注意和注意物:注意与注意物:对注意情境的感知

IF 0.7 2区 哲学 0 PHILOSOPHY
Tom McClelland
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引用次数: 0

摘要

代理不断面临着两个相关的选择问题:i) 从可能的行为空间中选择做什么的问题;ii) 从可能的关注空间中选择关注什么的问题。我们拥有能够解决这两类问题的心理机制。但是,这些机制是遵循不同的原则,还是沿着相同的路线工作呢?我认为是后者。我的理论出发点是,身体行动是由对可承受性的敏感性所支持的。有力的证据表明,负担能力是我们感知世界的一个特征,而负担能力感知可以触发神经系统为负担行为做准备。因此,一个人可以把茶壶看作是可以抓握的,而这样做可以自动准备好抓握反应。某样东西能让行为主体注意到它,以防它可能成为其焦点注意力的目标。我认为,我们对这些注意能力的敏感程度与此基本相同。首先,我认为我们将事物视为可关注的。其次,我认为我们这样做会引发焦点注意的准备转移。我的论证基于我们对身体可承受性的敏感性与我们对注意可承受性的敏感性之间的各种现象学、神经学和行为学相似之处。这就产生了一个统一的解释,对我们理解注意力和承受力感知有具体的影响,对我们理解思维如何解决选择问题也有普遍的影响。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Attention and Attendabilia: The Perception of Attentional Affordances
Agents are continually faced with two related selection problems: i) the problem of selecting what to do from a space of possible behaviours; ii) the problem of selecting what to attend to from a space of possible attendabilia. We have psychological mechanisms that enable us to solve both types of problem. But do these mechanisms follow different principles or work along the same lines? I argue for the latter. I start from the theory that bodily action is supported by a sensitivity to affordances. Strong evidence suggests that affordances feature in our perception of the world and that affordance perception can trigger the neural preparation of the afforded act. An agent can thus see a teapot as grippable and their doing so can automatically ready a gripping response. Something affords attending for an agent just in case it is a possible target of their focal attention. I argue that we are sensitive to these attentional affordances in much the same way. First I argue that we perceive things as attendable. Second I argue that our doing so can trigger the preparation of shifts in focal attention. My case for this is based on a variety of phenomenological, neurological and behavioural parallels between our sensitivity to bodily affordances and our sensitivity to attentional affordances. This yields a unified account with specific implications for our understanding of attention and affordance perception and general implications for our understanding of how the mind solves selection problems.
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来源期刊
CiteScore
1.50
自引率
11.10%
发文量
82
期刊介绍: ''Founded by Mark Sacks in 1993, the European Journal of Philosophy has come to occupy a distinctive and highly valued place amongst the philosophical journals. The aim of EJP has been to bring together the best work from those working within the "analytic" and "continental" traditions, and to encourage connections between them, without diluting their respective priorities and concerns. This has enabled EJP to publish a wide range of material of the highest standard from philosophers across the world, reflecting the best thinking from a variety of philosophical perspectives, in a way that is accessible to all of them.''
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