EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY最新文献

筛选
英文 中文
Doxastic Agent's Awareness 哆啦A梦的意识
IF 0.9 2区 哲学
EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY Pub Date : 2024-09-09 DOI: 10.1111/ejop.13006
Sophie Keeling
{"title":"Doxastic Agent's Awareness","authors":"Sophie Keeling","doi":"10.1111/ejop.13006","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/ejop.13006","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":46958,"journal":{"name":"EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY","volume":"7 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2024-09-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142215335","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Attention and Attendabilia: The Perception of Attentional Affordances 注意和注意物:注意与注意物:对注意情境的感知
IF 0.9 2区 哲学
EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY Pub Date : 2024-09-09 DOI: 10.1111/ejop.13010
Tom McClelland
{"title":"Attention and Attendabilia: The Perception of Attentional Affordances","authors":"Tom McClelland","doi":"10.1111/ejop.13010","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/ejop.13010","url":null,"abstract":"Agents are continually faced with two related selection problems: i) the problem of selecting what to do from a space of possible behaviours; ii) the problem of selecting what to attend to from a space of possible <jats:italic>attendabilia</jats:italic>. We have psychological mechanisms that enable us to solve both types of problem. But do these mechanisms follow different principles or work along the same lines? I argue for the latter. I start from the theory that bodily action is supported by a sensitivity to <jats:italic>affordances</jats:italic>. Strong evidence suggests that affordances feature in our perception of the world and that affordance perception can trigger the neural preparation of the afforded act. An agent can thus see a teapot <jats:italic>as grippable</jats:italic> and their doing so can automatically ready a gripping response. Something affords attending for an agent just in case it is a possible target of their focal attention. I argue that we are sensitive to these attentional affordances in much the same way. First I argue that we perceive things <jats:italic>as attendable</jats:italic>. Second I argue that our doing so can trigger the preparation of shifts in focal attention. My case for this is based on a variety of phenomenological, neurological and behavioural parallels between our sensitivity to bodily affordances and our sensitivity to attentional affordances. This yields a unified account with specific implications for our understanding of attention and affordance perception and general implications for our understanding of how the mind solves selection problems.","PeriodicalId":46958,"journal":{"name":"EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY","volume":"18 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2024-09-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142215334","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Misinterpreting Negativism: on Peter E. Gordon's A Precarious Happiness: Adorno and the Sources of Normativity 误读否定论:论彼得-E-戈登的《岌岌可危的幸福》:阿多诺与规范性的来源
IF 0.9 2区 哲学
EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY Pub Date : 2024-09-09 DOI: 10.1111/ejop.13005
Fabian Freyenhagen
{"title":"Misinterpreting Negativism: on Peter E. Gordon's A Precarious Happiness: Adorno and the Sources of Normativity","authors":"Fabian Freyenhagen","doi":"10.1111/ejop.13005","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/ejop.13005","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":46958,"journal":{"name":"EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY","volume":"34 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2024-09-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142215336","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Introspection: First‐person access in science and agency: By MajaSpener Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2024. ISBN: 9780198867449 自省:科学与代理中的第一人称访问:牛津大学出版社,2024 年:牛津大学出版社,2024 年。ISBN: 9780198867449
IF 0.9 2区 哲学
EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY Pub Date : 2024-08-23 DOI: 10.1111/ejop.13004
Christopher Mole
{"title":"Introspection: First‐person access in science and agency: By MajaSpener Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2024. ISBN: 9780198867449","authors":"Christopher Mole","doi":"10.1111/ejop.13004","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/ejop.13004","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":46958,"journal":{"name":"EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY","volume":"42 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2024-08-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142215337","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Irony, Tragedy, Deception 讽刺、悲剧、欺骗
IF 0.9 2区 哲学
EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY Pub Date : 2024-08-16 DOI: 10.1111/ejop.12997
Gregory Currie
{"title":"Irony, Tragedy, Deception","authors":"Gregory Currie","doi":"10.1111/ejop.12997","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/ejop.12997","url":null,"abstract":"Two theories dominate the current debate over the nature of verbal irony: the pretence theory and the echoic theory. It is common ground in this debate that irony is sometimes both echoic and enacted through pretence; my concern here is with such cases. I ask how these features interact with each other within a form of irony that has not so far been the focus of theoretical attention: hidden or deceptive irony. This enables us to see that interesting cases of verbal irony often target an outlook or point of view rather than some real or imagined prior utterance. This, in turn, suggests a move from the idea of echoic irony to <jats:italic>irony which invokes a defective outlook</jats:italic>. Using the tools constructed thus far, I focus on an exchange in Euripides' <jats:italic>Medea</jats:italic>, indicating how deceptive verbal irony gives rise to situations of dramatic irony, and provides a showcase for exhibitions of mastery by characters otherwise lacking control of their situations. I ask whether such instances of deceptive irony encourage audience members to see themselves as side‐participants in the dramas they witness. The question has an empirical aspect we are in no good position to answer; I offer a version of the idea which has at least the merit of not falling victim to obvious philosophical objections.","PeriodicalId":46958,"journal":{"name":"EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY","volume":"281 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2024-08-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142215338","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Knowledge Aided by Observation† 通过观察获取知识†
IF 0.7 2区 哲学
EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY Pub Date : 2024-08-14 DOI: 10.1111/ejop.12993
Adrian Haddock
{"title":"Knowledge Aided by Observation†","authors":"Adrian Haddock","doi":"10.1111/ejop.12993","DOIUrl":"10.1111/ejop.12993","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Anscombe seems to think that, even though “the knowledge that a man has of his intentional actions” is not “knowledge by observation”, it can be aided by observation. My aim in this essay is to explain how I think we should understand this thought. I suggest that, in a central class of cases, knowledge of one's intentional action is knowledge whose canonical linguistic expression is an utterance of the form “I am doing something to that <i>G</i>\": knowledge in which the subject, at once, knows himself “as self\" (and so, not by observation), and knows an outer object “as other” (and so, by observation). To characterise this knowledge either as knowledge by observation, or as knowledge not by observation, is to characterise it in a manner that abstracts away from its fundamental unity.</p>","PeriodicalId":46958,"journal":{"name":"EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY","volume":"32 3","pages":"716-727"},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2024-08-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142215339","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Moral Articulation: On the Development of New Moral Concepts, by Matthew Congdon Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2024, ISBN: 9780197691571 道德衔接:论新道德观念的发展》,牛津大学出版社,2024 年,ISBN:9780197691571:牛津大学出版社,2024 年,国际标准书号:9780197691571
IF 0.7 2区 哲学
EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY Pub Date : 2024-08-06 DOI: 10.1111/ejop.12987
Nora Hämäläinen
{"title":"Moral Articulation: On the Development of New Moral Concepts, by Matthew Congdon Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2024, ISBN: 9780197691571","authors":"Nora Hämäläinen","doi":"10.1111/ejop.12987","DOIUrl":"10.1111/ejop.12987","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":46958,"journal":{"name":"EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY","volume":"32 3","pages":"1000-1004"},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2024-08-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141938549","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
T. H. Green and Henry Sidgwick on free agency and the guise of the good T.T. H. 格林和亨利-西吉威克论自由代理和善良的幌子
IF 0.9 2区 哲学
EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY Pub Date : 2024-08-01 DOI: 10.1111/ejop.12980
E. E. Sheng
{"title":"T. H. Green and Henry Sidgwick on free agency and the guise of the good","authors":"E. E. Sheng","doi":"10.1111/ejop.12980","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/ejop.12980","url":null,"abstract":"The history of the thesis of the guise of the good between Kant and Anscombe is not well understood. This article examines a notable disagreement over the thesis during this period, between Green and Sidgwick. It shows that Green accepts versions of the thesis concerning action and desire in one sense of “desire,” and that Sidgwick rejects the thesis concerning both action and desire. It then considers why Green accepts the thesis, and how effective Sidgwick's criticism of Green is. Despite the appearance of a mere clash of intuitions, an interesting rationale for the thesis can be found in Green's theory of free will and moral responsibility, of which I defend a broadly compatibilist interpretation. Sidgwick's criticisms either miss this rationale altogether, or do not take adequately into account Green's complex theory of free will.","PeriodicalId":46958,"journal":{"name":"EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY","volume":"50 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2024-08-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141885198","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
The unity argument: Phenomenology's departure from Kant 统一性论证:现象学与康德的背离
IF 0.9 2区 哲学
EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY Pub Date : 2024-07-31 DOI: 10.1111/ejop.12963
Lilian Alweiss
{"title":"The unity argument: Phenomenology's departure from Kant","authors":"Lilian Alweiss","doi":"10.1111/ejop.12963","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/ejop.12963","url":null,"abstract":"Phenomenology questions the centrality that Kant attributes to the “I think.” It claims that on the pre‐reflective level experience is selfless as unity is given. I call this the “unity argument.” The paper explores the significance of this claim by focusing on the work of Edmund Husserl. What interests me is that although the unity argument claims that we can account for the unity of experience without appealing to the an “I think,” Husserl agrees with Kant that experience must be owned. Moreover, he endorses Kant's dictum that ‘the “I think” must be capable of accompanying all my presentations’. The aim of the paper is to explore how Husserl can consistently appeal to Kant's account of the “I think” and at the same time contend that on the pre‐reflective level experience is selfless. The thesis I wish to advance is that although the unity argument acknowledges that experience is necessarily mine, it reveals that it is a necessary feature of self‐reference that I have never taken absolute ownership over my experience. This may explain why our sense of self can often be out of tune with the way we live our lives.","PeriodicalId":46958,"journal":{"name":"EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY","volume":"75 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2024-07-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141863124","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Das Wissen der Person: Eine Topographie des menschlichen Geistes By  Pirmin, Stekeler-Weithofer Edited by  Leander Berger,  Jakob Kümmerer, and  Max Stange Hamburg: Felix Meiner,  2022. ISBN 978–3–7873-4129-0 Pirmin Stekeler-Weithofer 著,Leander Berger、Jakob Kümmerer 和 Max Stange 编辑 汉堡:Felix Meiner,2022 年 ISBN 978-3-7873-4129-0。
IF 0.7 2区 哲学
EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY Pub Date : 2024-07-30 DOI: 10.1111/ejop.12988
Simon Schüz
{"title":"Das Wissen der Person: Eine Topographie des menschlichen Geistes By  Pirmin, Stekeler-Weithofer Edited by  Leander Berger,  Jakob Kümmerer, and  Max Stange Hamburg: Felix Meiner,  2022. ISBN 978–3–7873-4129-0","authors":"Simon Schüz","doi":"10.1111/ejop.12988","DOIUrl":"10.1111/ejop.12988","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":46958,"journal":{"name":"EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY","volume":"32 3","pages":"1005-1011"},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2024-07-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141863231","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
0
×
引用
GB/T 7714-2015
复制
MLA
复制
APA
复制
导出至
BibTeX EndNote RefMan NoteFirst NoteExpress
×
提示
您的信息不完整,为了账户安全,请先补充。
现在去补充
×
提示
您因"违规操作"
具体请查看互助需知
我知道了
×
提示
确定
请完成安全验证×
相关产品
×
本文献相关产品
联系我们:info@booksci.cn Book学术提供免费学术资源搜索服务,方便国内外学者检索中英文文献。致力于提供最便捷和优质的服务体验。 Copyright © 2023 布克学术 All rights reserved.
京ICP备2023020795号-1
ghs 京公网安备 11010802042870号
Book学术文献互助
Book学术文献互助群
群 号:481959085
Book学术官方微信