EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY最新文献

{"title":"Anscombe on the shallowness of consequentialism","authors":"Craig Taylor","doi":"10.1111/ejop.12995","DOIUrl":"10.1111/ejop.12995","url":null,"abstract":"<p>This paper is divided into two parts. In the first I outline and defend Elizabeth Anscombe's claim that consequentialism is a shallow philosophy by considering how two contemporary consequentialists reach opposing but equally outlandish moral conclusions on a matter as fundamental as whether it is good or bad that the human race continues. In the second I argue that in order to show what is wrong with the consequentialist arguments presented in part one, we need to deploy a wider range of critical resources than what typically appears in contemporary analytic moral philosophy. One example of a relevant and under-appreciated resource I then consider is satire as a mode of moral thought.</p>","PeriodicalId":46958,"journal":{"name":"EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY","volume":"33 2","pages":"737-747"},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2024-07-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/ejop.12995","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141783338","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Seeing through the forms - towards a Platonic indirect realism","authors":"Christophe de Ray","doi":"10.1111/ejop.12989","DOIUrl":"10.1111/ejop.12989","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Universals in the Platonic tradition were intended to play both metaphysical and epistemological roles. The contemporary debate around universals has focused overwhelmingly on the former, with even ‘platonists’ typically holding that our knowledge of universals is derived from our knowledge of particulars. In contrast, I wish to argue for the epistemological primacy of the universal: specifically, I defend the thesis that we perceive particulars as a result of knowing universals, and not the other way around. My argument draws from the work of Malebranche, who notoriously contended that we see ordinary objects <i>through</i> the immutable ‘ideas’. I conclude with the suggestion that the resulting account of the relationship between our knowledge of universals and our perception of particulars may be thought of as a kind of Platonic indirect realism.</p>","PeriodicalId":46958,"journal":{"name":"EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY","volume":"33 1","pages":"17-28"},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2024-07-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141786245","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Conscience and Bad Conscience","authors":"Avery Snelson","doi":"10.1111/ejop.12991","DOIUrl":"10.1111/ejop.12991","url":null,"abstract":"<p>This paper attempts to clarify the relationship between conscience and bad conscience in the Second Essay of the <i>Genealogy of Morality</i> (GM II). Conscience, which Nietzsche calls the “will's memory” (GM II, 1), is a faculty that enables agents to generate and sustain the motivation necessary to honor commitments, while bad conscience is that “other gloomy thing” (GM II, 4), gloomy because it is a self-punishing faculty that produces feelings of guilt. In addition to having different functions, conscience and bad conscience have distinct causal origins. Conscience originated as a memory of “I will nots” inculcated by punishment (GM II, 3), whereas bad conscience is produced by the process of “internalization” (GM II, 16)—<i>not</i> punishment (GM II, 14–15). It would seem to be possible, then, that an agent could have a conscience without having a bad conscience. The sovereign individual is sometimes interpreted in such terms. I argue that this separation is impossible, however. An agent would be incapable of generating and sustaining the motivation to honor commitments, thus having a conscience, without having undergone the process of internalization, necessitating the presence of bad conscience as well.</p>","PeriodicalId":46958,"journal":{"name":"EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY","volume":"33 2","pages":"577-590"},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2024-07-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141642856","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Experience and naturalism","authors":"Adam Zweber","doi":"10.1111/ejop.12974","DOIUrl":"10.1111/ejop.12974","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Much of contemporary metaethics revolves around the issue of “naturalism.” However, there is little agreement on what “naturalism” is or why it should be of significance. In this paper, I aim to rectify this situation by providing a set of necessary conditions on what positions ought to count as “naturalistic.” A metaethical view should count as an instance of naturalism only if it claims that there can be evidence for normative claims that is both <i>public</i> and <i>spatiotemporal.</i> I argue that, unlike other characterizations of “naturalism,” this view shows a clear difference between many metaethical positions and the sciences. The view thereby renders debates about naturalism philosophically significant: the division between naturalists and non-naturalists is that between philosophers who hold that ethics is relevantly similar to the sciences and those who deny this.</p>","PeriodicalId":46958,"journal":{"name":"EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY","volume":"32 4","pages":"1334-1352"},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2024-07-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/ejop.12974","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141649463","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"The art of thinking as an intersubjective practice: Eloquence, affect, and association in the Port-Royal Logic","authors":"Laura Kotevska,&nbsp;Anik Waldow","doi":"10.1111/ejop.12976","DOIUrl":"10.1111/ejop.12976","url":null,"abstract":"<p>In the <i>Port-Royal Logic</i>, Arnauld and Nicole argue that eloquence plays a crucial role in the cultivation of the art of thinking. In this essay, we demonstrate that Arnauld and Nicole's reflections on eloquence exemplify the need to reconceive the larger framework in which Cartesian theories of ideas operate. Instead of understanding epistemic agents as solitary thinkers who pursue their intellectual goals without the influence of others, our analysis shows that for Arnauld and Nicole thinking well was an intersubjective discursive activity that unfolds between complexly organized persons. Central to this activity is the ability to gauge the affective and associative tendencies of interlocutors and to communicate accordingly. This ability is required to enable speakers to deal constructively with problems arising from the context sensitivity of language, the influences of the passions, and the audience's capacity to decipher meaning in the communication of ideas that facilitate understanding and knowledge. By drawing attention to communication, affect, and association in the <i>Port-Royal Logic</i>, we show that there is a significant connection between thinking and expressing oneself well in the early modern period.</p>","PeriodicalId":46958,"journal":{"name":"EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY","volume":"32 4","pages":"1015-1032"},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2024-07-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/ejop.12976","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141613675","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"A processual account of progress: On Rahel Jaeggi's Fortschritt und Regression","authors":"César Ortega-Esquembre","doi":"10.1111/ejop.12982","DOIUrl":"10.1111/ejop.12982","url":null,"abstract":"&lt;p&gt;In her 2013 book &lt;i&gt;Kritik von Lebensformen&lt;/i&gt;, Rahel Jaeggi, one of the most prominent exponents of the new German social philosophy, set out to offer a revision of critical theory centered on the notion of “forms of life.” This reconsideration, however, did not take the typical form of a new &lt;i&gt;diagnosis of the times&lt;/i&gt;, comparable, for example, to the diagnoses of the reification of social relations (Suhrkamp Lukács, &lt;span&gt;2013&lt;/span&gt;), the one-dimensionality of consciousness (Marcuse, &lt;span&gt;2012&lt;/span&gt;), or the systemic colonization of the &lt;i&gt;lebenswelt&lt;/i&gt;, or lifeworld (Habermas, &lt;span&gt;2014&lt;/span&gt;). Rather, Jaeggi was interested in developing a theoretical conception of how forms of life fail or succeed. We find a similar strategy, albeit oriented to a different theoretical object, in her earlier book, &lt;i&gt;Entfremdung. Zur Aktualität eines sozialphilosophischen Problems&lt;/i&gt;. Here, again, the author did not articulate a diagnosis of the social causes of alienation, but rather a highly abstract theory of human subjectivity from which to offer a functional account of the concept of alienation (Jaeggi, &lt;span&gt;2005&lt;/span&gt;; Neuhouser, &lt;span&gt;2016&lt;/span&gt;). We again find this strategy in the formidable 2013 article “Was (wenn überhaupt etwas) ist falsch am Kapitalismus? Drei Wege der Kapitalismuskritik,” in which Jaeggi is not interested in advancing a concrete critique of capitalist societies, but rather in discussing the three most common forms of doing so (functional, moral, and ethical) in order to develop an integrative and complex approach (Jaeggi, &lt;span&gt;2013b&lt;/span&gt;).&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;If I understand it correctly, Jaeggi's latest book, published by Suhrkamp under the title &lt;i&gt;Fortschritt und Regression&lt;/i&gt; (Jaeggi, &lt;span&gt;2023&lt;/span&gt;), follows the same strategy. Jaeggi does not aim to answer the question (of an empirical nature, of course) of the existence, or nonexistence, of progress in modern societies. Rather, her interest is, again, of a conceptual nature. &lt;i&gt;Fortschritt und Regression&lt;/i&gt; offers an impressive analysis of the concepts of progress and regression as consistent criteria for criticisms of social development, and thus, as useful instruments for critical theory. Of course, this approach is not only legitimate, but also extremely useful in shedding light on some of the central concepts critical social theory is based on—sometimes in an insufficiently reflexive way. However, such a strategy, which is well suited to the category of a “critical theory of criticism” (Boltanski &amp; Honneth, &lt;span&gt;2009&lt;/span&gt;; Celikates, &lt;span&gt;2006&lt;/span&gt;; Jaeggi &amp; Wesche, &lt;span&gt;2009&lt;/span&gt;), should not, in my opinion, exhaust the tasks of social philosophy, lest we run the risk of critical theory of criticism ending up cornering social criticism itself. In order to do justice to both elements, in what follows I will proceed in two steps. First, I will offer a systematic reconstruction of Jaeggi's central theses concerning the concepts of progress and r","PeriodicalId":46958,"journal":{"name":"EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY","volume":"32 3","pages":"993-999"},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2024-07-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/ejop.12982","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141574980","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Obscure representations from a pragmatic point of view","authors":"Francey Russell","doi":"10.1111/ejop.12986","DOIUrl":"10.1111/ejop.12986","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Kant's most sustained discussion of obscure representations can be found in the first book of his <i>Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View</i>. What is puzzling is that in the middle of the section devoted to the topic, Kant asserts that “because this field can only be perceived in his passive side as a play of sensations, the theory of obscure representations belongs only to physiological anthropology, and so it is properly disregarded here.” So, do obscure representations belong to pragmatic anthropology or not? Kant's official position is that they do not, yet the textual evidence—we find discussions of obscure representations in 20 years of his work on pragmatic anthropology—suggests that they do, in fact, belong here. Most of the literature on obscure representations focuses on their contribution to cognition and none has clarified what it would mean to assume a “pragmatic point of view” on obscure representations, and to study them in the context of pragmatic anthropology. My aim in this paper is to provide such clarification, focusing on Kant's discussion of our propensity to “play with” obscure representations and what he calls our “art of obscuring.”</p>","PeriodicalId":46958,"journal":{"name":"EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY","volume":"32 4","pages":"1068-1085"},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2024-07-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141574825","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"The generality problem of perception","authors":"Farid Zahnoun,&nbsp;Luca Roccioletti,&nbsp;Erik Myin","doi":"10.1111/ejop.12984","DOIUrl":"10.1111/ejop.12984","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Much of contemporary philosophy of perception revolves around the question of whether perceptual experience has representational content. On one side of the debate, we find representationalists claiming that perceptual experience is representational in that it always presents the world as being a certain way. Perceptual experience is therefore said to have content, which can be evaluated for truth or accuracy. Against the idea that perception has content, relationalists have leveled an argument based on the generality of content, which we shall here refer to as the generality problem of perception (GPP). We will analyze and assess existing replies to the GPP. Based on these analyses, we will conclude that representationalists have as yet not offered a convincing answer to the problem and that, after almost 20 years, the problem still stands.</p>","PeriodicalId":46958,"journal":{"name":"EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY","volume":"33 1","pages":"269-284"},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2024-07-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141574822","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"The Kantian origin of Adorno's concept of metaphysical experience","authors":"Farshid Baghai","doi":"10.1111/ejop.12985","DOIUrl":"10.1111/ejop.12985","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Metaphysical experience is one of the most obscure concepts in Adorno's <i>Negative Dialectics</i>. The obscurity stems partly from the way in which metaphysical experience is antinomic. To describe the antinomic character of metaphysical experience, Adorno situates it in relation to Kant's first <i>Critique</i>. He distinguishes two conceptions of antinomy in the first <i>Critique</i>: first, the explicit conception of antinomy that the transcendental dialectic exposes and resolves; and second, the implicit conception of antinomy that remains insoluble and structures the first <i>Critique</i> and Adorno's own concept of metaphysical experience. Yet Adorno does not clarify what he means by the antinomic structure of the first <i>Critique</i> and how this structure underlies his own concept of metaphysical experience. Nor does the scholarship on Adorno. This article reconstructs Adorno's response to these questions, and, in so doing, demonstrates the Kantian origin of Adorno's concept of metaphysical experience in <i>Negative Dialectics</i>.</p>","PeriodicalId":46958,"journal":{"name":"EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY","volume":"33 1","pages":"92-111"},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2024-07-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141574823","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Who are Nietzsche's slaves?","authors":"Ken Gemes","doi":"10.1111/ejop.12979","DOIUrl":"10.1111/ejop.12979","url":null,"abstract":"<p>This paper argues that Nietzsche is deliberately imprecise in his characterization of what he calls the slave revolt in morality. In particular, none of the people or groups he nominates as instigators of the slave revolt, namely, Jewish priests, the Jewish people, the prophets, Jesus, and Paul, were literally slaves. Analysis of Nietzsche's texts, including his usage of the term “slaves,” and his sources concerning those he nominates as the instigators of the slave revolt, make clear that Nietzsche knew none of these were literally slaves. He calls it a slave revolt because he means that the propagators of that revolt preached what he takes to be the slavish values, including, humility, compassion, obedience, and lack of egoism. He uses the high loaded term “slave” both to disparage those values and, most importantly, to bring home to his readers the message that they, as inheritors of Judeo-Christian values, actual adhere to and practice the debased slavish values preached, but not necessarily practiced, by the original instigators of the slave revolt. For Nietzsche, his readers are strangers to themselves, thus he notes “slavery is everywhere visible, although it does not call itself as such.”</p>","PeriodicalId":46958,"journal":{"name":"EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY","volume":"32 4","pages":"1116-1129"},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2024-07-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/ejop.12979","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141574981","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}