EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY最新文献

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Transcendental arguments and metaphysical neutrality: A Wittgensteinian proposal 超验论证与形而上学中立:维特根斯坦的建议
IF 0.9 2区 哲学
EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY Pub Date : 2024-01-14 DOI: 10.1111/ejop.12922
Sidra Shahid
{"title":"Transcendental arguments and metaphysical neutrality: A Wittgensteinian proposal","authors":"Sidra Shahid","doi":"10.1111/ejop.12922","DOIUrl":"10.1111/ejop.12922","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Despite periods of resurgence over the last decades, it is safe to say that transcendental arguments no longer enjoy a prominent presence in the philosophical landscape. One reason for their declining prominence is the sustained suspicion that despite their self-proclaimed metaphysical neutrality, transcendental arguments are, in fact, metaphysically committed. This paper aims to revive the discussion of transcendental considerations by offering a metaphysically neutral account of transcendental arguments. I argue that a metaphysically neutral conception of transcendental arguments requires a revision of two concepts constitutive of transcendental claims, namely, transcendental necessity and the a priori. I propose a transcendental reading of Wittgenstein's <i>On Certainty</i>, which, I maintain, provides us with an alternative, metaphysically neutral understanding of these concepts. Thus revised, transcendental claims are suitable for what Mark Sacks once described as the “post-metaphysical” orientation of contemporary philosophy.</p>","PeriodicalId":46958,"journal":{"name":"EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2024-01-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/ejop.12922","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139496205","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Kant on race and the radical evil in the human species 康德论种族与人类的极端邪恶
IF 0.9 2区 哲学
EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY Pub Date : 2024-01-12 DOI: 10.1111/ejop.12921
Laura Papish
{"title":"Kant on race and the radical evil in the human species","authors":"Laura Papish","doi":"10.1111/ejop.12921","DOIUrl":"10.1111/ejop.12921","url":null,"abstract":"<p><i>Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason</i> remains one of the most opaque of Kant's published writings. Though this opacity belongs, partly, to the text itself, a key claim of this article is that this opacity stems also from the narrow lenses through which his readers view this text. Often read as part of Kant's moral philosophy or his universal history, the literature has thus far neglected a different vantage point on the <i>Religion</i>, one that does not refute the utility of these lenses but complements them. This paper places the <i>Religion</i> alongside parts of Kant's corpus that it is less typically paired with, namely his natural history writings—in particular, his writings on the concept of race and the development of the human races. I argue that by doing so, we can shed much light on Kant's infamous claim that there is a radical evil in the human species. More precisely, we will come to appreciate that this evil is not, as it is usually understood, a static property or fixed characteristic of human beings. Instead, radical evil concerns a dynamic, changing defect in human nature that increasingly threatens our aspirations to collective moral perfection.</p>","PeriodicalId":46958,"journal":{"name":"EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2024-01-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139462399","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Extravagance and misery: Hegel on the multiplication and refinement of needs 奢侈与痛苦黑格尔论需求的倍增与细化
IF 0.7 2区 哲学
EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY Pub Date : 2024-01-12 DOI: 10.1111/ejop.12916
Nicolás García Mills
{"title":"Extravagance and misery: Hegel on the multiplication and refinement of needs","authors":"Nicolás García Mills","doi":"10.1111/ejop.12916","DOIUrl":"10.1111/ejop.12916","url":null,"abstract":"<p>The topic of this paper is Hegel's claim in the <i>Philosophy of Right</i> that, within the modern social world, human needs tend to be endlessly expanded. Unlike the role that the system of needs plays in the formation of its participants' psychological makeup and the problem of poverty and the rabble, the topic of the expansion of needs remains underdiscussed in the recent Hegel literature on the virtues and vices of civil society. My discussion of the topic aims to answer the following two sets of questions: How does it come to pass that individuals' needs are endlessly expanded in this way? And is that expansion a phenomenon to be applauded or condemned? In particular, does the endless expansion of needs aid or obstruct the realization of social members' freedom? In answer to the first question, I argue that for Hegel the endless expansion of needs results from the level of specialization and division of labor distinctive of the modern market economy, the human capacity for a certain kind of abstraction, and the desire to be recognized by other participants in the market system. In answer to the second set of questions, and despite Hegel's own apparent ambivalence, I argue on his behalf that the endless expansion of needs represents an obstacle to the realization of freedom, and is on that ground a phenomenon to be condemned, for the following two reasons: First, the endless expansion of needs increases the influence or “pressure” of desire on the members of civil society that are subject to that expansion. Second, that expansion leads to widespread frustration, understood as the inability on the part of the members of civil society to ever fully realize their ends or satisfy their desires. I end by briefly considering two Hegelian solutions to the pernicious effects of the endless expansion of needs.</p>","PeriodicalId":46958,"journal":{"name":"EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2024-01-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/ejop.12916","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139462359","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Listening to algorithms: The case of self-knowledge 聆听算法:自知之明
IF 0.9 2区 哲学
EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY Pub Date : 2024-01-10 DOI: 10.1111/ejop.12923
Casey Doyle
{"title":"Listening to algorithms: The case of self-knowledge","authors":"Casey Doyle","doi":"10.1111/ejop.12923","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/ejop.12923","url":null,"abstract":"This paper begins with the thought that there is something out of place about offloading inquiry into one's own mind to AI. The paper's primary goal is to articulate the unease felt when considering cases of doing so. It draws a parallel between the use of algorithms in the criminal law: in both cases one feels entitled to be treated as an exception to a verdict made on the basis of a certain kind of evidence. Then it identifies an account of first-person authority that can make good on this: agentialism. Thus, the paper constitutes an argument in favor of an agentialist treatment of self-knowledge and first-person authority.","PeriodicalId":46958,"journal":{"name":"EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2024-01-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139462384","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Reason, reasoning, and the taking condition 理性、推理和取舍条件
IF 0.9 2区 哲学
EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY Pub Date : 2024-01-10 DOI: 10.1111/ejop.12917
Hamid Vahid
{"title":"Reason, reasoning, and the taking condition","authors":"Hamid Vahid","doi":"10.1111/ejop.12917","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/ejop.12917","url":null,"abstract":"Theoretical reasoning (inference) is a conscious personal-level activity and a causal process. It is the process of revising one's beliefs for a reason whereby some of our beliefs cause or result in other beliefs. But inference is more than mere causation. This raises the question of what exactly distinguishes theoretical reasoning from mere causal processes. Paul Boghossian has located the distinguishing feature of inference in, what he calls, the “taking condition” requirement (TC). It turns out, however, that all attempts to explain this notion fail. In this paper, I shall offer an indirect argument for the taking condition grounded in a specific account of the structure of epistemic reasons that distinguishes two levels of epistemic normativity, namely, the possession and justification levels. I show how such an account can legitimize the role of (TC) in reasoning and deflect the standard objections raised against it. Finally, I explain how this proposal naturally accommodates the defeasibility of reasoning.","PeriodicalId":46958,"journal":{"name":"EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2024-01-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139462311","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Moderate realist ideology critique 温和现实主义意识形态批判
IF 0.9 2区 哲学
EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY Pub Date : 2024-01-10 DOI: 10.1111/ejop.12929
Rebecca L. Clark
{"title":"Moderate realist ideology critique","authors":"Rebecca L. Clark","doi":"10.1111/ejop.12929","DOIUrl":"10.1111/ejop.12929","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Realist ideology critique (RIC) is a strand of political realism recently developed in response to concerns that realism is biased toward the status quo. RIC aims to debunk an individual's belief that a social institution is legitimate by revealing that the belief is <i>caused</i> by that very same institution. Despite its growing prominence, RIC has received little critical attention. In this article, I buck this trend. First, I improve on contemporary accounts of RIC by clarifying its status and the role of motivated reasoning. Second, I show that realist ideology critics face a dilemma: either their account makes deeply implausible epistemological assumptions, or they temper its epistemology at the expense of rendering it toothless. I argue for each horn in turn before revealing the dilemma to be a false one by making a novel distinction between varying strengths of RIC based on their underlying epistemological assumptions. I propose Moderate RIC as a solution: upon discovering that one reason for your belief that a social institution is legitimate is likely malignantly epistemically circular, the belief should undergo further epistemic testing. I respond to three potential objections and suggest that Moderate RIC would make a fruitful addition to political theorists' methodological toolkit.</p>","PeriodicalId":46958,"journal":{"name":"EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2024-01-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/ejop.12929","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139462358","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Against theological readings of Sartre 反对对萨特的神学解读
IF 0.9 2区 哲学
EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY Pub Date : 2024-01-10 DOI: 10.1111/ejop.12918
Matthew Eshleman
{"title":"Against theological readings of Sartre","authors":"Matthew Eshleman","doi":"10.1111/ejop.12918","DOIUrl":"10.1111/ejop.12918","url":null,"abstract":"<p>This essay addresses ‘the God-haunted Atheist paradox’ in Sartre's early philosophy and argues against a series of efforts to show that Sartre maintains a ‘secular theology’. It shows that if Sartre's ontology is correct, the God of ‘classic theism’ cannot possibly exist. It argues against two sophisticated efforts to show that theological influences infiltrate Sartre's early ontology and permeate his moral psychology. It also rejects the claim that Sartre's (Existentialism is a Humanism, 1946/2007, Yale University Press) distinction between secular and religious existentialism ‘has no basis in fact’. It shows that Sartre appropriates religious language in order to give debunking secular explanations for religious phenomena and that he inverts traditional Christian values. It concludes that Sartre is an anti-theologian.</p>","PeriodicalId":46958,"journal":{"name":"EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2024-01-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/ejop.12918","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139462284","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Willful testimonial injustice as a form of epistemic injustice 故意作证不公正是认识论不公正的一种形式
IF 0.9 2区 哲学
EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY Pub Date : 2024-01-10 DOI: 10.1111/ejop.12928
Hilkje C. Hänel
{"title":"Willful testimonial injustice as a form of epistemic injustice","authors":"Hilkje C. Hänel","doi":"10.1111/ejop.12928","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/ejop.12928","url":null,"abstract":"In the debate on epistemic injustice, it is generally assumed that testimonial injustice as one form of epistemic injustice cannot be committed (fully) deliberately or intentionally because it involves unconscious identity prejudices. Drawing on the case of sexual violence against refugees in European refugee camps, this paper argues that there is a form of testimonial injustice—willful testimonial injustice—that is deliberate. To do so, the paper argues (a) that the hearer intentionally utilizes negative identity prejudices for a particular purpose and (b) that the hearer is aware of the fact that the intentionally used prejudices are in fact prejudices. Furthermore, the paper shows how testimonial injustice relates to recognition failures both in terms of a causal as well as a constitutive claim. In fact, introducing willful testimonial injustice can support the constitutive claim of such a relation that has so far received little attention. Besides arguing for a novel form of testimonial injustice and contributing to the recent debate on the relation between epistemic injustice and recognition failures, this paper is also motivated by the attempt to draw attention to the inhumane conditions for refugees at the border of Europe as well as elsewhere.","PeriodicalId":46958,"journal":{"name":"EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2024-01-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139462285","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Fish as fellow creatures—A matter of moral attention 鱼是同类--道德关注的问题
IF 0.9 2区 哲学
EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY Pub Date : 2023-12-28 DOI: 10.1111/ejop.12920
Hannah Winther, Bjørn Myskja
{"title":"Fish as fellow creatures—A matter of moral attention","authors":"Hannah Winther,&nbsp;Bjørn Myskja","doi":"10.1111/ejop.12920","DOIUrl":"10.1111/ejop.12920","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Up against capacity-based approaches to animal ethics, Cora Diamond has put the idea of animals as our <i>fellow creatures</i>. The aim of this article is to explore the implications of this concept for our treatment of fish. Fish have traditionally been placed at the borders or even outside of the moral community, although there is growing evidence that they have perceptual and social capacities comparable to animals that are considered morally significant. Given that a fellow creature's approach is not primarily concerned with capacities, fish may pose a challenge: Can fish be seen as our fellow creatures, and if so, on what grounds? In exploring these questions, we defend Diamond against Jeff McMahan's critique of her account and its implications that the fellow creature-concept is reducible to either capacities or special relationships and leaves no room for argument-based moral reform. We suggest that moral attention is key to grasping the moral significance of fish and discuss how scientific research can support such attention. In so doing, we demonstrate how Diamond's approach to animal ethics provides a viable alternative to the dominant animal ethics approaches. Finally, we indicate how this approach can be useful for discussions on industrial fish farming.</p>","PeriodicalId":46958,"journal":{"name":"EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2023-12-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/ejop.12920","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139067837","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Joint action and spontaneity 共同行动和自发性
IF 0.9 2区 哲学
EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY Pub Date : 2023-12-28 DOI: 10.1111/ejop.12926
Alexander Leferman
{"title":"Joint action and spontaneity","authors":"Alexander Leferman","doi":"10.1111/ejop.12926","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/ejop.12926","url":null,"abstract":"This paper poses a challenge to theories of joint action. In addition to the typical requirement of explaining how agents count as acting together as opposed to acting in parallel or independently—the togetherness requirement—it is argued that theories must explain how agents can be spontaneously joined such that they can act together spontaneously—the spontaneity requirement. To be spontaneously joined is to be immediately joined. The challenge arises because the typical means of satisfying the togetherness requirement, for example, planning, expressing willingness, and so forth, are forms of mediating, binding interaction and so seem to eliminate the possibility of spontaneity. Likewise, taking spontaneity seriously makes it difficult to see how the togetherness requirement can be simultaneously met. The challenge threatens the very idea of joint agency.","PeriodicalId":46958,"journal":{"name":"EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2023-12-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139067836","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
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