EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY最新文献_第8页

IF 0.7 2区哲学

EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY Pub Date : 2024-07-05 DOI: 10.1111/ejop.12979

Ken Gemes

{"title":"Who are Nietzsche's slaves?","authors":"Ken Gemes","doi":"10.1111/ejop.12979","DOIUrl":"10.1111/ejop.12979","url":null,"abstract":"This paper argues that Nietzsche is deliberately imprecise in his characterization of what he calls the slave revolt in morality. In particular, none of the people or groups he nominates as instigators of the slave revolt, namely, Jewish priests, the Jewish people, the prophets, Jesus, and Paul, were literally slaves. Analysis of Nietzsche's texts, including his usage of the term “slaves,” and his sources concerning those he nominates as the instigators of the slave revolt, make clear that Nietzsche knew none of these were literally slaves. He calls it a slave revolt because he means that the propagators of that revolt preached what he takes to be the slavish values, including, humility, compassion, obedience, and lack of egoism. He uses the high loaded term “slave” both to disparage those values and, most importantly, to bring home to his readers the message that they, as inheritors of Judeo-Christian values, actual adhere to and practice the debased slavish values preached, but not necessarily practiced, by the original instigators of the slave revolt. For Nietzsche, his readers are strangers to themselves, thus he notes “slavery is everywhere visible, although it does not call itself as such.”","PeriodicalId":46958,"journal":{"name":"EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY","volume":"32 4","pages":"1116-1129"},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2024-07-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/ejop.12979","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141574981","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Modalization and demodalization: On the phenomenology of negation 模态化和去模态化：论否定的现象学

IF 0.7 2区哲学

EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY Pub Date : 2024-07-03 DOI: 10.1111/ejop.12983

Kyle Banick

{"title":"Modalization and demodalization: On the phenomenology of negation","authors":"Kyle Banick","doi":"10.1111/ejop.12983","DOIUrl":"10.1111/ejop.12983","url":null,"abstract":"Negation is widely thought to be uniquely captured by the usual extensional Boolean connective in the setting of classical logic. However, there has been recent interest in a modal approach to negation. This essay examines the problem of modal negation with an Husserlian phenomenological lens. I argue that the Husserlian approach to negation contains an ambiguity which points to a pluralism about negation. On this view, negation begins its life as a modal notion with nonclassical properties, and the question of classical negation is a question of its demodalization. I reconstruct a phenomenological legitimation of the demodalization, but I remain skeptical about its wider prospects. Nevertheless, the phenomenological-modal approach to negation answers the skepticism about the very possibility of debates about negation and gives valuable insight into the fundamental nature of the problem. The argument should be of interest both to those who are specifically interested in Husserl's logic and the relationship of phenomenology to intuitionistic (and other nonclassical) logics, as well as to philosophers of logic more generally interested in obtaining different angles on the problem of negation from a systematic perspective.","PeriodicalId":46958,"journal":{"name":"EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY","volume":"33 2","pages":"613-628"},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2024-07-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141550864","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Acting as causing change 作为引起变化的行为

IF 0.7 2区哲学

EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY Pub Date : 2024-07-02 DOI: 10.1111/ejop.12973

Maria Alvarez

引用次数: 0

How to decide what to do: Why you're already a realist about value 如何决定做什么为什么你已经是价值现实主义者？

IF 0.7 2区哲学

EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY Pub Date : 2024-06-18 DOI: 10.1111/ejop.12977

Claire Kirwin

{"title":"How to decide what to do: Why you're already a realist about value","authors":"Claire Kirwin","doi":"10.1111/ejop.12977","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/ejop.12977","url":null,"abstract":"Metaethical realists and anti-realists alike have typically assumed that deliberation about what to do is, at least sometimes, properly settled by the agent's evaluative attitudes—what she wants, likes, or values—rather than by any objective source of value out in the world. I argue that this picture of deliberation is not one that the deliberating agent herself can accept. Seen from within the first-person perspective, the agent's own evaluative attitudes are not encountered as descriptive psychological facts, but are rather “transparent” to the external world, conceived as a place already suffused with normative significance: they are her finding the relevant parts of the world to be desirable, valuable, and so on. And from the agent's own point of view, these attitudes can do the normative work involved in settling deliberation only because and insofar as they are understood as in this way a warranted response to this desirability or value. Attitudes that the agent does not experience as transparent in this way are attitudes from which she is alienated, and as such she cannot understand them as authoritative over her deliberation. What this means, I argue, is that deliberation about what to do involves a commitment to a particularly substantive form of metaethical realism.","PeriodicalId":46958,"journal":{"name":"EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY","volume":"32 3","pages":"847-859"},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2024-06-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/ejop.12977","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142404841","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

A project of “impure” enquiry—Williams' historical self-consciousness 一个 "不纯粹 "的探究项目--威廉斯的历史自我意识

IF 0.9 2区哲学

EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY Pub Date : 2024-06-18 DOI: 10.1111/ejop.12981

Miranda Fricker

引用次数: 0

Vindicating universalism: Pragmatic genealogy and moral progress 平反普遍主义：实用主义谱系与道德进步

IF 0.7 2区哲学

EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY Pub Date : 2024-06-12 DOI: 10.1111/ejop.12975

Charlie Blunden, Benedict Lane

{"title":"Vindicating universalism: Pragmatic genealogy and moral progress","authors":"Charlie Blunden, Benedict Lane","doi":"10.1111/ejop.12975","DOIUrl":"10.1111/ejop.12975","url":null,"abstract":"How do we justify the normative standards to which we appeal in support of our moral progress judgments, given their historical and cultural contingency? To answer this question in a noncircular way, Elizabeth Anderson and Philip Kitcher appeal exclusively to formal features of the methodology by which a moral change was brought about; some moral methodologies are systematically less prone to bias than others and are therefore less vulnerable to error. However, we argue that the methodologies espoused by Anderson and Kitcher implicitly appeal to the substantive principle of “moral universalism.” This sets up the positive project of the paper: an attempt to vindicate moral universalism with a pragmatic genealogy. Using resources from cultural evolutionary theory and the history of ideas we argue that the universalistic norms widely committed to in many societies today have the function of maintaining cooperation in large anonymous groups. Furthermore, while universalistic norms play this instrumental role, their functional benefits are best secured when people following such norms do so for intrinsic rather than instrumental reasons. Finally, having elaborated our pragmatic genealogy, we close by considering how this genealogy should affect our commitment to moral universalism and how it can complement the methods of Anderson and Kitcher.","PeriodicalId":46958,"journal":{"name":"EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY","volume":"33 1","pages":"249-268"},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2024-06-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/ejop.12975","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141349861","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Love's realism: Iris Murdoch and the importance of being human 爱的现实主义：艾里斯-默多克与做人的重要性

IF 0.7 2区哲学

EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY Pub Date : 2024-06-11 DOI: 10.1111/ejop.12978

Lesley Jamieson

{"title":"Love's realism: Iris Murdoch and the importance of being human","authors":"Lesley Jamieson","doi":"10.1111/ejop.12978","DOIUrl":"10.1111/ejop.12978","url":null,"abstract":"Defenders of two Rationality Views of love—the Qualities View and the Personhood View—have drawn on Iris Murdoch's philosophical writings to highlight a connection between love and a “realistic” perspective on the beloved. Murdoch does not inform the basic structure of these views—she is rather introduced as a supplement who shows that in love, we pay accurate, nuanced, unguarded, and unflinching attention to the other. In this paper, I contend that these authors have failed to see that Murdoch offers a distinct view of love and is inappropriate to enlist as an ally. This is in large part because they have missed the full sense of what Murdoch means by connecting love and realism. I contend that for Murdoch, to love someone means seeing them in light of a realistic vision of what it means to be human; this includes an appreciation of the limits of freedom, the formative influence of personal history, and the nature and extent of our differences from one another. This helps us to see why Murdoch variously describes loving attention as realistic, compassionate, tolerant, and extremely difficult. It also sheds light on some important and familiar ways that we criticize one another's grounds for love.","PeriodicalId":46958,"journal":{"name":"EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY","volume":"32 4","pages":"1204-1220"},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2024-06-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/ejop.12978","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141357895","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Unalienated labor as cooperative self-determination: Aristotle and Marx 作为合作自决的无偿劳动：亚里士多德与马克思

IF 0.7 2区哲学

EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY Pub Date : 2024-06-11 DOI: 10.1111/ejop.12972

Kyle Scott

{"title":"Unalienated labor as cooperative self-determination: Aristotle and Marx","authors":"Kyle Scott","doi":"10.1111/ejop.12972","DOIUrl":"10.1111/ejop.12972","url":null,"abstract":"In this paper, I offer an original interpretation of Marx's conception of unalienated labor, which I frame as a response to Aristotle's view of work, or technē. Both Aristotle and Marx share a particular conception of freedom as “normative self-determination,” according to which an activity is free insofar as it does not depend for its value on externally valuable things. For instance, when my activity is a mere means for satisfying some need separate from it, it comes to depend for its value on the externally valuable effect—the “needs-meeting”—it achieves. Or, when my activity is only causally—but not normatively—enabled by the cooperative contributions of others, it comes to depend for its value on those externally valuable contributions. On Aristotle's view, work is unleisurely (ascholos) and servile (doulos) because it is normatively dependent in both of these ways. For Marx, by contrast, work possesses the capacity to “internalize” these external determinants of its value. Unalienated work does this, first, by satisfying “internal” needs, or needs whose satisfaction does not constitute a normatively external effect of the work that satisfies them. The satisfaction of internal needs is valuable because of the manner or way in which they are satisfied. Second, unalienated work would not only be causally, but also normatively, enabled by the contributions of others, in that those contributions would help to make it the distinctively valuable act that it is. Unalienated work would be valuable because, and not despite, its cooperative character. In both of these respects, then, cooperation is essential to make work fully free.","PeriodicalId":46958,"journal":{"name":"EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY","volume":"33 1","pages":"29-55"},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2024-06-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/ejop.12972","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141358610","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Torturous withdrawal: Emotional compulsion in addiction 折磨人的戒断成瘾中的情感强迫

IF 0.7 2区哲学

EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY Pub Date : 2024-06-11 DOI: 10.1111/ejop.12967

Arthur Krieger

引用次数: 0

The factivity of practical knowledge 实践知识的事实性

IF 0.7 2区哲学

EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY Pub Date : 2024-06-05 DOI: 10.1111/ejop.12960

Dawa Ometto, Niels van Miltenburg

引用次数: 0