从利希滕贝格出发

IF 0.7 2区 哲学 0 PHILOSOPHY
Rory Madden
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引用次数: 0

摘要

利希滕贝格的言论是《实践自我》一书的推动力。根据戈麦斯的解释,利希滕贝格对人的认知能动性的理论知识提出了挑战。戈麦斯认为,这种挑战是无法克服的,因此为对个人认知代理的信念腾出了空间。在解释为什么通常被解读为Lichtenberg言论的挑战对Gomes的项目来说是有问题的之前,我质疑Lichtenberg的解释和挑战的不可克服性。最后,我代表戈麦斯概述了对这一挑战的回应。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Departures from Lichtenberg

Lichtenberg's remarks are a driving force of The Practical Self. On Gomes's interpretation, Lichtenberg is presenting a challenge to theoretical knowledge of one's cognitive agency. Gomes argues that this challenge is insuperable, thereby making room instead for faith in one's cognitive agency. I question both the interpretation of Lichtenberg and the insuperability of the challenge, before explaining why a challenge which is more usually read into Lichtenberg's remarks is problematic for Gomes's project. I close by sketching on Gomes's behalf a response to this challenge.

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来源期刊
CiteScore
1.50
自引率
11.10%
发文量
82
期刊介绍: ''Founded by Mark Sacks in 1993, the European Journal of Philosophy has come to occupy a distinctive and highly valued place amongst the philosophical journals. The aim of EJP has been to bring together the best work from those working within the "analytic" and "continental" traditions, and to encourage connections between them, without diluting their respective priorities and concerns. This has enabled EJP to publish a wide range of material of the highest standard from philosophers across the world, reflecting the best thinking from a variety of philosophical perspectives, in a way that is accessible to all of them.''
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