EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY最新文献

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Irony, Tragedy, Deception 讽刺、悲剧、欺骗
IF 0.7 2区 哲学
EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY Pub Date : 2024-08-16 DOI: 10.1111/ejop.12997
Gregory Currie
{"title":"Irony, Tragedy, Deception","authors":"Gregory Currie","doi":"10.1111/ejop.12997","DOIUrl":"10.1111/ejop.12997","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Two theories dominate the current debate over the nature of verbal irony: the pretence theory and the echoic theory. It is common ground in this debate that irony is sometimes both echoic and enacted through pretence; my concern here is with such cases. I ask how these features interact with each other within a form of irony that has not so far been the focus of theoretical attention: hidden or deceptive irony. This enables us to see that interesting cases of verbal irony often target an outlook or point of view rather than some real or imagined prior utterance. This, in turn, suggests a move from the idea of echoic irony to <i>irony which invokes a defective outlook</i>. Using the tools constructed thus far, I focus on an exchange in Euripides' <i>Medea</i>, indicating how deceptive verbal irony gives rise to situations of dramatic irony, and provides a showcase for exhibitions of mastery by characters otherwise lacking control of their situations. I ask whether such instances of deceptive irony encourage audience members to see themselves as side-participants in the dramas they witness. The question has an empirical aspect we are in no good position to answer; I offer a version of the idea which has at least the merit of not falling victim to obvious philosophical objections.</p>","PeriodicalId":46958,"journal":{"name":"EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY","volume":"33 2","pages":"424-437"},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2024-08-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/ejop.12997","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142215338","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Knowledge Aided by Observation† 通过观察获取知识†
IF 0.7 2区 哲学
EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY Pub Date : 2024-08-14 DOI: 10.1111/ejop.12993
Adrian Haddock
{"title":"Knowledge Aided by Observation†","authors":"Adrian Haddock","doi":"10.1111/ejop.12993","DOIUrl":"10.1111/ejop.12993","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Anscombe seems to think that, even though “the knowledge that a man has of his intentional actions” is not “knowledge by observation”, it can be aided by observation. My aim in this essay is to explain how I think we should understand this thought. I suggest that, in a central class of cases, knowledge of one's intentional action is knowledge whose canonical linguistic expression is an utterance of the form “I am doing something to that <i>G</i>\": knowledge in which the subject, at once, knows himself “as self\" (and so, not by observation), and knows an outer object “as other” (and so, by observation). To characterise this knowledge either as knowledge by observation, or as knowledge not by observation, is to characterise it in a manner that abstracts away from its fundamental unity.</p>","PeriodicalId":46958,"journal":{"name":"EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY","volume":"32 3","pages":"716-727"},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2024-08-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142215339","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Quietist Elements in Adorno 阿多诺的静穆主义元素
IF 0.7 2区 哲学
EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY Pub Date : 2024-08-09 DOI: 10.1111/ejop.12999
Christian Lamp
{"title":"Quietist Elements in Adorno","authors":"Christian Lamp","doi":"10.1111/ejop.12999","DOIUrl":"10.1111/ejop.12999","url":null,"abstract":"<p>In this article I take a closer look at Adorno's methodology, and specifically the question of how – in Adorno's view – philosophy ought to be done. In this, my aim is to see whether there might be ‘quietist’ elements in his methodological account, i.e. the meta-philosophical position of quietism as it stands against (scientific) naturalism in recent discussions. Recent work on Adorno and classical critical theory has discussed numerous similarities and overlaps with the post-analytical work of, e.g., John McDowell and Michael Thompson. Building on this recent work, my article suggests further points of contact, by focusing on the interplay of question and answer present in both McDowell and Adorno. To do this, I first outline McDowell's version of quietism. From there, an interpretation of Adorno can proceed along the lines developed with McDowell, centering the idea of unanswerable philosophical questions that need to be treated instead of answered straightforwardly. I demonstrate the relation he draws from disappearance of questions to ‘praxis’ and suggest how this differs from McDowell yet might still be viewed as an account related to quietism. I conclude by suggesting taking up Adorno's term ‘immanent criticism’ as a methodological concept.</p>","PeriodicalId":46958,"journal":{"name":"EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY","volume":"33 2","pages":"700-720"},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2024-08-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/ejop.12999","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141921397","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
The Unity of the Moral Domain 道德领域的统一性
IF 0.7 2区 哲学
EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY Pub Date : 2024-08-08 DOI: 10.1111/ejop.12998
Jeremy David Fix
{"title":"The Unity of the Moral Domain","authors":"Jeremy David Fix","doi":"10.1111/ejop.12998","DOIUrl":"10.1111/ejop.12998","url":null,"abstract":"<p>What is the function of morality—what is it all about? What is the basis of morality—what explains our moral agency and patiency? This essay defends a unique Kantian answer to these questions. Morality is about securing our independence from each other by giving each other equal discretion over whether and how we interact. The basis of our moral agency and patiency is practical reason. The first half addresses objections that this account cannot explain the moral patiency of beings who are not also moral agents such as infantile, elderly, and infirm human beings and the other animals. The second half argues that this account is preferable, on grounds of consistency with the basic Kantian account of the function and content of morality, to the familiar account of our moral patiency, popular especially though not exclusively with contemporary Kantians, in terms of the value of humanity.</p>","PeriodicalId":46958,"journal":{"name":"EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY","volume":"33 2","pages":"438-457"},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2024-08-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/ejop.12998","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141928068","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Moral Articulation: On the Development of New Moral Concepts, by Matthew Congdon Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2024, ISBN: 9780197691571 道德衔接:论新道德观念的发展》,牛津大学出版社,2024 年,ISBN:9780197691571:牛津大学出版社,2024 年,国际标准书号:9780197691571
IF 0.7 2区 哲学
EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY Pub Date : 2024-08-06 DOI: 10.1111/ejop.12987
Nora Hämäläinen
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引用次数: 0
The unity argument: Phenomenology's departure from Kant 统一性论证:现象学与康德的背离
IF 0.7 2区 哲学
EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY Pub Date : 2024-07-31 DOI: 10.1111/ejop.12963
Lilian Alweiss
{"title":"The unity argument: Phenomenology's departure from Kant","authors":"Lilian Alweiss","doi":"10.1111/ejop.12963","DOIUrl":"10.1111/ejop.12963","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Phenomenology questions the centrality that Kant attributes to the “I think.” It claims that on the pre-reflective level experience is selfless as unity is given. I call this the “unity argument.” The paper explores the significance of this claim by focusing on the work of Edmund Husserl. What interests me is that although the unity argument claims that we can account for the unity of experience without appealing to the an “I think,” Husserl agrees with Kant that experience must be owned. Moreover, he endorses Kant's dictum that ‘the “I think” must be capable of accompanying all my presentations’. The aim of the paper is to explore how Husserl can consistently appeal to Kant's account of the “I think” and at the same time contend that on the pre-reflective level experience is selfless. The thesis I wish to advance is that although the unity argument acknowledges that experience is necessarily mine, it reveals that it is a necessary feature of self-reference that I have never taken absolute ownership over my experience. This may explain why our sense of self can often be out of tune with the way we live our lives.</p>","PeriodicalId":46958,"journal":{"name":"EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY","volume":"32 4","pages":"1130-1145"},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2024-07-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/ejop.12963","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141863124","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
T. H. Green and Henry Sidgwick on free agency and the guise of the good T.T. H. 格林和亨利-西吉威克论自由代理和善良的幌子
IF 0.7 2区 哲学
EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY Pub Date : 2024-07-31 DOI: 10.1111/ejop.12980
E. E. Sheng
{"title":"T. H. Green and Henry Sidgwick on free agency and the guise of the good","authors":"E. E. Sheng","doi":"10.1111/ejop.12980","DOIUrl":"10.1111/ejop.12980","url":null,"abstract":"<p>The history of the thesis of the guise of the good between Kant and Anscombe is not well understood. This article examines a notable disagreement over the thesis during this period, between Green and Sidgwick. It shows that Green accepts versions of the thesis concerning action and desire in one sense of “desire,” and that Sidgwick rejects the thesis concerning both action and desire. It then considers why Green accepts the thesis, and how effective Sidgwick's criticism of Green is. Despite the appearance of a mere clash of intuitions, an interesting rationale for the thesis can be found in Green's theory of free will and moral responsibility, of which I defend a broadly compatibilist interpretation. Sidgwick's criticisms either miss this rationale altogether, or do not take adequately into account Green's complex theory of free will.</p>","PeriodicalId":46958,"journal":{"name":"EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY","volume":"33 1","pages":"56-72"},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2024-07-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/ejop.12980","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141885198","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Das Wissen der Person: Eine Topographie des menschlichen Geistes By  Pirmin, Stekeler-Weithofer Edited by  Leander Berger,  Jakob Kümmerer, and  Max Stange Hamburg: Felix Meiner,  2022. ISBN 978–3–7873-4129-0 Pirmin Stekeler-Weithofer 著,Leander Berger、Jakob Kümmerer 和 Max Stange 编辑 汉堡:Felix Meiner,2022 年 ISBN 978-3-7873-4129-0。
IF 0.7 2区 哲学
EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY Pub Date : 2024-07-30 DOI: 10.1111/ejop.12988
Simon Schüz
{"title":"Das Wissen der Person: Eine Topographie des menschlichen Geistes By  Pirmin, Stekeler-Weithofer Edited by  Leander Berger,  Jakob Kümmerer, and  Max Stange Hamburg: Felix Meiner,  2022. ISBN 978–3–7873-4129-0","authors":"Simon Schüz","doi":"10.1111/ejop.12988","DOIUrl":"10.1111/ejop.12988","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":46958,"journal":{"name":"EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY","volume":"32 3","pages":"1005-1011"},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2024-07-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141863231","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
The Puzzle of Empty Formal Indications: On the ‘Deferred’ Meaning of Heidegger's Language 空形式指示之谜:论海德格尔语言的 "延迟 "意义
IF 0.7 2区 哲学
EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY Pub Date : 2024-07-29 DOI: 10.1111/ejop.12990
David Zoller
{"title":"The Puzzle of Empty Formal Indications: On the ‘Deferred’ Meaning of Heidegger's Language","authors":"David Zoller","doi":"10.1111/ejop.12990","DOIUrl":"10.1111/ejop.12990","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Heidegger's notion of philosophical concepts as “formal indications” is rightly viewed as a crucial development. The idea of formal indication is partly intended to answer concerns that phenomenology objectivizes conscious life. Formal indication responds—in what would become a signature feature of much of Heidegger's early work—by setting up a unique dependency of the meaning of phenomenological concepts on their “enactment” in the first-personal life of the investigator or reader. Commentators have appropriately wondered whether this move succeeds. Yet relatively little emphasis has been placed on the potential problem of underdetermination: whether this model of deferring meaning to “enactment” leaves the reader with a sufficient understanding of the term that they know what to enact and (hopefully) gain some positive self-understanding through it. This problem becomes more or less acute depending on how we model the “deferred meaning” of formal indication. Here I study candidate models of “deferred meaning,” including those prominent in the literature, to determine whether any are suitable to model the meaning-structure of formal indication and stave off the underdetermination problem.</p>","PeriodicalId":46958,"journal":{"name":"EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY","volume":"33 2","pages":"643-659"},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2024-07-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141863233","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
An Indeterminate Conception of Practical Reasoning 实践推理的不确定概念
IF 0.7 2区 哲学
EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY Pub Date : 2024-07-26 DOI: 10.1111/ejop.12992
Jorah Dannenberg
{"title":"An Indeterminate Conception of Practical Reasoning","authors":"Jorah Dannenberg","doi":"10.1111/ejop.12992","DOIUrl":"10.1111/ejop.12992","url":null,"abstract":"<p>This paper makes a case for treating the boundary between what counts as <i>practical reasoning</i> and what does not as essentially indeterminate. The idea that there is an “essential indeterminacy in what can be counted as a rational deliberative process” was put forward by Bernard Williams in his well-known discussion of statements about an agent's reasons for action. But in contrast to the more familiar argument of that paper, the idea has received almost no attention. To understand and defend the idea, I first offer a somewhat novel reconstruction of the more familiar argument against making statements about a person's reasons intended on an “external” interpretation. On my reading, the argument shows how making such statements runs afoul of ideals of <i>honesty</i> in our interpersonal dealings. I then argue for countenancing an essential indeterminacy in what counts as practical reasoning, in a manner that involves a re-application of these same ideals of honesty, albeit at a higher level of abstraction. One advantage of understanding the entire discussion of reasons statements and reasoning along these lines is that it highlights the deeply anti-rationalistic flavor of Williams' own interest in these topics. Unsurprisingly, Williams' treatment displays a deep affinity with the anti-rationalistic ethics advanced by Hume. It also turns out to be at cross purposes with the far more rationalistic ethical vision that animates more recent attempts to advance a “Humean Theory of Reasons,” which is sometimes mistakenly seen as following in Williams' and Hume's footsteps.</p>","PeriodicalId":46958,"journal":{"name":"EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY","volume":"33 1","pages":"285-299"},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2024-07-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/ejop.12992","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141786244","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
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