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EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY最新文献

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Karl Marx and the Actualization of Philosophy By Christoph SchuringaCambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2025. 205 pp. ISBN: 9781009304849 《卡尔·马克思与哲学的实现》，克里斯托夫·舒林著。剑桥：剑桥大学出版社，2025年。205页。ISBN: 9781009304849
IF 0.9 2区 哲学
EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY Pub Date : 2026-10-23 Epub Date: 2026-07-12 DOI: 10.1111/ejop.70107
Sabina Vaccarino Bremner
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引用次数: 0
Hegel's “No” and “Yes” on the Question: Is Hegelian Recognition Second-Personal? 黑格尔的“否”与“是”——关于黑格尔的承认是否是第二人称的问题？
IF 0.9 2区 哲学
EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY Pub Date : 2026-10-23 Epub Date: 2025-03-06 DOI: 10.1111/ejop.13061
Dina Emundts
{"title":"Hegel's “No” and “Yes” on the Question: Is Hegelian Recognition Second-Personal?","authors":"Dina Emundts","doi":"10.1111/ejop.13061","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/ejop.13061","url":null,"abstract":"<p>This paper discusses a thesis put forward by Robert Stern. The thesis is that Hegel's conception of forgiveness should not be read as something in which the ethics of the second person is expressed. The paper develops an alternative reading of forgiveness that takes Stern's objections to a direct second personal approach of forgiveness seriously. Forgiveness is second-personal and we have the authority to forgive if we at the same time deny our individual standpoint as absolute. We thus get a concept of second-personal action which implies that the authority is grounded in society or the community and not in the person as an individual.</p>","PeriodicalId":46958,"journal":{"name":"EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY","volume":"34 3","pages":"821-832"},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2026-10-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"149258240","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Stern versus Houlgate on the Presuppositionless Nature of Hegel's Science of Logic 斯特恩与霍尔盖特论黑格尔逻辑科学的无预设性质
IF 0.9 2区 哲学
EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY Pub Date : 2026-10-23 DOI: 10.1111/ejop.70075
Sally S. Sedgwick
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引用次数: 0
Recognitive Volitional Practices and the Ontology of the Will1 认知意志实践与意志本体论
IF 0.9 2区 哲学
EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY Pub Date : 2026-10-23 DOI: 10.1111/ejop.70032
Wayne Martin
{"title":"Recognitive Volitional Practices and the Ontology of the Will1","authors":"Wayne Martin","doi":"10.1111/ejop.70032","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/ejop.70032","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Recognitive volitional practices are practices in which a person is recognised as having a will in a matter. Different ways of understanding the will presuppose or project different kinds of recognitive volitional practices – and vice versa. In the history of philosophical treatments of the will, it has generally been assumed that its mode of being is psychological; the will is understood to be some kind of power of the mind. An alternative would be to understand the mode of being of the will as recognitive, such that the existence of a will as a will makes essential reference to the practices in which it is recognised. These ideas are explored with reference to three recognitive volitional practices: one implicated in a 2016 atrocity in Japan; one from baptismal practices in an ancient Coptic community in Upper Egypt; one from a celebrated scene in American cinema. A conditional proof is offered in support of the hypothesis that the will enjoys a recognitive mode of being. The hypothesis is explored in connection with the ongoing struggle for more inclusive forms of legal recognition, particularly for persons living with disabilities.</p>","PeriodicalId":46958,"journal":{"name":"EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY","volume":"34 3","pages":"833-847"},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2026-10-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/ejop.70032","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"149258468","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Stern versus Houlgate on the Presuppositionless Nature of Hegel's Science of Logic 斯特恩与霍尔盖特论黑格尔逻辑科学的无预设性质
IF 0.9 2区 哲学
EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY Pub Date : 2026-10-23 DOI: 10.1111/ejop.70075
Sally S. Sedgwick
{"title":"Stern versus Houlgate on the Presuppositionless Nature of Hegel's Science of Logic","authors":"Sally S. Sedgwick","doi":"10.1111/ejop.70075","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/ejop.70075","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Hegel remarks in the early pages of the <i>Science of Logic</i> that his science “must not presuppose” anything; it “must not be mediated by anything nor have a ground”. In this paper, I consider two recent interpretations of these remarks. Stephen Houlgate argues that in beginning with “indeterminate immediacy”, that is, with the concept “pure being”, the <i>Logic</i> is indeed presuppositionless. According to Robert Stern, in contrast, “pure being” expresses at most the <i>effort</i> to begin without presuppositions, an effort Hegel believes is in vain. After defending features of each of these lines of interpretation, I conclude that the evidence is more solidly on Stern's side.</p>","PeriodicalId":46958,"journal":{"name":"EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY","volume":"34 3","pages":"859-871"},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2026-10-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"149258475","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Marcuse By Jacob McNultyNew York: Routledge, 2025. 284 pp. ISBN: 9781032308722 《马尔库塞》，雅各布·麦克纳蒂著。纽约：劳特利奇出版社，2025年。284页。ISBN: 9781032308722
IF 0.9 2区 哲学
EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY Pub Date : 2026-10-23 Epub Date: 2026-08-25 DOI: 10.1111/ejop.70117
Todd Hedrick
{"title":"Marcuse By Jacob McNultyNew York: Routledge, 2025. 284 pp. ISBN: 9781032308722","authors":"Todd Hedrick","doi":"10.1111/ejop.70117","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/ejop.70117","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":46958,"journal":{"name":"EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY","volume":"34 3","pages":"892-896"},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2026-10-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"149258944","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Reason and the Good in Leibniz, Kant and Hegel: Theodicies of Freedom By Alex EnglanderCambridge University Press, 2026. 304 pp. ISBN: 9781009442596 莱布尼茨、康德和黑格尔的理性与善：自由的神正论，亚历克斯·英格兰德著，剑桥大学出版社，2026年。304页。ISBN: 9781009442596
IF 0.9 2区 哲学
EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY Pub Date : 2026-10-23 Epub Date: 2026-08-06 DOI: 10.1111/ejop.70116
Dylan Shaul
{"title":"Reason and the Good in Leibniz, Kant and Hegel: Theodicies of Freedom By Alex EnglanderCambridge University Press, 2026. 304 pp. ISBN: 9781009442596","authors":"Dylan Shaul","doi":"10.1111/ejop.70116","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/ejop.70116","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":46958,"journal":{"name":"EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY","volume":"34 3","pages":"881-887"},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2026-10-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"149258237","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Introduction: In Honour of Robert Stern (1962–2024) 导言：纪念罗伯特·斯特恩（1962-2024）
IF 0.9 2区 哲学
EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY Pub Date : 2026-10-23 DOI: 10.1111/ejop.70126
David Batho, Joe Saunders, Joseph Schear
{"title":"Introduction: In Honour of Robert Stern (1962–2024)","authors":"David Batho,&nbsp;Joe Saunders,&nbsp;Joseph Schear","doi":"10.1111/ejop.70126","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/ejop.70126","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":46958,"journal":{"name":"EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY","volume":"34 3","pages":"779-785"},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2026-10-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/ejop.70126","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"149258474","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Hegel's “No” and “Yes” on the Question: Is Hegelian Recognition Second-Personal? 黑格尔的“否”与“是”——关于黑格尔的承认是否是第二人称的问题？
IF 0.9 2区 哲学
EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY Pub Date : 2026-10-23 Epub Date: 2025-03-06 DOI: 10.1111/ejop.13061
Dina Emundts
{"title":"Hegel's “No” and “Yes” on the Question: Is Hegelian Recognition Second-Personal?","authors":"Dina Emundts","doi":"10.1111/ejop.13061","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/ejop.13061","url":null,"abstract":"<p>This paper discusses a thesis put forward by Robert Stern. The thesis is that Hegel's conception of forgiveness should not be read as something in which the ethics of the second person is expressed. The paper develops an alternative reading of forgiveness that takes Stern's objections to a direct second personal approach of forgiveness seriously. Forgiveness is second-personal and we have the authority to forgive if we at the same time deny our individual standpoint as absolute. We thus get a concept of second-personal action which implies that the authority is grounded in society or the community and not in the person as an individual.</p>","PeriodicalId":46958,"journal":{"name":"EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY","volume":"34 3","pages":"821-832"},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2026-10-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"149258233","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Introduction: In Honour of Robert Stern (1962–2024) 导言：纪念罗伯特·斯特恩（1962-2024）
IF 0.9 2区 哲学
EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY Pub Date : 2026-10-23 DOI: 10.1111/ejop.70126
David Batho, Joe Saunders, Joseph Schear
{"title":"Introduction: In Honour of Robert Stern (1962–2024)","authors":"David Batho,&nbsp;Joe Saunders,&nbsp;Joseph Schear","doi":"10.1111/ejop.70126","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/ejop.70126","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":46958,"journal":{"name":"EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY","volume":"34 3","pages":"779-785"},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2026-10-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/ejop.70126","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"149258843","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
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