal":{"name":"EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY","volume":"33 3","pages":"1226-1235"},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2025-09-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144927585","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Samantha Matherne on Intuitions of Sense, Intuitions of Imagination, and Full-Blown Experience","authors":"Stefanie Grüne","doi":"10.1111/ejop.70005","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/ejop.70005","url":null,"abstract":"<p>In her book <i>Seeing more</i>,<sup>1</sup> Samantha Matherne first gives a characterization of imagination in general and then explains how we use imagination in theoretical, aesthetic and practical contexts. <i>Seeing More</i> is an extraordinarily valuable and helpful contribution to Kant scholarship, offering a remarkably clear and comprehensive account of the faculty of imagination. It is rare to encounter philosophical writing that is so lucid and accessible. Particularly impressive is the way she develops and applies her conception of imagination across a wide range of philosophical domains, including theoretical philosophy, aesthetics, and practical philosophy.</p><p>Matherne starts her book with examining how imagination relates to the two cognitive capacities of sensibility and understanding and argues for the view that imagination belongs to the faculty of sensibility. Her main reason is that Kant characterizes sensibility as the general capacity to bring about intuitions and imagination as the capacity to bring about specific intuitions. On her view, sensibility has two parts, namely sense and imagination, which are capacities to bring about two different kinds of intuitions, which she calls “intuitions of sense” and “intuitions of imagination” (<i>SM</i>, 74). Whereas intuitions of sense are the direct result of the senses being affected by objects, intuitions of imagination require an act of synthesis that is performed by imagination. Furthermore, she claims that in order for imagination to synthesize a sensible manifold it has to be guided by concepts. Intuitions of sense, by contrast, neither require synthesis nor the use of concepts.</p><p>Matherne begins the second part of <i>Seeing More</i>, in which she analyzes the use of imagination in theoretical contexts, with discussing a specific kind of intuitions of imagination, namely perceptions. She distinguishes perceptions not only from intuitions of sense, but also from what she calls “full-blown experience”. Whereas in her view both perceptions and full-blown experience require the use of empirical concepts, only full-blown experience involves the application of concepts in judgments. The way in which concepts guide acts of the imagination does not consist in being applied in a judgment.</p><p>In my comment, I will only discuss topics from the first and second part of the book. More specifically, what interests me is how Matherne conceives of perceptions and how she distinguishes them from intuitions of sense on the one hand and from full-blown experience on the other hand. In the first part of my comment, I will treat the relation between perceptions and intuitions of sense. In the second and third part, I will examine how perceptions relate to concepts. This will include a discussion of the relation between perceptions and full-blown experience which is the topic of the third part of my comment. From now on, like Matherne, I will refer to intuitions of sense as “intuitions<","PeriodicalId":46958,"journal":{"name":"EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY","volume":"33 3","pages":"1216-1225"},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2025-09-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/ejop.70005","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144927228","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Making Concepts Sensible? Two Problem Cases for Matherne's Account","authors":"Jessica J. Williams","doi":"10.1111/ejop.70019","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/ejop.70019","url":null,"abstract":"<p>In her recent book, Samantha Matherne argues that the primary cognitive function of the imagination in Kant's philosophy is to exhibit concepts, that is, to make them sensible. She further argues that exhibition is the unifying thread in Kant's treatment of the imagination in the theoretical, aesthetic, and practical domains. In this paper, I present two problem cases for her interpretation. First, I argue that it is a mistake to think of perception as a case of exhibition. I focus on Matherne's claim that forming perceptual images requires empirical schemata and argue that this conflicts with Kant's remarks in the “Schematism” chapter and makes it hard to account for empirical concept formation. Second, I argue that the free play of the faculties in the experience of natural beauty is not a case of exhibition, as this would violate Kant's claim that judgments of beauty are not conceptual judgments.</p>","PeriodicalId":46958,"journal":{"name":"EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY","volume":"33 3","pages":"1202-1209"},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2025-09-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144927240","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Making the Most of the Moral Uses of Imagination in Kant: Comments on Part IV of Seeing More","authors":"Mavis L. Biss","doi":"10.1111/ejop.70006","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/ejop.70006","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":46958,"journal":{"name":"EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY","volume":"33 3","pages":"1210-1215"},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2025-09-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144927584","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Kant's Critique of Pure Reason and the Method of Metaphysics By Gabriele Gava.Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2023. xii + 286 pp. ISBN: 9781009172127","authors":"Christopher Benzenberg","doi":"10.1111/ejop.70009","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/ejop.70009","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":46958,"journal":{"name":"EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY","volume":"33 3","pages":"1236-1242"},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2025-07-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144927780","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Embodied Idealism: Merleau-Ponty's Transcendental Philosophy By Joseph C. BerendzenNew York: Oxford University Press, 2023. 288 pp. ISBN: 9780192874764","authors":"Taylor Carman","doi":"10.1111/ejop.70007","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/ejop.70007","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":46958,"journal":{"name":"EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY","volume":"33 3","pages":"1249-1252"},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2025-07-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144927247","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"True Purposes in Hegel's Logic By Edgar MaraguatCambridge University Press, 2023. 272 pp. ISBN: 9781009304924","authors":"Karen Ng","doi":"10.1111/ejop.70000","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/ejop.70000","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":46958,"journal":{"name":"EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY","volume":"33 3","pages":"1243-1248"},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2025-06-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144927720","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Anil Gomes's The Practical Self","authors":"Bill Brewer","doi":"10.1111/ejop.13021","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/ejop.13021","url":null,"abstract":"&lt;p&gt;Gomes's rich and compelling book revolves around an extended line of argument for the thesis that a self-conscious subject must be one object amongst many in an objective world: self-consciousness entails objectivity. Others have offered arguments for the same conclusion; but, in contrast with his own, Gomes finds all of these wanting. After setting out my own understanding of Gomes's central argument, I will raise a series of concerns about each of its key moves.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;This is an original and significant line of argument. In what follows, I raise five critical questions about it: two each about premises 1 and 2, and one about premise 3. I develop two of these in detail, into fully-formed objections to Gomes's argument; the others I leave almost to fend for themselves against his case for the thesis that self-consciousness entails objectivity.\u0000 &lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;By way of clarification of the content of premise 1, Gomes contrasts the &lt;i&gt;cognitive agency&lt;/i&gt; in question with a corresponding &lt;i&gt;passivity&lt;/i&gt; in &lt;i&gt;perception&lt;/i&gt;. Here is what I think he means in the perceptual case. We select and initiate projects, like counting the stripes on a zebra, discerning which chair seat is closest in colour to the carpet, and so on. We focus and modulate our attention appropriately over time in order to execute them as best we can, checking and going back if necessary as we proceed. But which specific experiences and beliefs we find ourselves with at the end of the day is entirely outside of our control; &lt;i&gt;and so it should be&lt;/i&gt;, if the result is to be determined by how things really are rather than by our own preferences and prejudices. We set the question and direct our attention and capacities to pursue it; the facts settle the answer.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;Isn't it just the same with paradigmatically intellectual projects too, though, such as counting the primes between 0 and 100, or working out how best to accommodate all a child's friends at a sleepover without provoking too much over-excitement or antagonism, and so on? We pursue the project and keep our attention on the relevant considerations, taking each stage in turn, checking and going back if necessary as we proceed. But, again, which beliefs we find ourselves with at the end of the day is entirely outside of our control; &lt;i&gt;and so it should be&lt;/i&gt; if the result is to be determined by how things really are rather than by our own preferences and prejudices. Just as in the case of perception, we set the question and direct our attention and capacities to pursue it; the facts settle the answer.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;Perceptually: ‘is there a dark blue chair in the room? … ‘yes'; and, analogously, intellectually: ‘is there a prime between 37 and 43?’ … ‘yes'. Realism about the domain of enquiry in both cases surely legislates in favour of our ultimate passivity with respect to the outcome. So it is unclear to me precisely what the cognitive activity that Gomes is interested in comes to. Certainly, the comparison with perce","PeriodicalId":46958,"journal":{"name":"EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY","volume":"33 2","pages":"757-761"},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2025-05-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/ejop.13021","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144117866","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Phenomenology and the Norms of Perception By Maxime DoyonOxford: Oxford University Press, 2024. ISBN: 9780198884224","authors":"Søren Overgaard","doi":"10.1111/ejop.13083","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/ejop.13083","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":46958,"journal":{"name":"EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY","volume":"33 3","pages":"1253-1256"},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2025-05-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144927757","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Departures from Lichtenberg","authors":"Rory Madden","doi":"10.1111/ejop.13040","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/ejop.13040","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Lichtenberg's remarks are a driving force of <i>The Practical Self</i>. On Gomes's interpretation, Lichtenberg is presenting a challenge to theoretical knowledge of one's cognitive agency. Gomes argues that this challenge is insuperable, thereby making room instead for faith in one's cognitive agency. I question both the interpretation of Lichtenberg and the insuperability of the challenge, before explaining why a challenge which is more usually read into Lichtenberg's remarks is problematic for Gomes's project. I close by sketching on Gomes's behalf a response to this challenge.</p>","PeriodicalId":46958,"journal":{"name":"EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY","volume":"33 2","pages":"748-756"},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2025-05-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/ejop.13040","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144118172","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}